mirror of
https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt.git
synced 2024-12-27 09:12:39 +00:00
bzip2: Fix CVE-2019-12900
More details about this CVE: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-12900 Signed-off-by: Josef Schlehofer <pepe.schlehofer@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
7ac6044632
commit
f6de1fa6c6
@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
PKG_NAME:=bzip2
|
PKG_NAME:=bzip2
|
||||||
PKG_VERSION:=1.0.6
|
PKG_VERSION:=1.0.6
|
||||||
PKG_RELEASE:=4
|
PKG_RELEASE:=5
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz
|
PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz
|
||||||
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=http://www.bzip.org/$(PKG_VERSION)
|
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=http://www.bzip.org/$(PKG_VERSION)
|
||||||
|
65
package/utils/bzip2/patches/020-CVE-2019-12900.patch
Normal file
65
package/utils/bzip2/patches/020-CVE-2019-12900.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
|
|||||||
|
From 812a898b7622de90e98f103ff7fed0984e4548e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||||
|
From: Mark Wielaard <mark@klomp.org>
|
||||||
|
Date: Wed, 3 Jul 2019 01:28:11 +0200
|
||||||
|
Subject: [PATCH] Accept as many selectors as the file format allows.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
But ignore any larger than the theoretical maximum, BZ_MAX_SELECTORS.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The theoretical maximum number of selectors depends on the maximum
|
||||||
|
blocksize (900000 bytes) and the number of symbols (50) that can be
|
||||||
|
encoded with a different Huffman tree. BZ_MAX_SELECTORS is 18002.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
But the bzip2 file format allows the number of selectors to be encoded
|
||||||
|
with 15 bits (because 18002 isn't a factor of 2 and doesn't fit in
|
||||||
|
14 bits). So the file format maximum is 32767 selectors.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Some bzip2 encoders might actually have written out more selectors
|
||||||
|
than the theoretical maximum because they rounded up the number of
|
||||||
|
selectors to some convenient factor of 8.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The extra 14766 selectors can never be validly used by the decompression
|
||||||
|
algorithm. So we can read them, but then discard them.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
This is effectively what was done (by accident) before we added a
|
||||||
|
check for nSelectors to be at most BZ_MAX_SELECTORS to mitigate
|
||||||
|
CVE-2019-12900.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The extra selectors were written out after the array inside the
|
||||||
|
EState struct. But the struct has extra space allocated after the
|
||||||
|
selector arrays of 18060 bytes (which is larger than 14766).
|
||||||
|
All of which will be initialized later (so the overwrite of that
|
||||||
|
space with extra selector values would have been harmless).
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
compress.c | 2 +-
|
||||||
|
decompress.c | 10 +++++++-
|
||||||
|
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
--- a/compress.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/compress.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ void sendMTFValues ( EState* s )
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AssertH( nGroups < 8, 3002 );
|
||||||
|
AssertH( nSelectors < 32768 &&
|
||||||
|
- nSelectors <= (2 + (900000 / BZ_G_SIZE)),
|
||||||
|
+ nSelectors <= BZ_MAX_SELECTORS,
|
||||||
|
3003 );
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
--- a/decompress.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/decompress.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -296,8 +296,14 @@ Int32 BZ2_decompress ( DState* s )
|
||||||
|
j++;
|
||||||
|
if (j >= nGroups) RETURN(BZ_DATA_ERROR);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
- s->selectorMtf[i] = j;
|
||||||
|
+ /* Having more than BZ_MAX_SELECTORS doesn't make much sense
|
||||||
|
+ since they will never be used, but some implementations might
|
||||||
|
+ "round up" the number of selectors, so just ignore those. */
|
||||||
|
+ if (i < BZ_MAX_SELECTORS)
|
||||||
|
+ s->selectorMtf[i] = j;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
+ if (nSelectors > BZ_MAX_SELECTORS)
|
||||||
|
+ nSelectors = BZ_MAX_SELECTORS;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/*--- Undo the MTF values for the selectors. ---*/
|
||||||
|
{
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user