Also include the station auth_type in the ubus and log message in order
to detect, if clients used FT or FILS to associate
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
b704dc72e tests: sigma_dut and updated ConfResult value for Configurator failures
89de431f2 DPP: Add config response status value to DPP-CONF-SENT
10104915a tests: sigma_dut and DPP PB session overlap
80d5e264c Enhance QCA vendor roam event to indicate MLO links after reassociation
662249306 Update copyright notices for the QCA vendor definitions
8adcdd659 tests: Temporary workaround for dpp_chirp_ap_5g
ddcd15c2d tests: Fix fuzzing/sae build
7fa67861a tests: Fix p2p_channel_avoid3
ee3567d65 tests: Add more time for scan/connection
1d08b238c nl80211: Allow more time for the initial scan with 6 GHz
ac9e6a2ab tests: Allow 6 GHz opclasses in MBO checks
faf9c04cb Remove a host of unnecessary OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL ifdefs
b9cd5a82f Always process pending QCA_NL80211_VENDOR_SUBCMD_KEY_MGMT_ROAM_AUTH data
ef4cd8e33 QoS: Use common classifier_mask for ipv4/ipv6
93be02592 Add fixed FDD mode to qca_btc_chain_mode QCA vendor attribute
e7cbfa1c1 tests: sigma_dut and DPP Enrollee unsupported curves
5565fbee2 DPP: Check Enrollee supported curves when building Config Response
ceae05cec tests: sigma_dut and DPP MUDURL setting for hostapd
4cfb484e9 DPP: Allow dpp_controller_start without arguments in CLIs
c97000933 Fix ifdef condition for imsi_privacy_cert
2a9a61d6c tests: SAE with extended key AKM
e35f6ed1d tests: More detailed report on SAE PMKSA caching error case
f70db167a SAE: Derive a variable length PMK with the new AKM suites
91010e6f6 SAE: Indicate AKM suite selector in commit for new AKM suites
e81ec0962 SAE: Use H2E unconditionally with the new AKM suites
f8eed2e8b SAE: Store PMK length and AKM in SAE data
9dc4e9d13 SAE: EAPOL-Key and key/MIC length information for the new AKM suites
a32ef3cfb SAE: Driver capability flags for the new SAE AKM suites
91df8c9c6 SAE: Internal WPA_KEY_MGMT_* defines for extended key AKMs
5c8a714b1 SAE: Use wpa_key_mgmt_sae() helper
5456b0f26 Define new RSN AKM suite selector values
def33101c DPP: Clear push button announcement state on wpa_supplicant FLUSH
35587fa8f tests: DPP Controller/Relay with need to discover Controller
d22dfe918 DPP: Event message for indicating when Relay would need a Controller
ca7892e98 tests: DPP Relay and adding/removing connection to a Controller
bfe3cfc38 DPP: Allow Relay connections to Controllers to be added and removed
808834b18 Add a comparison function for hostapd_ip_addr
f7763880b DPP: Advertise Configurator connectivity on Relay automatically
ff7cc1d49 tests: DPP Relay and dynamic Controller addition
ca682f80a DPP: Dynamic Controller initiated connection on Relay
d2388bcca DPP: Strict validation of PKEX peer bootstrapping key during auth
a7b8cef8b DPP3: Fix push button boostrapping key passing through PKEX
69d7c8e6b DPP: Add peer=id entry for PKEX-over-TCP case
b607d2723 tests: sigma_dut and DPP PB Configurator in wpa_supplicant
1ff9251a8 DPP3: Push button Configurator in wpa_supplicant
b94e46bc7 tests: PB Configurator in wpa_supplicant
ca4e82cbf tests: sigma_dut DPP/PKEX initiator as Configurator over TCP and Wi-Fi
e9137950f DPP: Recognize own PKEX Exchange Request if it ends up being received
692956446 DPP: Note PKEX code/identifier deletion in debug log
dfa9183b1 tests: DPP reconfig after Controller-initiated operation through Relay
ae4a3a6f6 DPP: Add DPP-CONF-REQ-RX event for Controller
17216b524 tests: sigma_dut DPP/PKEX initiator as Configurator (TCP) through Relay
fb2937b85 DPP: Allow Controller to initiate PKEX through Relay
15af83cf1 DPP: Delete PKEX code and identifier on success completion of PKEX
d86ed5b72 tests: Allow DPP_PKEX_REMOVE success in dpp_pkex_hostapd_errors
0a4f391b1 tests: sigma_dut and DPP Connector Privacy
479e412a6 DPP3: Default value for dpp_connector_privacy
7d12871ba test: DPP Private Peer Introduction protocol
148de3e0d DPP3: Private Peer Introduction protocol
786ea402b HPKE base mode with single-shot API
f0273bc81 OpenSSL: Remove a forgotten debug print
f2bb0839f test: DPP 3rd party config information
68209ddbe DPP: Allow 3rd party information to be added into config object
0e2217c95 DPP: Allow 3rd party information to be added into config request obj
3d82fbe05 Add QCA vendor subcommand and attributes for SCS rule configuration
16b62ddfa QCA vendor attribute for DBAM configuration
004b1ff47 tests: DPP Controller initiating through Relay
451ede2c3 DPP: Allow AP/Relay to be configured to listed for new TCP connections
248654d36 tests: sigma_dut DPP PB test cases
697b7d7ec tests: DPP push button
7bbe85987 DPP3: Allow external configuration to be specified on AP for PB
8db786a43 DPP3: Testing functionality for push button announcements
37bccfcab DPP3: Push button bootstrap mechanism
a0054fe7c Add AP and STA specific P802.11az security capabilities (vendor command)
159e63613 QCA vendor command for CoAP offload processing
3b7bb17f6 Add QCA vendor attribute for TIM beacon statistics
09a281e52 Add QCA vendor interface for PASN offload to userspace
809fb96fa Add a vendor attribute to configure concurrency policy for AP interface
a5754f531 Rename QCA_NL80211_VENDOR_SUBCMD_CONCURRENT_MULTI_STA_POLICY
085a3fc76 EHT: Add 320 channel width support
bafe35df0 Move CHANWIDTH_* definitions from ieee80211_defs.h to defs.h
92f549901 tests: Remove the 80+80 vs. 160 part from wpa2_ocv_ap_vht160_mismatch
c580c2aec tests: Make OCV negative test error cases more robust
3c2ba98ad Add QCA vendor event to indicate driver recovery after internal failures
6b461f68c Set current_ssid before changing state to ASSOCIATING
8dd826741 QCA vendor attribute to configure direct data path for audio traffic
504be2f9d QCA vendor command support to get WLAN radio combinations
d5905dbc8 OCV: Check the Frequency Segment 1 Channel Number only on 80+80 MHz
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
Don't select channels designated for exclusive-indoor use when the
country3 element is set on outdoor operation.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
4383528e0 P2P: Use weighted preferred channel list for channel selection
f2c5c8d38 QCA vendor attribute to configure RX link speed threshold for roaming
94bc94b20 Add QCA vendor attribute for DO_ACS to allow using existing scan entries
b9e2826b9 P2P: Filter 6 GHz channels if peer doesn't support them
d5a9944b8 Reserve QCA vendor sub command id 206..212
ed63c286f Remove space before tab in QCA vendor commands
e4015440a ProxyARP: Clear bridge parameters on deinit only if hostapd set them
02047e9c8 hs20-osu-client: Explicit checks for snprintf() result
cd92f7f98 FIPS PRF: Avoid duplicate SHA1Init() functionality
5c87fcc15 OpenSSL: Use internal FIPS 186-2 PRF with OpenSSL 3.0
9e305878c SAE-PK: Fix build without AES-SIV
c41004d86 OpenSSL: Convert more crypto_ec_key routines to new EVP API
667a2959c OpenSSL: crypto_ec_key_get_public_key() using new EVP_PKEY API
5b97395b3 OpenSSL: crypto_ec_key_get_private_key() using new EVP_PKEY API
177ebfe10 crypto: Convert crypto_ec_key_get_public_key() to return new ec_point
26780d92f crypto: Convert crypto_ec_key_get_private_key() to return new bignum
c9c2c2d9c OpenSSL: Fix a memory leak on crypto_hash_init() error path
6d19dccf9 OpenSSL: Free OSSL_DECODER_CTX in tls_global_dh()
4f4479ef9 OpenSSL: crypto_ec_key_parse_{priv,pub}() without EC_KEY API
b092d8ee6 tests: imsi_privacy_attr
563699174 EAP-SIM/AKA peer: IMSI privacy attribute
1004fb7ee tests: Testing functionality to discard DPP Public Action frames
355069616 tests: Add forgotten files for expired IMSI privacy cert tests
b9a222cdd tests: sigma_dut and DPP curve-from-URI special functionality
fa36e7ee4 tests: sigma_dut controlled STA and EAP-AKA parameters
99165cc4b Rename wpa_supplicant imsi_privacy_key configuration parameter
dde7f90a4 tests: Update VM setup example to use Ubuntu 22.04 and UML
426932f06 tests: EAP-AKA and expired imsi_privacy_key
35eda6e70 EAP-SIM peer: Free imsi_privacy_key on an error path
1328cdeb1 Do not try to use network profile with invalid imsi_privacy_key
d1652dc7c OpenSSL: Refuse to accept expired RSA certificate
866e7b745 OpenSSL: Include rsa.h for OpenSSL 3.0
bc99366f9 OpenSSL: Drop security level to 0 with OpenSSL 3.0 when using TLS 1.0/1.1
39e662308 tests: Work around reentrant logging issues due to __del__ misuse
72641f924 tests: Clean up failed test list in parallel-vm.py
e36a7c794 tests: Support pycryptodome
a44744d3b tests: Set ECB mode for AES explicitly to work with cryptodome
e90ea900a tests: sigma_dut DPP TCP Configurator as initiator with addr from URI
ed325ff0f DPP: Allow TCP destination (address/port) to be used from peer URI
e58dabbcf tests: DPP URI with host info
37bb4178b DPP: Host information in bootstrapping URI
1142b6e41 EHT: Do not check HE PHY capability info reserved fields
7173992b9 tests: Flush scan table in ap_wps_priority to make it more robust
b9313e17e tests: Update ap_wpa2_psk_ext_delayed_ptk_rekey to match implementation
bc3699179 Use Secure=1 in PTK rekeying EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 and 2/4
d2ce1b4d6 tests: Wait for request before responding in dscp_response
Compile-tested: all versions / ath79-generic, ramips-mt7621
Run-tested: hostapd-wolfssl / ath79-generic, ramips-mt7621
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
Fix hostapd feature detection after the bump to 2022-05-08.
getopt was not updated correctly after upstream added support for -q arg.
This reenables feature detection so that LuCi can check for features like
SAE, fast roaming etc.
Fixes: c35ff1affe ("hostapd: update to 2022-05-08")
Signed-off-by: Robert Marko <robimarko@gmail.com>
In case no specific BSS color is configured, set it to a random value.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
Tested-by: Stijn Tintel <stijn@linux-ipv6.be>
Update hostapd to Git HEAD from 2022-05-08. This allows us to take
advantage of background radar-detection as well as BSS color collision
detection.
Suggested-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
Tested-by: Stijn Tintel <stijn@linux-ipv6.be>
Recently the hostapd has undergone many changes. The patches were not refreshed.
Refreshed with
make package/hostapd/{clean,refresh}
Refreshed:
- 380-disable_ctrl_iface_mib.patch
- 600-ubus_support.patch
- 700-wifi-reload.patch
- 720-iface_max_num_sta.patch
Signed-off-by: Nick Hainke <vincent@systemli.org>
The auto-ht option already kept HT and VHT support, but wasn't updated
to support HE (11ax).
Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
Provide incoming BSS transition queries to ubus subscribers.
This allows external steering daemons to provide clients with
an optimal list of transition candidates.
This commit has no functional state in case no ubus subscriber is
present or it does not handle this ubus message.
To prevent hostapd from sending out a generic response by itself, a
subscribing daemon has to return a non-zero response code to hostapd.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
Backport a patch to allow extending the ubus BSS-transition method
for specifying individual dialog tokens for BSS transition
management requests.
This is required for handling BSS transition queries in the future.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
This adds a new struct for storing statistics not (yet) tracked by
hostapd regarding RRM and WNM activity.
These statistics can be read using the get_status hostapd interface ubus
method.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
If authentication fails repeatedly e.g. because of a weak signal, the link
can end up in blocked state. If one of the nodes tries to establish a link
again before it is unblocked on the other side, it will block the link to
that other side. The same happens on the other side when it unblocks the
link. In that scenario, the link never recovers on its own.
To fix this, allow restarting authentication even if the link is in blocked
state, but don't initiate the attempt until the blocked period is over.
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
When procd-ujail is available, 1f78538387 runs hostapd as user
"network", with only limited additional capabilities (CAP_NET_ADMIN and
CAP_NET_RAW).
hostapd_cli (CONFIG_PACKAGE_hostapd-utils) communicates with hostapd
over a named UNIX-domain socket. hostapd_cli is responsible for creating
this socket at /tmp/wpa_ctrl_$pid_$counter. Since it typically runs as
root, this endpoint is normally created with uid root, gid root, mode
0755. As a result, hostapd running as uid network is able to receive
control messages sent through this interface, but is not able to respond
to them. If debug-level logging is enabled (CONFIG_WPA_MSG_MIN_PRIORITY
<= 2 at build, and log_level <= 2 in /etc/config/wireless wifi-device),
this message will appear from hostapd:
CTRL: sendto failed: Permission denied
As a fix, hostapd_cli should create the socket node in the filesystem
with uid network, gid network, mode 0770. This borrows the presently
Android-only strategy already in hostapd intended to solve the same
problem on Android.
If procd-ujail is not available and hostapd falls back to running as
root, it will still be able to read from and write to the socket even if
the node in the filesystem has been restricted to the network user and
group. This matches the logic in
package/network/services/hostapd/files/wpad.init, which sets the uid and
gid of /var/run/hostapd to network regardless of whether procd-ujail is
available.
As it appears that the "network" user and group are statically allocated
uid 101 and gid 101, respectively, per
package/base-files/files/etc/passwd and USERID in
package/network/services/hostapd/Makefile, this patch also uses a
constant 101 for the uid and gid.
Signed-off-by: Mark Mentovai <mark@moxienet.com>
[refreshed patch]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
This fixes passing a bogus non-null pointer to the ubus handler in case
the transition request is rejected.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
Both hostapd and netifd attempt to add a VLAN device to a bridge.
Depending on which one wins the race, bridge vlan settings might be incomplete,
or hostapd might run into an error and refuse to service the client.
Fix this by preventing hostapd from adding interfaces to the bridge and
instead rely entirely on netifd handling this properly
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
When a ubus event handler denies a association with a non-zero return
value, the code jumps to preceeding code, creating an endless loop until
the event handler accepts the assc request.
Move the ubus handler further up the code to avoid creating such a loop.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
To allow steering daemons to be aware of the STA-decided transition
target, publish WNM transition responses to ubus. This way, steerings
daemons can learn about STA-chosen targets and send a better selection
of transition candidates.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
The disable_dgaf config fiels is only available in case Hostapd is
compiled with Hotspot 2.0 support, however Proxy-ARP does not depend on
Hotspot 2.0.
Only add the code related to this config field when Hotspot 2.0 is
enabled to fix compilation with the aformentioned preconditions.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
In setups using VLAN bridge filtering, hostapd may need to communicate using
a VLAN interface on top of the bridge, instead of using the bridge directly
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
It allows enforcing a limit on associated stations to be enforced for the
full device, e.g. in order to deal with hardware/driver limitations
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Channel 100 is a valid channel to choose for 80MHz operation. However,
it's assigned to 5500 MHz, not 5550MHz. In fact, there is no channel
assigned to this frequency.
Fix this obbvious typo to allow ACS to select channel 100 for 80 MHz
operation again.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
Since upstream commit 6467de5a8840 ("Randomize z ordinates in
scalar mult when timing resistant") WolfSSL requires a RNG for
the EC key when built hardened which is the default.
Set the RNG for the EC key to fix connections for OWE clients.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
This can be used to handle network configuration of dynamically created vlan
interfaces in a more flexible way
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
p2p_add_device() may remove the oldest entry if there is no room in the
peer table for a new peer. This would result in any pointer to that
removed entry becoming stale. A corner case with an invalid PD Request
frame could result in such a case ending up using (read+write) freed
memory. This could only by triggered when the peer table has reached its
maximum size and the PD Request frame is received from the P2P Device
Address of the oldest remaining entry and the frame has incorrect P2P
Device Address in the payload.
Fix this by fetching the dev pointer again after having called
p2p_add_device() so that the stale pointer cannot be used.
This fixes the following security vulnerabilities/bugs:
- CVE-2021-27803 - A vulnerability was discovered in how p2p/p2p_pd.c
in wpa_supplicant before 2.10 processes P2P (Wi-Fi Direct) provision
discovery requests. It could result in denial of service or other
impact (potentially execution of arbitrary code), for an attacker
within radio range.
Fixes: 17bef1e97a50 ("P2P: Add peer entry based on Provision Discovery Request")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
This is a backport of the upstream commit 58bbbb598144 ("nl80211: Ignore
4addr mode enabling error if it was already enabled") which fixes same
issue as in the current fix contained in '130-wpa_supplicant-multi_ap_roam.patch',
but in a different way:
nl80211_set_4addr_mode() could fail when trying to enable 4addr mode on
an interface that is in a bridge and has 4addr mode already enabled.
This operation would not have been necessary in the first place and this
failure results in disconnecting, e.g., when roaming from one backhaul
BSS to another BSS with Multi AP.
Avoid this issue by ignoring the nl80211 command failure in the case
where 4addr mode is being enabled while it has already been enabled.
Signed-off-by: Raphaël Mélotte <raphael.melotte@mind.be>
[bump PKG_RELEASE, more verbose commit description]
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
This patch is required to be able to roam from one backhaul AP to
another one in the same ESS.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
(daniel@makrotopia.org: PKG_REVISION bump and refreshed patches)
Signed-off-by: Raphaël Mélotte <raphael.melotte@mind.be>
This patch allows other applications to get events management
frames (for example: association requests).
This is useful in Multi-AP context to be able to save association
requests from stations.
It has been sent to upstream hostapd in this series:
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/hostap/list/?series=217500
'700-wifi-reload.patch' is updated due to the introduction of
'110-notify-mgmt-frames.patch'.
Signed-off-by: Raphaël Mélotte <raphael.melotte@mind.be>
Commit 7c8c4f1be6 ("hostapd: fix P2P group information processing
vulnerability") was missing the actual patch for the vulnerability.
Fixes: 7c8c4f1be6 ("hostapd: fix P2P group information processing vulnerability")
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
Fixes the offset of the patch added in 93bbd998aa
("hostapd: enter DFS state if no available channel is found").
Signed-off-by: Leon M. George <leon@georgemail.eu>
This fixes the following compile errors after the wolfssl 4.5.0 update:
LD wpa_cli
../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.c: In function 'tls_match_alt_subject':
../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.c:610:11: error: 'GEN_EMAIL' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'ENAVAIL'?
type = GEN_EMAIL;
^~~~~~~~~
ENAVAIL
../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.c:610:11: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.c:613:11: error: 'GEN_DNS' undeclared (first use in this function)
type = GEN_DNS;
^~~~~~~
../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.c:616:11: error: 'GEN_URI' undeclared (first use in this function)
type = GEN_URI;
^~~~~~~
../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.c: In function 'wolfssl_tls_cert_event':
../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.c:902:20: error: 'GEN_EMAIL' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'ENAVAIL'?
if (gen->type != GEN_EMAIL &&
^~~~~~~~~
ENAVAIL
../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.c:903:20: error: 'GEN_DNS' undeclared (first use in this function)
gen->type != GEN_DNS &&
^~~~~~~
../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.c:904:20: error: 'GEN_URI' undeclared (first use in this function)
gen->type != GEN_URI)
^~~~~~~
Makefile:2029: recipe for target '../src/crypto/tls_wolfssl.o' failed
Fixes: 00722a720c ("wolfssl: Update to version 4.5.0")
Reported-by: Andre Heider <a.heider@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
Drop outdated and by now broken patchset originally supplied by
Peter Oh in August 2018 but never merged upstream.
Instead add the more promissing rework recently submitted by
Markus Theil who picked up Peter's patchset, fixed and completed it
and added support for HE (802.11ax) in mesh mode.
This is only compile tested and needs some real-life testing.
Fixes: FS#3214
Fixes: 167028b750 ("hostapd: Update to version 2.9 (2019-08-08)")
Fixes: 0a3ec87a66 ("hostapd: update to latest Git hostap_2_9-1238-gdd2daf0848ed")
Fixes: 017320ead3 ("hostapd: bring back mesh patches")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Previously hostapd would not stop transmitting when a DFS event was
detected and no available channel to switch to was available.
Disable and re-enable the interface to enter DFS state. This way, TX
does not happen until the kernel notifies hostapd about the NOP
expiring.
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
Ubus patch as it seems have been broken by some rebase in the past as
the location of line that adds ubus object file was in condition for
CONFIG_MACSEC. That condition was adding object files that are not
touched by ubus patch. This means ubus.o does not have to be included in
that case. When it has to be and when build fails is when CONFIG_AP is
set. All files included in wpa_supplicant that are touched by this patch
are in this condition. This means that this is for sure the original
place for it.
Signed-off-by: Karel Kočí <karel.koci@nic.cz>
Bump to latest Git and refresh all patches in order to get fix for "UPnP
SUBSCRIBE misbehavior in hostapd WPS AP" (CVE-2020-12695).
General security vulnerability in the way the callback URLs in the UPnP
SUBSCRIBE command are used were reported (VU#339275, CVE-2020-12695).
Some of the described issues may be applicable to the use of UPnP in WPS
AP mode functionality for supporting external registrars.
Ref: https://w1.fi/security/2020-1/
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
Bring back 802.11s mesh features to the level previously available
before the recent hostapd version bump. This is mostly to support use
of 802.11s on DFS channels, but also making mesh forwarding
configurable which is crucial for use of 802.11s MAC with other routing
protocols, such as batman-adv, on top.
While at it, fix new compiler warning by adapting 700-wifi-reload.patch
to upstream changes, now building without any warnings again.
Fixes: 0a3ec87a66 ("hostapd: update to latest Git hostap_2_9-1238-gdd2daf0848ed")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Bump package to latest upstream Git HEAD which is commit dd2daf0848ed
("HE: Process HE 6 GHz band capab from associating HE STA"). Since last
update there was 1238 commits done in the upstream tree with 618 files
changed, 53399 insertions, 24928 deletions.
I didn't bothered to rebase mesh patches as the changes seems not
trivial and I don't have enough knowledge of those parts to do/test that
properly, so someone else has to forward port them, ideally upstream
them so we don't need to bother anymore. I've just deleted them for now:
004-mesh-use-setup-completion-callback-to-complete-mesh-.patch
005-mesh-update-ssid-frequency-as-pri-sec-channel-switch.patch
006-mesh-inform-kernel-driver-DFS-handler-in-userspace.patch
007-mesh-apply-channel-attributes-before-running-Mesh.patch
011-mesh-Allow-DFS-channels-to-be-selected-if-dfs-is-ena.patch
013-mesh-do-not-allow-pri-sec-channel-switch.patch
015-mesh-do-not-use-offchan-mgmt-tx-on-DFS.patch
016-mesh-fix-channel-switch-error-during-CAC.patch
018-mesh-make-forwarding-configurable.patch
Refreshed all other patches, removed upstreamed patches:
051-wpa_supplicant-fix-race-condition-in-mesh-mpm-new-pe.patch
067-0001-AP-Silently-ignore-management-frame-from-unexpected-.patch
070-driver_nl80211-fix-WMM-queue-mapping-for-regulatory-.patch
071-driver_nl80211-fix-regulatory-limits-for-wmm-cwmin-c.patch
090-wolfssl-fix-crypto_bignum_sum.patch
091-0001-wolfssl-Fix-compiler-warnings-on-size_t-printf-forma.patch
091-0002-wolfssl-Fix-crypto_bignum_rand-implementation.patch
091-0003-wolfssl-Do-not-hardcode-include-directory-in-wpa_sup.patch
800-usleep.patch
Tested-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de> [ipq8065/NBG6817; ipq40xx/MAP-AC2200]
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
crypto_bignum_rand() use needless time-consuming filtering
which resulted in SAE no longer connecting within time limits.
Import fixes from hostap upstream to fix that.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Backport patch from hostapd.git master that fixes copy/paste error in
crypto_bignum_sub() in crypto_wolfssl.c.
This missing fix was discovered while testing SAE over a mesh interface.
With this fix applied and wolfssl >3.14.4 mesh+SAE works fine with
wpad-mesh-wolfssl.
Cc: Sean Parkinson <sean@wolfssl.com>
Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Subscribe to beacon reports through ubus.
Can be used for hearing map and client steering purposes.
First enable rrm:
ubus call hostapd.wlan0 bss_mgmt_enable '{"beacon_report":True}'
Subscribe to the hostapd notifications via ubus.
Request beacon report:
ubus call hostapd.wlan0 rrm_beacon_req
'{"addr":"00:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx", "op_class":0, "channel":1,
"duration":1,"mode":2,"bssid":"ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff", "ssid":""}'
Signed-off-by: Nick Hainke <vincent@systemli.org>
[rework identation]
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
Add a radio_config_id property. If the radio config changes return an error
upon receiving the reconf call.
Signed-off-by: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org>
Fixes handling CSA when using AP+STA or AP+Mesh
This change was accidentally dropped in commit 167028b75
("hostapd: Update to version 2.9 (2019-08-08)")
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Without this change, wpa-cli features depend on which wpad build variant was
used to build the wpa-cli package
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
hostapd sets minimum values for CWmin/CWmax/AIFS and maximum for TXOP.
The code for applying those values had a few bugs leading to bogus values,
which caused significant latency and packet loss.
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Add ubus interface to hostapd and wpa_supplicant to allow dynamically
reloading wiface configuration without having to restart the hostapd
process.
As a consequence, both hostapd and wpa_supplicant are now started
persistently on boot for each wifi device in the system and then
receive ubus calls adding, modifying or removing interface
configuration.
At a later stage it would be desirable to reduce the services to one
single instance managing all radios.
Signed-off-by: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
All the content of this function is proceeded by IEEE8021X_EAPOL no code
accesses the ssid variable outside of this ifdef.
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
The size of the ipkgs increase a bit (between 0.7% and 1.1%):
old 2019-04-21 (2.8):
288264 wpad-basic_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
256188 wpad-mini_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
427475 wpad-openssl_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
423071 wpad-wolfssl_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
new 2019-08-08 (2.9):
290217 wpad-basic_2019-08-08-ca8c2bd2-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
258745 wpad-mini_2019-08-08-ca8c2bd2-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
431732 wpad-openssl_2019-08-08-ca8c2bd2-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
427641 wpad-wolfssl_2019-08-08-ca8c2bd2-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
This also syncs the configuration files with the default configuration
files, but no extra options are activated or deactivated.
The mesh patches were partially merged into hostapd 2.8, the remaining
patches were extracted from patchwork and are now applied by OpenWrt.
The patches still have open questions which are not fixed by the author.
They were taken from this page:
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/hostap/list/?series=62725&state=*
The changes in 007-mesh-apply-channel-attributes-before-running-Mesh.patch
where first applied to hostapd, but later reverted in hostapd commit
3e949655ccc5 because they caused memory leaks.
The size of the ipkgs increase a bit (between 1.3% and 2.3%):
old 2018-12-02 (2.7):
283337 wpad-basic_2018-12-02-c2c6c01b-11_mipsel_24kc.ipk
252857 wpad-mini_2018-12-02-c2c6c01b-11_mipsel_24kc.ipk
417473 wpad-openssl_2018-12-02-c2c6c01b-11_mipsel_24kc.ipk
415105 wpad-wolfssl_2018-12-02-c2c6c01b-11_mipsel_24kc.ipk
new 2019-04-21 (2.8):
288264 wpad-basic_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
256188 wpad-mini_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
427475 wpad-openssl_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
423071 wpad-wolfssl_2019-04-21-63962824-1_mipsel_24kc.ipk
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
Tested-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
wps_supplicant.h assumes that 'struct wpa_bss' is forward declared if
CONFIG_WPS is not defined. With the later inclusion of
600-ubus_support, the issue manifests in warnings like these:
wps_supplicant.h:113:15: warning: 'struct wpa_bss' declared inside parameter list will not be visible outside of this definition or declaration
struct wpa_bss *bss)
^~~~~~~
This patch forward declares 'struct wpa_bss' regardless.
Signed-off-by: Leon M. George <leon@georgemail.eu>
[commit message facelift]
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
The original wpa_hexdump uses a 'void *' for the payload. With patch
410-limit_debug_messages, the signature changes and compiler warnings
occur at various places. One such warning is:
wpa_debug.h:106:20: note: expected 'const u8 * {aka const unsigned char *}' but argument is of type 'struct wpa_eapol_key *'
Signed-off-by: Leon M. George <leon@georgemail.eu>
[commit message facelift]
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
EAP-pwd missing commit validation
Published: April 10, 2019
Identifiers:
- CVE-2019-9497 (EAP-pwd server not checking for reflection attack)
- CVE-2019-9498 (EAP-pwd server missing commit validation for
scalar/element)
- CVE-2019-9499 (EAP-pwd peer missing commit validation for
scalar/element)
Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-4/
Vulnerability
EAP-pwd implementation in hostapd (EAP server) and wpa_supplicant (EAP
peer) was discovered not to validate the received scalar and element
values in EAP-pwd-Commit messages properly. This could result in attacks
that would be able to complete EAP-pwd authentication exchange without
the attacker having to know the used password.
A reflection attack is possible against the EAP-pwd server since the
hostapd EAP server did not verify that the EAP-pwd-Commit contains
scalar/element values that differ from the ones the server sent out
itself. This allows the attacker to complete EAP-pwd authentication
without knowing the password, but this does not result in the attacker
being able to derive the session key (MSK), i.e., the attacker would not
be able to complete the following key exchange (e.g., 4-way handshake in
RSN/WPA).
An attack using invalid scalar/element values is possible against both
the EAP-pwd server and peer since hostapd and wpa_supplicant did not
validate these values in the received EAP-pwd-Commit messages. If the
used crypto library does not implement additional checks for the element
(EC point), this could result in attacks where the attacker could use a
specially crafted commit message values to manipulate the exchange to
result in deriving a session key value from a very small set of possible
values. This could further be used to attack the EAP-pwd server in a
practical manner. An attack against the EAP-pwd peer is slightly more
complex, but still consider practical. These invalid scalar/element
attacks could result in the attacker being able to complete
authentication and learn the session key and MSK to allow the key
exchange to be completed as well, i.e., the attacker gaining access to
the network in case of the attack against the EAP server or the attacker
being able to operate a rogue AP in case of the attack against the EAP
peer.
While similar attacks might be applicable against SAE, it should be
noted that the SAE implementation in hostapd and wpa_supplicant does
have the validation steps that were missing from the EAP-pwd
implementation and as such, these attacks do not apply to the current
SAE implementation. Old versions of wpa_supplicant/hostapd did not
include the reflection attack check in the SAE implementation, though,
since that was added in June 2015 for v2.5 (commit 6a58444d27fd 'SAE:
Verify that own/peer commit-scalar and COMMIT-ELEMENT are different').
Vulnerable versions/configurations
All hostapd versions with EAP-pwd support (CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y in the build
configuration and EAP-pwd being enabled in the runtime configuration)
are vulnerable against the reflection attack.
All wpa_supplicant and hostapd versions with EAP-pwd support
(CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y in the build configuration and EAP-pwd being enabled
in the runtime configuration) are vulnerable against the invalid
scalar/element attack when built against a crypto library that does not
have an explicit validation step on imported EC points. The following
list indicates which cases are vulnerable/not vulnerable:
- OpenSSL v1.0.2 or older: vulnerable
- OpenSSL v1.1.0 or newer: not vulnerable
- BoringSSL with commit 38feb990a183 ('Require that EC points are on the
curve.') from September 2015: not vulnerable
- BoringSSL without commit 38feb990a183: vulnerable
- LibreSSL: vulnerable
- wolfssl: vulnerable
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Mathy Vanhoef (New York University Abu Dhabi) for discovering
and reporting the issues and for proposing changes to address them in
the implementation.
Possible mitigation steps
- Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant/hostapd and rebuild:
CVE-2019-9497:
EAP-pwd server: Detect reflection attacks
CVE-2019-9498:
EAP-pwd server: Verify received scalar and element
EAP-pwd: Check element x,y coordinates explicitly
CVE-2019-9499:
EAP-pwd client: Verify received scalar and element
EAP-pwd: Check element x,y coordinates explicitly
These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-4/
- Update to wpa_supplicant/hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available
Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
[bump PKG_RELEASE]
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
hostapd: fix SAE confirm missing state validation
Published: April 10, 2019
Identifiers:
- CVE-2019-9496 (SAE confirm missing state validation in hostapd/AP)
Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-3/
Vulnerability
When hostapd is used to operate an access point with SAE (Simultaneous
Authentication of Equals; also known as WPA3-Personal), an invalid
authentication sequence could result in the hostapd process terminating
due to a NULL pointer dereference when processing SAE confirm
message. This was caused by missing state validation steps when
processing the SAE confirm message in hostapd/AP mode.
Similar cases against the wpa_supplicant SAE station implementation had
already been tested by the hwsim test cases, but those sequences did not
trigger this specific code path in AP mode which is why the issue was
not discovered earlier.
An attacker in radio range of an access point using hostapd in SAE
configuration could use this issue to perform a denial of service attack
by forcing the hostapd process to terminate.
Vulnerable versions/configurations
All hostapd versions with SAE support (CONFIG_SAE=y in the build
configuration and SAE being enabled in the runtime configuration).
Possible mitigation steps
- Merge the following commit to hostapd and rebuild:
SAE: Fix confirm message validation in error cases
These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-3/
- Update to hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available
Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
[bump PKG_RELEASE]
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
EAP-pwd side-channel attack
Published: April 10, 2019
Identifiers:
- CVE-2019-9495 (cache attack against EAP-pwd)
Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-2/
Vulnerability
Number of potential side channel attacks were recently discovered in the
SAE implementations used by both hostapd and wpa_supplicant (see
security advisory 2019-1 and VU#871675). EAP-pwd uses a similar design
for deriving PWE from the password and while a specific attack against
EAP-pwd is not yet known to be tested, there is no reason to believe
that the EAP-pwd implementation would be immune against the type of
cache attack that was identified for the SAE implementation. Since the
EAP-pwd implementation in hostapd (EAP server) and wpa_supplicant (EAP
peer) does not support MODP groups, the timing attack described against
SAE is not applicable for the EAP-pwd implementation.
A novel cache-based attack against SAE handshake would likely be
applicable against the EAP-pwd implementation. Even though the
wpa_supplicant/hostapd PWE derivation iteration for EAP-pwd has
protections against timing attacks, this new cache-based attack might
enable an attacker to determine which code branch is taken in the
iteration if the attacker is able to run unprivileged code on the victim
machine (e.g., an app installed on a smart phone or potentially a
JavaScript code on a web site loaded by a web browser). This depends on
the used CPU not providing sufficient protection to prevent unprivileged
applications from observing memory access patterns through the shared
cache (which is the most likely case with today's designs).
The attacker could use information about the selected branch to learn
information about the password and combine this information from number
of handshake instances with an offline dictionary attack. With
sufficient number of handshakes and sufficiently weak password, this
might result in full recovery of the used password if that password is
not strong enough to protect against dictionary attacks.
This attack requires the attacker to be able to run a program on the
target device. This is not commonly the case on an authentication server
(EAP server), so the most likely target for this would be a client
device using EAP-pwd.
The commits listed in the end of this advisory change the EAP-pwd
implementation shared by hostapd and wpa_supplicant to perform the PWE
derivation loop using operations that use constant time and memory
access pattern to minimize the externally observable differences from
operations that depend on the password even for the case where the
attacker might be able to run unprivileged code on the same device.
Vulnerable versions/configurations
All wpa_supplicant and hostapd versions with EAP-pwd support
(CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y in the build configuration and EAP-pwd being enabled
in the runtime configuration).
It should also be noted that older versions of wpa_supplicant/hostapd
prior to v2.7 did not include additional protection against certain
timing differences. The definition of the EAP-pwd (RFC 5931) does not
describe such protection, but the same issue that was addressed in SAE
earlier can be applicable against EAP-pwd as well and as such, that
implementation specific extra protection (commit 22ac3dfebf7b, "EAP-pwd:
Mask timing of PWE derivation") is needed to avoid showing externally
visible timing differences that could leak information about the
password. Any uses of older wpa_supplicant/hostapd versions with EAP-pwd
are recommended to update to v2.7 or newer in addition to the mitigation
steps listed below for the more recently discovered issue.
Possible mitigation steps
- Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant/hostapd and rebuild:
OpenSSL: Use constant time operations for private bignums
Add helper functions for constant time operations
OpenSSL: Use constant time selection for crypto_bignum_legendre()
EAP-pwd: Use constant time and memory access for finding the PWE
These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-2/
- Update to wpa_supplicant/hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available
- Use strong passwords to prevent dictionary attacks
Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
[bump PKG_RELEASE]
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
SAE side-channel attacks
Published: April 10, 2019
Identifiers:
- VU#871675
- CVE-2019-9494 (cache attack against SAE)
Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-1/
Vulnerability
Number of potential side channel attacks were discovered in the SAE
implementations used by both hostapd (AP) and wpa_supplicant
(infrastructure BSS station/mesh station). SAE (Simultaneous
Authentication of Equals) is also known as WPA3-Personal. The discovered
side channel attacks may be able to leak information about the used
password based on observable timing differences and cache access
patterns. This might result in full password recovery when combined with
an offline dictionary attack and if the password is not strong enough to
protect against dictionary attacks.
Cache attack
A novel cache-based attack against SAE handshake was discovered. This
attack targets SAE with ECC groups. ECC group 19 being the mandatory
group to support and the most likely used group for SAE today, so this
attack applies to the most common SAE use case. Even though the PWE
derivation iteration in SAE has protections against timing attacks, this
new cache-based attack enables an attacker to determine which code
branch is taken in the iteration if the attacker is able to run
unprivileged code on the victim machine (e.g., an app installed on a
smart phone or potentially a JavaScript code on a web site loaded by a
web browser). This depends on the used CPU not providing sufficient
protection to prevent unprivileged applications from observing memory
access patterns through the shared cache (which is the most likely case
with today's designs).
The attacker can use information about the selected branch to learn
information about the password and combine this information from number
of handshake instances with an offline dictionary attack. With
sufficient number of handshakes and sufficiently weak password, this
might result in full discovery of the used password.
This attack requires the attacker to be able to run a program on the
target device. This is not commonly the case on access points, so the
most likely target for this would be a client device using SAE in an
infrastructure BSS or mesh BSS.
The commits listed in the end of this advisory change the SAE
implementation shared by hostapd and wpa_supplicant to perform the PWE
derivation loop using operations that use constant time and memory
access pattern to minimize the externally observable differences from
operations that depend on the password even for the case where the
attacker might be able to run unprivileged code on the same device.
Timing attack
The timing attack applies to the MODP groups 22, 23, and 24 where the
PWE generation algorithm defined for SAE can have sufficient timing
differences for an attacker to be able to determine how many rounds were
needed to find the PWE based on the used password and MAC
addresses. When the attack is repeated with multiple times, the attacker
may be able to gather enough information about the password to be able
to recover it fully using an offline dictionary attack if the password
is not strong enough to protect against dictionary attacks. This attack
could be performed by an attacker in radio range of an access point or a
station enabling the specific MODP groups.
This timing attack requires the applicable MODP groups to be enabled
explicitly in hostapd/wpa_supplicant configuration (sae_groups
parameter). All versions of hostapd/wpa_supplicant have disabled these
groups by default.
While this security advisory lists couple of commits introducing
additional protection for MODP groups in SAE, it should be noted that
the groups 22, 23, and 24 are not considered strong enough to meet the
current expectation for a secure system. As such, their use is
discouraged even if the additional protection mechanisms in the
implementation are included.
Vulnerable versions/configurations
All wpa_supplicant and hostapd versions with SAE support (CONFIG_SAE=y
in the build configuration and SAE being enabled in the runtime
configuration).
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Mathy Vanhoef (New York University Abu Dhabi) and Eyal Ronen
(Tel Aviv University) for discovering the issues and for discussions on
how to address them.
Possible mitigation steps
- Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant/hostapd and rebuild:
OpenSSL: Use constant time operations for private bignums
Add helper functions for constant time operations
OpenSSL: Use constant time selection for crypto_bignum_legendre()
SAE: Minimize timing differences in PWE derivation
SAE: Avoid branches in is_quadratic_residue_blind()
SAE: Mask timing of MODP groups 22, 23, 24
SAE: Use const_time selection for PWE in FFC
SAE: Use constant time operations in sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc()
These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-1/
- Update to wpa_supplicant/hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available
- In addition to either of the above alternatives, disable MODP groups
1, 2, 5, 22, 23, and 24 by removing them from hostapd/wpa_supplicant
sae_groups runtime configuration parameter, if they were explicitly
enabled since those groups are not considered strong enough to meet
current security expectations. The groups 22, 23, and 24 are related
to the discovered side channel (timing) attack. The other groups in
the list are consider too weak to provide sufficient security. Note
that all these groups have been disabled by default in all
hostapd/wpa_supplicant versions and these would be used only if
explicitly enabled in the configuration.
- Use strong passwords to prevent dictionary attacks
Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
[bump PKG_RELEASE]
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
Cherry-pick Multi-AP commits from uptream:
9c06f0f6a hostapd: Add Multi-AP protocol support
5abc7823b wpa_supplicant: Add Multi-AP backhaul STA support
a1debd338 tests: Refactor test_multi_ap
bfcdac1c8 Multi-AP: Don't reject backhaul STA on fronthaul BSS
cb3c156e7 tests: Update multi_ap_fronthaul_on_ap to match implementation
56a2d788f WPS: Add multi_ap_subelem to wps_build_wfa_ext()
83ebf5586 wpa_supplicant: Support Multi-AP backhaul STA onboarding with WPS
66819b07b hostapd: Support Multi-AP backhaul STA onboarding with WPS
8682f384c hostapd: Add README-MULTI-AP
b1daf498a tests: Multi-AP WPS provisioning
Add support for Multi-AP to the UCI configuration. Every wifi-iface gets
an option 'multi_ap'. For APs, its value can be 0 (multi-AP support
disabled), 1 (backhaul AP), 2 (fronthaul AP), or 3 (fronthaul + backhaul
AP). For STAs, it can be 0 (not a backhaul STA) or 1 (backhaul STA, can
only associate with backhaul AP).
Also add new optional parameter to wps_start ubus call of
wpa_supplicant to indicate that a Multi-AP backhaul link is required.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
This updates hostapd to version the git version from 2018-12-02 which
matches the 2.7 release.
The removed patches were are already available in the upstream code, one
additional backport is needed to fix a compile problem.
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
similar to hostapd, also add a ubus interface for wpa_supplicant
which will allow handling WPS push-button just as it works for hostapd.
In order to have wpa_supplicant running without any network
configuration (so you can use it to retrieve credentials via WPS),
configure wifi-iface in /etc/config/wireless:
config wifi-iface 'default_radio0'
option device 'radio0'
option network 'wwan'
option mode 'sta'
option encryption 'wps'
This section will automatically be edited if credentials have
successfully been acquired via WPS.
Size difference (mips_24kc): roughly +4kb for the 'full' variants of
wpa_supplicant and wpad which do support WPS.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
