Commit Graph

1201 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Rosy Song
524810ce6d dropbear: allow build without dbclient
This can save ~16KBytes size for the ipk

Signed-off-by: Rosy Song <rosysong@rosinson.com>
2019-04-18 22:34:19 +02:00
Hans Dedecker
e20c2909a5 odhcpd: update to latest git HEAD (FS#2206)
38bc630 router: use ra_lifetime as lifetime for RA options (FS#2206)
0523bdd router: improve code readibility
0a3b279 Revert "router:"
207f8e0 treewide: align syslog loglevels
f1d7da9 router:
0e048ac treewide: fix compiler warnings
83698f6 CMakeList.txt: enable extra compiler checks

Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
2019-04-17 14:43:38 +02:00
Stefan Lippers-Hollmann
8f17c019a1 hostapd: fix CVE-2019-9497, CVE-2019-9498, CVE-2019-9499
EAP-pwd missing commit validation

Published: April 10, 2019
Identifiers:
- CVE-2019-9497 (EAP-pwd server not checking for reflection attack)
- CVE-2019-9498 (EAP-pwd server missing commit validation for
  scalar/element)
- CVE-2019-9499 (EAP-pwd peer missing commit validation for
  scalar/element)

Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-4/

Vulnerability

EAP-pwd implementation in hostapd (EAP server) and wpa_supplicant (EAP
peer) was discovered not to validate the received scalar and element
values in EAP-pwd-Commit messages properly. This could result in attacks
that would be able to complete EAP-pwd authentication exchange without
the attacker having to know the used password.

A reflection attack is possible against the EAP-pwd server since the
hostapd EAP server did not verify that the EAP-pwd-Commit contains
scalar/element values that differ from the ones the server sent out
itself. This allows the attacker to complete EAP-pwd authentication
without knowing the password, but this does not result in the attacker
being able to derive the session key (MSK), i.e., the attacker would not
be able to complete the following key exchange (e.g., 4-way handshake in
RSN/WPA).

An attack using invalid scalar/element values is possible against both
the EAP-pwd server and peer since hostapd and wpa_supplicant did not
validate these values in the received EAP-pwd-Commit messages. If the
used crypto library does not implement additional checks for the element
(EC point), this could result in attacks where the attacker could use a
specially crafted commit message values to manipulate the exchange to
result in deriving a session key value from a very small set of possible
values. This could further be used to attack the EAP-pwd server in a
practical manner. An attack against the EAP-pwd peer is slightly more
complex, but still consider practical. These invalid scalar/element
attacks could result in the attacker being able to complete
authentication and learn the session key and MSK to allow the key
exchange to be completed as well, i.e., the attacker gaining access to
the network in case of the attack against the EAP server or the attacker
being able to operate a rogue AP in case of the attack against the EAP
peer.

While similar attacks might be applicable against SAE, it should be
noted that the SAE implementation in hostapd and wpa_supplicant does
have the validation steps that were missing from the EAP-pwd
implementation and as such, these attacks do not apply to the current
SAE implementation. Old versions of wpa_supplicant/hostapd did not
include the reflection attack check in the SAE implementation, though,
since that was added in June 2015 for v2.5 (commit 6a58444d27fd 'SAE:
Verify that own/peer commit-scalar and COMMIT-ELEMENT are different').

Vulnerable versions/configurations

All hostapd versions with EAP-pwd support (CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y in the build
configuration and EAP-pwd being enabled in the runtime configuration)
are vulnerable against the reflection attack.

All wpa_supplicant and hostapd versions with EAP-pwd support
(CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y in the build configuration and EAP-pwd being enabled
in the runtime configuration) are vulnerable against the invalid
scalar/element attack when built against a crypto library that does not
have an explicit validation step on imported EC points. The following
list indicates which cases are vulnerable/not vulnerable:
- OpenSSL v1.0.2 or older: vulnerable
- OpenSSL v1.1.0 or newer: not vulnerable
- BoringSSL with commit 38feb990a183 ('Require that EC points are on the
  curve.') from September 2015: not vulnerable
- BoringSSL without commit 38feb990a183: vulnerable
- LibreSSL: vulnerable
- wolfssl: vulnerable

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Mathy Vanhoef (New York University Abu Dhabi) for discovering
and reporting the issues and for proposing changes to address them in
the implementation.

Possible mitigation steps

- Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant/hostapd and rebuild:

  CVE-2019-9497:
  EAP-pwd server: Detect reflection attacks

  CVE-2019-9498:
  EAP-pwd server: Verify received scalar and element
  EAP-pwd: Check element x,y coordinates explicitly

  CVE-2019-9499:
  EAP-pwd client: Verify received scalar and element
  EAP-pwd: Check element x,y coordinates explicitly

  These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-4/

- Update to wpa_supplicant/hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available

Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
[bump PKG_RELEASE]
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
2019-04-11 11:26:01 +02:00
Stefan Lippers-Hollmann
57ab9e3add hostapd: fix CVE-2019-9496
hostapd: fix SAE confirm missing state validation

Published: April 10, 2019
Identifiers:
- CVE-2019-9496 (SAE confirm missing state validation in hostapd/AP)
Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-3/

Vulnerability

When hostapd is used to operate an access point with SAE (Simultaneous
Authentication of Equals; also known as WPA3-Personal), an invalid
authentication sequence could result in the hostapd process terminating
due to a NULL pointer dereference when processing SAE confirm
message. This was caused by missing state validation steps when
processing the SAE confirm message in hostapd/AP mode.

Similar cases against the wpa_supplicant SAE station implementation had
already been tested by the hwsim test cases, but those sequences did not
trigger this specific code path in AP mode which is why the issue was
not discovered earlier.

An attacker in radio range of an access point using hostapd in SAE
configuration could use this issue to perform a denial of service attack
by forcing the hostapd process to terminate.

Vulnerable versions/configurations

All hostapd versions with SAE support (CONFIG_SAE=y in the build
configuration and SAE being enabled in the runtime configuration).

Possible mitigation steps

- Merge the following commit to hostapd and rebuild:

  SAE: Fix confirm message validation in error cases

  These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-3/

- Update to hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available

Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
[bump PKG_RELEASE]
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
2019-04-11 11:26:01 +02:00
Stefan Lippers-Hollmann
262229e924 hostapd: fix CVE-2019-9495
EAP-pwd side-channel attack

Published: April 10, 2019
Identifiers:
- CVE-2019-9495 (cache attack against EAP-pwd)
Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-2/

Vulnerability

Number of potential side channel attacks were recently discovered in the
SAE implementations used by both hostapd and wpa_supplicant (see
security advisory 2019-1 and VU#871675). EAP-pwd uses a similar design
for deriving PWE from the password and while a specific attack against
EAP-pwd is not yet known to be tested, there is no reason to believe
that the EAP-pwd implementation would be immune against the type of
cache attack that was identified for the SAE implementation. Since the
EAP-pwd implementation in hostapd (EAP server) and wpa_supplicant (EAP
peer) does not support MODP groups, the timing attack described against
SAE is not applicable for the EAP-pwd implementation.

A novel cache-based attack against SAE handshake would likely be
applicable against the EAP-pwd implementation. Even though the
wpa_supplicant/hostapd PWE derivation iteration for EAP-pwd has
protections against timing attacks, this new cache-based attack might
enable an attacker to determine which code branch is taken in the
iteration if the attacker is able to run unprivileged code on the victim
machine (e.g., an app installed on a smart phone or potentially a
JavaScript code on a web site loaded by a web browser). This depends on
the used CPU not providing sufficient protection to prevent unprivileged
applications from observing memory access patterns through the shared
cache (which is the most likely case with today's designs).

The attacker could use information about the selected branch to learn
information about the password and combine this information from number
of handshake instances with an offline dictionary attack. With
sufficient number of handshakes and sufficiently weak password, this
might result in full recovery of the used password if that password is
not strong enough to protect against dictionary attacks.

This attack requires the attacker to be able to run a program on the
target device. This is not commonly the case on an authentication server
(EAP server), so the most likely target for this would be a client
device using EAP-pwd.

The commits listed in the end of this advisory change the EAP-pwd
implementation shared by hostapd and wpa_supplicant to perform the PWE
derivation loop using operations that use constant time and memory
access pattern to minimize the externally observable differences from
operations that depend on the password even for the case where the
attacker might be able to run unprivileged code on the same device.

Vulnerable versions/configurations

All wpa_supplicant and hostapd versions with EAP-pwd support
(CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y in the build configuration and EAP-pwd being enabled
in the runtime configuration).

It should also be noted that older versions of wpa_supplicant/hostapd
prior to v2.7 did not include additional protection against certain
timing differences. The definition of the EAP-pwd (RFC 5931) does not
describe such protection, but the same issue that was addressed in SAE
earlier can be applicable against EAP-pwd as well and as such, that
implementation specific extra protection (commit 22ac3dfebf7b, "EAP-pwd:
Mask timing of PWE derivation") is needed to avoid showing externally
visible timing differences that could leak information about the
password. Any uses of older wpa_supplicant/hostapd versions with EAP-pwd
are recommended to update to v2.7 or newer in addition to the mitigation
steps listed below for the more recently discovered issue.

Possible mitigation steps

- Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant/hostapd and rebuild:

  OpenSSL: Use constant time operations for private bignums
  Add helper functions for constant time operations
  OpenSSL: Use constant time selection for crypto_bignum_legendre()
  EAP-pwd: Use constant time and memory access for finding the PWE

  These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-2/

- Update to wpa_supplicant/hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available

- Use strong passwords to prevent dictionary attacks

Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
[bump PKG_RELEASE]
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
2019-04-11 11:26:01 +02:00
Stefan Lippers-Hollmann
af606d077f hostapd: fix CVE-2019-9494
SAE side-channel attacks

Published: April 10, 2019
Identifiers:
- VU#871675
- CVE-2019-9494 (cache attack against SAE)
Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-1/

Vulnerability

Number of potential side channel attacks were discovered in the SAE
implementations used by both hostapd (AP) and wpa_supplicant
(infrastructure BSS station/mesh station). SAE (Simultaneous
Authentication of Equals) is also known as WPA3-Personal. The discovered
side channel attacks may be able to leak information about the used
password based on observable timing differences and cache access
patterns. This might result in full password recovery when combined with
an offline dictionary attack and if the password is not strong enough to
protect against dictionary attacks.

Cache attack

A novel cache-based attack against SAE handshake was discovered. This
attack targets SAE with ECC groups. ECC group 19 being the mandatory
group to support and the most likely used group for SAE today, so this
attack applies to the most common SAE use case. Even though the PWE
derivation iteration in SAE has protections against timing attacks, this
new cache-based attack enables an attacker to determine which code
branch is taken in the iteration if the attacker is able to run
unprivileged code on the victim machine (e.g., an app installed on a
smart phone or potentially a JavaScript code on a web site loaded by a
web browser). This depends on the used CPU not providing sufficient
protection to prevent unprivileged applications from observing memory
access patterns through the shared cache (which is the most likely case
with today's designs).

The attacker can use information about the selected branch to learn
information about the password and combine this information from number
of handshake instances with an offline dictionary attack. With
sufficient number of handshakes and sufficiently weak password, this
might result in full discovery of the used password.

This attack requires the attacker to be able to run a program on the
target device. This is not commonly the case on access points, so the
most likely target for this would be a client device using SAE in an
infrastructure BSS or mesh BSS.

The commits listed in the end of this advisory change the SAE
implementation shared by hostapd and wpa_supplicant to perform the PWE
derivation loop using operations that use constant time and memory
access pattern to minimize the externally observable differences from
operations that depend on the password even for the case where the
attacker might be able to run unprivileged code on the same device.

Timing attack

The timing attack applies to the MODP groups 22, 23, and 24 where the
PWE generation algorithm defined for SAE can have sufficient timing
differences for an attacker to be able to determine how many rounds were
needed to find the PWE based on the used password and MAC
addresses. When the attack is repeated with multiple times, the attacker
may be able to gather enough information about the password to be able
to recover it fully using an offline dictionary attack if the password
is not strong enough to protect against dictionary attacks. This attack
could be performed by an attacker in radio range of an access point or a
station enabling the specific MODP groups.

This timing attack requires the applicable MODP groups to be enabled
explicitly in hostapd/wpa_supplicant configuration (sae_groups
parameter). All versions of hostapd/wpa_supplicant have disabled these
groups by default.

While this security advisory lists couple of commits introducing
additional protection for MODP groups in SAE, it should be noted that
the groups 22, 23, and 24 are not considered strong enough to meet the
current expectation for a secure system. As such, their use is
discouraged even if the additional protection mechanisms in the
implementation are included.

Vulnerable versions/configurations

All wpa_supplicant and hostapd versions with SAE support (CONFIG_SAE=y
in the build configuration and SAE being enabled in the runtime
configuration).

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Mathy Vanhoef (New York University Abu Dhabi) and Eyal Ronen
(Tel Aviv University) for discovering the issues and for discussions on
how to address them.

Possible mitigation steps

- Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant/hostapd and rebuild:

  OpenSSL: Use constant time operations for private bignums
  Add helper functions for constant time operations
  OpenSSL: Use constant time selection for crypto_bignum_legendre()
  SAE: Minimize timing differences in PWE derivation
  SAE: Avoid branches in is_quadratic_residue_blind()
  SAE: Mask timing of MODP groups 22, 23, 24
  SAE: Use const_time selection for PWE in FFC
  SAE: Use constant time operations in sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc()

  These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-1/

- Update to wpa_supplicant/hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available

- In addition to either of the above alternatives, disable MODP groups
  1, 2, 5, 22, 23, and 24 by removing them from hostapd/wpa_supplicant
  sae_groups runtime configuration parameter, if they were explicitly
  enabled since those groups are not considered strong enough to meet
  current security expectations. The groups 22, 23, and 24 are related
  to the discovered side channel (timing) attack. The other groups in
  the list are consider too weak to provide sufficient security. Note
  that all these groups have been disabled by default in all
  hostapd/wpa_supplicant versions and these would be used only if
  explicitly enabled in the configuration.

- Use strong passwords to prevent dictionary attacks

Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
[bump PKG_RELEASE]
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
2019-04-11 11:26:01 +02:00
Florian Eckert
2101002b3d wireguard: remove obvious comments
Remove obvious comments to save disk space.

Signed-off-by: Florian Eckert <fe@dev.tdt.de>
2019-04-09 22:25:11 +02:00
Florian Eckert
78b6931a1a wireguard: converted whitespaces from space to tab
With this change, the file is reduced from 5186 bytes to 4649 bytes that
its approximately 10.5 percent less memory consumption. For small
devices, sometimes every byte counts.
Also, all other protocol handler use tabs instead of spaces.

Signed-off-by: Florian Eckert <fe@dev.tdt.de>
2019-04-09 22:25:02 +02:00
Hans Dedecker
80568e5854 dropbear: bump to 2019.78
Fix dbclient regression in 2019.77. After exiting the terminal would be left
in a bad state. Reported by Ryan Woodsmall

drop patch applied upstream:
	010-tty-modes-werent-reset-for-client.patch

Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
2019-04-07 20:32:55 +02:00
Jason A. Donenfeld
549d44736a wireguard: bump to 0.0.20190406
* allowedips: initialize list head when removing intermediate nodes

Fix for an important regression in removing allowed IPs from the last
snapshot. We have new test cases to catch these in the future as well.

* tools: warn if an AllowedIP has a nonzero host part

If you try to run `wg set wg0 peer ... allowed-ips 192.168.1.82/24`, wg(8)
will now print a warning. Even though we mask this automatically down to
192.168.1.0/24, usually when people specify it like this, it's a mistake.

* wg-quick: add 'strip' subcommand

The new strip subcommand prints the config file to stdout after stripping
it of all wg-quick-specific options. This enables tricks such as:
`wg addconf $DEV <(wg-quick strip $DEV)`.

* tools: avoid unneccessary next_peer assignments in sort_peers()

Small C optimization the compiler was probably already doing.

* peerlookup: rename from hashtables
* allowedips: do not use __always_inline
* device: use skb accessor functions where possible

Suggested tweaks from Dave Miller.

* blake2s: simplify
* blake2s: remove outlen parameter from final

The blake2s implementation has been simplified, since we don't use any of the
fancy tree hashing parameters or the like. We also no longer separate the
output length at initialization time from the output length at finalization
time.

* global: the _bh variety of rcu helpers have been unified
* compat: nf_nat_core.h was removed upstream
* compat: backport skb_mark_not_on_list

The usual assortment of compat fixes for Linux 5.1.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2019-04-06 17:26:47 +02:00
Hans Dedecker
f483274422 odhcpd: update to latest git HEAD
65a9519 ndp: create ICMPv6 socket per interface
c6dae8e router: create ICMPv6 socket per interface
e7b1d4b treewide: initialize properly file descriptors

Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
2019-04-05 12:04:01 +02:00
Magnus Kroken
701b8d0050 openvpn: openssl: explicitly depend on deprecated APIs
OpenVPN as of 2.4.7 uses some OpenSSL APIs that are deprecated in
OpenSSL >= 1.1.0.

Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com> [white space fix]
2019-04-03 10:00:39 +02:00
Magnus Kroken
4376c06e80 openvpn: update to 2.4.7
Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com>
2019-04-01 11:23:43 +02:00
Hans Dedecker
6df5ab89cf odhcpd: update to latest git HEAD
7798d50 netlink: rework IPv4 address refresh logic
0b20876 netlink: rework IPv6 address refresh logic

Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
2019-03-29 15:55:08 +01:00
Daniel Golle
28920330f8 wireguard: introduce 'nohostroute' option
Instead of creating host-routes depending on fwmark as (accidentally)
pushed by commit
1e8bb50b93 ("wireguard: do not add host-dependencies if fwmark is set")
use a new config option 'nohostroute' to explicitely prevent creation
of the route to the endpoint.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
2019-03-27 22:59:03 +01:00
Daniel Golle
1e8bb50b93 wireguard: do not add host-dependencies if fwmark is set
The 'fwmark' option is used to define routing traffic to
wireguard endpoints to go through specific routing tables.
In that case it doesn't make sense to setup routes for
host-dependencies in the 'main' table, so skip setting host
dependencies if 'fwmark' is set.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
2019-03-27 22:53:14 +01:00
Hans Dedecker
b2152c8e6b odhcpd: update to latest git HEAD (FS#2204)
420945c netlink: fix IPv6 address updates (FS#2204)

Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
2019-03-27 21:05:07 +01:00
Konstantin Demin
01964148c6 dropbear: split ECC support to basic and full
- limit ECC support to ec*-sha2-nistp256:
  * DROPBEAR_ECC now provides only basic support for ECC
- provide full ECC support as an option:
  * DROPBEAR_ECC_FULL brings back support for ec{dh,dsa}-sha2-nistp{384,521}
- update feature costs in binary size

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
2019-03-25 22:25:35 +01:00
Konstantin Demin
5eb7864aad dropbear: rewrite init script startup logic to handle both host key files
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
2019-03-25 22:25:34 +01:00
Konstantin Demin
6145e59881 dropbear: change type of config option "Port" to scalar type "port"
it was never used anywhere, even LuCI works with "Port" as scalar type.

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
2019-03-25 22:25:34 +01:00
Konstantin Demin
5d27b10c61 dropbear: introduce config option "keyfile" (replacement for "rsakeyfile")
* option "keyfile" is more generic than "rsakeyfile".
* option "rsakeyfile" is considered to be deprecated and should be removed
  in future releases.
* warn user (in syslog) if option "rsakeyfile" is used
* better check options ("rsakeyfile" and "keyfile"): don't append
  "-r keyfile" to command line if file is absent (doesn't exist or empty),
  warn user (in syslog) about such files

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
2019-03-25 22:25:34 +01:00
Konstantin Demin
efc533cc2f dropbear: add initial support for ECC host key
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
2019-03-25 22:25:33 +01:00
Konstantin Demin
c40a84cc15 dropbear: fix regression where TTY modes weren't reset for client
cherry-pick upstream commit 7bc6280613f5ab4ee86c14c779739070e5784dfe

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
2019-03-25 22:25:33 +01:00
Konstantin Demin
ddf1a06326 dropbear: honour CFLAGS while building bundled libtomcrypt/libtommath
Felix Fietkau pointed out that bundled libtomcrypt/libtommath do funny stuff with CFLAGS.
fix this with checking environment variable OPENWRT_BUILD in both libs.
change in dropbear binary size is drastical: 221621 -> 164277.

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
2019-03-25 22:25:33 +01:00
Konstantin Demin
9c3bfd0906 dropbear: fix hardening flags during configure
compiler complains about messed up CFLAGS in build log:
  <command-line>: warning: "_FORTIFY_SOURCE" redefined
  <command-line>: note: this is the location of the previous definition

and then linker fails:
  mips-openwrt-linux-musl-gcc [...] -o dropbearmulti [...]
  collect2: fatal error: ld terminated with signal 11 [Segmentation fault]
  compilation terminated.
  /staging_dir/toolchain-mips_24kc_gcc-8.2.0_musl/mips-openwrt-linux-musl/bin/ld: /tmp/cc27zORz.ltrans0.ltrans.o: relocation R_MIPS_HI16 against `cipher_descriptor' can not be used when making a shared object; recompile with -fPIC
  /staging_dir/toolchain-mips_24kc_gcc-8.2.0_musl/mips-openwrt-linux-musl/bin/ld: /tmp/cc27zORz.ltrans1.ltrans.o: relocation R_MIPS_HI16 against `ses' can not be used when making a shared object; recompile with -fPIC
  /staging_dir/toolchain-mips_24kc_gcc-8.2.0_musl/mips-openwrt-linux-musl/bin/ld: /tmp/cc27zORz.ltrans2.ltrans.o: relocation R_MIPS_HI16 against `cipher_descriptor' can not be used when making a shared object; recompile with -fPIC
  /staging_dir/toolchain-mips_24kc_gcc-8.2.0_musl/mips-openwrt-linux-musl/bin/ld: BFD (GNU Binutils) 2.31.1 assertion fail elfxx-mips.c:6550
  [...]
  /staging_dir/toolchain-mips_24kc_gcc-8.2.0_musl/mips-openwrt-linux-musl/bin/ld: BFD (GNU Binutils) 2.31.1 assertion fail elfxx-mips.c:6550
  make[3]: *** [Makefile:198: dropbearmulti] Error 1
  make[3]: *** Deleting file 'dropbearmulti'
  make[3]: Leaving directory '/build_dir/target-mips_24kc_musl/dropbear-2018.76'
  make[2]: *** [Makefile:158: /build_dir/target-mips_24kc_musl/dropbear-2018.76/.built] Error 2
  make[2]: Leaving directory '/package/network/services/dropbear'

This FTBFS issue was caused by hardening flags set up by dropbear's configure script.

By default, Dropbear offers hardening via CFLAGS and LDFLAGS,
but this may break or confuse OpenWrt settings.

Remove most Dropbear's hardening settings in favour of precise build,
but preserve Spectre v2 mitigations:
* -mfunction-return=thunk
* -mindirect-branch=thunk

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
2019-03-25 22:25:33 +01:00
Konstantin Demin
a1099edf32 dropbear: bump to 2019.77
- drop patches applied upstream:
  * 010-runtime-maxauthtries.patch
  * 020-Wait-to-fail-invalid-usernames.patch
  * 150-dbconvert_standalone.patch
  * 610-skip-default-keys-in-custom-runs.patch
- refresh patches
- move OpenWrt configuration from patch to Build/Configure recipe,
  thus drop patch 120-openwrt_options.patch

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
2019-03-25 22:25:32 +01:00
Hans Dedecker
1ca69003fd odhcpd: update to latest git HEAD (FS#2160)
6d23385 dhcpv6: extra syslog tracing
b076916 dhcpv6/router: add support for mutiple master interfaces
e4a24dc ndp: fix adding proxy neighbor entries
4ca7f7e router: add extra syslog tracing
8318e93 netlink: fix neighbor event handling (FS#2160)

Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
2019-03-21 16:06:10 +01:00
Jason A. Donenfeld
2e9b92da1f wireguard: bump to 0.0.20190227
* wg-quick: freebsd: allow loopback to work

FreeBSD adds a route for point-to-point destination addresses. We don't
really want to specify any destination address, but unfortunately we
have to. Before we tried to cheat by giving our own address as the
destination, but this had the unfortunate effect of preventing
loopback from working on our local ip address. We work around this with
yet another kludge: we set the destination address to 127.0.0.1. Since
127.0.0.1 is already assigned to an interface, this has the same effect
of not specifying a destination address, and therefore we accomplish the
intended behavior. Note that the bad behavior is still present in Darwin,
where such workaround does not exist.

* tools: remove unused check phony declaration
* highlighter: when subtracting char, cast to unsigned
* chacha20: name enums
* tools: fight compiler slightly harder
* tools: c_acc doesn't need to be initialized
* queueing: more reasonable allocator function convention

Usual nits.

* systemd: wg-quick should depend on nss-lookup.target

Since wg-quick(8) calls wg(8) which does hostname lookups, we should
probably only run this after we're allowed to look up hostnames.

* compat: backport ALIGN_DOWN
* noise: whiten the nanoseconds portion of the timestamp

This mitigates unrelated sidechannel attacks that think they can turn
WireGuard into a useful time oracle.

* hashtables: decouple hashtable allocations from the main device allocation

The hashtable allocations are quite large, and cause the device allocation in
the net framework to stall sometimes while it tries to find a contiguous
region that can fit the device struct. To fix the allocation stalls, decouple
the hashtable allocations from the device allocation and allocate the
hashtables with kvmalloc's implicit __GFP_NORETRY so that the allocations fall
back to vmalloc with little resistance.

* chacha20poly1305: permit unaligned strides on certain platforms

The map allocations required to fix this are mostly slower than unaligned
paths.

* noise: store clamped key instead of raw key

This causes `wg show` to now show the right thing. Useful for doing
comparisons.

* compat: ipv6_stub is sometimes null

On ancient kernels, ipv6_stub is sometimes null in cases where IPv6 has
been disabled with a command line flag or other failures.

* Makefile: don't duplicate code in install and modules-install
* Makefile: make the depmod path configurable

* queueing: net-next has changed signature of skb_probe_transport_header

A 5.1 change. This could change again, but for now it allows us to keep this
snapshot aligned with our upstream submissions.

* netlink: don't remove allowed ips for new peers
* peer: only synchronize_rcu_bh and traverse trie once when removing all peers
* allowedips: maintain per-peer list of allowedips

This is a rather big and important change that makes it much much faster to do
operations involving thousands of peers. Batch peer/allowedip addition and
clearing is several orders of magnitude faster now.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2019-02-28 08:50:19 +01:00
Hans Dedecker
c8153722a2 odhcpd: update to latest git HEAD
16c5b6c ubus: always trigger an update if interface is not found

Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
2019-02-27 12:12:48 +01:00
David Santamaría Rogado
e9b2a1e382 omcproxy: define configuration file
omcproxy's configuration is lost on every update or installation.
Avoid it by defining the configuration file.

Signed-off-by: David Santamaría Rogado <howl.nsp@gmail.com>
2019-02-27 10:26:14 +01:00
Hans Dedecker
0b4b1027c6 odhcpd: update to latest git HEAD (FS#2142)
9e9389c dhcpv4: fix adding assignment in list (FS#2142)
e69265b dhcpv4: fix static lease lookup
afbd7dd dhcp: rework assignment free logic

Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
2019-02-25 12:07:52 +01:00
Alexander Couzens
b7f2adbdd3
package/dnsmasq: add max_ttl/min_cache_ttl/max_cache_ttl
max_ttl - limit the ttl in the dns answer if greater as $max_ttl
min_cache_ttl - force caching of dns answers even the ttl in the answer
		is lower than the $min_cache_ttl
max_cache_ttl - cache only dns answer for $max_cache_ttl.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Couzens <lynxis@fe80.eu>
2019-02-24 01:48:25 +01:00
Yousong Zhou
c17a68cc61 dnsmasq: prefer localuse over resolvfile guesswork
This makes it clear that localuse when explicitly specified in the
config will have its final say on whether or not the initscript should
touch /etc/resolv.conf, no matter whatever the result of previous
guesswork would be

Signed-off-by: Yousong Zhou <yszhou4tech@gmail.com>
2019-02-23 01:58:20 +00:00
Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind)
2e0f41e73a hostapd: add Multi-AP patches and config options
Cherry-pick Multi-AP commits from uptream:
 9c06f0f6a hostapd: Add Multi-AP protocol support
 5abc7823b wpa_supplicant: Add Multi-AP backhaul STA support
 a1debd338 tests: Refactor test_multi_ap
 bfcdac1c8 Multi-AP: Don't reject backhaul STA on fronthaul BSS
 cb3c156e7 tests: Update multi_ap_fronthaul_on_ap to match implementation
 56a2d788f WPS: Add multi_ap_subelem to wps_build_wfa_ext()
 83ebf5586 wpa_supplicant: Support Multi-AP backhaul STA onboarding with WPS
 66819b07b hostapd: Support Multi-AP backhaul STA onboarding with WPS
 8682f384c hostapd: Add README-MULTI-AP
 b1daf498a tests: Multi-AP WPS provisioning

Add support for Multi-AP to the UCI configuration. Every wifi-iface gets
an option 'multi_ap'. For APs, its value can be 0 (multi-AP support
disabled), 1 (backhaul AP), 2 (fronthaul AP), or 3 (fronthaul + backhaul
AP). For STAs, it can be 0 (not a backhaul STA) or 1 (backhaul STA, can
only associate with backhaul AP).

Also add new optional parameter to wps_start ubus call of
wpa_supplicant to indicate that a Multi-AP backhaul link is required.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
2019-02-20 13:17:11 +01:00
Yousong Zhou
ec2a2a2aea dnsmasq: allow using dnsmasq as the sole resolver
Currently it seems impossible to configure /etc/config/dhcp to achieve
the following use case

 - run dnsmasq with no-resolv
 - re-generate /etc/resolv.conf with "nameserver 127.0.0.1"

Before this change, we have to set resolvfile to /tmp/resolv.conf.auto
to achive the 2nd effect above, but setting resolvfile requires noresolv
being false.

A new boolean option "localuse" is added to indicate that we intend to
use dnsmasq as the local dns resolver.  It's false by default and to
align with old behaviour it will be true automatically if resolvfile is
set to /tmp/resolv.conf.auto

Signed-off-by: Yousong Zhou <yszhou4tech@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
2019-02-19 13:06:06 +00:00
Hans Dedecker
331963717b odhcpd: update to latest git HEAD
1f01299 config: fix build failure in case DHCPv4 support is disabled
67b3a14 dhcpv4: fix assignment of requested IP address
ca8ba91 dhcp: rework static lease logic
36833ea dhcpv6: rapid commit support
1ae316e dhcpv6: fix parsing of DHCPv6 relay messages
80157e1 dhcpv4: fix compile issue
671ccaa dhcpv6-ia: move function definitions to odhcpd.h
0db69b0 dhcpv6: improve code readibility
7847b27 treewide: unify dhcpv6 and dhcpv4 assignments
a54cee0 netlink: rework handling of netlink messages
9f25dd8 treewide: use avl tree to store interfaces
f21a0a7 treewide: align syslog tracing
edc5fb0 dhcpv6-ia: add full CONFIRM support
9d6eadf dhcpv6-ia: rework append_reply()

Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
2019-02-18 16:11:32 +01:00
Rosy Song
93b984b78a samba36: allow build with no ipv6 support
Signed-off-by: Rosy Song <rosysong@rosinson.com>
2019-02-17 19:22:39 +01:00
Jonas Gorski
c8a30172f8 dnsmasq: ensure test and rc order as older than final releases
Opkg treats text after a version number as higher than without:

 ~# opkg compare-versions "2.80rc1" "<<" "2.80"; echo $?
 1
 ~# opkg compare-versions "2.80rc1" ">>" "2.80"; echo $?
 0

This causes opkg not offering final release as upgradable version, and
even refusing to update, since it thinks the installed version is
higher.

This can be mitigated by adding ~ between the version and the text, as ~
will order as less than everything except itself. Since 'r' < 't', to
make sure that test will be treated as lower than rc we add a second ~
before the test tag. That way, the ordering becomes

  2.80~~test < 2.80~rc < 2.80

which then makes opkg properly treat prerelease versions as lower.

Signed-off-by: Jonas Gorski <jonas.gorski@gmail.com>
2019-02-17 16:55:24 +01:00
Felix Fietkau
5b6997dcb3 hostapd: update the fix for a race condition in mesh new peer handling
Prevent the mesh authentication state machine from getting reset on bogus
new peer discovery

Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
2019-02-17 16:06:44 +01:00
Felix Fietkau
f948aa4d4f hostapd: enable CONFIG_DEBUG_SYSLOG for wpa_supplicant
It was already enabled for wpad builds and since commit 6a15077e2d
the script relies on it. Size impact is minimal (2 kb on MIPS .ipk).

Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
2019-02-17 13:05:14 +01:00
Hans Dedecker
880f8e6d32 dnsmasq: add rapid commit config option
Add config option rapidcommit to enable support for DHCPv4 rapid
commit (RFC4039)

Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
2019-02-13 10:37:36 +01:00
Felix Fietkau
db93949aa3 hostapd: fix race condition in mesh new peer handling
Avoid trying to add the same station to the driver multiple times

Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
2019-02-12 15:12:35 +01:00
Felix Fietkau
6a15077e2d hostapd: send wpa_supplicant logging output to syslog
Helpful for debugging network connectivity issues

Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
2019-02-12 15:12:35 +01:00
Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant
352db3e62a dnsmasq: latest pre-2.81 patches
Signed-off-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <ldir@darbyshire-bryant.me.uk>
2019-01-31 10:13:05 +00:00
Jo-Philipp Wich
c6aa9ff388 uhttpd: disable concurrent requests by default
In order to avoid straining CPU and memory resources on lower end devices,
avoid running multiple CGI requests in parallel.

Ref: https://forum.openwrt.org/t/high-load-fix-on-openwrt-luci/29006
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
2019-01-30 10:12:00 +01:00
Felix Fietkau
4443804b54 wpa_supplicant: fix calling channel switch via wpa_cli on mesh interfaces
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
2019-01-29 11:27:13 +01:00
Felix Fietkau
ae6b5815cd hostapd: add support for passing CSA events from sta/mesh to AP interfaces
Fixes handling CSA when using AP+STA or AP+Mesh

Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
2019-01-29 11:27:06 +01:00
Martin Schiller
eaaee181d1 ppp: update to version 2.4.7.git-2018-06-23
This bumps ppp to latest git version.

There is one upstream commit, which changes DES encryption calls from
libcrypt / glibc to openssl.

As long as we don't use glibc-2.28, revert this commit.

Signed-off-by: Martin Schiller <ms@dev.tdt.de>
2019-01-25 14:55:46 +01:00
Jason A. Donenfeld
bbcd0634f8 wireguard: bump to 0.0.20190123
* tools: curve25519: handle unaligned loads/stores safely

This should fix sporadic crashes with `wg pubkey` on certain architectures.

* netlink: auth socket changes against namespace of socket

In WireGuard, the underlying UDP socket lives in the namespace where the
interface was created and doesn't move if the interface is moved. This
allows one to create the interface in some privileged place that has
Internet access, and then move it into a container namespace that only
has the WireGuard interface for egress. Consider the following
situation:

1. Interface created in namespace A. Socket therefore lives in namespace A.
2. Interface moved to namespace B. Socket remains in namespace A.
3. Namespace B now has access to the interface and changes the listen
port and/or fwmark of socket. Change is reflected in namespace A.

This behavior is arguably _fine_ and perhaps even expected or
acceptable. But there's also an argument to be made that B should have
A's cred to do so. So, this patch adds a simple ns_capable check.

* ratelimiter: build tests with !IPV6

Should reenable building in debug mode for systems without IPv6.

* noise: replace getnstimeofday64 with ktime_get_real_ts64
* ratelimiter: totalram_pages is now a function
* qemu: enable FP on MIPS

Linux 5.0 support.

* keygen-html: bring back pure javascript implementation

Benoît Viguier has proofs that values will stay well within 2^53. We
also have an improved carry function that's much simpler. Probably more
constant time than emscripten's 64-bit integers.

* contrib: introduce simple highlighter library

This is the highlighter library being used in:
- https://twitter.com/EdgeSecurity/status/1085294681003454465
- https://twitter.com/EdgeSecurity/status/1081953278248796165

It's included here as a contrib example, so that others can paste it into
their own GUI clients for having the same strictly validating highlighting.

* netlink: use __kernel_timespec for handshake time

This readies us for Y2038. See https://lwn.net/Articles/776435/ for more info.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2019-01-23 18:06:49 +01:00
Jeffery To
d13e86d4c2 procd: Add wrapper for uci_validate_section()
This adds a wrapper (uci_load_validate) for uci_validate_section() that
allows callers (through a callback function) to access the values set by
uci_validate_section(), without having to manually declare a
(potentially long) list of local variables.

The callback function receives two arguments when called, the config
section name and the return value of uci_validate_section().

If no callback function is given, then the wrapper exits with the value
returned by uci_validate_section().

This also updates several init scripts to use the new wrapper function.

Signed-off-by: Jeffery To <jeffery.to@gmail.com>
2019-01-22 09:05:59 +01:00