This fixes some minor security problems.
Old size:
162262 bin/packages/mips_24kc/base/libmbedtls_2.7.0-1_mips_24kc.ipk
New size:
163162 bin/packages/mips_24kc/base/libmbedtls_2.8.0-1_mips_24kc.ipk
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
Some functions used by a lot of other software was renamed and is only
active when deprecated functions are allowed, deactivate the removal of
deprecated functions for now.
Fixes: 75c5ab4caf ("mbedtls: update to version 2.7.0")
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
This fixes the following security problems:
* CVE-2018-0488: Risk of remote code execution when truncated HMAC is enabled
* CVE-2018-0487: Risk of remote code execution when verifying RSASSA-PSS signatures
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
Fixed an authentication bypass issue in SSL/TLS. When the TLS
authentication mode was set to 'optional',
mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result() would incorrectly return 0 when the
peer's X.509 certificate chain had more than
MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA intermediates (default: 8), even when
it was not trusted. This could be triggered remotely on both the client
and server side. (Note, with the authentication mode set by
mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode()to be 'required' (the default), the handshake
was correctly aborted).
Signed-off-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <kevin@darbyshire-bryant.me.uk>
Tested-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com>
Fixes some security issues (no remote exploits), and introduces
some changes. See release notes for details:
https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/releases/mbedtls-2.5.1-2.1.8-and-1.3.20-released
* Fixes an unlimited overread of heap-based buffers in mbedtls_ssl_read()
* Adds exponent blinding to RSA private operations
* Wipes stack buffers in RSA private key operations (rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(), rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt())
* Removes SHA-1 and RIPEMD-160 from the default hash algorithms for certificate verification.
* Fixes offset in FALLBACK_SCSV parsing that caused TLS server to fail to detect it sometimes.
* Tighten parsing of RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures, to avoid a potential Bleichenbacher/BERserk-style attack.
Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com>
This fixes the following security problems:
* CVE-2017-2784: Freeing of memory allocated on stack when validating a public key with a secp224k1 curve
* SLOTH vulnerability
* Denial of Service through Certificate Revocation List
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
Later OpenVPN 2.3-openssl versions only enable
TLS cipher suites with perfect forward secrecy, i.e. DHE and ECDHE
cipher suites. ECDHE key exchange is not supported by
OpenVPN 2.3-openssl, enable DHE key exchange to allow LEDE
OpenVPN 2.4-mbedtls clients to connect to such servers.
Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Martin Blumenstingl <martin.blumenstingl@googlemail.com>
Reported-by: Lucian Cristian <luci@createc.ro>
Secp384r1 is the default curve for OpenVPN 2.4+. Enable this to
make OpenVPN-mbedtls clients able to perform ECDHE key exchange
with remote OpenVPN 2.4-openssl servers that use the default
OpenVPN curve.
Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com>
One of those changes is re-enabling blowfish support to make
openvpn-mbedtls compatible with common configurations
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
This option is required by OpenVPN, and OpenVPN 2.4 uses mbedTLS 2.x.
DHM_C is also already enabled in the PolarSSL 1.3.x config.h.
Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com>
luci using ustream-mbedtls is extremely slow vs ustream-polarssl.
polarssl alias mbedtls v1 is configured to use NIST prime speed
optimisation, so no longer disable the default optimisation for
mbedtls v2.
Compile & run tested: Archer C7v2
Signed-off-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <kevin@darbyshire-bryant.me.uk>
[Jo-Philipp Wich: refresh patch to use common format]
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
