This makes it possible to avoid using a RADIUS server for WPA enterprise authentication
Signed-off-by: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org>
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
This allows WPA enterprise roaming in the same mobility domain without any
manual key configuration (aside from radius credentials)
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
It allows enforcing a limit on associated stations to be enforced for the
full device, e.g. in order to deal with hardware/driver limitations
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
This update only adds one commit:
b102f19bcc53 tests: Opportunistic Wireless Encryption - SA Query
The main reason for the bump is to have a newer PKG_SOURCE_DATE,
so we can reset PKG_RELEASE to 1 (this has not been done for the
most recent bump), and replace it with AUTORELEASE.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Schmutzler <freifunk@adrianschmutzler.de>
Channel 100 is a valid channel to choose for 80MHz operation. However,
it's assigned to 5500 MHz, not 5550MHz. In fact, there is no channel
assigned to this frequency.
Fix this obbvious typo to allow ACS to select channel 100 for 80 MHz
operation again.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
Instead of requiring the user to call it on each BSS individually,
run it on all BSSs internally.
Signed-off-by: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org>
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Since upstream commit 6467de5a8840 ("Randomize z ordinates in
scalar mult when timing resistant") WolfSSL requires a RNG for
the EC key when built hardened which is the default.
Set the RNG for the EC key to fix connections for OWE clients.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
This can be used to handle network configuration of dynamically created vlan
interfaces in a more flexible way
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Airtime policy configuration is extremely useful in multiple BSS scenarios.
Since nowadays most people configure both private and guest networks (at
least), it makes sense to enable it by default, except for the most limited
of the variants.
Size of the hostapd-basic-openssl binary (mipsel 24Kc -O2):
543944 bytes (airtime policy disabled)
548040 bytes (airtime policy enabled)
Signed-off-by: Rui Salvaterra <rsalvaterra@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
p2p_add_device() may remove the oldest entry if there is no room in the
peer table for a new peer. This would result in any pointer to that
removed entry becoming stale. A corner case with an invalid PD Request
frame could result in such a case ending up using (read+write) freed
memory. This could only by triggered when the peer table has reached its
maximum size and the PD Request frame is received from the P2P Device
Address of the oldest remaining entry and the frame has incorrect P2P
Device Address in the payload.
Fix this by fetching the dev pointer again after having called
p2p_add_device() so that the stale pointer cannot be used.
This fixes the following security vulnerabilities/bugs:
- CVE-2021-27803 - A vulnerability was discovered in how p2p/p2p_pd.c
in wpa_supplicant before 2.10 processes P2P (Wi-Fi Direct) provision
discovery requests. It could result in denial of service or other
impact (potentially execution of arbitrary code), for an attacker
within radio range.
Fixes: 17bef1e97a50 ("P2P: Add peer entry based on Provision Discovery Request")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
This is a backport of the upstream commit 58bbbb598144 ("nl80211: Ignore
4addr mode enabling error if it was already enabled") which fixes same
issue as in the current fix contained in '130-wpa_supplicant-multi_ap_roam.patch',
but in a different way:
nl80211_set_4addr_mode() could fail when trying to enable 4addr mode on
an interface that is in a bridge and has 4addr mode already enabled.
This operation would not have been necessary in the first place and this
failure results in disconnecting, e.g., when roaming from one backhaul
BSS to another BSS with Multi AP.
Avoid this issue by ignoring the nl80211 command failure in the case
where 4addr mode is being enabled while it has already been enabled.
Signed-off-by: Raphaël Mélotte <raphael.melotte@mind.be>
[bump PKG_RELEASE, more verbose commit description]
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
This patch is required to be able to roam from one backhaul AP to
another one in the same ESS.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
(daniel@makrotopia.org: PKG_REVISION bump and refreshed patches)
Signed-off-by: Raphaël Mélotte <raphael.melotte@mind.be>
This patch allows other applications to get events management
frames (for example: association requests).
This is useful in Multi-AP context to be able to save association
requests from stations.
It has been sent to upstream hostapd in this series:
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/hostap/list/?series=217500
'700-wifi-reload.patch' is updated due to the introduction of
'110-notify-mgmt-frames.patch'.
Signed-off-by: Raphaël Mélotte <raphael.melotte@mind.be>
Commit 7c8c4f1be6 ("hostapd: fix P2P group information processing
vulnerability") was missing the actual patch for the vulnerability.
Fixes: 7c8c4f1be6 ("hostapd: fix P2P group information processing vulnerability")
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
With encryption disabled, it was intended to set wpa_state=1 (enabled,
not configured) through the 'wps_not_configured' flag.
The flag is set appropriately but the condition using it is broken.
Instead, 'wps_configured' is checked and wpa_state is always 2 (enabled,
configured). Fix it by using the correct variable name.
Fixes: 498d84fc4e ("netifd: add wireless configuration support
and port mac80211 to the new framework")
Signed-off-by: Leon M. George <leon@georgemail.eu>
[commit title/message improvements]
Signed-off-by: Adrian Schmutzler <freifunk@adrianschmutzler.de>
The key_mgmt variable was mistyped when checking against "WPS", so
the if clause was never entered.
Fixes: f5753aae23 ("hostapd: add support for WPS pushbutton station")
Signed-off-by: Leon M. George <leon@georgemail.eu>
[add commit message, bump PKG_RELEASE]
Signed-off-by: Adrian Schmutzler <freifunk@adrianschmutzler.de>
'base' was never used.
Fixes: 498d84fc4e ("netifd: add wireless configuration support
and port mac80211 to the new framework")
Signed-off-by: Leon M. George <leon@georgemail.eu>
'enc_str' was never used.
Fixes: 498d84fc4e ("netifd: add wireless configuration support
and port mac80211 to the new framework")
Signed-off-by: Leon M. George <leon@georgemail.eu>
Granting capabilities CAP_NET_ADMIN and CAP_NET_RAW allows running
hostapd and wpa_supplicant without root priviledges.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
This allows configuration of multicast_to_unicast and per_sta_vif options.
- multicast_to_unicast requests multicast-to-unicast conversion.
- per_sta_vif assigns each station its own AP_VLAN interface.
Signed-off-by: Etan Kissling <etan_kissling@apple.com>
To simplify the way netifd acquires the PIDs of wpa_supplicant and
hostapd let the config_add method of both of them return the PID of the
called process. Use the returned PID instead of querying procd when
adding wpa_supplicant configuration.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
This patch enables hostapd.sh to properly configure wpa_supplicant
for when GCMP is used as cipher in station mode.
Without this wpa_supplicant will be unable to connect to AP.
This is needed for wil6210 as it does not support CCMP.
Signed-off-by: Robert Marko <robimarko@gmail.com>
This adds an option "hostapd_bss_options" that does the same as
"hostapd_options" but on a per-BSS level, instead of a per-device level.
This can be used, for example, to configure different per-devce sae_passwords
per BSS or to augment some of the existing per-BSS options.
Signed-off-by: Florian Beverborg <flo@beverb.org>
[remove whitespace errors, bump release]
Signed-off-by: Paul Spooren <mail@aparcar.org>
As of hostapd upstream commit 7d2ed8ba "Remove CONFIG_IEEE80211W build parameter"
https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit?id=7d2ed8bae86a31dd2df45c24b3f7281d55315482
802.11w feature is always enabled in the build time.
It doesn't make sense to opt-in 802.11w per driver as hostapd will always
be compiled with this feature enabled.
As suggested by Hauke Mehrtens, for now keep 11w enabled in build_features.h
for compatibility reasons. This option will be dropped when LuCI is adjusted.
Signed-off-by: Dobroslaw Kijowski <dobo90@gmail.com>
When hostapd gets restarted to often/quickly will cause procd to not restart it
anymore. it will think that hapd is in a crash loop.
Signed-off-by: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org>
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> [adjust respawn time]
Currently, EAPOLv2 (802.1X-2004) is used by default for legacy clients that
are not WPA2 (RSN) capable. These legacy clients are often intolerant to this
EAPOL version and fail to connect.
hostapd.conf upstream documents for eapol_version the following and that this
is a known compatibility issue with version 2:
// IEEE 802.1X/EAPOL version
// hostapd is implemented based on IEEE Std 802.1X-2004 which defines EAPOL
// version 2. However, there are many client implementations that do not handle
// the new version number correctly (they seem to drop the frames completely).
// In order to make hostapd interoperate with these clients, the version number
// can be set to the older version (1) with this configuration value.
// Note: When using MACsec, eapol_version shall be set to 3, which is
// defined in IEEE Std 802.1X-2010.
//eapol_version=2
For the wpa parameter, hostapd.conf upstream documents that this is a bitfield,
configured as follows:
// Enable WPA. Setting this variable configures the AP to require WPA (either
// WPA-PSK or WPA-RADIUS/EAP based on other configuration). For WPA-PSK, either
// wpa_psk or wpa_passphrase must be set and wpa_key_mgmt must include WPA-PSK.
// Instead of wpa_psk / wpa_passphrase, wpa_psk_radius might suffice.
// For WPA-RADIUS/EAP, ieee8021x must be set (but without dynamic WEP keys),
// RADIUS authentication server must be configured, and WPA-EAP must be included
// in wpa_key_mgmt.
// This field is a bit field that can be used to enable WPA (IEEE 802.11i/D3.0)
// and/or WPA2 (full IEEE 802.11i/RSN):
// bit0 = WPA
// bit1 = IEEE 802.11i/RSN (WPA2) (dot11RSNAEnabled)
// Note that WPA3 is also configured with bit1 since it uses RSN just like WPA2.
// In other words, for WPA3, wpa=2 is used the configuration (and
// wpa_key_mgmt=SAE for WPA3-Personal instead of wpa_key_mgmt=WPA-PSK).
//wpa=2
For client compatibility therefore:
EAPOLv1 (802.1X-2001) should be used by default where WPA is enabled.
EAPOLv2 (802.1X-2004) should be used by default where WPA is disabled.
To fix this, we can therefore change in the script:
set_default eapol_version 0
To the following:
set_default eapol_version $((wpa & 1))
This therefore:
1) Sets eapol_version to 1 where WPA has been enabled via wpa bit0 being set.
2) Sets eapol_version to 0 where WPA has been disabled via wpa bit0 being unset.
For usual configurations that only have WPA2 enabled, EAPOLv2 is then used.
Signed-off-by: Nick Lowe <nick.lowe@gmail.com>
hostapd.sh does not parse skip_inactivity_poll boolean from
/etc/config/wireless despite being mentioned in the documentation [1].
This change fixes this, and by default sets its value to 0 [1].
[1] https://openwrt.org/docs/guide-user/network/wifi/basic
Signed-off-by: Nadim Atiya <nadim.atiya@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
[fix and reformat commit message, make patch apply]
Set legacy_rates to 0 by default to disable 802.11b data rates by default.
The time has long come where 802.11b DSSS/CCK data rates should be disabled
by default in OpenWRT. Users in need of 802.11b client support can reasonably
enable these where they are needed.
The balance of equities has significantly, and for a long time, tipped
such that dropping backwards compatibility by default with 802.11b
devices is appropriate, proportionate and justified. By doing so,
management and control traffic is moved by default to a 20
MHz wide 6 Mb/s OFDM data rate instead of a 22 MHz wide 1 Mb/s DSSS data
rate. This is significantly more airtime efficient.
Signed-off-by: Nick Lowe <nick.lowe@gmail.com>
Add a cell_density option to configure data rates for normal, high and
very high cell density wireless deployments.
The purpose of using a minimum basic/mandatory data rate that is higher
than 6 Mb/s, or 5.5 Mb/s (802.11b compatible), in high cell density
environments is to transmit broadcast/multicast data frames using less
airtime or to reduce management overheads where significant co-channel
interference (CCI) exists and cannot be avoided.
Caution: Without careful design and validation, configuration of a too
high minimum basic/mandatory data rate can sacrifice connection stability
or disrupt the ability to reliably connect and authenticate for little to
no capacity benefit. This is because this configuration affects the
ability of clients to hear and demodulate management, control and
broadcast/multicast data frames.
Deployments that have not been specifically designed and validated are
usually best suited to use 6, 12 and 24 Mb/s as basic/mandatory data
rates.
Only usually seek to configure a 12 Mb/s, or 11 Mb/s (802.11b
compatible), minimum basic/mandatory rate in high cell density
deployments that have been designed and validated for this.
For many deployments, the minimum basic/mandatory data rate should not be
configured above 12 Mb/s to 18 Mb/s, 24 Mb/s or higher. Such a
configuration is only appropriate for use in very high cell density
deployment scenarios.
A cell_density of Very High (3) should only be used where a deployment
has a valid use case and has been designed and validated specifically for
this use, nearly always with highly directional antennas - an example
would be stadium deployments. For example, with a 24 Mb/s OFDM minimum
basic/mandatory data rate, approximately a -73 dBm RSSI is required to
decode frames. Many clients will not have roamed elsewhere by the time
that they experience -73 dBm and, where they do, they frequently may not
hear and be able to demodulate beacon, control or broadcast/multicast
data frames causing connectivity issues.
There is a myth that disabling lower basic/mandatory data rates will
improve roaming and avoid sticky clients. For 802.11n, 802.11ac and
802.11ax clients this is not correct as clients will shift to and use
lower MCS rates and not to the 802.11b or 802.11g/802.11a rates that are
able to be used as basic/mandatory data rates.
There is a myth that disabling lower basic/mandatory data rates will
ensure that clients only use higher data rates and that better
performance is assured. For 802.11n, 802.11ac and 802.11ax clients this
is not correct as clients will shift around and use MCS rates and not the
802.11b or 802.11g/802.11a rates that able to be used as basic/mandatory
data rates.
Cell Density
0 - Disabled (Default)
Setting cell_density to 0 does not configure data rates. This is the
default.
1 - Normal Cell Density
Setting cell_density to 1 configures the basic/mandatory rates to 6, 12
and 24 Mb/s OFDM rates where legacy_rates is 0. Supported rates lower
than the minimum basic/mandatory rate are not offered.
Setting cell_density to 1 configures the basic/mandatory rates to the 5.5
and 11 Mb/s DSSS rates where legacy_rates is 1. Supported rates lower
than the minimum basic/mandatory rate are not offered.
2 - High Cell Density
Setting the cell_density to 2 configures the basic/mandatory rates to the
12 and 24 Mb/s OFDM rates where legacy_rates is 0. Supported rates lower
than the minimum basic/mandatory rate are not offered.
Setting the cell_density to 2 configures the basic/mandatory rates to the
11 Mb/s DSSS rate where legacy_rates is 1. Supported rates lower than the
minimum basic/mandatory rate are not offered.
3 - Very High Cell Density
Setting the cell_density to 3 configures the basic/mandatory rates to the
24 Mb/s OFDM rate where legacy_rates is 0. Supported rates lower than the
minimum basic/mandatory rate are not offered.
Setting the cell_density to 3 only has effect where legacy_rates is 0,
else this has the same effect as being configured with a cell_density of 2.
Where specified, the basic_rate and supported_rates options continue to
override both the cell_density and legacy_rates options.
Signed-off-by: Nick Lowe <nick.lowe@gmail.com>
Several variables in hostapd.sh can be used uninitialized in numerical
comparisons, causing errors in logread:
netifd: radio24 (1668): sh: out of range
Set defaults for those variables to silence those errors.
Fixes: b518f07d4b ("hostapd: remove ieee80211v option")
Fixes: cc80cf53c5 ("hostapd: add FTM responder support")
Fixes: e66bd0eb04 ("hostapd: make rrm report independent of ieee80211k setting")
Signed-off-by: Stijn Tintel <stijn@linux-ipv6.be>
Fixes the offset of the patch added in 93bbd998aa
("hostapd: enter DFS state if no available channel is found").
Signed-off-by: Leon M. George <leon@georgemail.eu>
This sets the validity interval for the BSS transition candidate
list to the same value as the disassociation timer.
Currently the value is always 0, which is the specification states is a
reserved value. Also, wpa_supplicant and from the looks of it some
Android implementations will outright ignore the candidate list in this
case.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
* Add support for passing airtime_sta_weight into hostapd configuration.
* Since that commit it is possible to configure station weights. Set higher
value for larger airtime share, lower for smaller share.
I have tested this functionality by modyfing /etc/config/wireless to:
config wifi-device 'radio0'
...
option airtime_mode '1'
config wifi-iface 'default_radio0'
...
list airtime_sta_weight '01:02:03:04:05:06 1024'
Now, when the station associates with the access point it has been assigned
a higher weight value.
root@OpenWrt:~# cat /sys/kernel/debug/ieee80211/phy0/netdev\:wlan0/stations/01\:02\:03\:04\:05\:06/airtime
RX: 12656 us
TX: 10617 us
Weight: 1024
Deficit: VO: -2075 us VI: 256 us BE: -206 us BK: 256 us
[MAC address has been changed into a dummy one.]
Signed-off-by: Dobroslaw Kijowski <dobo90@gmail.com>
airtime_mode is always parsed as an empty string since it hasn't been
added into hostapd_common_add_device_config function.
Fixes: e289f183 ("hostapd: add support for per-BSS airtime configuration")
Signed-off-by: Dobroslaw Kijowski <dobo90@gmail.com>
This adds a new get_status method to a hostapd interface, which
provides information about the current interface status.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
This adds information from mac80211 to hostapd get_client ubus function.
This way, TX as well as RX status information as well as the signal can
be determined.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
If only AP mode is needed, this is currently the most space-efficient way to
provide support for WPA{2,3}-PSK, 802.11w and 802.11r.
openwrt-ath79-generic-ubnt_nanostation-loco-m-squashfs-sysupgrade.bin sizes:
4719426 bytes (with wpad-basic-wolfssl)
4457282 bytes (with hostapd-basic-wolfssl)
Signed-off-by: Rui Salvaterra <rsalvaterra@gmail.com>
Hotspot 2.0 AP features have been made available in the -full variants
of hostapd and wpad. Hence we no longer need a seperate package for
that.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Add OpenSSL-linked basic variants (which provides WPA-PSK only, 802.11r and
802.11w) of both hostapd and wpad. For people who don't need the full hostapd
but are stuck with libopenssl for other reasons, this saves space by avoiding
the need of an additional library (or a larger hostapd with built-in crypto).
Signed-off-by: Rui Salvaterra <rsalvaterra@gmail.com>
This adds missing config symbols for interworking as well as Hotspot 2.0
to the wpa_supplicant-full configuration.
These symbols were added to the hostapd-full configuration prior to this
commit. Without adding them to the wpa_supplicant configuration,
building of wpad-full fails.
Thanks to Rene for reaching out on IRC.
Fixes: commit be9694aaa2 ("hostapd: add UCI support for Hotspot 2.0")
Fixes: commit 838b412cb5 ("hostapd: add interworking support")
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
This adds configuration options to enable interworking for hostapd.
All options require iw_enabled to be set to 1 for a given VAP.
All IEEE802.11u related settings are supported with exception of the
venue information which will be added as separate UCI sections at a
later point.
The options use the same name as the ones from the hostapd.conf file
with a "iw_" prefix added.
All UCI configuration options are passed without further modifications
to hostapd with exceptions of the following options, whose elements can
be provided using UCI lis elements:
- iw_roaming_consortium
- iw_anqp_elem
- iw_nai_realm
- iw_domain_name
- iw_anqp_3gpp_cell_net
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
This adds support for enabling the FTM responder flag for the APs
extended capabilities. On supported hardware, enabling the ftm_responder
config key for a given AP will enable the FTM responder bit.
FTM support itself is unconditionally implemented in the devices
firmware (ath10k 2nd generation with 3.2.1.1 firmware). There's
currently no softmac implementation.
Also allow to configure LCI and civic location information which can be
transmitted to a FTM initiator.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
Remove the ieee80211v option. It previously was required to be enabled
in order to use time_advertisement, time_zone, wnm_sleep_mode and
bss_transition, however it didn't enable any of these options by default.
Remove it, as configuring these options independently is enough.
This change does not influence the behavior of any already configured
setting.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
Allow to configure both RRM beacon as well as neighbor reports
independently and only enable them by default in case the ieee80211k
config option is set.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
Expose WPS ubus API only if compiled with WPS support and add new
handler for wps_status call.
Also add '-v wps' option to check whether WPS support is present in
hostapd.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
This is useful to bring up multiple client mode interfaces on a single
channel much faster without having to scan through a lot of channels
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Make the BSSID and SSID fields optional when configuring a neighbor
report into hostapd.
Both options can now be an empty string. For the BSSID, the first 6 byte
are copied from the neighbor report. For the SSID, the SSID for the
affected hostapd BSS is used.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
Rafal Milecki pointed out that ubus events are meant for low-level ubus
events only (e.g. addition or removal of an object). Higher level
events should happen as notifications on the ubus object itself.
Dispatch BSS events on the main hostapd ubus object instead of
publishing them as ubus events.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
hostapd will emit a ubus event with the eventname hostapd.<ifname>.<event>
when adding, removing or reloading a BSS.
This way, services which install state (for example the RMM neighbor
list) can on-demand reinstall this information for the BSS without
polling this state.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
Add support for per-BSS airtime weight configuration. This allows to set
a airtime weight per BSS as well as a ratio limit based on the weight.
Support for this feature is only enabled in the full flavors of hostapd.
Consult the hostapd.conf documentation (Airtime policy configuration)
for more information on the inner workings of the exposed settings.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
This fixes the following compile errors after the wolfssl 4.5.0 update:
LD wpa_cli
../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.c: In function 'tls_match_alt_subject':
../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.c:610:11: error: 'GEN_EMAIL' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'ENAVAIL'?
type = GEN_EMAIL;
^~~~~~~~~
ENAVAIL
../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.c:610:11: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.c:613:11: error: 'GEN_DNS' undeclared (first use in this function)
type = GEN_DNS;
^~~~~~~
../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.c:616:11: error: 'GEN_URI' undeclared (first use in this function)
type = GEN_URI;
^~~~~~~
../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.c: In function 'wolfssl_tls_cert_event':
../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.c:902:20: error: 'GEN_EMAIL' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'ENAVAIL'?
if (gen->type != GEN_EMAIL &&
^~~~~~~~~
ENAVAIL
../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.c:903:20: error: 'GEN_DNS' undeclared (first use in this function)
gen->type != GEN_DNS &&
^~~~~~~
../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.c:904:20: error: 'GEN_URI' undeclared (first use in this function)
gen->type != GEN_URI)
^~~~~~~
Makefile:2029: recipe for target '../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.o' failed
Fixes: 00722a720c ("wolfssl: Update to version 4.5.0")
Reported-by: Andre Heider <a.heider@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
The hostapd configuration logic is supposed to accept "option key" as
legacy alias for "option auth_secret". This particular fallback option
failed to work though because "key" was not a registered configuration
variable.
Fix this issue by registering the "key" option as well, similar to the
existing "server" nad "port" options.
Ref: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/3282
Suggested-by: Michael Jones <mike@meshplusplus.com>
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
If an existing "wpa_psk_file" is passed to hostapd, the "key" option may
be omitted.
While we're at it, also improve the passphrase length checking to ensure
that it is either exactly 64 bytes or 8 to 63 bytes.
Fixes: FS#2689
Ref: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/3283
Suggested-by: Michael Jones <mike@meshplusplus.com>
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
Add package which provides size optimized wpad with support for just
WPA-PSK, SAE (WPA3-Personal), 802.11r and 802.11w.
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
[adapt to recent changes, add dependency for WPA_WOLFSSL config]
Signed-off-by: Adrian Schmutzler <freifunk@adrianschmutzler.de>
When retrieving the PID for hostapd and wpa_supplicant via ubus the
wrong service name is currently used. This leads to the following error
in the log:
netifd: radio0 (1409): WARNING (wireless_add_process):
executable path /usr/sbin/wpad does not match process path (/proc/exe)
Fixing the service name retrieves the correct PID and therefore the
warning won't occur.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
The current selection of DRIVER_MAKEOPTS and TARGET_LDFLAGS is
exceptionally hard to read. This tries to make things a little
easier by inverting the hierarchy of the conditions, so SSL_VARIANT
is checked first and LOCAL_VARIANT is checked second.
This exploits the fact that some of the previous conditions were
unnecessary, e.g. there is no hostapd-mesh*, so we don't need
to exclude this combination.
It also should make it a little easier to see which options are
actually switched by SSL_VARIANT and which by LOCAL_VARIANT.
The patch is supposed to be cosmetic.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Schmutzler <freifunk@adrianschmutzler.de>
For a few packages, the current TITLE is too long, so it is not
displayed at all when running make menuconfig. Despite, there is
no indication of OpenSSL vs. wolfSSL in the titles.
Thus, this patch adjusts titles to be generally shorter, and adds
the SSL variant to it.
While at it, make things easier by creating a shared definition for
eapol-test like it's done already for all the other flavors.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Schmutzler <freifunk@adrianschmutzler.de>
Drop outdated and by now broken patchset originally supplied by
Peter Oh in August 2018 but never merged upstream.
Instead add the more promissing rework recently submitted by
Markus Theil who picked up Peter's patchset, fixed and completed it
and added support for HE (802.11ax) in mesh mode.
This is only compile tested and needs some real-life testing.
Fixes: FS#3214
Fixes: 167028b750 ("hostapd: Update to version 2.9 (2019-08-08)")
Fixes: 0a3ec87a66 ("hostapd: update to latest Git hostap_2_9-1238-gdd2daf0848ed")
Fixes: 017320ead3 ("hostapd: bring back mesh patches")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Previously hostapd would not stop transmitting when a DFS event was
detected and no available channel to switch to was available.
Disable and re-enable the interface to enter DFS state. This way, TX
does not happen until the kernel notifies hostapd about the NOP
expiring.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
Ubus patch as it seems have been broken by some rebase in the past as
the location of line that adds ubus object file was in condition for
CONFIG_MACSEC. That condition was adding object files that are not
touched by ubus patch. This means ubus.o does not have to be included in
that case. When it has to be and when build fails is when CONFIG_AP is
set. All files included in wpa_supplicant that are touched by this patch
are in this condition. This means that this is for sure the original
place for it.
Signed-off-by: Karel Kočí <karel.koci@nic.cz>
The sender domain has a DMARC Reject/Quarantine policy which disallows
sending mailing list messages using the original "From" header.
To mitigate this problem, the original message has been wrapped
automatically by the mailing list software.
Bringing up of station vlan fails if the optional mac entry isn't set.
The default mac "00:00:00:00:00:00", which should match all stations,
is mistakenly set to the non used variable "isolate". This results in
a wrong formatted .psk file which has to be "vlan_id mac key".
fixes: 5aa2ddd0: hostapd: add support for wifi-station and wifi-vlan sections
Signed-off-by: Johann Neuhauser <johann@it-neuhauser.de>
Bump to latest Git and refresh all patches in order to get fix for "UPnP
SUBSCRIBE misbehavior in hostapd WPS AP" (CVE-2020-12695).
General security vulnerability in the way the callback URLs in the UPnP
SUBSCRIBE command are used were reported (VU#339275, CVE-2020-12695).
Some of the described issues may be applicable to the use of UPnP in WPS
AP mode functionality for supporting external registrars.
Ref: https://w1.fi/security/2020-1/
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
When bringing up wifi the first time after boot, these warnings appear:
netifd: radio0 (1370): rm: can't remove '/var/run/hostapd-wlan0.psk': No such file or directory
netifd: radio0 (1370): rm: can't remove '/var/run/hostapd-wlan0.vlan': No such file or directory
Silence them by adding the "-f" option to rm.
Signed-off-by: Stijn Tintel <stijn@linux-ipv6.be>
Acked-by: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org>
This patch adds support for 2 new uci sections.
config wifi-vlan
# iface is optional. if it is not defined the vlan will apply
# to all interfaces
option iface default_radio0
option name guest
option vid 100
option network guest
config wifi-station
# iface is optional. if it is not defined the station will apply
# to all interfaces
option iface default_radio0
# mac is optional. if it is not defined it will be a catch all
# for any sta using this key
option mac '00:11:22:33:44:55'
# vid is optional. if it is not defined, the sta will be part of
# the primary iface.
option vid 100
option key testtest
With this patch applied it is possible to use multiple PSKs on a single BSS.
Signed-off-by: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org>
disable_vht parameter needs to be set when using wpa_supplicant NOHT/HT* modes.
Signed-off-by: Enrique Rodríguez Valencia <enrique.rodriguez@galgus.net>
Commit 472fd98c5b ("hostapd: disable support for Wired Equivalent
Privacy by default") made support for WEP optional.
Expose the WEP support to LuCi or other userspace tools using the
existing interface. This way they are able to remove WEP from the
available ciphers if hostapd is built without WEP support.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
Bring back 802.11s mesh features to the level previously available
before the recent hostapd version bump. This is mostly to support use
of 802.11s on DFS channels, but also making mesh forwarding
configurable which is crucial for use of 802.11s MAC with other routing
protocols, such as batman-adv, on top.
While at it, fix new compiler warning by adapting 700-wifi-reload.patch
to upstream changes, now building without any warnings again.
Fixes: 0a3ec87a66 ("hostapd: update to latest Git hostap_2_9-1238-gdd2daf0848ed")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Upstream in commit 200c7693c9a1 ("Make WEP functionality an optional
build parameter") has made WEP functionality an optional build parameter
disabled as default, because WEP should not be used for anything
anymore. As a step towards removing it completely, they moved all WEP
related functionality behind CONFIG_WEP blocks and disabled it by
default.
This functionality is subject to be completely removed in a future
release.
So follow this good security advice, deprecation notice and disable WEP
by default, but still allow custom builds with WEP support via
CONFIG_WPA_ENABLE_WEP config option till upstream removes support for
WEP completely.
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
Bump package to latest upstream Git HEAD which is commit dd2daf0848ed
("HE: Process HE 6 GHz band capab from associating HE STA"). Since last
update there was 1238 commits done in the upstream tree with 618 files
changed, 53399 insertions, 24928 deletions.
I didn't bothered to rebase mesh patches as the changes seems not
trivial and I don't have enough knowledge of those parts to do/test that
properly, so someone else has to forward port them, ideally upstream
them so we don't need to bother anymore. I've just deleted them for now:
004-mesh-use-setup-completion-callback-to-complete-mesh-.patch
005-mesh-update-ssid-frequency-as-pri-sec-channel-switch.patch
006-mesh-inform-kernel-driver-DFS-handler-in-userspace.patch
007-mesh-apply-channel-attributes-before-running-Mesh.patch
011-mesh-Allow-DFS-channels-to-be-selected-if-dfs-is-ena.patch
013-mesh-do-not-allow-pri-sec-channel-switch.patch
015-mesh-do-not-use-offchan-mgmt-tx-on-DFS.patch
016-mesh-fix-channel-switch-error-during-CAC.patch
018-mesh-make-forwarding-configurable.patch
Refreshed all other patches, removed upstreamed patches:
051-wpa_supplicant-fix-race-condition-in-mesh-mpm-new-pe.patch
067-0001-AP-Silently-ignore-management-frame-from-unexpected-.patch
070-driver_nl80211-fix-WMM-queue-mapping-for-regulatory-.patch
071-driver_nl80211-fix-regulatory-limits-for-wmm-cwmin-c.patch
090-wolfssl-fix-crypto_bignum_sum.patch
091-0001-wolfssl-Fix-compiler-warnings-on-size_t-printf-forma.patch
091-0002-wolfssl-Fix-crypto_bignum_rand-implementation.patch
091-0003-wolfssl-Do-not-hardcode-include-directory-in-wpa_sup.patch
800-usleep.patch
Tested-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de> [ipq8065/NBG6817; ipq40xx/MAP-AC2200]
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
crypto_bignum_rand() use needless time-consuming filtering
which resulted in SAE no longer connecting within time limits.
Import fixes from hostap upstream to fix that.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Backport patch from hostapd.git master that fixes copy/paste error in
crypto_bignum_sub() in crypto_wolfssl.c.
This missing fix was discovered while testing SAE over a mesh interface.
With this fix applied and wolfssl >3.14.4 mesh+SAE works fine with
wpad-mesh-wolfssl.
Cc: Sean Parkinson <sean@wolfssl.com>
Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
CONFIG_WRITE functionality is not used and could be removed.
Looks helpful for devices with small flash because wpad is also affected.
Little testing shows that about 6 KB could be saved.
Signed-off-by: Kirill Lukonin <klukonin@gmail.com>
It seemed very confusing when trying to select the different variants of
hostapd which are somewhat scattered about under the menu 'Network'.
Moving all hostapd variants under a common submenu helps avoid
confusion.
Inspired-by: Kevin Mahoney <kevin.mahoney@zenotec.net>
[Fixup badly formatted patch, change menu name]
Signed-off-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <ldir@darbyshire-bryant.me.uk>
If the abridged flag is set to 1 the APs that are listed in the BSS
Transition Candidate List are prioritized. If the bit is not set, the
APs have the same prioritization as the APs that are not in the list.
If you want to steer a client, you should set the flag!
The flag can be set by adding {...,'abridged': true,...} to the normal
ubus call.
Signed-off-by: Nick Hainke <vincent@systemli.org>
Subscribe to beacon reports through ubus.
Can be used for hearing map and client steering purposes.
First enable rrm:
ubus call hostapd.wlan0 bss_mgmt_enable '{"beacon_report":True}'
Subscribe to the hostapd notifications via ubus.
Request beacon report:
ubus call hostapd.wlan0 rrm_beacon_req
'{"addr":"00:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx", "op_class":0, "channel":1,
"duration":1,"mode":2,"bssid":"ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff", "ssid":""}'
Signed-off-by: Nick Hainke <vincent@systemli.org>
[rework identation]
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
When introducing ubus reload support, ubus initialization was moved
to the service level instead of being carried out when adding a BSS
configuration. While this works when using wpa_supplicant in that way,
it breaks the ability to run wpa_supplicant on the command line, eg.
for debugging purposes.
Fix that by re-introducing ubus context intialization when adding
configuration.
Reported-by: @PolynomialDivision https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/2417
Fixes: 60fb4c92b6 ("hostapd: add ubus reload")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Add a radio_config_id property. If the radio config changes return an error
upon receiving the reconf call.
Signed-off-by: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org>
c888e17e06 ("hostapd: manage instances via procd instead of pidfile")
added procd support for managing hostapd and wpa_supplicant daemons
but at the same time limited wiphy names to 'phy*'.
This brings back initial behaviour (introduced in 60fb4c92b6 ("hostapd:
add ubus reload") and makes procd manage daemons for any wiphy device
found in '/sys/class/ieee80211'.
CC: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
CC: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Signed-off-by: Piotr Dymacz <pepe2k@gmail.com>
The $(space) definition in the hostapd Makefile ceased to work with
GNU Make 4.3 and later, leading to syntax errors in the generated
Kconfig files.
Drop the superfluous redefinition and reuse the working $(space)
declaration from rules.mk to fix this issue.
Fixes: GH#2713
Ref: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/2713#issuecomment-583722469
Reported-by: Karel Kočí <cynerd@email.cz>
Suggested-by: Jonas Gorski <jonas.gorski@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Shaleen Jain <shaleen@jain.sh>
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
Fixes handling CSA when using AP+STA or AP+Mesh
This change was accidentally dropped in commit 167028b75
("hostapd: Update to version 2.9 (2019-08-08)")
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Without this change, wpa-cli features depend on which wpad build variant was
used to build the wpa-cli package
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
"[[" is a bash extension for test. As the ash-implementation is not
fully compatible we drop its usage.
Signed-off-by: Sven Roederer <devel-sven@geroedel.de>
[remove shebang, slightly facelift commit title/message]
Signed-off-by: Adrian Schmutzler <freifunk@adrianschmutzler.de>
hostapd sets minimum values for CWmin/CWmax/AIFS and maximum for TXOP.
The code for applying those values had a few bugs leading to bogus values,
which caused significant latency and packet loss.
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Currently, it is very cumbersome for a user to connect to a WPA-Enterprise
based network securely because the RADIUS server's CA certificate must first be
extracted from the EAPOL handshake using tcpdump or other methods before it can
be pinned using the ca_cert(2) fields. To make this process easier and more
secure (combined with changes in openwrt/openwrt#2654), this commit adds
support for validating against the built-in CA bundle when the ca-bundle
package is installed. Related LuCI changes in openwrt/luci#3513.
Signed-off-by: David Lam <david@thedavid.net>
[bump PKG_RELEASE]
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
The sender domain has a DMARC Reject/Quarantine policy which disallows
sending mailing list messages using the original "From" header.
To mitigate this problem, the original message has been wrapped
automatically by the mailing list software.
Rekey GTK on STA disassociate
Signed-off-by: Kyle Copperfield <kmcopper@danwin1210.me>
The sender domain has a DMARC Reject/Quarantine policy which disallows
sending mailing list messages using the original "From" header.
To mitigate this problem, the original message has been wrapped
automatically by the mailing list software.
Allows dtim_period to be configurable, the default is from hostapd.
Adds additional regulatory tunables for power constraint and spectrum
managment.
Signed-off-by: Kyle Copperfield <kmcopper@danwin1210.me>
The wpa_supplicant supports certificate subject validation via the
subject match(2) and altsubject_match(2) fields. domain_match(2) and
domain_suffix_match(2) fields are also supported for advanced matches.
This validation is especially important when connecting to access
points that use PAP as the Phase 2 authentication type. Without proper
validation, the user's password can be transmitted to a rogue access
point in plaintext without the user's knowledge. Most organizations
already require these attributes to be included to ensure that the
connection from the STA and the AP is secure. Includes LuCI changes via
openwrt/luci#3444.
From the documentation:
subject_match - Constraint for server certificate subject. This substring
is matched against the subject of the authentication server certificate.
If this string is set, the server sertificate is only accepted if it
contains this string in the subject. The subject string is in following
format: /C=US/ST=CA/L=San Francisco/CN=Test AS/emailAddress=as
.example.com
subject_match2 - Constraint for server certificate subject. This field is
like subject_match, but used for phase 2 (inside EAP-TTLS/PEAP/FAST
tunnel) authentication.
altsubject_match - Constraint for server certificate alt. subject.
Semicolon separated string of entries to be matched against the
alternative subject name of the authentication server certificate. If
this string is set, the server sertificate is only accepted if it
contains one of the entries in an alternative subject name extension.
altSubjectName string is in following format: TYPE:VALUE Example:
EMAIL:server@example.com Example:
DNS:server.example.com;DNS:server2.example.com Following types are
supported: EMAIL, DNS, URI
altsubject_match2 - Constraint for server certificate alt. subject. This
field is like altsubject_match, but used for phase 2 (inside
EAP-TTLS/PEAP/FAST tunnel) authentication.
domain_match - Constraint for server domain name. If set, this FQDN is
used as a full match requirement for the
server certificate in SubjectAltName dNSName element(s). If a
matching dNSName is found, this constraint is met. If no dNSName
values are present, this constraint is matched against SubjectName CN
using same full match comparison. This behavior is similar to
domain_suffix_match, but has the requirement of a full match, i.e.,
no subdomains or wildcard matches are allowed. Case-insensitive
comparison is used, so "Example.com" matches "example.com", but would
not match "test.Example.com". More than one match string can be
provided by using semicolons to
separate the strings (e.g., example.org;example.com). When multiple
strings are specified, a match with any one of the values is considered
a sufficient match for the certificate, i.e., the conditions are ORed
together.
domain_match2 - Constraint for server domain name. This field is like
domain_match, but used for phase 2 (inside EAP-TTLS/PEAP/FAST tunnel)
authentication.
domain_suffix_match - Constraint for server domain name. If set, this
FQDN is used as a suffix match requirement for the AAA server
certificate in SubjectAltName dNSName element(s). If a matching dNSName
is found, this constraint is met. If no dNSName values are present,
this constraint is matched against SubjectName CN using same suffix
match comparison. Suffix match here means that the host/domain name is
compared one label at a time starting from the top-level domain and all
the labels in domain_suffix_match shall be included in the certificate.
The certificate may include additional sub-level labels in addition to
the required labels. More than one match string can be provided by using
semicolons to separate the strings (e.g., example.org;example.com).
When multiple strings are specified, a match with any one of the values
is considered a sufficient match for the certificate, i.e., the
conditions are ORed together. For example,
domain_suffix_match=example.com would match test.example.com but would
not match test-example.com. This field is like domain_match, but used
for phase 2 (inside EAP-TTLS/PEAP/FAST tunnel) authentication.
domain_suffix_match2 - Constraint for server domain name. This field is
like domain_suffix_match, but used for phase 2 (inside
EAP-TTLS/PEAP/FAST tunnel) authentication.
Signed-off-by: David Lam <david@thedavid.net>
This activates PIE ASLR support by default when the regular option is
selected.
This increases the binary size by 26% uncompressed and 16% compressed
on MIPS BE.
old:
460,933 /usr/sbin/wpad
283,891 wpad-basic_2019-08-08-ca8c2bd2-1_mips_24kc.ipk
new:
584,508 /usr/sbin/wpad
330,281 wpad-basic_2019-08-08-ca8c2bd2-1_mips_24kc.ipk
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
Acked-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
Without this commit, ft_psk_generate_local is enabled for non-PSK
networks by default. This breaks 802.11r for EAP networks.
Disable ft_psk_generate_local by default for non-PSK networks resolves
this misbehavior.
Reported-by: Martin Weinelt <martin@darmstadt.freifunk.net>
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
Tested-by: Martin Weinelt <martin@darmstadt.freifunk.net>
Before commit 60fb4c92b6 ("hostapd: add ubus reload") netifd was
tracking hostapd/wpa_supplicant and restarting wifi in case of a
process crash. Restore this behaviour by tracking the PIDs of
hostapd and wpa_supplicant.
Also make sure hostapd and/or wpa_supplicant have been started before
emmitting ubus calls to them using ubus wait_for.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Allows graceful restart of crashing hostapd/wpa_supplicant instances
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
[daniel@makrotopia.org: attempt to launch only present services]
This enables the CTRL_IFACE_MIB symbol for wpad-full and hostapd-full.
If it is not enabled, statistic outputs such as "hostapd_cli all_sta"
are empty.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
Add ubus interface to hostapd and wpa_supplicant to allow dynamically
reloading wiface configuration without having to restart the hostapd
process.
As a consequence, both hostapd and wpa_supplicant are now started
persistently on boot for each wifi device in the system and then
receive ubus calls adding, modifying or removing interface
configuration.
At a later stage it would be desirable to reduce the services to one
single instance managing all radios.
Signed-off-by: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
This enables PMKSA and opportunistic key caching by default for
WPA2/WPA3-Personal, WPA3-Personal and OWE auth types.
Otherwise, Apple devices won't connect to the WPA3 network.
This should not degrade security, as there's no external authentication
provider.
Tested with OCEDO Koala and iPhone 7 (iOS 13.1).
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
The sender domain has a DMARC Reject/Quarantine policy which disallows
sending mailing list messages using the original "From" header.
To mitigate this problem, the original message has been wrapped
automatically by the mailing list software.
Enables radio resource management to be reported by hostapd to clients.
Ref: https://github.com/lede-project/source/pull/1430
Co-developed-by: Lorenzo Santina <lorenzo.santina@edu.unito.it>
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Santina <lorenzo.santina@edu.unito.it>
Signed-off-by: Kyle Copperfield <kmcopper@danwin1210.me>
hostapd will not use the getrandom() syscall and as a fallback use
/dev/random, the syscall is supported since Linux 3.17 and in the musl,
glibc and uclibc version used by OpenWrt.
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
All the content of this function is proceeded by IEEE8021X_EAPOL no code
accesses the ssid variable outside of this ifdef.
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
The size of the ipkgs increase a bit (between 0.7% and 1.1%):
old 2019-04-21 (2.8):
288264 wpad-basic_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
256188 wpad-mini_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
427475 wpad-openssl_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
423071 wpad-wolfssl_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
new 2019-08-08 (2.9):
290217 wpad-basic_2019-08-08-ca8c2bd2-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
258745 wpad-mini_2019-08-08-ca8c2bd2-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
431732 wpad-openssl_2019-08-08-ca8c2bd2-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
427641 wpad-wolfssl_2019-08-08-ca8c2bd2-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
This also syncs the configuration files with the default configuration
files, but no extra options are activated or deactivated.
The mesh patches were partially merged into hostapd 2.8, the remaining
patches were extracted from patchwork and are now applied by OpenWrt.
The patches still have open questions which are not fixed by the author.
They were taken from this page:
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/hostap/list/?series=62725&state=*
The changes in 007-mesh-apply-channel-attributes-before-running-Mesh.patch
where first applied to hostapd, but later reverted in hostapd commit
3e949655ccc5 because they caused memory leaks.
The size of the ipkgs increase a bit (between 1.3% and 2.3%):
old 2018-12-02 (2.7):
283337 wpad-basic_2018-12-02-c2c6c01b-11_mipsel_24kc.ipk
252857 wpad-mini_2018-12-02-c2c6c01b-11_mipsel_24kc.ipk
417473 wpad-openssl_2018-12-02-c2c6c01b-11_mipsel_24kc.ipk
415105 wpad-wolfssl_2018-12-02-c2c6c01b-11_mipsel_24kc.ipk
new 2019-04-21 (2.8):
288264 wpad-basic_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
256188 wpad-mini_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
427475 wpad-openssl_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
423071 wpad-wolfssl_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
Tested-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
For AP mode, OpenWrt automatically sets ieee80211w to either 1 or 2, depending
on whether the encryption is set to sae-mixed, or sae/owe/eap suite-b.
Mirror the same defaults for client mode connections, in order to allow an
OpenWrt station to associate to an OpenWrt ap with SAE, OWE or Suite-B encryption
without the need to manually specify "option ieee80211w" on the station.
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
This changes fixes the generation of the wpa_supplicant client configuration
in WPA3 OWE client mode. Instead of incorrectly emitting key_mgmt=NONE, use
the proper key_mgmt=OWE setting instead.
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
wps_supplicant.h assumes that 'struct wpa_bss' is forward declared if
CONFIG_WPS is not defined. With the later inclusion of
600-ubus_support, the issue manifests in warnings like these:
wps_supplicant.h:113:15: warning: 'struct wpa_bss' declared inside parameter list will not be visible outside of this definition or declaration
struct wpa_bss *bss)
^~~~~~~
This patch forward declares 'struct wpa_bss' regardless.
Signed-off-by: Leon M. George <leon@georgemail.eu>
[commit message facelift]
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
The original wpa_hexdump uses a 'void *' for the payload. With patch
410-limit_debug_messages, the signature changes and compiler warnings
occur at various places. One such warning is:
wpa_debug.h:106:20: note: expected 'const u8 * {aka const unsigned char *}' but argument is of type 'struct wpa_eapol_key *'
Signed-off-by: Leon M. George <leon@georgemail.eu>
[commit message facelift]
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
This commit will activate CONFIG_IEEE80211W for all, but the mini
variant when at least one driver supports it. This will add ieee80211w
support for the mesh variant for example.
Fixes: FS#2397
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
This changes the default PKG_BUILD_DIR to take BUILD_VARIANT into
account (if set), so that packages do not need to manually override
PKG_BUILD_DIR just to handle variants.
This also updates most base packages with variants to use the updated
default PKG_BUILD_DIR.
Signed-off-by: Jeffery To <jeffery.to@gmail.com>
This edjusts the selection of recently removed wolfssl options which
have always been built into the library even in their abscence.
Also remove the selection of libwolfssl itself, allowing the library to
be built as a module.
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cotequeiroz@gmail.com>
Support to disable the timestamp check for certificates in
wpa_supplicant (Useful for devices without RTC that cannot
reliably get the real date/time) has been accepted in the
upstream hostapd. It's implemented in wpa_supplicant as a
per-AP flag tls_disable_time_checks=[0|1].
Signed-off-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com>
EAP-pwd missing commit validation
Published: April 10, 2019
Identifiers:
- CVE-2019-9497 (EAP-pwd server not checking for reflection attack)
- CVE-2019-9498 (EAP-pwd server missing commit validation for
scalar/element)
- CVE-2019-9499 (EAP-pwd peer missing commit validation for
scalar/element)
Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-4/
Vulnerability
EAP-pwd implementation in hostapd (EAP server) and wpa_supplicant (EAP
peer) was discovered not to validate the received scalar and element
values in EAP-pwd-Commit messages properly. This could result in attacks
that would be able to complete EAP-pwd authentication exchange without
the attacker having to know the used password.
A reflection attack is possible against the EAP-pwd server since the
hostapd EAP server did not verify that the EAP-pwd-Commit contains
scalar/element values that differ from the ones the server sent out
itself. This allows the attacker to complete EAP-pwd authentication
without knowing the password, but this does not result in the attacker
being able to derive the session key (MSK), i.e., the attacker would not
be able to complete the following key exchange (e.g., 4-way handshake in
RSN/WPA).
An attack using invalid scalar/element values is possible against both
the EAP-pwd server and peer since hostapd and wpa_supplicant did not
validate these values in the received EAP-pwd-Commit messages. If the
used crypto library does not implement additional checks for the element
(EC point), this could result in attacks where the attacker could use a
specially crafted commit message values to manipulate the exchange to
result in deriving a session key value from a very small set of possible
values. This could further be used to attack the EAP-pwd server in a
practical manner. An attack against the EAP-pwd peer is slightly more
complex, but still consider practical. These invalid scalar/element
attacks could result in the attacker being able to complete
authentication and learn the session key and MSK to allow the key
exchange to be completed as well, i.e., the attacker gaining access to
the network in case of the attack against the EAP server or the attacker
being able to operate a rogue AP in case of the attack against the EAP
peer.
While similar attacks might be applicable against SAE, it should be
noted that the SAE implementation in hostapd and wpa_supplicant does
have the validation steps that were missing from the EAP-pwd
implementation and as such, these attacks do not apply to the current
SAE implementation. Old versions of wpa_supplicant/hostapd did not
include the reflection attack check in the SAE implementation, though,
since that was added in June 2015 for v2.5 (commit 6a58444d27fd 'SAE:
Verify that own/peer commit-scalar and COMMIT-ELEMENT are different').
Vulnerable versions/configurations
All hostapd versions with EAP-pwd support (CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y in the build
configuration and EAP-pwd being enabled in the runtime configuration)
are vulnerable against the reflection attack.
All wpa_supplicant and hostapd versions with EAP-pwd support
(CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y in the build configuration and EAP-pwd being enabled
in the runtime configuration) are vulnerable against the invalid
scalar/element attack when built against a crypto library that does not
have an explicit validation step on imported EC points. The following
list indicates which cases are vulnerable/not vulnerable:
- OpenSSL v1.0.2 or older: vulnerable
- OpenSSL v1.1.0 or newer: not vulnerable
- BoringSSL with commit 38feb990a183 ('Require that EC points are on the
curve.') from September 2015: not vulnerable
- BoringSSL without commit 38feb990a183: vulnerable
- LibreSSL: vulnerable
- wolfssl: vulnerable
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Mathy Vanhoef (New York University Abu Dhabi) for discovering
and reporting the issues and for proposing changes to address them in
the implementation.
Possible mitigation steps
- Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant/hostapd and rebuild:
CVE-2019-9497:
EAP-pwd server: Detect reflection attacks
CVE-2019-9498:
EAP-pwd server: Verify received scalar and element
EAP-pwd: Check element x,y coordinates explicitly
CVE-2019-9499:
EAP-pwd client: Verify received scalar and element
EAP-pwd: Check element x,y coordinates explicitly
These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-4/
- Update to wpa_supplicant/hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available
Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
[bump PKG_RELEASE]
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
hostapd: fix SAE confirm missing state validation
Published: April 10, 2019
Identifiers:
- CVE-2019-9496 (SAE confirm missing state validation in hostapd/AP)
Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-3/
Vulnerability
When hostapd is used to operate an access point with SAE (Simultaneous
Authentication of Equals; also known as WPA3-Personal), an invalid
authentication sequence could result in the hostapd process terminating
due to a NULL pointer dereference when processing SAE confirm
message. This was caused by missing state validation steps when
processing the SAE confirm message in hostapd/AP mode.
Similar cases against the wpa_supplicant SAE station implementation had
already been tested by the hwsim test cases, but those sequences did not
trigger this specific code path in AP mode which is why the issue was
not discovered earlier.
An attacker in radio range of an access point using hostapd in SAE
configuration could use this issue to perform a denial of service attack
by forcing the hostapd process to terminate.
Vulnerable versions/configurations
All hostapd versions with SAE support (CONFIG_SAE=y in the build
configuration and SAE being enabled in the runtime configuration).
Possible mitigation steps
- Merge the following commit to hostapd and rebuild:
SAE: Fix confirm message validation in error cases
These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-3/
- Update to hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available
Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
[bump PKG_RELEASE]
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
EAP-pwd side-channel attack
Published: April 10, 2019
Identifiers:
- CVE-2019-9495 (cache attack against EAP-pwd)
Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-2/
Vulnerability
Number of potential side channel attacks were recently discovered in the
SAE implementations used by both hostapd and wpa_supplicant (see
security advisory 2019-1 and VU#871675). EAP-pwd uses a similar design
for deriving PWE from the password and while a specific attack against
EAP-pwd is not yet known to be tested, there is no reason to believe
that the EAP-pwd implementation would be immune against the type of
cache attack that was identified for the SAE implementation. Since the
EAP-pwd implementation in hostapd (EAP server) and wpa_supplicant (EAP
peer) does not support MODP groups, the timing attack described against
SAE is not applicable for the EAP-pwd implementation.
A novel cache-based attack against SAE handshake would likely be
applicable against the EAP-pwd implementation. Even though the
wpa_supplicant/hostapd PWE derivation iteration for EAP-pwd has
protections against timing attacks, this new cache-based attack might
enable an attacker to determine which code branch is taken in the
iteration if the attacker is able to run unprivileged code on the victim
machine (e.g., an app installed on a smart phone or potentially a
JavaScript code on a web site loaded by a web browser). This depends on
the used CPU not providing sufficient protection to prevent unprivileged
applications from observing memory access patterns through the shared
cache (which is the most likely case with today's designs).
The attacker could use information about the selected branch to learn
information about the password and combine this information from number
of handshake instances with an offline dictionary attack. With
sufficient number of handshakes and sufficiently weak password, this
might result in full recovery of the used password if that password is
not strong enough to protect against dictionary attacks.
This attack requires the attacker to be able to run a program on the
target device. This is not commonly the case on an authentication server
(EAP server), so the most likely target for this would be a client
device using EAP-pwd.
The commits listed in the end of this advisory change the EAP-pwd
implementation shared by hostapd and wpa_supplicant to perform the PWE
derivation loop using operations that use constant time and memory
access pattern to minimize the externally observable differences from
operations that depend on the password even for the case where the
attacker might be able to run unprivileged code on the same device.
Vulnerable versions/configurations
All wpa_supplicant and hostapd versions with EAP-pwd support
(CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y in the build configuration and EAP-pwd being enabled
in the runtime configuration).
It should also be noted that older versions of wpa_supplicant/hostapd
prior to v2.7 did not include additional protection against certain
timing differences. The definition of the EAP-pwd (RFC 5931) does not
describe such protection, but the same issue that was addressed in SAE
earlier can be applicable against EAP-pwd as well and as such, that
implementation specific extra protection (commit 22ac3dfebf7b, "EAP-pwd:
Mask timing of PWE derivation") is needed to avoid showing externally
visible timing differences that could leak information about the
password. Any uses of older wpa_supplicant/hostapd versions with EAP-pwd
are recommended to update to v2.7 or newer in addition to the mitigation
steps listed below for the more recently discovered issue.
Possible mitigation steps
- Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant/hostapd and rebuild:
OpenSSL: Use constant time operations for private bignums
Add helper functions for constant time operations
OpenSSL: Use constant time selection for crypto_bignum_legendre()
EAP-pwd: Use constant time and memory access for finding the PWE
These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-2/
- Update to wpa_supplicant/hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available
- Use strong passwords to prevent dictionary attacks
Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
[bump PKG_RELEASE]
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
SAE side-channel attacks
Published: April 10, 2019
Identifiers:
- VU#871675
- CVE-2019-9494 (cache attack against SAE)
Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-1/
Vulnerability
Number of potential side channel attacks were discovered in the SAE
implementations used by both hostapd (AP) and wpa_supplicant
(infrastructure BSS station/mesh station). SAE (Simultaneous
Authentication of Equals) is also known as WPA3-Personal. The discovered
side channel attacks may be able to leak information about the used
password based on observable timing differences and cache access
patterns. This might result in full password recovery when combined with
an offline dictionary attack and if the password is not strong enough to
protect against dictionary attacks.
Cache attack
A novel cache-based attack against SAE handshake was discovered. This
attack targets SAE with ECC groups. ECC group 19 being the mandatory
group to support and the most likely used group for SAE today, so this
attack applies to the most common SAE use case. Even though the PWE
derivation iteration in SAE has protections against timing attacks, this
new cache-based attack enables an attacker to determine which code
branch is taken in the iteration if the attacker is able to run
unprivileged code on the victim machine (e.g., an app installed on a
smart phone or potentially a JavaScript code on a web site loaded by a
web browser). This depends on the used CPU not providing sufficient
protection to prevent unprivileged applications from observing memory
access patterns through the shared cache (which is the most likely case
with today's designs).
The attacker can use information about the selected branch to learn
information about the password and combine this information from number
of handshake instances with an offline dictionary attack. With
sufficient number of handshakes and sufficiently weak password, this
might result in full discovery of the used password.
This attack requires the attacker to be able to run a program on the
target device. This is not commonly the case on access points, so the
most likely target for this would be a client device using SAE in an
infrastructure BSS or mesh BSS.
The commits listed in the end of this advisory change the SAE
implementation shared by hostapd and wpa_supplicant to perform the PWE
derivation loop using operations that use constant time and memory
access pattern to minimize the externally observable differences from
operations that depend on the password even for the case where the
attacker might be able to run unprivileged code on the same device.
Timing attack
The timing attack applies to the MODP groups 22, 23, and 24 where the
PWE generation algorithm defined for SAE can have sufficient timing
differences for an attacker to be able to determine how many rounds were
needed to find the PWE based on the used password and MAC
addresses. When the attack is repeated with multiple times, the attacker
may be able to gather enough information about the password to be able
to recover it fully using an offline dictionary attack if the password
is not strong enough to protect against dictionary attacks. This attack
could be performed by an attacker in radio range of an access point or a
station enabling the specific MODP groups.
This timing attack requires the applicable MODP groups to be enabled
explicitly in hostapd/wpa_supplicant configuration (sae_groups
parameter). All versions of hostapd/wpa_supplicant have disabled these
groups by default.
While this security advisory lists couple of commits introducing
additional protection for MODP groups in SAE, it should be noted that
the groups 22, 23, and 24 are not considered strong enough to meet the
current expectation for a secure system. As such, their use is
discouraged even if the additional protection mechanisms in the
implementation are included.
Vulnerable versions/configurations
All wpa_supplicant and hostapd versions with SAE support (CONFIG_SAE=y
in the build configuration and SAE being enabled in the runtime
configuration).
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Mathy Vanhoef (New York University Abu Dhabi) and Eyal Ronen
(Tel Aviv University) for discovering the issues and for discussions on
how to address them.
Possible mitigation steps
- Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant/hostapd and rebuild:
OpenSSL: Use constant time operations for private bignums
Add helper functions for constant time operations
OpenSSL: Use constant time selection for crypto_bignum_legendre()
SAE: Minimize timing differences in PWE derivation
SAE: Avoid branches in is_quadratic_residue_blind()
SAE: Mask timing of MODP groups 22, 23, 24
SAE: Use const_time selection for PWE in FFC
SAE: Use constant time operations in sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc()
These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-1/
- Update to wpa_supplicant/hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available
- In addition to either of the above alternatives, disable MODP groups
1, 2, 5, 22, 23, and 24 by removing them from hostapd/wpa_supplicant
sae_groups runtime configuration parameter, if they were explicitly
enabled since those groups are not considered strong enough to meet
current security expectations. The groups 22, 23, and 24 are related
to the discovered side channel (timing) attack. The other groups in
the list are consider too weak to provide sufficient security. Note
that all these groups have been disabled by default in all
hostapd/wpa_supplicant versions and these would be used only if
explicitly enabled in the configuration.
- Use strong passwords to prevent dictionary attacks
Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
[bump PKG_RELEASE]
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
Cherry-pick Multi-AP commits from uptream:
9c06f0f6a hostapd: Add Multi-AP protocol support
5abc7823b wpa_supplicant: Add Multi-AP backhaul STA support
a1debd338 tests: Refactor test_multi_ap
bfcdac1c8 Multi-AP: Don't reject backhaul STA on fronthaul BSS
cb3c156e7 tests: Update multi_ap_fronthaul_on_ap to match implementation
56a2d788f WPS: Add multi_ap_subelem to wps_build_wfa_ext()
83ebf5586 wpa_supplicant: Support Multi-AP backhaul STA onboarding with WPS
66819b07b hostapd: Support Multi-AP backhaul STA onboarding with WPS
8682f384c hostapd: Add README-MULTI-AP
b1daf498a tests: Multi-AP WPS provisioning
Add support for Multi-AP to the UCI configuration. Every wifi-iface gets
an option 'multi_ap'. For APs, its value can be 0 (multi-AP support
disabled), 1 (backhaul AP), 2 (fronthaul AP), or 3 (fronthaul + backhaul
AP). For STAs, it can be 0 (not a backhaul STA) or 1 (backhaul STA, can
only associate with backhaul AP).
Also add new optional parameter to wps_start ubus call of
wpa_supplicant to indicate that a Multi-AP backhaul link is required.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
It was already enabled for wpad builds and since commit 6a15077e2d
the script relies on it. Size impact is minimal (2 kb on MIPS .ipk).
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
This updates hostapd to version the git version from 2018-12-02 which
matches the 2.7 release.
The removed patches were are already available in the upstream code, one
additional backport is needed to fix a compile problem.
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
The eapol-test application also uses the code with the newly activated
ubus support, add the missing dependency.
Fixes: f5753aae23 ("hostapd: add support for WPS pushbutton station")
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
similar to hostapd, also add a ubus interface for wpa_supplicant
which will allow handling WPS push-button just as it works for hostapd.
In order to have wpa_supplicant running without any network
configuration (so you can use it to retrieve credentials via WPS),
configure wifi-iface in /etc/config/wireless:
config wifi-iface 'default_radio0'
option device 'radio0'
option network 'wwan'
option mode 'sta'
option encryption 'wps'
This section will automatically be edited if credentials have
successfully been acquired via WPS.
Size difference (mips_24kc): roughly +4kb for the 'full' variants of
wpa_supplicant and wpad which do support WPS.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
SSIDs may contain UTF8 characters but ideally hostapd should be told
this is the case so it can advertise the fact. Default enable this
option.
add uci option utf8_ssid '0'/'1' for disable/enable e.g.
config wifi-iface
option utf8_ssid '0'
Signed-off-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <ldir@darbyshire-bryant.me.uk>
Add a basic variant which provides WPA-PSK only, 802.11r and 802.11w and
is intended to support 11r & 11w (subject to driver support) out of the
box.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <ldir@darbyshire-bryant.me.uk>
Backport two upstream fixes to address overly verbose logging of MAC ACL
rejection messages.
Fixes: FS#1468
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
This adds support for the WPA3-Enterprise mode authentication.
The settings for the WPA3-Enterpriese mode are defined in
WPA3_Specification_v1.0.pdf. This mode also requires ieee80211w and
guarantees at least 192 bit of security.
This does not increase the ipkg size by a significant size.
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
OWE is defined in RFC 8110 and provides encryption and forward security
for open networks.
This is based on the requirements in the Wifi alliance document
Opportunistic_Wireless_Encryption_Specification_v1.0_0.pdf
The wifi alliance requires ieee80211w for the OWE mode.
This also makes it possible to configure the OWE transission mode which
allows it operate an open and an OWE BSSID in parallel and the client
should only show one network.
This increases the ipkg size by 5.800 Bytes.
Old: 402.541 Bytes
New: 408.341 Bytes
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
This build the full openssl and wolfssl versions with SAE support which
is the main part of WPA3 PSK.
This needs elliptic curve cryptography which is only provided by these
two external cryptographic libraries and not by the internal
implementation.
The WPA3_Specification_v1.0.pdf file says that in SAE only mode
Protected Management Frames (PMF) is required, in mixed mode with
WPA2-PSK PMF should be required for clients using SAE, and optional for
clients using WPA2-PSK. The defaults are set now accordingly.
This increases the ipkg size by 8.515 Bytes.
Old: 394.026 Bytes
New: 402.541 Bytes
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
This replaces the configuration files with the versions from the hostapd
project and the adaptions done by OpenWrt.
The resulting binaries should be the same.
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
This adds processing of all CSA arguments from ubus switch_chan request
in the same manner as in the control interface API.
Signed-off-by: Yury Shvedov <yshvedov@wimarksystems.com>
Unauthenticated EAPOL-Key decryption in wpa_supplicant
Published: August 8, 2018
Identifiers:
- CVE-2018-14526
Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/
Vulnerability
A vulnerability was found in how wpa_supplicant processes EAPOL-Key
frames. It is possible for an attacker to modify the frame in a way that
makes wpa_supplicant decrypt the Key Data field without requiring a
valid MIC value in the frame, i.e., without the frame being
authenticated. This has a potential issue in the case where WPA2/RSN
style of EAPOL-Key construction is used with TKIP negotiated as the
pairwise cipher. It should be noted that WPA2 is not supposed to be used
with TKIP as the pairwise cipher. Instead, CCMP is expected to be used
and with that pairwise cipher, this vulnerability is not applicable in
practice.
When TKIP is negotiated as the pairwise cipher, the EAPOL-Key Key Data
field is encrypted using RC4. This vulnerability allows unauthenticated
EAPOL-Key frames to be processed and due to the RC4 design, this makes
it possible for an attacker to modify the plaintext version of the Key
Data field with bitwise XOR operations without knowing the contents.
This can be used to cause a denial of service attack by modifying
GTK/IGTK on the station (without the attacker learning any of the keys)
which would prevent the station from accepting received group-addressed
frames. Furthermore, this might be abused by making wpa_supplicant act
as a decryption oracle to try to recover some of the Key Data payload
(GTK/IGTK) to get knowledge of the group encryption keys.
Full recovery of the group encryption keys requires multiple attempts
(128 connection attempts per octet) and each attempt results in
disconnection due to a failure to complete the 4-way handshake. These
failures can result in the AP/network getting disabled temporarily or
even permanently (requiring user action to re-enable) which may make it
impractical to perform the attack to recover the keys before the AP has
already changes the group keys. By default, wpa_supplicant is enforcing
at minimum a ten second wait time between each failed connection
attempt, i.e., over 20 minutes waiting to recover each octet while
hostapd AP implementation uses 10 minute default for GTK rekeying when
using TKIP. With such timing behavior, practical attack would need large
number of impacted stations to be trying to connect to the same AP to be
able to recover sufficient information from the GTK to be able to
determine the key before it gets changed.
Vulnerable versions/configurations
All wpa_supplicant versions.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Mathy Vanhoef of the imec-DistriNet research group of KU
Leuven for discovering and reporting this issue.
Possible mitigation steps
- Remove TKIP as an allowed pairwise cipher in RSN/WPA2 networks. This
can be done also on the AP side.
- Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant and rebuild:
WPA: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data
This patch is available from https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/
- Update to wpa_supplicant v2.7 or newer, once available
Signed-off-by: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org>
The call "get_features" allows to gather hostapd config options
via ubus. As first infos we add the ht and vht support.
Although nl80211 supports to gather informations about
ht and vht capabilities, the hostapd configuration can disable
vht and ht. However, it is possible that the iw output is not
representing the actual hostapd configuration.
Signed-off-by: Nick Hainke <vincent@systemli.org>
Add each variant to the matching PROVIDERS variables after evaluating
the respective hostapd*, wpad* and wpa* variant.
Each package providing the same feature will automatically conflict with
all prior packages providing the same feature.
This way we can handle the conflicts automatically without introducing
recursive dependencies.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Kresin <dev@kresin.me>
Move common variables and/or values to the package (variant) default.
Add additional values in variant packages if necessary. Remove further
duplicates by introducing new templates.
Remove the ANY_[HOSTAPD|SUPPLICANT_PROVIDERS]_PROVIDERS. The are the
same as the variables without the any prefix. No need to maintain both
variables.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Kresin <dev@kresin.me>
Clean up conflicts/provides/depends hell and add PROVIDES for
eapol-test variants while at it.
Update mesh-DFS patchset from Peter Oh to v5 (with local fixes) which
allows to drop two revert-patches for upstream commits which previously
were necessary to un-break mesh-DFS support.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Instead of selecting the SSL provider at compile time, build package
variants for each option so users can select the binary package without
having to build it themselves.
Most likely not all variants have actually ever been user by anyone.
We should reduce the selection to the reasonable and most used
combinations at some point in future. For now, build them all.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Support for building wpa_supplicant/hostapd against wolfssl has been
added upstream recently, add build option to allow users using it.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Use ft_psk_generate_local=1 by default, as it makes everything else fairly
trivial. All of the r0kh/r1kh and key management stuff goes away and hostapd
fairly much does it all for us.
We do need to provide nas_identifier, which can be derived from the BSSID,
and we need to generate a mobility_domain, for which we default to the first
four chars of the md5sum of the SSID.
The complex manual setup should also still work, but the defaults also
now work easily out of the box. Verified by manually running hostapd
(with the autogenerated config) and watching the debug output:
wlan2: STA ac:37:43:a0:a6:ae WPA: FT authentication already completed - do not start 4-way handshake
This was previous submitted to LEDE in
https://github.com/lede-project/source/pull/1382
[dwmw2: Rewrote commit message]
Signed-off-by: Gospod Nassa <devianca@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
The max_oper_chwidth settings was parsed incorrectly for big endian system.
This prevented the system to switch to VHT80 (or VHT160). Instead they were
mapped to:
* HT20: 20MHz
* VHT20: 20MHz
* HT40: 40MHz
* VHT40: 40MHz
* VHT80: 40MHz
* VHT160: 40MHz
This happened because each max_oper_chwidth setting in the config file was
parsed as "0" instead of the actual value.
Fixes: a4322eba2b ("hostapd: fix encrypted mesh channel settings")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven.eckelmann@openmesh.com>
Fix encrypted (or DFS) AP+MESH interface combination in a way similar
to how it's done for AP+STA and fix netifd shell script.
Refresh patches while at it.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Import two patches from Peter Oh to allow setting channel
bandwidth in the way it already works for managed interfaces.
This fixes mesh interfaces on 802.11ac devices always coming up in
VHT80 mode.
Add a patch to allow HT40 also on 2.4GHz if noscan option is set, which
also skips secondary channel scan just like noscan works in AP mode.
This time also make sure to add all files to the patch before
committing it...
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Import two patches from Peter Oh to allow setting channel
bandwidth in the way it already works for managed interfaces.
This fixes mesh interfaces on 802.11ac devices always coming up in
VHT80 mode.
Add a patch to allow HT40 also on 2.4GHz if noscan option is set, which
also skips secondary channel scan just like noscan works in AP mode.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
