Commit Graph

154 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Raphaël Mélotte
59fa9c28d6 hostapd: add notifications for management frames
This patch allows other applications to get events management
frames (for example: association requests).

This is useful in Multi-AP context to be able to save association
requests from stations.

It has been sent to upstream hostapd in this series:
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/hostap/list/?series=217500

'700-wifi-reload.patch' is updated due to the introduction of
'110-notify-mgmt-frames.patch'.

Signed-off-by: Raphaël Mélotte <raphael.melotte@mind.be>
2021-02-12 08:52:41 +01:00
Petr Štetiar
43ff6e641e hostapd: add forgotten patch for P2P vulnerability fix
Commit 7c8c4f1be6 ("hostapd: fix P2P group information processing
vulnerability") was missing the actual patch for the vulnerability.

Fixes: 7c8c4f1be6 ("hostapd: fix P2P group information processing vulnerability")
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
2021-02-04 09:11:50 +01:00
Leon M. George
651f0c0999 hostapd: fix patch offset
Fixes the offset of the patch added in 93bbd998aa
  ("hostapd: enter DFS state if no available channel is found").

Signed-off-by: Leon M. George <leon@georgemail.eu>
2020-11-23 22:53:15 +01:00
Hauke Mehrtens
bc19481826 hostapd: Fix compile errors after wolfssl update
This fixes the following compile errors after the wolfssl 4.5.0 update:
  LD  wpa_cli
../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.c: In function 'tls_match_alt_subject':
../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.c:610:11: error: 'GEN_EMAIL' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'ENAVAIL'?
    type = GEN_EMAIL;
           ^~~~~~~~~
           ENAVAIL
../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.c:610:11: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.c:613:11: error: 'GEN_DNS' undeclared (first use in this function)
    type = GEN_DNS;
           ^~~~~~~
../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.c:616:11: error: 'GEN_URI' undeclared (first use in this function)
    type = GEN_URI;
           ^~~~~~~
../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.c: In function 'wolfssl_tls_cert_event':
../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.c:902:20: error: 'GEN_EMAIL' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'ENAVAIL'?
   if (gen->type != GEN_EMAIL &&
                    ^~~~~~~~~
                    ENAVAIL
../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.c:903:20: error: 'GEN_DNS' undeclared (first use in this function)
       gen->type != GEN_DNS &&
                    ^~~~~~~
../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.c:904:20: error: 'GEN_URI' undeclared (first use in this function)
       gen->type != GEN_URI)
                    ^~~~~~~
Makefile:2029: recipe for target '../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.o' failed

Fixes: 00722a720c ("wolfssl: Update to version 4.5.0")
Reported-by: Andre Heider <a.heider@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
2020-08-27 12:11:47 +02:00
Daniel Golle
34705946e2 hostapd: update mesh DFS patches and add mesh HE support
Drop outdated and by now broken patchset originally supplied by
Peter Oh in August 2018 but never merged upstream.
Instead add the more promissing rework recently submitted by
Markus Theil who picked up Peter's patchset, fixed and completed it
and added support for HE (802.11ax) in mesh mode.

This is only compile tested and needs some real-life testing.

Fixes: FS#3214
Fixes: 167028b750 ("hostapd: Update to version 2.9 (2019-08-08)")
Fixes: 0a3ec87a66 ("hostapd: update to latest Git hostap_2_9-1238-gdd2daf0848ed")
Fixes: 017320ead3 ("hostapd: bring back mesh patches")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
2020-07-30 16:27:44 +01:00
David Bauer
93bbd998aa hostapd: enter DFS state if no available channel is found
Previously hostapd would not stop transmitting when a DFS event was
detected and no available channel to switch to was available.

Disable and re-enable the interface to enter DFS state. This way, TX
does not happen until the kernel notifies hostapd about the NOP
expiring.

Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
2020-07-20 15:08:19 +02:00
Karel Kočí
a4248577a0 hostapd: fix compilation of wpa_supplicant
Ubus patch as it seems have been broken by some rebase in the past as
the location of line that adds ubus object file was in condition for
CONFIG_MACSEC. That condition was adding object files that are not
touched by ubus patch. This means ubus.o does not have to be included in
that case. When it has to be and when build fails is when CONFIG_AP is
set. All files included in wpa_supplicant that are touched by this patch
are in this condition. This means that this is for sure the original
place for it.

Signed-off-by: Karel Kočí <karel.koci@nic.cz>
2020-06-18 20:08:18 +02:00
Petr Štetiar
df6a33a8d4 hostapd: update to latest Git hostap_2_9-1331-g5a8b366233f5
Bump to latest Git and refresh all patches in order to get fix for "UPnP
SUBSCRIBE misbehavior in hostapd WPS AP" (CVE-2020-12695).

 General security vulnerability in the way the callback URLs in the UPnP
 SUBSCRIBE command are used were reported (VU#339275, CVE-2020-12695).
 Some of the described issues may be applicable to the use of UPnP in WPS
 AP mode functionality for supporting external registrars.

Ref: https://w1.fi/security/2020-1/
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
2020-06-09 16:59:33 +02:00
Daniel Golle
017320ead3 hostapd: bring back mesh patches
Bring back 802.11s mesh features to the level previously available
before the recent hostapd version bump. This is mostly to support use
of 802.11s on DFS channels, but also making mesh forwarding
configurable which is crucial for use of 802.11s MAC with other routing
protocols, such as batman-adv, on top.
While at it, fix new compiler warning by adapting 700-wifi-reload.patch
to upstream changes, now building without any warnings again.

Fixes: 0a3ec87a66 ("hostapd: update to latest Git hostap_2_9-1238-gdd2daf0848ed")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
2020-05-21 10:21:59 +01:00
Petr Štetiar
0a3ec87a66 hostapd: update to latest Git hostap_2_9-1238-gdd2daf0848ed
Bump package to latest upstream Git HEAD which is commit dd2daf0848ed
("HE: Process HE 6 GHz band capab from associating HE STA"). Since last
update there was 1238 commits done in the upstream tree with 618 files
changed, 53399 insertions, 24928 deletions.

I didn't bothered to rebase mesh patches as the changes seems not
trivial and I don't have enough knowledge of those parts to do/test that
properly, so someone else has to forward port them, ideally upstream
them so we don't need to bother anymore. I've just deleted them for now:

 004-mesh-use-setup-completion-callback-to-complete-mesh-.patch
 005-mesh-update-ssid-frequency-as-pri-sec-channel-switch.patch
 006-mesh-inform-kernel-driver-DFS-handler-in-userspace.patch
 007-mesh-apply-channel-attributes-before-running-Mesh.patch
 011-mesh-Allow-DFS-channels-to-be-selected-if-dfs-is-ena.patch
 013-mesh-do-not-allow-pri-sec-channel-switch.patch
 015-mesh-do-not-use-offchan-mgmt-tx-on-DFS.patch
 016-mesh-fix-channel-switch-error-during-CAC.patch
 018-mesh-make-forwarding-configurable.patch

Refreshed all other patches, removed upstreamed patches:

 051-wpa_supplicant-fix-race-condition-in-mesh-mpm-new-pe.patch
 067-0001-AP-Silently-ignore-management-frame-from-unexpected-.patch
 070-driver_nl80211-fix-WMM-queue-mapping-for-regulatory-.patch
 071-driver_nl80211-fix-regulatory-limits-for-wmm-cwmin-c.patch
 090-wolfssl-fix-crypto_bignum_sum.patch
 091-0001-wolfssl-Fix-compiler-warnings-on-size_t-printf-forma.patch
 091-0002-wolfssl-Fix-crypto_bignum_rand-implementation.patch
 091-0003-wolfssl-Do-not-hardcode-include-directory-in-wpa_sup.patch
 800-usleep.patch

Tested-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de> [ipq8065/NBG6817; ipq40xx/MAP-AC2200]
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
2020-05-21 08:18:01 +02:00
Daniel Golle
631c437a91 hostapd: backport wolfssl bignum fixes
crypto_bignum_rand() use needless time-consuming filtering
which resulted in SAE no longer connecting within time limits.
Import fixes from hostap upstream to fix that.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
2020-05-16 22:28:08 +01:00
Antonio Quartulli
4b3b8ec81c wpad-wolfssl: fix crypto_bignum_sub()
Backport patch from hostapd.git master that fixes copy/paste error in
crypto_bignum_sub() in crypto_wolfssl.c.

This missing fix was discovered while testing SAE over a mesh interface.

With this fix applied and wolfssl >3.14.4 mesh+SAE works fine with
wpad-mesh-wolfssl.

Cc: Sean Parkinson <sean@wolfssl.com>
Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
2020-04-28 11:45:44 +01:00
Daniel Golle
f37d634236 hostapd: reduce to a single instance per service
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
2020-04-14 00:22:21 +01:00
Rosen Penev
76d22fc24b hostapd: backport usleep patch
Optionally fixes compilation with uClibc-ng.

Signed-off-by: Rosen Penev <rosenp@gmail.com>
2020-04-13 22:40:19 +02:00
Nick Hainke
c8ef465e10 hostapd: expose beacon reports through ubus
Subscribe to beacon reports through ubus.
Can be used for hearing map and client steering purposes.

First enable rrm:
    ubus call hostapd.wlan0 bss_mgmt_enable '{"beacon_report":True}'

Subscribe to the hostapd notifications via ubus.

Request beacon report:
    ubus call hostapd.wlan0 rrm_beacon_req
	'{"addr":"00:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx", "op_class":0, "channel":1,
	"duration":1,"mode":2,"bssid":"ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff", "ssid":""}'

Signed-off-by: Nick Hainke <vincent@systemli.org>
[rework identation]
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
2020-03-30 01:46:50 +02:00
John Crispin
d3b7838ebe hostapd: enhance wifi reload
Add a radio_config_id property. If the radio config changes return an error
upon receiving the reconf call.

Signed-off-by: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org>
2020-02-25 17:01:55 +01:00
Felix Fietkau
b3e86cbb4f hostapd: add back support for passing CSA events from sta/mesh to AP interfaces
Fixes handling CSA when using AP+STA or AP+Mesh
This change was accidentally dropped in commit 167028b75
("hostapd: Update to version 2.9 (2019-08-08)")

Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
2020-01-29 12:25:10 +01:00
Felix Fietkau
03e9e4ba9e hostapd: unconditionally enable ap/mesh for wpa-cli
Without this change, wpa-cli features depend on which wpad build variant was
used to build the wpa-cli package

Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
2020-01-28 14:38:43 +01:00
Felix Fietkau
c07f6e8659 hostapd: fix faulty WMM IE parameters with ETSI regulatory domains
hostapd sets minimum values for CWmin/CWmax/AIFS and maximum for TXOP.
The code for applying those values had a few bugs leading to bogus values,
which caused significant latency and packet loss.

Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
2020-01-23 14:53:13 +01:00
Felix Fietkau
4225b83a76 hostapd: fix crash regression triggered by mesh mode
Fixes: 60fb4c92b6 ("hostapd: add ubus reload")
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
[daniel@makrotopia.org: polish commit message]
2019-12-08 19:51:53 +01:00
John Crispin
60fb4c92b6 hostapd: add ubus reload
Add ubus interface to hostapd and wpa_supplicant to allow dynamically
reloading wiface configuration without having to restart the hostapd
process.
As a consequence, both hostapd and wpa_supplicant are now started
persistently on boot for each wifi device in the system and then
receive ubus calls adding, modifying or removing interface
configuration.
At a later stage it would be desirable to reduce the services to one
single instance managing all radios.

Signed-off-by: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
2019-11-12 11:52:26 +01:00
Hauke Mehrtens
0d86bf518a hostapd: Remove unneeded patch
All the content of this function is proceeded by IEEE8021X_EAPOL no code
accesses the ssid variable outside of this ifdef.

Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
2019-09-22 17:39:51 +02:00
Hauke Mehrtens
9b4a27455c hostapd: use config option CONFIG_NO_LINUX_PACKET_SOCKET_WAR
Instead of patching the workaround away, just use the config option.

Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
2019-09-22 17:39:51 +02:00
Hauke Mehrtens
167028b750 hostapd: Update to version 2.9 (2019-08-08)
The size of the ipkgs increase a bit (between 0.7% and 1.1%):

old 2019-04-21 (2.8):
288264 wpad-basic_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
256188 wpad-mini_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
427475 wpad-openssl_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
423071 wpad-wolfssl_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk

new 2019-08-08 (2.9):
290217 wpad-basic_2019-08-08-ca8c2bd2-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
258745 wpad-mini_2019-08-08-ca8c2bd2-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
431732 wpad-openssl_2019-08-08-ca8c2bd2-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
427641 wpad-wolfssl_2019-08-08-ca8c2bd2-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk

Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
2019-09-22 17:39:38 +02:00
Hauke Mehrtens
8af79550e6 hostapd: Update to version 2.8 (2019-04-21)
This also syncs the configuration files with the default configuration
files, but no extra options are activated or deactivated.

The mesh patches were partially merged into hostapd 2.8, the remaining
patches were extracted from patchwork and are now applied by OpenWrt.
The patches still have open questions which are not fixed by the author.
They were taken from this page:
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/hostap/list/?series=62725&state=*

The changes in 007-mesh-apply-channel-attributes-before-running-Mesh.patch
where first applied to hostapd, but later reverted in hostapd commit
3e949655ccc5 because they caused memory leaks.

The size of the ipkgs increase a bit (between 1.3% and 2.3%):

old 2018-12-02 (2.7):
283337 wpad-basic_2018-12-02-c2c6c01b-11_mipsel_24kc.ipk
252857 wpad-mini_2018-12-02-c2c6c01b-11_mipsel_24kc.ipk
417473 wpad-openssl_2018-12-02-c2c6c01b-11_mipsel_24kc.ipk
415105 wpad-wolfssl_2018-12-02-c2c6c01b-11_mipsel_24kc.ipk

new 2019-04-21 (2.8):
288264 wpad-basic_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
256188 wpad-mini_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
427475 wpad-openssl_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
423071 wpad-wolfssl_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk

Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
Tested-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
2019-09-22 17:39:26 +02:00
Hauke Mehrtens
a6981604b3 hostapd: Fix AP mode PMF disconnection protection bypass
This fixes
* CVE-2019-16275 AP mode PMF disconnection protection bypass
https://w1.fi/security/2019-7/ap-mode-pmf-disconnection-protection-bypass.txt

Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
2019-09-21 01:12:35 +02:00
Leon M. George
f974f8213b hostapd: declare struct wpa_bss early
wps_supplicant.h assumes that 'struct wpa_bss' is forward declared if
CONFIG_WPS is not defined.  With the later inclusion of
600-ubus_support, the issue manifests in warnings like these:

wps_supplicant.h:113:15: warning: 'struct wpa_bss' declared inside parameter list will not be visible outside of this definition or declaration
        struct wpa_bss *bss)
               ^~~~~~~

This patch forward declares 'struct wpa_bss' regardless.

Signed-off-by: Leon M. George <leon@georgemail.eu>
[commit message facelift]
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
2019-09-19 23:43:27 +02:00
Leon M. George
a123df2758 hostapd: revert signature change in patch
The original wpa_hexdump uses a 'void *' for the payload.  With patch
410-limit_debug_messages, the signature changes and compiler warnings
occur at various places.  One such warning is:

 wpa_debug.h:106:20: note: expected 'const u8 * {aka const unsigned char *}' but argument is of type 'struct wpa_eapol_key *'

Signed-off-by: Leon M. George <leon@georgemail.eu>
[commit message facelift]
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
2019-09-19 23:43:27 +02:00
Hauke Mehrtens
7bed9bf10f hostapd: SAE/EAP-pwd side-channel attack update
Fixes this security problem:
* SAE/EAP-pwd side-channel attack update
https://w1.fi/security/2019-6/sae-eap-pwd-side-channel-attack-update.txt

Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
2019-09-10 21:51:41 +02:00
Hauke Mehrtens
9f34bf51d6 hostapd: Fix security problem
This fixes:
CVE-2019-11555 "EAP-pwd message reassembly issue with unexpected fragment"
https://w1.fi/security/2019-5/eap-pwd-message-reassembly-issue-with-unexpected-fragment.txt

This shouöld not affect OpenWrt in the default settings as we do not use
EAP-pwd.

Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
2019-09-10 21:51:26 +02:00
Stefan Lippers-Hollmann
8f17c019a1 hostapd: fix CVE-2019-9497, CVE-2019-9498, CVE-2019-9499
EAP-pwd missing commit validation

Published: April 10, 2019
Identifiers:
- CVE-2019-9497 (EAP-pwd server not checking for reflection attack)
- CVE-2019-9498 (EAP-pwd server missing commit validation for
  scalar/element)
- CVE-2019-9499 (EAP-pwd peer missing commit validation for
  scalar/element)

Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-4/

Vulnerability

EAP-pwd implementation in hostapd (EAP server) and wpa_supplicant (EAP
peer) was discovered not to validate the received scalar and element
values in EAP-pwd-Commit messages properly. This could result in attacks
that would be able to complete EAP-pwd authentication exchange without
the attacker having to know the used password.

A reflection attack is possible against the EAP-pwd server since the
hostapd EAP server did not verify that the EAP-pwd-Commit contains
scalar/element values that differ from the ones the server sent out
itself. This allows the attacker to complete EAP-pwd authentication
without knowing the password, but this does not result in the attacker
being able to derive the session key (MSK), i.e., the attacker would not
be able to complete the following key exchange (e.g., 4-way handshake in
RSN/WPA).

An attack using invalid scalar/element values is possible against both
the EAP-pwd server and peer since hostapd and wpa_supplicant did not
validate these values in the received EAP-pwd-Commit messages. If the
used crypto library does not implement additional checks for the element
(EC point), this could result in attacks where the attacker could use a
specially crafted commit message values to manipulate the exchange to
result in deriving a session key value from a very small set of possible
values. This could further be used to attack the EAP-pwd server in a
practical manner. An attack against the EAP-pwd peer is slightly more
complex, but still consider practical. These invalid scalar/element
attacks could result in the attacker being able to complete
authentication and learn the session key and MSK to allow the key
exchange to be completed as well, i.e., the attacker gaining access to
the network in case of the attack against the EAP server or the attacker
being able to operate a rogue AP in case of the attack against the EAP
peer.

While similar attacks might be applicable against SAE, it should be
noted that the SAE implementation in hostapd and wpa_supplicant does
have the validation steps that were missing from the EAP-pwd
implementation and as such, these attacks do not apply to the current
SAE implementation. Old versions of wpa_supplicant/hostapd did not
include the reflection attack check in the SAE implementation, though,
since that was added in June 2015 for v2.5 (commit 6a58444d27fd 'SAE:
Verify that own/peer commit-scalar and COMMIT-ELEMENT are different').

Vulnerable versions/configurations

All hostapd versions with EAP-pwd support (CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y in the build
configuration and EAP-pwd being enabled in the runtime configuration)
are vulnerable against the reflection attack.

All wpa_supplicant and hostapd versions with EAP-pwd support
(CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y in the build configuration and EAP-pwd being enabled
in the runtime configuration) are vulnerable against the invalid
scalar/element attack when built against a crypto library that does not
have an explicit validation step on imported EC points. The following
list indicates which cases are vulnerable/not vulnerable:
- OpenSSL v1.0.2 or older: vulnerable
- OpenSSL v1.1.0 or newer: not vulnerable
- BoringSSL with commit 38feb990a183 ('Require that EC points are on the
  curve.') from September 2015: not vulnerable
- BoringSSL without commit 38feb990a183: vulnerable
- LibreSSL: vulnerable
- wolfssl: vulnerable

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Mathy Vanhoef (New York University Abu Dhabi) for discovering
and reporting the issues and for proposing changes to address them in
the implementation.

Possible mitigation steps

- Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant/hostapd and rebuild:

  CVE-2019-9497:
  EAP-pwd server: Detect reflection attacks

  CVE-2019-9498:
  EAP-pwd server: Verify received scalar and element
  EAP-pwd: Check element x,y coordinates explicitly

  CVE-2019-9499:
  EAP-pwd client: Verify received scalar and element
  EAP-pwd: Check element x,y coordinates explicitly

  These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-4/

- Update to wpa_supplicant/hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available

Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
[bump PKG_RELEASE]
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
2019-04-11 11:26:01 +02:00
Stefan Lippers-Hollmann
57ab9e3add hostapd: fix CVE-2019-9496
hostapd: fix SAE confirm missing state validation

Published: April 10, 2019
Identifiers:
- CVE-2019-9496 (SAE confirm missing state validation in hostapd/AP)
Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-3/

Vulnerability

When hostapd is used to operate an access point with SAE (Simultaneous
Authentication of Equals; also known as WPA3-Personal), an invalid
authentication sequence could result in the hostapd process terminating
due to a NULL pointer dereference when processing SAE confirm
message. This was caused by missing state validation steps when
processing the SAE confirm message in hostapd/AP mode.

Similar cases against the wpa_supplicant SAE station implementation had
already been tested by the hwsim test cases, but those sequences did not
trigger this specific code path in AP mode which is why the issue was
not discovered earlier.

An attacker in radio range of an access point using hostapd in SAE
configuration could use this issue to perform a denial of service attack
by forcing the hostapd process to terminate.

Vulnerable versions/configurations

All hostapd versions with SAE support (CONFIG_SAE=y in the build
configuration and SAE being enabled in the runtime configuration).

Possible mitigation steps

- Merge the following commit to hostapd and rebuild:

  SAE: Fix confirm message validation in error cases

  These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-3/

- Update to hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available

Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
[bump PKG_RELEASE]
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
2019-04-11 11:26:01 +02:00
Stefan Lippers-Hollmann
262229e924 hostapd: fix CVE-2019-9495
EAP-pwd side-channel attack

Published: April 10, 2019
Identifiers:
- CVE-2019-9495 (cache attack against EAP-pwd)
Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-2/

Vulnerability

Number of potential side channel attacks were recently discovered in the
SAE implementations used by both hostapd and wpa_supplicant (see
security advisory 2019-1 and VU#871675). EAP-pwd uses a similar design
for deriving PWE from the password and while a specific attack against
EAP-pwd is not yet known to be tested, there is no reason to believe
that the EAP-pwd implementation would be immune against the type of
cache attack that was identified for the SAE implementation. Since the
EAP-pwd implementation in hostapd (EAP server) and wpa_supplicant (EAP
peer) does not support MODP groups, the timing attack described against
SAE is not applicable for the EAP-pwd implementation.

A novel cache-based attack against SAE handshake would likely be
applicable against the EAP-pwd implementation. Even though the
wpa_supplicant/hostapd PWE derivation iteration for EAP-pwd has
protections against timing attacks, this new cache-based attack might
enable an attacker to determine which code branch is taken in the
iteration if the attacker is able to run unprivileged code on the victim
machine (e.g., an app installed on a smart phone or potentially a
JavaScript code on a web site loaded by a web browser). This depends on
the used CPU not providing sufficient protection to prevent unprivileged
applications from observing memory access patterns through the shared
cache (which is the most likely case with today's designs).

The attacker could use information about the selected branch to learn
information about the password and combine this information from number
of handshake instances with an offline dictionary attack. With
sufficient number of handshakes and sufficiently weak password, this
might result in full recovery of the used password if that password is
not strong enough to protect against dictionary attacks.

This attack requires the attacker to be able to run a program on the
target device. This is not commonly the case on an authentication server
(EAP server), so the most likely target for this would be a client
device using EAP-pwd.

The commits listed in the end of this advisory change the EAP-pwd
implementation shared by hostapd and wpa_supplicant to perform the PWE
derivation loop using operations that use constant time and memory
access pattern to minimize the externally observable differences from
operations that depend on the password even for the case where the
attacker might be able to run unprivileged code on the same device.

Vulnerable versions/configurations

All wpa_supplicant and hostapd versions with EAP-pwd support
(CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y in the build configuration and EAP-pwd being enabled
in the runtime configuration).

It should also be noted that older versions of wpa_supplicant/hostapd
prior to v2.7 did not include additional protection against certain
timing differences. The definition of the EAP-pwd (RFC 5931) does not
describe such protection, but the same issue that was addressed in SAE
earlier can be applicable against EAP-pwd as well and as such, that
implementation specific extra protection (commit 22ac3dfebf7b, "EAP-pwd:
Mask timing of PWE derivation") is needed to avoid showing externally
visible timing differences that could leak information about the
password. Any uses of older wpa_supplicant/hostapd versions with EAP-pwd
are recommended to update to v2.7 or newer in addition to the mitigation
steps listed below for the more recently discovered issue.

Possible mitigation steps

- Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant/hostapd and rebuild:

  OpenSSL: Use constant time operations for private bignums
  Add helper functions for constant time operations
  OpenSSL: Use constant time selection for crypto_bignum_legendre()
  EAP-pwd: Use constant time and memory access for finding the PWE

  These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-2/

- Update to wpa_supplicant/hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available

- Use strong passwords to prevent dictionary attacks

Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
[bump PKG_RELEASE]
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
2019-04-11 11:26:01 +02:00
Stefan Lippers-Hollmann
af606d077f hostapd: fix CVE-2019-9494
SAE side-channel attacks

Published: April 10, 2019
Identifiers:
- VU#871675
- CVE-2019-9494 (cache attack against SAE)
Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-1/

Vulnerability

Number of potential side channel attacks were discovered in the SAE
implementations used by both hostapd (AP) and wpa_supplicant
(infrastructure BSS station/mesh station). SAE (Simultaneous
Authentication of Equals) is also known as WPA3-Personal. The discovered
side channel attacks may be able to leak information about the used
password based on observable timing differences and cache access
patterns. This might result in full password recovery when combined with
an offline dictionary attack and if the password is not strong enough to
protect against dictionary attacks.

Cache attack

A novel cache-based attack against SAE handshake was discovered. This
attack targets SAE with ECC groups. ECC group 19 being the mandatory
group to support and the most likely used group for SAE today, so this
attack applies to the most common SAE use case. Even though the PWE
derivation iteration in SAE has protections against timing attacks, this
new cache-based attack enables an attacker to determine which code
branch is taken in the iteration if the attacker is able to run
unprivileged code on the victim machine (e.g., an app installed on a
smart phone or potentially a JavaScript code on a web site loaded by a
web browser). This depends on the used CPU not providing sufficient
protection to prevent unprivileged applications from observing memory
access patterns through the shared cache (which is the most likely case
with today's designs).

The attacker can use information about the selected branch to learn
information about the password and combine this information from number
of handshake instances with an offline dictionary attack. With
sufficient number of handshakes and sufficiently weak password, this
might result in full discovery of the used password.

This attack requires the attacker to be able to run a program on the
target device. This is not commonly the case on access points, so the
most likely target for this would be a client device using SAE in an
infrastructure BSS or mesh BSS.

The commits listed in the end of this advisory change the SAE
implementation shared by hostapd and wpa_supplicant to perform the PWE
derivation loop using operations that use constant time and memory
access pattern to minimize the externally observable differences from
operations that depend on the password even for the case where the
attacker might be able to run unprivileged code on the same device.

Timing attack

The timing attack applies to the MODP groups 22, 23, and 24 where the
PWE generation algorithm defined for SAE can have sufficient timing
differences for an attacker to be able to determine how many rounds were
needed to find the PWE based on the used password and MAC
addresses. When the attack is repeated with multiple times, the attacker
may be able to gather enough information about the password to be able
to recover it fully using an offline dictionary attack if the password
is not strong enough to protect against dictionary attacks. This attack
could be performed by an attacker in radio range of an access point or a
station enabling the specific MODP groups.

This timing attack requires the applicable MODP groups to be enabled
explicitly in hostapd/wpa_supplicant configuration (sae_groups
parameter). All versions of hostapd/wpa_supplicant have disabled these
groups by default.

While this security advisory lists couple of commits introducing
additional protection for MODP groups in SAE, it should be noted that
the groups 22, 23, and 24 are not considered strong enough to meet the
current expectation for a secure system. As such, their use is
discouraged even if the additional protection mechanisms in the
implementation are included.

Vulnerable versions/configurations

All wpa_supplicant and hostapd versions with SAE support (CONFIG_SAE=y
in the build configuration and SAE being enabled in the runtime
configuration).

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Mathy Vanhoef (New York University Abu Dhabi) and Eyal Ronen
(Tel Aviv University) for discovering the issues and for discussions on
how to address them.

Possible mitigation steps

- Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant/hostapd and rebuild:

  OpenSSL: Use constant time operations for private bignums
  Add helper functions for constant time operations
  OpenSSL: Use constant time selection for crypto_bignum_legendre()
  SAE: Minimize timing differences in PWE derivation
  SAE: Avoid branches in is_quadratic_residue_blind()
  SAE: Mask timing of MODP groups 22, 23, 24
  SAE: Use const_time selection for PWE in FFC
  SAE: Use constant time operations in sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc()

  These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-1/

- Update to wpa_supplicant/hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available

- In addition to either of the above alternatives, disable MODP groups
  1, 2, 5, 22, 23, and 24 by removing them from hostapd/wpa_supplicant
  sae_groups runtime configuration parameter, if they were explicitly
  enabled since those groups are not considered strong enough to meet
  current security expectations. The groups 22, 23, and 24 are related
  to the discovered side channel (timing) attack. The other groups in
  the list are consider too weak to provide sufficient security. Note
  that all these groups have been disabled by default in all
  hostapd/wpa_supplicant versions and these would be used only if
  explicitly enabled in the configuration.

- Use strong passwords to prevent dictionary attacks

Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
[bump PKG_RELEASE]
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
2019-04-11 11:26:01 +02:00
Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind)
2e0f41e73a hostapd: add Multi-AP patches and config options
Cherry-pick Multi-AP commits from uptream:
 9c06f0f6a hostapd: Add Multi-AP protocol support
 5abc7823b wpa_supplicant: Add Multi-AP backhaul STA support
 a1debd338 tests: Refactor test_multi_ap
 bfcdac1c8 Multi-AP: Don't reject backhaul STA on fronthaul BSS
 cb3c156e7 tests: Update multi_ap_fronthaul_on_ap to match implementation
 56a2d788f WPS: Add multi_ap_subelem to wps_build_wfa_ext()
 83ebf5586 wpa_supplicant: Support Multi-AP backhaul STA onboarding with WPS
 66819b07b hostapd: Support Multi-AP backhaul STA onboarding with WPS
 8682f384c hostapd: Add README-MULTI-AP
 b1daf498a tests: Multi-AP WPS provisioning

Add support for Multi-AP to the UCI configuration. Every wifi-iface gets
an option 'multi_ap'. For APs, its value can be 0 (multi-AP support
disabled), 1 (backhaul AP), 2 (fronthaul AP), or 3 (fronthaul + backhaul
AP). For STAs, it can be 0 (not a backhaul STA) or 1 (backhaul STA, can
only associate with backhaul AP).

Also add new optional parameter to wps_start ubus call of
wpa_supplicant to indicate that a Multi-AP backhaul link is required.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
2019-02-20 13:17:11 +01:00
Felix Fietkau
5b6997dcb3 hostapd: update the fix for a race condition in mesh new peer handling
Prevent the mesh authentication state machine from getting reset on bogus
new peer discovery

Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
2019-02-17 16:06:44 +01:00
Felix Fietkau
db93949aa3 hostapd: fix race condition in mesh new peer handling
Avoid trying to add the same station to the driver multiple times

Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
2019-02-12 15:12:35 +01:00
Felix Fietkau
4443804b54 wpa_supplicant: fix calling channel switch via wpa_cli on mesh interfaces
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
2019-01-29 11:27:13 +01:00
Felix Fietkau
ae6b5815cd hostapd: add support for passing CSA events from sta/mesh to AP interfaces
Fixes handling CSA when using AP+STA or AP+Mesh

Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
2019-01-29 11:27:06 +01:00
Hauke Mehrtens
99956528df hostapd: update to version 2018-12-02 (2.7)
This updates hostapd to version the git version from 2018-12-02 which
matches the 2.7 release.

The removed patches were are already available in the upstream code, one
additional backport is needed to fix a compile problem.

Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
2019-01-02 15:47:13 +01:00
Daniel Golle
f5753aae23 hostapd: add support for WPS pushbutton station
similar to hostapd, also add a ubus interface for wpa_supplicant
which will allow handling WPS push-button just as it works for hostapd.
In order to have wpa_supplicant running without any network
configuration (so you can use it to retrieve credentials via WPS),
configure wifi-iface in /etc/config/wireless:

  config wifi-iface 'default_radio0'
      option device 'radio0'
      option network 'wwan'
      option mode 'sta'
      option encryption 'wps'

This section will automatically be edited if credentials have
successfully been acquired via WPS.

Size difference (mips_24kc): roughly +4kb for the 'full' variants of
wpa_supplicant and wpad which do support WPS.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
2018-12-12 09:37:23 +01:00
Jo-Philipp Wich
3e633bb370 hostapd: fix MAC filter related log spam
Backport two upstream fixes to address overly verbose logging of MAC ACL
rejection messages.

Fixes: FS#1468
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
2018-10-16 12:11:20 +02:00
Hauke Mehrtens
a1ad1144b6 hostapd: SAE: Do not ignore option sae_require_mfp
This patch was send for integration into the hostapd project.

Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
2018-10-14 13:57:14 +02:00
Hauke Mehrtens
779773a0de hostapd: backport build fix when OWE is activated
This backports a compile fix form the hostapd project.

Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
2018-10-14 13:57:14 +02:00
Rosen Penev
f78e07ad2a hostapd: Fix compile with OpenSSL 1.1.0 + no deprecated APIs
Patch was accepted upsteam:

https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=373c796948599a509bad71695b5b72eef003f661

Signed-off-by: Rosen Penev <rosenp@gmail.com>
2018-09-10 09:01:37 +02:00
John Crispin
1961948585 wpa_supplicant: fix CVE-2018-14526
Unauthenticated EAPOL-Key decryption in wpa_supplicant

Published: August 8, 2018
Identifiers:
- CVE-2018-14526
Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/

Vulnerability

A vulnerability was found in how wpa_supplicant processes EAPOL-Key
frames. It is possible for an attacker to modify the frame in a way that
makes wpa_supplicant decrypt the Key Data field without requiring a
valid MIC value in the frame, i.e., without the frame being
authenticated. This has a potential issue in the case where WPA2/RSN
style of EAPOL-Key construction is used with TKIP negotiated as the
pairwise cipher. It should be noted that WPA2 is not supposed to be used
with TKIP as the pairwise cipher. Instead, CCMP is expected to be used
and with that pairwise cipher, this vulnerability is not applicable in
practice.

When TKIP is negotiated as the pairwise cipher, the EAPOL-Key Key Data
field is encrypted using RC4. This vulnerability allows unauthenticated
EAPOL-Key frames to be processed and due to the RC4 design, this makes
it possible for an attacker to modify the plaintext version of the Key
Data field with bitwise XOR operations without knowing the contents.
This can be used to cause a denial of service attack by modifying
GTK/IGTK on the station (without the attacker learning any of the keys)
which would prevent the station from accepting received group-addressed
frames. Furthermore, this might be abused by making wpa_supplicant act
as a decryption oracle to try to recover some of the Key Data payload
(GTK/IGTK) to get knowledge of the group encryption keys.

Full recovery of the group encryption keys requires multiple attempts
(128 connection attempts per octet) and each attempt results in
disconnection due to a failure to complete the 4-way handshake. These
failures can result in the AP/network getting disabled temporarily or
even permanently (requiring user action to re-enable) which may make it
impractical to perform the attack to recover the keys before the AP has
already changes the group keys. By default, wpa_supplicant is enforcing
at minimum a ten second wait time between each failed connection
attempt, i.e., over 20 minutes waiting to recover each octet while
hostapd AP implementation uses 10 minute default for GTK rekeying when
using TKIP. With such timing behavior, practical attack would need large
number of impacted stations to be trying to connect to the same AP to be
able to recover sufficient information from the GTK to be able to
determine the key before it gets changed.

Vulnerable versions/configurations

All wpa_supplicant versions.

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Mathy Vanhoef of the imec-DistriNet research group of KU
Leuven for discovering and reporting this issue.

Possible mitigation steps

- Remove TKIP as an allowed pairwise cipher in RSN/WPA2 networks. This
can be done also on the AP side.

- Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant and rebuild:

WPA: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data

This patch is available from https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/

- Update to wpa_supplicant v2.7 or newer, once available

Signed-off-by: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org>
2018-08-10 15:48:21 +02:00
Nick Hainke
abefb4fda3 hostapd: add ht and vht support in handle event function Add ht and vht capabilities. If a device sends a probe request, the capabilities are added.
Signed-off-by: Nick Hainke <vincent@systemli.org>
2018-07-30 11:01:04 +02:00
Felix Fietkau
f0ac9afe69 hostapd: remove unused struct hostapd_ubus_iface
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
2018-07-22 17:17:20 +02:00
Felix Fietkau
6dac92a42e hostapd: build with LTO enabled (using jobserver for parallel build)
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
2018-07-10 14:26:35 +02:00
Denton Gentry
a84962ea35 hostapd: make cli treat UNKNOWN COMMAND as failing
Avoid infinite loop at 100% CPU when running hostapd_cli
if CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_MIB is not defined.

  _newselect(4, [3], NULL, NULL, ...)
  recvfrom(3, "UNKNOWN COMMAND\n", 4095, 0, NULL, NULL) = 16
  sendto(3, "STA-NEXT UNKNOWN COMMAND", 24, 0, NULL, 0) = 24

Signed-off-by: Denton Gentry <denny@geekhold.com>
2018-06-07 09:27:50 +02:00