hostapd: fix SAE confirm missing state validation
Published: April 10, 2019
Identifiers:
- CVE-2019-9496 (SAE confirm missing state validation in hostapd/AP)
Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-3/
Vulnerability
When hostapd is used to operate an access point with SAE (Simultaneous
Authentication of Equals; also known as WPA3-Personal), an invalid
authentication sequence could result in the hostapd process terminating
due to a NULL pointer dereference when processing SAE confirm
message. This was caused by missing state validation steps when
processing the SAE confirm message in hostapd/AP mode.
Similar cases against the wpa_supplicant SAE station implementation had
already been tested by the hwsim test cases, but those sequences did not
trigger this specific code path in AP mode which is why the issue was
not discovered earlier.
An attacker in radio range of an access point using hostapd in SAE
configuration could use this issue to perform a denial of service attack
by forcing the hostapd process to terminate.
Vulnerable versions/configurations
All hostapd versions with SAE support (CONFIG_SAE=y in the build
configuration and SAE being enabled in the runtime configuration).
Possible mitigation steps
- Merge the following commit to hostapd and rebuild:
SAE: Fix confirm message validation in error cases
These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-3/
- Update to hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available
Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
[bump PKG_RELEASE]
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
EAP-pwd side-channel attack
Published: April 10, 2019
Identifiers:
- CVE-2019-9495 (cache attack against EAP-pwd)
Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-2/
Vulnerability
Number of potential side channel attacks were recently discovered in the
SAE implementations used by both hostapd and wpa_supplicant (see
security advisory 2019-1 and VU#871675). EAP-pwd uses a similar design
for deriving PWE from the password and while a specific attack against
EAP-pwd is not yet known to be tested, there is no reason to believe
that the EAP-pwd implementation would be immune against the type of
cache attack that was identified for the SAE implementation. Since the
EAP-pwd implementation in hostapd (EAP server) and wpa_supplicant (EAP
peer) does not support MODP groups, the timing attack described against
SAE is not applicable for the EAP-pwd implementation.
A novel cache-based attack against SAE handshake would likely be
applicable against the EAP-pwd implementation. Even though the
wpa_supplicant/hostapd PWE derivation iteration for EAP-pwd has
protections against timing attacks, this new cache-based attack might
enable an attacker to determine which code branch is taken in the
iteration if the attacker is able to run unprivileged code on the victim
machine (e.g., an app installed on a smart phone or potentially a
JavaScript code on a web site loaded by a web browser). This depends on
the used CPU not providing sufficient protection to prevent unprivileged
applications from observing memory access patterns through the shared
cache (which is the most likely case with today's designs).
The attacker could use information about the selected branch to learn
information about the password and combine this information from number
of handshake instances with an offline dictionary attack. With
sufficient number of handshakes and sufficiently weak password, this
might result in full recovery of the used password if that password is
not strong enough to protect against dictionary attacks.
This attack requires the attacker to be able to run a program on the
target device. This is not commonly the case on an authentication server
(EAP server), so the most likely target for this would be a client
device using EAP-pwd.
The commits listed in the end of this advisory change the EAP-pwd
implementation shared by hostapd and wpa_supplicant to perform the PWE
derivation loop using operations that use constant time and memory
access pattern to minimize the externally observable differences from
operations that depend on the password even for the case where the
attacker might be able to run unprivileged code on the same device.
Vulnerable versions/configurations
All wpa_supplicant and hostapd versions with EAP-pwd support
(CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y in the build configuration and EAP-pwd being enabled
in the runtime configuration).
It should also be noted that older versions of wpa_supplicant/hostapd
prior to v2.7 did not include additional protection against certain
timing differences. The definition of the EAP-pwd (RFC 5931) does not
describe such protection, but the same issue that was addressed in SAE
earlier can be applicable against EAP-pwd as well and as such, that
implementation specific extra protection (commit 22ac3dfebf7b, "EAP-pwd:
Mask timing of PWE derivation") is needed to avoid showing externally
visible timing differences that could leak information about the
password. Any uses of older wpa_supplicant/hostapd versions with EAP-pwd
are recommended to update to v2.7 or newer in addition to the mitigation
steps listed below for the more recently discovered issue.
Possible mitigation steps
- Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant/hostapd and rebuild:
OpenSSL: Use constant time operations for private bignums
Add helper functions for constant time operations
OpenSSL: Use constant time selection for crypto_bignum_legendre()
EAP-pwd: Use constant time and memory access for finding the PWE
These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-2/
- Update to wpa_supplicant/hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available
- Use strong passwords to prevent dictionary attacks
Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
[bump PKG_RELEASE]
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
SAE side-channel attacks
Published: April 10, 2019
Identifiers:
- VU#871675
- CVE-2019-9494 (cache attack against SAE)
Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-1/
Vulnerability
Number of potential side channel attacks were discovered in the SAE
implementations used by both hostapd (AP) and wpa_supplicant
(infrastructure BSS station/mesh station). SAE (Simultaneous
Authentication of Equals) is also known as WPA3-Personal. The discovered
side channel attacks may be able to leak information about the used
password based on observable timing differences and cache access
patterns. This might result in full password recovery when combined with
an offline dictionary attack and if the password is not strong enough to
protect against dictionary attacks.
Cache attack
A novel cache-based attack against SAE handshake was discovered. This
attack targets SAE with ECC groups. ECC group 19 being the mandatory
group to support and the most likely used group for SAE today, so this
attack applies to the most common SAE use case. Even though the PWE
derivation iteration in SAE has protections against timing attacks, this
new cache-based attack enables an attacker to determine which code
branch is taken in the iteration if the attacker is able to run
unprivileged code on the victim machine (e.g., an app installed on a
smart phone or potentially a JavaScript code on a web site loaded by a
web browser). This depends on the used CPU not providing sufficient
protection to prevent unprivileged applications from observing memory
access patterns through the shared cache (which is the most likely case
with today's designs).
The attacker can use information about the selected branch to learn
information about the password and combine this information from number
of handshake instances with an offline dictionary attack. With
sufficient number of handshakes and sufficiently weak password, this
might result in full discovery of the used password.
This attack requires the attacker to be able to run a program on the
target device. This is not commonly the case on access points, so the
most likely target for this would be a client device using SAE in an
infrastructure BSS or mesh BSS.
The commits listed in the end of this advisory change the SAE
implementation shared by hostapd and wpa_supplicant to perform the PWE
derivation loop using operations that use constant time and memory
access pattern to minimize the externally observable differences from
operations that depend on the password even for the case where the
attacker might be able to run unprivileged code on the same device.
Timing attack
The timing attack applies to the MODP groups 22, 23, and 24 where the
PWE generation algorithm defined for SAE can have sufficient timing
differences for an attacker to be able to determine how many rounds were
needed to find the PWE based on the used password and MAC
addresses. When the attack is repeated with multiple times, the attacker
may be able to gather enough information about the password to be able
to recover it fully using an offline dictionary attack if the password
is not strong enough to protect against dictionary attacks. This attack
could be performed by an attacker in radio range of an access point or a
station enabling the specific MODP groups.
This timing attack requires the applicable MODP groups to be enabled
explicitly in hostapd/wpa_supplicant configuration (sae_groups
parameter). All versions of hostapd/wpa_supplicant have disabled these
groups by default.
While this security advisory lists couple of commits introducing
additional protection for MODP groups in SAE, it should be noted that
the groups 22, 23, and 24 are not considered strong enough to meet the
current expectation for a secure system. As such, their use is
discouraged even if the additional protection mechanisms in the
implementation are included.
Vulnerable versions/configurations
All wpa_supplicant and hostapd versions with SAE support (CONFIG_SAE=y
in the build configuration and SAE being enabled in the runtime
configuration).
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Mathy Vanhoef (New York University Abu Dhabi) and Eyal Ronen
(Tel Aviv University) for discovering the issues and for discussions on
how to address them.
Possible mitigation steps
- Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant/hostapd and rebuild:
OpenSSL: Use constant time operations for private bignums
Add helper functions for constant time operations
OpenSSL: Use constant time selection for crypto_bignum_legendre()
SAE: Minimize timing differences in PWE derivation
SAE: Avoid branches in is_quadratic_residue_blind()
SAE: Mask timing of MODP groups 22, 23, 24
SAE: Use const_time selection for PWE in FFC
SAE: Use constant time operations in sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc()
These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-1/
- Update to wpa_supplicant/hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available
- In addition to either of the above alternatives, disable MODP groups
1, 2, 5, 22, 23, and 24 by removing them from hostapd/wpa_supplicant
sae_groups runtime configuration parameter, if they were explicitly
enabled since those groups are not considered strong enough to meet
current security expectations. The groups 22, 23, and 24 are related
to the discovered side channel (timing) attack. The other groups in
the list are consider too weak to provide sufficient security. Note
that all these groups have been disabled by default in all
hostapd/wpa_supplicant versions and these would be used only if
explicitly enabled in the configuration.
- Use strong passwords to prevent dictionary attacks
Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
[bump PKG_RELEASE]
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
Cherry-pick Multi-AP commits from uptream:
9c06f0f6a hostapd: Add Multi-AP protocol support
5abc7823b wpa_supplicant: Add Multi-AP backhaul STA support
a1debd338 tests: Refactor test_multi_ap
bfcdac1c8 Multi-AP: Don't reject backhaul STA on fronthaul BSS
cb3c156e7 tests: Update multi_ap_fronthaul_on_ap to match implementation
56a2d788f WPS: Add multi_ap_subelem to wps_build_wfa_ext()
83ebf5586 wpa_supplicant: Support Multi-AP backhaul STA onboarding with WPS
66819b07b hostapd: Support Multi-AP backhaul STA onboarding with WPS
8682f384c hostapd: Add README-MULTI-AP
b1daf498a tests: Multi-AP WPS provisioning
Add support for Multi-AP to the UCI configuration. Every wifi-iface gets
an option 'multi_ap'. For APs, its value can be 0 (multi-AP support
disabled), 1 (backhaul AP), 2 (fronthaul AP), or 3 (fronthaul + backhaul
AP). For STAs, it can be 0 (not a backhaul STA) or 1 (backhaul STA, can
only associate with backhaul AP).
Also add new optional parameter to wps_start ubus call of
wpa_supplicant to indicate that a Multi-AP backhaul link is required.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
This updates hostapd to version the git version from 2018-12-02 which
matches the 2.7 release.
The removed patches were are already available in the upstream code, one
additional backport is needed to fix a compile problem.
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
The eapol-test application also uses the code with the newly activated
ubus support, add the missing dependency.
Fixes: f5753aae23 ("hostapd: add support for WPS pushbutton station")
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
similar to hostapd, also add a ubus interface for wpa_supplicant
which will allow handling WPS push-button just as it works for hostapd.
In order to have wpa_supplicant running without any network
configuration (so you can use it to retrieve credentials via WPS),
configure wifi-iface in /etc/config/wireless:
config wifi-iface 'default_radio0'
option device 'radio0'
option network 'wwan'
option mode 'sta'
option encryption 'wps'
This section will automatically be edited if credentials have
successfully been acquired via WPS.
Size difference (mips_24kc): roughly +4kb for the 'full' variants of
wpa_supplicant and wpad which do support WPS.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
SSIDs may contain UTF8 characters but ideally hostapd should be told
this is the case so it can advertise the fact. Default enable this
option.
add uci option utf8_ssid '0'/'1' for disable/enable e.g.
config wifi-iface
option utf8_ssid '0'
Signed-off-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <ldir@darbyshire-bryant.me.uk>
Add a basic variant which provides WPA-PSK only, 802.11r and 802.11w and
is intended to support 11r & 11w (subject to driver support) out of the
box.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <ldir@darbyshire-bryant.me.uk>
Backport two upstream fixes to address overly verbose logging of MAC ACL
rejection messages.
Fixes: FS#1468
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
This adds support for the WPA3-Enterprise mode authentication.
The settings for the WPA3-Enterpriese mode are defined in
WPA3_Specification_v1.0.pdf. This mode also requires ieee80211w and
guarantees at least 192 bit of security.
This does not increase the ipkg size by a significant size.
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
OWE is defined in RFC 8110 and provides encryption and forward security
for open networks.
This is based on the requirements in the Wifi alliance document
Opportunistic_Wireless_Encryption_Specification_v1.0_0.pdf
The wifi alliance requires ieee80211w for the OWE mode.
This also makes it possible to configure the OWE transission mode which
allows it operate an open and an OWE BSSID in parallel and the client
should only show one network.
This increases the ipkg size by 5.800 Bytes.
Old: 402.541 Bytes
New: 408.341 Bytes
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
This build the full openssl and wolfssl versions with SAE support which
is the main part of WPA3 PSK.
This needs elliptic curve cryptography which is only provided by these
two external cryptographic libraries and not by the internal
implementation.
The WPA3_Specification_v1.0.pdf file says that in SAE only mode
Protected Management Frames (PMF) is required, in mixed mode with
WPA2-PSK PMF should be required for clients using SAE, and optional for
clients using WPA2-PSK. The defaults are set now accordingly.
This increases the ipkg size by 8.515 Bytes.
Old: 394.026 Bytes
New: 402.541 Bytes
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
Add each variant to the matching PROVIDERS variables after evaluating
the respective hostapd*, wpad* and wpa* variant.
Each package providing the same feature will automatically conflict with
all prior packages providing the same feature.
This way we can handle the conflicts automatically without introducing
recursive dependencies.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Kresin <dev@kresin.me>
Move common variables and/or values to the package (variant) default.
Add additional values in variant packages if necessary. Remove further
duplicates by introducing new templates.
Remove the ANY_[HOSTAPD|SUPPLICANT_PROVIDERS]_PROVIDERS. The are the
same as the variables without the any prefix. No need to maintain both
variables.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Kresin <dev@kresin.me>
Clean up conflicts/provides/depends hell and add PROVIDES for
eapol-test variants while at it.
Update mesh-DFS patchset from Peter Oh to v5 (with local fixes) which
allows to drop two revert-patches for upstream commits which previously
were necessary to un-break mesh-DFS support.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Instead of selecting the SSL provider at compile time, build package
variants for each option so users can select the binary package without
having to build it themselves.
Most likely not all variants have actually ever been user by anyone.
We should reduce the selection to the reasonable and most used
combinations at some point in future. For now, build them all.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Support for building wpa_supplicant/hostapd against wolfssl has been
added upstream recently, add build option to allow users using it.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
The max_oper_chwidth settings was parsed incorrectly for big endian system.
This prevented the system to switch to VHT80 (or VHT160). Instead they were
mapped to:
* HT20: 20MHz
* VHT20: 20MHz
* HT40: 40MHz
* VHT40: 40MHz
* VHT80: 40MHz
* VHT160: 40MHz
This happened because each max_oper_chwidth setting in the config file was
parsed as "0" instead of the actual value.
Fixes: a4322eba2b ("hostapd: fix encrypted mesh channel settings")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven.eckelmann@openmesh.com>
Fix encrypted (or DFS) AP+MESH interface combination in a way similar
to how it's done for AP+STA and fix netifd shell script.
Refresh patches while at it.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Import two patches from Peter Oh to allow setting channel
bandwidth in the way it already works for managed interfaces.
This fixes mesh interfaces on 802.11ac devices always coming up in
VHT80 mode.
Add a patch to allow HT40 also on 2.4GHz if noscan option is set, which
also skips secondary channel scan just like noscan works in AP mode.
This time also make sure to add all files to the patch before
committing it...
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Import two patches from Peter Oh to allow setting channel
bandwidth in the way it already works for managed interfaces.
This fixes mesh interfaces on 802.11ac devices always coming up in
VHT80 mode.
Add a patch to allow HT40 also on 2.4GHz if noscan option is set, which
also skips secondary channel scan just like noscan works in AP mode.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
For unencrypted mesh networks our scripts take care of setting
the various mesh_param values. wpa_supplicant changes somes of them
when being used for SAE encrypted mesh and previously didn't allow
configuring any of them. Add support for setting mesh_fwding (which
has to be set to 0 when using other routing protocols on top of
802.11s) and update our script to pass the value to wpa_supplicant.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
And import patchset to allow 802.11s mesh on DFS channels, see also
http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/hostap/2018-April/038418.html
Fix sae_password for encryption mesh (sent upstream as well).
Also refreshed existing patches and fixed 463-add-mcast_rate-to-11s.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
The following patches were merged upstream:
000-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch
replaced by commit 0e3bd7ac6
001-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch
replaced by commit cb5132bb3
002-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch
replaced by commit 87e2db16b
003-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch
replaced by commit 53bb18cc8
004-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch
replaced by commit 0adc9b28b
005-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
replaced by commit ff89af96e
006-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch
replaced by commit adae51f8b
007-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
replaced by commit 2a9c5217b
008-WPA-Extra-defense-against-PTK-reinstalls-in-4-way-ha.patch
replaced by commit a00e946c1
009-Clear-PMK-length-and-check-for-this-when-deriving-PT.patch
replaced by commit b488a1294
010-Optional-AP-side-workaround-for-key-reinstallation-a.patch
replaced by commit 6f234c1e2
011-Additional-consistentcy-checks-for-PTK-component-len.patch
replaced by commit a6ea66530
012-Clear-BSSID-information-in-supplicant-state-machine-.patch
replaced by commit c0fe5f125
013-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Request-in-wnm_sleep_mode-.patch
replaced by commit 114f2830d
Some patches had to be modified to work with changed upstream source:
380-disable_ctrl_iface_mib.patch (adding more ifdef'ery)
plus some minor knits needed for other patches to apply which are not
worth being explicitely listed here.
For SAE key management in mesh mode, use the newly introduce
sae_password parameter instead of the psk parameter to also support
SAE keys which would fail the checks applied on the psk field (ie.
length and such). This fixes compatibility issues for users migrating
from authsae.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries can't prevent attacks against the Wireless
Network Management (WNM) Sleep Mode handshake. Currently, hostapd
processes WNM Sleep Mode requests from clients regardless of the setting
wnm_sleep_mode. Backport Jouni Malinen's upstream patch 114f2830 in
order to ignore such requests by clients when wnm_sleep_mode is disabled
(which is the default).
Signed-off-by: Timo Sigurdsson <public_timo.s@silentcreek.de>
[rewrite commit subject (<= 50 characters), bump PKG_RELEASE]
Signed-off-by: Stijn Tintel <stijn@linux-ipv6.be>
CPE ids helps to tracks CVE in packages.
https://cpe.mitre.org/specification/
Thanks to swalker for CPE to package mapping and
keep tracking CVEs.
Acked-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Couzens <lynxis@fe80.eu>
This reverts commit e7373e489d.
Support of "-s" depends on the CONFIG_DEBUG_SYSLOG compile time flag which
is not enabled for all build variants.
Revert the change for now until we can properly examine the size impact of
CONFIG_DEBUG_SYSLOG.
Fixes FS#1117.
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
The previous commit did not adjust PKG_RELEASE, therefore the
hostapd/wpad/wpa_supplicant packages containing the AP-side workaround
for KRACK do not appear as opkg update.
Bump the PKG_RELEASE to signify upgrades to downstream users.
Signed-off-by: Stijn Tintel <stijn@linux-ipv6.be>
The previous CVE bugfix commit did not adjust PKG_RELEASE, therefore the
fixed hostapd/wpad/wpa_supplicant packages do not appear as opkg update.
Bump the PKG_RELEASE to signify upgrades to downstream users.
Signed-off-by: Stijn Tintel <stijn@linux-ipv6.be>
A recent commit in hostapd added a build option to specify the default
TLS ciphers. This build option is passed via CFLAGS. Due to the way
CFLAGS are handled when building wpad, the compiler tries to recursively
expand TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERS, resulting in the following error:
../src/crypto/tls_openssl.c: In function 'tls_init':
<command-line>:0:21: error: 'DEFAULT' undeclared (first use in this function)
../src/crypto/tls_openssl.c:1028:13: note: in expansion of macro 'TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERS'
ciphers = TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERS;
^
Escape double quotes in the .cflags file to avoid this.
Fixes: 2f78034c3e ("hostapd: update to version 2017-08-24")
Signed-off-by: Stijn Tintel <stijn@linux-ipv6.be>
Fix multiple syntax errors in shelscripts (of packages only)
These errors were causing many conditions to not working properly
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Santina <lorenzo.santina@edu.unito.it>
[increase PKG_RELEASE, drop command substitution from directip.sh]
Signed-off-by: Mathias Kresin <dev@kresin.em>
During auto channel selection we may wish to prefer certain channels
over others.
e.g. we can just squeeze 4 channels into europe so '1:0.8 5:0.8 9:0.8
13:0.8' does that.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <kevin@darbyshire-bryant.me.uk>
One of the latest mac80211 updates added sanity checks, requiring the
beacon intervals of all VIFs of the same radio to match. This often broke
AP+11s setups, as these modes use different default intervals, at least in
some configurations (observed on ath9k).
Instead of relying on driver or hostapd defaults, change the scripts to
always explicitly set the beacon interval, defaulting to 100. This also
applies the beacon interval to 11s interfaces, which had been forgotten
before. VIF-specific beacon_int setting is removed from hostapd.sh.
Fixes FS#619.
Signed-off-by: Matthias Schiffer <mschiffer@universe-factory.net>
The hostapd_append_wpa_key_mgmt() procedure uses the possibly uninitialized
$ieee80211r and $ieee80211w variables in a numerical comparisation, leading
to stray "netifd: radio0 (0000): sh: out of range" errors in logread when
WPA-PSK security is enabled.
Ensure that those variables are substituted with a default value in order to
avoid emitting this (harmless) shell error.
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
Update to latest upstream HEAD:
- Refreshed all
- Delete patches and parts which made it upstream
Compile tested Full & Mini configs
Run-tested Mini config
Signed-off-by: Koen Vandeputte <koen.vandeputte@ncentric.com>
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> [another update, remove broken patch]
The build system only accepts Package/<name>/description and since the
typoed version virtually has the same content as the TITLE field, remove
them altogether
Signed-off-by: Yousong Zhou <yszhou4tech@gmail.com>
Ensure that selecting the wpa-supplicant-mesh package actually packages the
wpa_supplicant binary with SAE support and add missing dependency on OpenSSL.
Signed-off-by: Alexis Green <alexis@cessp.it>
[Jo-Philipp Wich: slightly reword commit message for clarity]
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
* Change git packages to xz
* Update mirror checksums in packages where they are used
* Change a few source tarballs to xz if available upstream
* Remove unused lines in packages we're touching, requested by jow- and blogic
* We're relying more on xz-utils so add official mirror as primary source, master site as secondary.
* Add SHA256 checksums to multiple git tarball packages
Signed-off-by: Daniel Engberg <daniel.engberg.lists@pyret.net>
In company networks everything except the http and https protocol is
often causes problems, because the network administrators try to block
everything else. To make it easier to use LEDE in company networks use
the https/http protocol for git access when possible.
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
As the OpenWrt build system only resolves build dependencies per directory,
all hostapd variants were causing libopenssl to be downloaded and built,
not only wpad-mesh. Fix this by applying the same workaround as in
ustream-ssl.
Signed-off-by: Matthias Schiffer <mschiffer@universe-factory.net>
SVN-Revision: 46851
Add CONFIG_IEEE80211W variable to DRIVER_MAKEOPTS so that 802.11w
support is properly compiled in full variant.
This fixes#20179
Signed-off-by: Janusz Dziemidowicz <rraptorr@nails.eu.org>
SVN-Revision: 46737
'hostapd-common' is needed by all of the variants for wifi to function
correctly (a number of the target profiles simply select 'wpad-mini').
Signed-off-by: Nathan Hintz <nlhintz@hotmail.com>
SVN-Revision: 45048
These new variants include support for mesh mode and SAE crypto.
They always depend on openssl as EC operations are not provided by
the internal crypto implementation.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
SVN-Revision: 45047
madwifi was dropped upstream, can't find it anywhere in OpenWrt
either, thus finally burrying madwifi.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>
SVN-Revision: 45045
Introduce configuration options to build an "hardened" OpenWRT.
Options to enable Stack-Smashing Protection, FORTIFY_SOURCE and RELRO
have been introduced.
uClibc makefile now automatically detects if SSP support is necessary.
hostapd makefile has been fixed to use "^" as sed separator since
using a comma was problematic when using "-Wl,-z,now" and the like in
TARGET_CFLAGS.
Currently enabling SSP on user space depends on enabling SSP kernel
side, this is due to the fact that TARGET_CFLAGS are used to build
kernel modules (at least). Suggestions on how to avoid this are welcome.
Using "select" instead of "depends on" doesn't seem to work with choice
entries.
Tested with a lantiq (WBMR) router, GCC 4.8, uClibc and a subset of
the available packages.
Needs to be tested with GCC 4.9 and the remaining packages.
PIE not currently included.
Signed-off-by: Alessandro Di Federico <ale+owrt@clearmind.me>
SVN-Revision: 44005
Note, that licensing stuff is a nightmare: many packages does not clearly
state their licenses, and often multiple source files are simply copied
together - each with different licensing information in the file headers.
I tried hard to ensure, that the license information extracted into the OpenWRT's
makefiles fit the "spirit" of the packages, e.g. such small packages which
come without a dedicated source archive "inherites" the OpenWRT's own license
in my opinion.
However, I can not garantee that I always picked the correct information
and/or did not miss license information.
Signed-off-by: Michael Heimpold <mhei@heimpold.de>
SVN-Revision: 43155
This patch brings full dynamic vlan support to netifd that existed in hostapd.sh in Attitude Adjustment.
Signed-off-by: Joseph CG Walker <Joe@ChubbyPenguin.net>
[jow@openwrt.org: changed commit message, rebased on top of current hostapd.sh]
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jow@openwrt.org>
SVN-Revision: 41872
This patch fixes compilation failure for hostapd when using eglibc 2.15.
Signed-off-by: Zachery Stoddard <zacherystoddard@gmail.com>
SVN-Revision: 40575
this cause the wps trigegr to be copied to the wrong place
https://dev.openwrt.org/ticket/13753
Signed-off-by: John Crispin <blogic@openwrt.org>
SVN-Revision: 37031
