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dnsmasq: Backport some security updates
This fixes the following security problems in dnsmasq: * CVE-2020-25681: Dnsmasq versions before 2.83 is susceptible to a heap-based buffer overflow in sort_rrset() when DNSSEC is used. This can allow a remote attacker to write arbitrary data into target device's memory that can lead to memory corruption and other unexpected behaviors on the target device. * CVE-2020-25682: Dnsmasq versions before 2.83 is susceptible to buffer overflow in extract_name() function due to missing length check, when DNSSEC is enabled. This can allow a remote attacker to cause memory corruption on the target device. * CVE-2020-25683: Dnsmasq version before 2.83 is susceptible to a heap-based buffer overflow when DNSSEC is enabled. A remote attacker, who can create valid DNS replies, could use this flaw to cause an overflow in a heap- allocated memory. This flaw is caused by the lack of length checks in rtc1035.c:extract_name(), which could be abused to make the code execute memcpy() with a negative size in get_rdata() and cause a crash in Dnsmasq, resulting in a Denial of Service. * CVE-2020-25684: A lack of proper address/port check implemented in Dnsmasq version < 2.83 reply_query function makes forging replies easier to an off-path attacker. * CVE-2020-25685: A lack of query resource name (RRNAME) checks implemented in Dnsmasq's versions before 2.83 reply_query function allows remote attackers to spoof DNS traffic that can lead to DNS cache poisoning. * CVE-2020-25686: Multiple DNS query requests for the same resource name (RRNAME) by Dnsmasq versions before 2.83 allows for remote attackers to spoof DNS traffic, using a birthday attack (RFC 5452), that can lead to DNS cache poisoning. * CVE-2020-25687: Dnsmasq versions before 2.83 is vulnerable to a heap-based buffer overflow with large memcpy in sort_rrset() when DNSSEC is enabled. A remote attacker, who can create valid DNS replies, could use this flaw to cause an overflow in a heap-allocated memory. This flaw is caused by the lack of length checks in rtc1035.c:extract_name(), which could be abused to make the code execute memcpy() with a negative size in sort_rrset() and cause a crash in dnsmasq, resulting in a Denial of Service. Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
This commit is contained in:
parent
733e62a8e1
commit
8055e38794
@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
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PKG_NAME:=dnsmasq
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PKG_UPSTREAM_VERSION:=2.80
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PKG_VERSION:=$(subst test,~~test,$(subst rc,~rc,$(PKG_UPSTREAM_VERSION)))
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PKG_RELEASE:=16.1
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PKG_RELEASE:=16.2
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PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_UPSTREAM_VERSION).tar.xz
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PKG_SOURCE_URL:=http://thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq
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@ -0,0 +1,375 @@
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From 4e96a4be685c9e4445f6ee79ad0b36b9119b502a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
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Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2020 23:25:04 +0000
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Subject: Fix remote buffer overflow CERT VU#434904
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The problem is in the sort_rrset() function and allows a remote
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attacker to overwrite memory. Any dnsmasq instance with DNSSEC
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enabled is vulnerable.
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---
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CHANGELOG | 7 +-
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src/dnssec.c | 273 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
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2 files changed, 158 insertions(+), 122 deletions(-)
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--- a/CHANGELOG
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+++ b/CHANGELOG
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@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
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+ Fix a remote buffer overflow problem in the DNSSEC code. Any
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+ dnsmasq with DNSSEC compiled in and enabled is vulnerable to this,
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+ referenced by CERT VU#434904.
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+
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+
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+>>>>>>> Fix remote buffer overflow CERT VU#434904
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version 2.81
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Impove cache behaviour for TCP connections. For ease of
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implementaion, dnsmasq has always forked a new process to handle
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--- a/src/dnssec.c
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+++ b/src/dnssec.c
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@@ -222,138 +222,147 @@ static int check_date_range(u32 date_sta
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&& serial_compare_32(curtime, date_end) == SERIAL_LT;
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}
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-/* Return bytes of canonicalised rdata, when the return value is zero, the remaining
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- data, pointed to by *p, should be used raw. */
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-static int get_rdata(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *end, char *buff, int bufflen,
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- unsigned char **p, u16 **desc)
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+/* Return bytes of canonicalised rrdata one by one.
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+ Init state->ip with the RR, and state->end with the end of same.
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+ Init state->op to NULL.
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+ Init state->desc to RR descriptor.
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+ Init state->buff with a MAXDNAME * 2 buffer.
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+
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+ After each call which returns 1, state->op points to the next byte of data.
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+ On returning 0, the end has been reached.
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+*/
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+struct rdata_state {
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+ u16 *desc;
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+ size_t c;
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+ unsigned char *end, *ip, *op;
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+ char *buff;
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+};
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+
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+static int get_rdata(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, struct rdata_state *state)
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{
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- int d = **desc;
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+ int d;
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- /* No more data needs mangling */
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- if (d == (u16)-1)
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+ if (state->op && state->c != 1)
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{
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- /* If there's more data than we have space for, just return what fits,
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- we'll get called again for more chunks */
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- if (end - *p > bufflen)
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- {
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- memcpy(buff, *p, bufflen);
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- *p += bufflen;
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- return bufflen;
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- }
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-
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- return 0;
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+ state->op++;
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+ state->c--;
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+ return 1;
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}
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-
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- (*desc)++;
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-
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- if (d == 0 && extract_name(header, plen, p, buff, 1, 0))
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- /* domain-name, canonicalise */
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- return to_wire(buff);
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- else
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- {
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- /* plain data preceding a domain-name, don't run off the end of the data */
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- if ((end - *p) < d)
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- d = end - *p;
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+
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+ while (1)
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+ {
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+ d = *(state->desc);
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- if (d != 0)
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+ if (d == (u16)-1)
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{
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- memcpy(buff, *p, d);
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- *p += d;
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+ /* all the bytes to the end. */
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+ if ((state->c = state->end - state->ip) != 0)
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+ {
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+ state->op = state->ip;
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+ state->ip = state->end;;
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+ }
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+ else
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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+ else
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+ {
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+ state->desc++;
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+
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+ if (d == (u16)0)
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+ {
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+ /* domain-name, canonicalise */
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+ int len;
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+
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+ if (!extract_name(header, plen, &state->ip, state->buff, 1, 0) ||
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+ (len = to_wire(state->buff)) == 0)
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+ continue;
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+
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+ state->c = len;
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+ state->op = (unsigned char *)state->buff;
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+ }
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+ else
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+ {
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+ /* plain data preceding a domain-name, don't run off the end of the data */
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+ if ((state->end - state->ip) < d)
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+ d = state->end - state->ip;
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+
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+ if (d == 0)
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+ continue;
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+
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+ state->op = state->ip;
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+ state->c = d;
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+ state->ip += d;
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+ }
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}
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- return d;
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+ return 1;
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}
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}
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-/* Bubble sort the RRset into the canonical order.
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- Note that the byte-streams from two RRs may get unsynced: consider
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- RRs which have two domain-names at the start and then other data.
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- The domain-names may have different lengths in each RR, but sort equal
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-
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- ------------
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- |abcde|fghi|
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- ------------
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- |abcd|efghi|
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- ------------
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-
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- leaving the following bytes as deciding the order. Hence the nasty left1 and left2 variables.
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-*/
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+/* Bubble sort the RRset into the canonical order. */
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static int sort_rrset(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, u16 *rr_desc, int rrsetidx,
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unsigned char **rrset, char *buff1, char *buff2)
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{
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- int swap, quit, i, j;
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+ int swap, i, j;
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do
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{
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for (swap = 0, i = 0; i < rrsetidx-1; i++)
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{
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- int rdlen1, rdlen2, left1, left2, len1, len2, len, rc;
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- u16 *dp1, *dp2;
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- unsigned char *end1, *end2;
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+ int rdlen1, rdlen2;
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+ struct rdata_state state1, state2;
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+
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/* Note that these have been determined to be OK previously,
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so we don't need to check for NULL return here. */
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- unsigned char *p1 = skip_name(rrset[i], header, plen, 10);
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- unsigned char *p2 = skip_name(rrset[i+1], header, plen, 10);
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-
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- p1 += 8; /* skip class, type, ttl */
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- GETSHORT(rdlen1, p1);
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- end1 = p1 + rdlen1;
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-
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- p2 += 8; /* skip class, type, ttl */
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- GETSHORT(rdlen2, p2);
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- end2 = p2 + rdlen2;
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-
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- dp1 = dp2 = rr_desc;
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-
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- for (quit = 0, left1 = 0, left2 = 0, len1 = 0, len2 = 0; !quit;)
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+ state1.ip = skip_name(rrset[i], header, plen, 10);
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+ state2.ip = skip_name(rrset[i+1], header, plen, 10);
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+ state1.op = state2.op = NULL;
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+ state1.buff = buff1;
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+ state2.buff = buff2;
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+ state1.desc = state2.desc = rr_desc;
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+
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+ state1.ip += 8; /* skip class, type, ttl */
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+ GETSHORT(rdlen1, state1.ip);
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+ if (!CHECK_LEN(header, state1.ip, plen, rdlen1))
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+ return rrsetidx; /* short packet */
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+ state1.end = state1.ip + rdlen1;
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+
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+ state2.ip += 8; /* skip class, type, ttl */
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+ GETSHORT(rdlen2, state2.ip);
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+ if (!CHECK_LEN(header, state2.ip, plen, rdlen2))
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+ return rrsetidx; /* short packet */
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+ state2.end = state2.ip + rdlen2;
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+
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+ while (1)
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{
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- if (left1 != 0)
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- memmove(buff1, buff1 + len1 - left1, left1);
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-
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- if ((len1 = get_rdata(header, plen, end1, buff1 + left1, (MAXDNAME * 2) - left1, &p1, &dp1)) == 0)
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- {
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- quit = 1;
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- len1 = end1 - p1;
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- memcpy(buff1 + left1, p1, len1);
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- }
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- len1 += left1;
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-
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- if (left2 != 0)
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- memmove(buff2, buff2 + len2 - left2, left2);
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-
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- if ((len2 = get_rdata(header, plen, end2, buff2 + left2, (MAXDNAME *2) - left2, &p2, &dp2)) == 0)
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- {
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- quit = 1;
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- len2 = end2 - p2;
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- memcpy(buff2 + left2, p2, len2);
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- }
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- len2 += left2;
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-
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- if (len1 > len2)
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- left1 = len1 - len2, left2 = 0, len = len2;
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- else
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- left2 = len2 - len1, left1 = 0, len = len1;
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+ int ok1, ok2;
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- rc = (len == 0) ? 0 : memcmp(buff1, buff2, len);
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-
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- if (rc > 0 || (rc == 0 && quit && len1 > len2))
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- {
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- unsigned char *tmp = rrset[i+1];
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- rrset[i+1] = rrset[i];
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- rrset[i] = tmp;
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- swap = quit = 1;
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- }
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- else if (rc == 0 && quit && len1 == len2)
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+ ok1 = get_rdata(header, plen, &state1);
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+ ok2 = get_rdata(header, plen, &state2);
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+
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+ if (!ok1 && !ok2)
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{
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/* Two RRs are equal, remove one copy. RFC 4034, para 6.3 */
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for (j = i+1; j < rrsetidx-1; j++)
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rrset[j] = rrset[j+1];
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rrsetidx--;
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i--;
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+ break;
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+ }
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+ else if (ok1 && (!ok2 || *state1.op > *state2.op))
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+ {
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+ unsigned char *tmp = rrset[i+1];
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+ rrset[i+1] = rrset[i];
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+ rrset[i] = tmp;
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+ swap = 1;
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+ break;
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}
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- else if (rc < 0)
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- quit = 1;
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+ else if (ok2 && (!ok1 || *state2.op > *state1.op))
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+ break;
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+
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+ /* arrive here when bytes are equal, go round the loop again
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+ and compare the next ones. */
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}
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}
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} while (swap);
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@@ -549,15 +558,18 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, st
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wire_len = to_wire(keyname);
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hash->update(ctx, (unsigned int)wire_len, (unsigned char*)keyname);
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from_wire(keyname);
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+
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+#define RRBUFLEN 300 /* Most RRs are smaller than this. */
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for (i = 0; i < rrsetidx; ++i)
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{
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- int seg;
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- unsigned char *end, *cp;
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- u16 len, *dp;
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+ int j;
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+ struct rdata_state state;
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+ u16 len;
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+ unsigned char rrbuf[RRBUFLEN];
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p = rrset[i];
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-
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+
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if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 10))
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return STAT_BOGUS;
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@@ -566,12 +578,11 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, st
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/* if more labels than in RRsig name, hash *.<no labels in rrsig labels field> 4035 5.3.2 */
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if (labels < name_labels)
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{
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- int k;
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- for (k = name_labels - labels; k != 0; k--)
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+ for (j = name_labels - labels; j != 0; j--)
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{
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while (*name_start != '.' && *name_start != 0)
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name_start++;
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- if (k != 1 && *name_start == '.')
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+ if (j != 1 && *name_start == '.')
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name_start++;
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}
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@@ -592,24 +603,44 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, st
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if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
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return STAT_BOGUS;
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- end = p + rdlen;
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-
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- /* canonicalise rdata and calculate length of same, use name buffer as workspace.
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- Note that name buffer is twice MAXDNAME long in DNSSEC mode. */
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- cp = p;
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- dp = rr_desc;
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- for (len = 0; (seg = get_rdata(header, plen, end, name, MAXDNAME * 2, &cp, &dp)) != 0; len += seg);
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- len += end - cp;
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- len = htons(len);
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+ /* canonicalise rdata and calculate length of same, use
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+ name buffer as workspace for get_rdata. */
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+ state.ip = p;
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+ state.op = NULL;
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+ state.desc = rr_desc;
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+ state.buff = name;
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+ state.end = p + rdlen;
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+
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+ for (j = 0; get_rdata(header, plen, &state); j++)
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+ if (j < RRBUFLEN)
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+ rrbuf[j] = *state.op;
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+
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+ len = htons((u16)j);
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hash->update(ctx, 2, (unsigned char *)&len);
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+
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+ /* If the RR is shorter than RRBUFLEN (most of them, in practice)
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+ then we can just digest it now. If it exceeds RRBUFLEN we have to
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+ go back to the start and do it in chunks. */
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+ if (j >= RRBUFLEN)
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+ {
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+ state.ip = p;
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+ state.op = NULL;
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+ state.desc = rr_desc;
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+
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+ for (j = 0; get_rdata(header, plen, &state); j++)
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+ {
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+ rrbuf[j] = *state.op;
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+
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+ if (j == RRBUFLEN - 1)
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+ {
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+ hash->update(ctx, RRBUFLEN, rrbuf);
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+ j = -1;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ }
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- /* Now canonicalise again and digest. */
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- cp = p;
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- dp = rr_desc;
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- while ((seg = get_rdata(header, plen, end, name, MAXDNAME * 2, &cp, &dp)))
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- hash->update(ctx, seg, (unsigned char *)name);
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- if (cp != end)
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- hash->update(ctx, end - cp, cp);
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+ if (j != 0)
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+ hash->update(ctx, j, rrbuf);
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}
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hash->digest(ctx, hash->digest_size, digest);
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@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
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From 257ac0c5f7732cbc6aa96fdd3b06602234593aca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
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Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2020 18:49:23 +0000
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Subject: Check destination of DNS UDP query replies.
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At any time, dnsmasq will have a set of sockets open, bound to
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random ports, on which it sends queries to upstream nameservers.
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This patch fixes the existing problem that a reply for ANY in-flight
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query would be accepted via ANY open port, which increases the
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chances of an attacker flooding answers "in the blind" in an
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attempt to poison the DNS cache. CERT VU#434904 refers.
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---
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CHANGELOG | 6 +++++-
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src/forward.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
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2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
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--- a/CHANGELOG
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+++ b/CHANGELOG
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@@ -2,8 +2,12 @@
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dnsmasq with DNSSEC compiled in and enabled is vulnerable to this,
|
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referenced by CERT VU#434904.
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+ Be sure to only accept UDP DNS query replies at the address
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+ from which the query was originated. This keeps as much entropy
|
||||
+ in the {query-ID, random-port} tuple as possible, help defeat
|
||||
+ cache poisoning attacks. Refer: CERT VU#434904.
|
||||
+
|
||||
|
||||
->>>>>>> Fix remote buffer overflow CERT VU#434904
|
||||
version 2.81
|
||||
Impove cache behaviour for TCP connections. For ease of
|
||||
implementaion, dnsmasq has always forked a new process to handle
|
||||
--- a/src/forward.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/forward.c
|
||||
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
#include "dnsmasq.h"
|
||||
|
||||
-static struct frec *lookup_frec(unsigned short id, void *hash);
|
||||
+static struct frec *lookup_frec(unsigned short id, int fd, int family, void *hash);
|
||||
static struct frec *lookup_frec_by_sender(unsigned short id,
|
||||
union mysockaddr *addr,
|
||||
void *hash);
|
||||
@@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ void reply_query(int fd, int family, tim
|
||||
crc = questions_crc(header, n, daemon->namebuff);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
- if (!(forward = lookup_frec(ntohs(header->id), hash)))
|
||||
+ if (!(forward = lookup_frec(ntohs(header->id), fd, family, hash)))
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef HAVE_DUMPFILE
|
||||
@@ -2289,14 +2289,25 @@ struct frec *get_new_frec(time_t now, in
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* crc is all-ones if not known. */
|
||||
-static struct frec *lookup_frec(unsigned short id, void *hash)
|
||||
+static struct frec *lookup_frec(unsigned short id, int fd, int family, void *hash)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct frec *f;
|
||||
|
||||
for(f = daemon->frec_list; f; f = f->next)
|
||||
if (f->sentto && f->new_id == id &&
|
||||
(!hash || memcmp(hash, f->hash, HASH_SIZE) == 0))
|
||||
- return f;
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ /* sent from random port */
|
||||
+ if (family == AF_INET && f->rfd4 && f->rfd4->fd == fd)
|
||||
+ return f;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (family == AF_INET6 && f->rfd6 && f->rfd6->fd == fd)
|
||||
+ return f;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* sent to upstream from bound socket. */
|
||||
+ if (f->sentto->sfd && f->sentto->sfd->fd == fd)
|
||||
+ return f;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -2357,12 +2368,20 @@ void server_gone(struct server *server)
|
||||
static unsigned short get_id(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned short ret = 0;
|
||||
+ struct frec *f;
|
||||
|
||||
- do
|
||||
- ret = rand16();
|
||||
- while (lookup_frec(ret, NULL));
|
||||
-
|
||||
- return ret;
|
||||
+ while (1)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ ret = rand16();
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* ensure id is unique. */
|
||||
+ for (f = daemon->frec_list; f; f = f->next)
|
||||
+ if (f->sentto && f->new_id == ret)
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (!f)
|
||||
+ return ret;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,581 @@
|
||||
From 2d765867c597db18be9d876c9c17e2c0fe1953cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2020 22:06:07 +0000
|
||||
Subject: Use SHA-256 to provide security against DNS cache poisoning.
|
||||
|
||||
Use the SHA-256 hash function to verify that DNS answers
|
||||
received are for the questions originally asked. This replaces
|
||||
the slightly insecure SHA-1 (when compiled with DNSSEC) or
|
||||
the very insecure CRC32 (otherwise). Refer: CERT VU#434904.
|
||||
---
|
||||
CHANGELOG | 5 +
|
||||
Makefile | 3 +-
|
||||
bld/Android.mk | 2 +-
|
||||
src/dnsmasq.h | 11 +-
|
||||
src/dnssec.c | 31 -----
|
||||
src/forward.c | 43 ++-----
|
||||
src/hash_questions.c | 281 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||||
src/rfc1035.c | 49 --------
|
||||
8 files changed, 301 insertions(+), 124 deletions(-)
|
||||
create mode 100644 src/hash_questions.c
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/CHANGELOG
|
||||
+++ b/CHANGELOG
|
||||
@@ -7,6 +7,11 @@
|
||||
in the {query-ID, random-port} tuple as possible, help defeat
|
||||
cache poisoning attacks. Refer: CERT VU#434904.
|
||||
|
||||
+ Use the SHA-256 hash function to verify that DNS answers
|
||||
+ received are for the questions originally asked. This replaces
|
||||
+ the slightly insecure SHA-1 (when compiled with DNSSEC) or
|
||||
+ the very insecure CRC32 (otherwise). Refer: CERT VU#434904.
|
||||
+
|
||||
|
||||
version 2.81
|
||||
Impove cache behaviour for TCP connections. For ease of
|
||||
--- a/Makefile
|
||||
+++ b/Makefile
|
||||
@@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ objs = cache.o rfc1035.o util.o option.o
|
||||
helper.o tftp.o log.o conntrack.o dhcp6.o rfc3315.o \
|
||||
dhcp-common.o outpacket.o radv.o slaac.o auth.o ipset.o \
|
||||
domain.o dnssec.o blockdata.o tables.o loop.o inotify.o \
|
||||
- poll.o rrfilter.o edns0.o arp.o crypto.o dump.o ubus.o metrics.o
|
||||
+ poll.o rrfilter.o edns0.o arp.o crypto.o dump.o ubus.o \
|
||||
+ metrics.o hash_questions.o
|
||||
|
||||
hdrs = dnsmasq.h config.h dhcp-protocol.h dhcp6-protocol.h \
|
||||
dns-protocol.h radv-protocol.h ip6addr.h metrics.h
|
||||
--- a/bld/Android.mk
|
||||
+++ b/bld/Android.mk
|
||||
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ LOCAL_SRC_FILES := bpf.c cache.c dbus.c
|
||||
radv.c slaac.c auth.c ipset.c domain.c \
|
||||
dnssec.c dnssec-openssl.c blockdata.c tables.c \
|
||||
loop.c inotify.c poll.c rrfilter.c edns0.c arp.c \
|
||||
- crypto.c dump.c ubus.c
|
||||
+ crypto.c dump.c ubus.c metrics.c hash_questions.c
|
||||
|
||||
LOCAL_MODULE := dnsmasq
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/src/dnsmasq.h
|
||||
+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
|
||||
@@ -644,11 +644,7 @@ struct hostsfile {
|
||||
#define FREC_TEST_PKTSZ 256
|
||||
#define FREC_HAS_EXTRADATA 512
|
||||
|
||||
-#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
|
||||
-#define HASH_SIZE 20 /* SHA-1 digest size */
|
||||
-#else
|
||||
-#define HASH_SIZE sizeof(int)
|
||||
-#endif
|
||||
+#define HASH_SIZE 32 /* SHA-256 digest size */
|
||||
|
||||
struct frec {
|
||||
union mysockaddr source;
|
||||
@@ -1199,7 +1195,6 @@ int check_for_bogus_wildcard(struct dns_
|
||||
struct bogus_addr *baddr, time_t now);
|
||||
int check_for_ignored_address(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, struct bogus_addr *baddr);
|
||||
int check_for_local_domain(char *name, time_t now);
|
||||
-unsigned int questions_crc(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name);
|
||||
size_t resize_packet(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen,
|
||||
unsigned char *pheader, size_t hlen);
|
||||
int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp,
|
||||
@@ -1227,9 +1222,11 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, st
|
||||
int check_unsigned, int *neganswer, int *nons);
|
||||
int dnskey_keytag(int alg, int flags, unsigned char *key, int keylen);
|
||||
size_t filter_rrsigs(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen);
|
||||
-unsigned char* hash_questions(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name);
|
||||
int setup_timestamp(void);
|
||||
|
||||
+/* hash_questions.c */
|
||||
+unsigned char *hash_questions(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name);
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* crypto.c */
|
||||
const struct nettle_hash *hash_find(char *name);
|
||||
int hash_init(const struct nettle_hash *hash, void **ctxp, unsigned char **digestp);
|
||||
--- a/src/dnssec.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/dnssec.c
|
||||
@@ -2082,35 +2082,4 @@ size_t dnssec_generate_query(struct dns_
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
-unsigned char* hash_questions(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name)
|
||||
-{
|
||||
- int q;
|
||||
- unsigned int len;
|
||||
- unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
|
||||
- const struct nettle_hash *hash;
|
||||
- void *ctx;
|
||||
- unsigned char *digest;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- if (!(hash = hash_find("sha1")) || !hash_init(hash, &ctx, &digest))
|
||||
- return NULL;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- for (q = ntohs(header->qdcount); q != 0; q--)
|
||||
- {
|
||||
- if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 4))
|
||||
- break; /* bad packet */
|
||||
-
|
||||
- len = to_wire(name);
|
||||
- hash->update(ctx, len, (unsigned char *)name);
|
||||
- /* CRC the class and type as well */
|
||||
- hash->update(ctx, 4, p);
|
||||
-
|
||||
- p += 4;
|
||||
- if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, 0))
|
||||
- break; /* bad packet */
|
||||
- }
|
||||
-
|
||||
- hash->digest(ctx, hash->digest_size, digest);
|
||||
- return digest;
|
||||
-}
|
||||
-
|
||||
#endif /* HAVE_DNSSEC */
|
||||
--- a/src/forward.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/forward.c
|
||||
@@ -248,19 +248,16 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, unio
|
||||
union all_addr *addrp = NULL;
|
||||
unsigned int flags = 0;
|
||||
struct server *start = NULL;
|
||||
-#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
|
||||
void *hash = hash_questions(header, plen, daemon->namebuff);
|
||||
+#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
|
||||
int do_dnssec = 0;
|
||||
-#else
|
||||
- unsigned int crc = questions_crc(header, plen, daemon->namebuff);
|
||||
- void *hash = &crc;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
unsigned int gotname = extract_request(header, plen, daemon->namebuff, NULL);
|
||||
unsigned char *oph = find_pseudoheader(header, plen, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
||||
(void)do_bit;
|
||||
|
||||
/* may be no servers available. */
|
||||
- if (forward || (hash && (forward = lookup_frec_by_sender(ntohs(header->id), udpaddr, hash))))
|
||||
+ if (forward || (forward = lookup_frec_by_sender(ntohs(header->id), udpaddr, hash)))
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* If we didn't get an answer advertising a maximal packet in EDNS,
|
||||
fall back to 1280, which should work everywhere on IPv6.
|
||||
@@ -761,9 +758,6 @@ void reply_query(int fd, int family, tim
|
||||
size_t nn;
|
||||
struct server *server;
|
||||
void *hash;
|
||||
-#ifndef HAVE_DNSSEC
|
||||
- unsigned int crc;
|
||||
-#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/* packet buffer overwritten */
|
||||
daemon->srv_save = NULL;
|
||||
@@ -790,12 +784,7 @@ void reply_query(int fd, int family, tim
|
||||
if (difftime(now, server->pktsz_reduced) > UDP_TEST_TIME)
|
||||
server->edns_pktsz = daemon->edns_pktsz;
|
||||
|
||||
-#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
|
||||
hash = hash_questions(header, n, daemon->namebuff);
|
||||
-#else
|
||||
- hash = &crc;
|
||||
- crc = questions_crc(header, n, daemon->namebuff);
|
||||
-#endif
|
||||
|
||||
if (!(forward = lookup_frec(ntohs(header->id), fd, family, hash)))
|
||||
return;
|
||||
@@ -1100,8 +1089,7 @@ void reply_query(int fd, int family, tim
|
||||
log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_DNSSEC | F_IPV6, daemon->keyname, (union all_addr *)&(server->addr.in6.sin6_addr),
|
||||
querystr("dnssec-query", querytype));
|
||||
|
||||
- if ((hash = hash_questions(header, nn, daemon->namebuff)))
|
||||
- memcpy(new->hash, hash, HASH_SIZE);
|
||||
+ memcpy(new->hash, hash_questions(header, nn, daemon->namebuff), HASH_SIZE);
|
||||
new->new_id = get_id();
|
||||
header->id = htons(new->new_id);
|
||||
/* Save query for retransmission */
|
||||
@@ -1937,15 +1925,9 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, ti
|
||||
if (!flags && last_server)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct server *firstsendto = NULL;
|
||||
-#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
|
||||
- unsigned char *newhash, hash[HASH_SIZE];
|
||||
- if ((newhash = hash_questions(header, (unsigned int)size, daemon->namebuff)))
|
||||
- memcpy(hash, newhash, HASH_SIZE);
|
||||
- else
|
||||
- memset(hash, 0, HASH_SIZE);
|
||||
-#else
|
||||
- unsigned int crc = questions_crc(header, (unsigned int)size, daemon->namebuff);
|
||||
-#endif
|
||||
+ unsigned char hash[HASH_SIZE];
|
||||
+ memcpy(hash, hash_questions(header, (unsigned int)size, daemon->namebuff), HASH_SIZE);
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* Loop round available servers until we succeed in connecting to one.
|
||||
Note that this code subtly ensures that consecutive queries on this connection
|
||||
which can go to the same server, do so. */
|
||||
@@ -2068,20 +2050,11 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, ti
|
||||
/* If the crc of the question section doesn't match the crc we sent, then
|
||||
someone might be attempting to insert bogus values into the cache by
|
||||
sending replies containing questions and bogus answers. */
|
||||
-#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
|
||||
- newhash = hash_questions(header, (unsigned int)m, daemon->namebuff);
|
||||
- if (!newhash || memcmp(hash, newhash, HASH_SIZE) != 0)
|
||||
+ if (memcmp(hash, hash_questions(header, (unsigned int)m, daemon->namebuff), HASH_SIZE) != 0)
|
||||
{
|
||||
m = 0;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
-#else
|
||||
- if (crc != questions_crc(header, (unsigned int)m, daemon->namebuff))
|
||||
- {
|
||||
- m = 0;
|
||||
- break;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
-#endif
|
||||
|
||||
m = process_reply(header, now, last_server, (unsigned int)m,
|
||||
option_bool(OPT_NO_REBIND) && !norebind, no_cache_dnssec, cache_secure, bogusanswer,
|
||||
@@ -2295,7 +2268,7 @@ static struct frec *lookup_frec(unsigned
|
||||
|
||||
for(f = daemon->frec_list; f; f = f->next)
|
||||
if (f->sentto && f->new_id == id &&
|
||||
- (!hash || memcmp(hash, f->hash, HASH_SIZE) == 0))
|
||||
+ (memcmp(hash, f->hash, HASH_SIZE) == 0))
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* sent from random port */
|
||||
if (family == AF_INET && f->rfd4 && f->rfd4->fd == fd)
|
||||
--- /dev/null
|
||||
+++ b/src/hash_questions.c
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
|
||||
+/* Copyright (c) 2012-2020 Simon Kelley
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
|
||||
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
|
||||
+ the Free Software Foundation; version 2 dated June, 1991, or
|
||||
+ (at your option) version 3 dated 29 June, 2007.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
|
||||
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
|
||||
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
|
||||
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
|
||||
+ along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
|
||||
+*/
|
||||
+
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/* Hash the question section. This is used to safely detect query
|
||||
+ retransmission and to detect answers to questions we didn't ask, which
|
||||
+ might be poisoning attacks. Note that we decode the name rather
|
||||
+ than CRC the raw bytes, since replies might be compressed differently.
|
||||
+ We ignore case in the names for the same reason.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ The hash used is SHA-256. If we're building with DNSSEC support,
|
||||
+ we use the Nettle cypto library. If not, we prefer not to
|
||||
+ add a dependency on Nettle, and use a stand-alone implementaion.
|
||||
+*/
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#include "dnsmasq.h"
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
|
||||
+unsigned char *hash_questions(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ int q;
|
||||
+ unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
|
||||
+ const struct nettle_hash *hash;
|
||||
+ void *ctx;
|
||||
+ unsigned char *digest;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (!(hash = hash_find("sha256")) || !hash_init(hash, &ctx, &digest))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ /* don't think this can ever happen. */
|
||||
+ static unsigned char dummy[HASH_SIZE];
|
||||
+ static int warned = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (warned)
|
||||
+ my_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Failed to create SHA-256 hash object"));
|
||||
+ warned = 1;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return dummy;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ for (q = ntohs(header->qdcount); q != 0; q--)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ char *cp, c;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 4))
|
||||
+ break; /* bad packet */
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ for (cp = name; (c = *cp); cp++)
|
||||
+ if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z')
|
||||
+ *cp += 'a' - 'A';
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ hash->update(ctx, cp - name, (unsigned char *)name);
|
||||
+ /* CRC the class and type as well */
|
||||
+ hash->update(ctx, 4, p);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ p += 4;
|
||||
+ if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, 0))
|
||||
+ break; /* bad packet */
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ hash->digest(ctx, hash->digest_size, digest);
|
||||
+ return digest;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#else /* HAVE_DNSSEC */
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#define SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE 32 // SHA256 outputs a 32 byte digest
|
||||
+typedef unsigned char BYTE; // 8-bit byte
|
||||
+typedef unsigned int WORD; // 32-bit word, change to "long" for 16-bit machines
|
||||
+
|
||||
+typedef struct {
|
||||
+ BYTE data[64];
|
||||
+ WORD datalen;
|
||||
+ unsigned long long bitlen;
|
||||
+ WORD state[8];
|
||||
+} SHA256_CTX;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+static void sha256_init(SHA256_CTX *ctx);
|
||||
+static void sha256_update(SHA256_CTX *ctx, const BYTE data[], size_t len);
|
||||
+static void sha256_final(SHA256_CTX *ctx, BYTE hash[]);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+
|
||||
+unsigned char *hash_questions(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ int q;
|
||||
+ unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
|
||||
+ SHA256_CTX ctx;
|
||||
+ static BYTE digest[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE];
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ sha256_init(&ctx);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ for (q = ntohs(header->qdcount); q != 0; q--)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ char *cp, c;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 4))
|
||||
+ break; /* bad packet */
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ for (cp = name; (c = *cp); cp++)
|
||||
+ if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z')
|
||||
+ *cp += 'a' - 'A';
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ sha256_update(&ctx, (BYTE *)name, cp - name);
|
||||
+ /* CRC the class and type as well */
|
||||
+ sha256_update(&ctx, (BYTE *)p, 4);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ p += 4;
|
||||
+ if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, 0))
|
||||
+ break; /* bad packet */
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ sha256_final(&ctx, digest);
|
||||
+ return (unsigned char *)digest;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/* Code from here onwards comes from https://github.com/B-Con/crypto-algorithms
|
||||
+ and was written by Brad Conte (brad@bradconte.com), to whom all credit is given.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ This code is in the public domain, and the copyright notice at the head of this
|
||||
+ file does not apply to it.
|
||||
+*/
|
||||
+
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/****************************** MACROS ******************************/
|
||||
+#define ROTLEFT(a,b) (((a) << (b)) | ((a) >> (32-(b))))
|
||||
+#define ROTRIGHT(a,b) (((a) >> (b)) | ((a) << (32-(b))))
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#define CH(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) ^ (~(x) & (z)))
|
||||
+#define MAJ(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) ^ ((x) & (z)) ^ ((y) & (z)))
|
||||
+#define EP0(x) (ROTRIGHT(x,2) ^ ROTRIGHT(x,13) ^ ROTRIGHT(x,22))
|
||||
+#define EP1(x) (ROTRIGHT(x,6) ^ ROTRIGHT(x,11) ^ ROTRIGHT(x,25))
|
||||
+#define SIG0(x) (ROTRIGHT(x,7) ^ ROTRIGHT(x,18) ^ ((x) >> 3))
|
||||
+#define SIG1(x) (ROTRIGHT(x,17) ^ ROTRIGHT(x,19) ^ ((x) >> 10))
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/**************************** VARIABLES *****************************/
|
||||
+static const WORD k[64] = {
|
||||
+ 0x428a2f98,0x71374491,0xb5c0fbcf,0xe9b5dba5,0x3956c25b,0x59f111f1,0x923f82a4,0xab1c5ed5,
|
||||
+ 0xd807aa98,0x12835b01,0x243185be,0x550c7dc3,0x72be5d74,0x80deb1fe,0x9bdc06a7,0xc19bf174,
|
||||
+ 0xe49b69c1,0xefbe4786,0x0fc19dc6,0x240ca1cc,0x2de92c6f,0x4a7484aa,0x5cb0a9dc,0x76f988da,
|
||||
+ 0x983e5152,0xa831c66d,0xb00327c8,0xbf597fc7,0xc6e00bf3,0xd5a79147,0x06ca6351,0x14292967,
|
||||
+ 0x27b70a85,0x2e1b2138,0x4d2c6dfc,0x53380d13,0x650a7354,0x766a0abb,0x81c2c92e,0x92722c85,
|
||||
+ 0xa2bfe8a1,0xa81a664b,0xc24b8b70,0xc76c51a3,0xd192e819,0xd6990624,0xf40e3585,0x106aa070,
|
||||
+ 0x19a4c116,0x1e376c08,0x2748774c,0x34b0bcb5,0x391c0cb3,0x4ed8aa4a,0x5b9cca4f,0x682e6ff3,
|
||||
+ 0x748f82ee,0x78a5636f,0x84c87814,0x8cc70208,0x90befffa,0xa4506ceb,0xbef9a3f7,0xc67178f2
|
||||
+};
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/*********************** FUNCTION DEFINITIONS ***********************/
|
||||
+static void sha256_transform(SHA256_CTX *ctx, const BYTE data[])
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ WORD a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, t1, t2, m[64];
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ for (i = 0, j = 0; i < 16; ++i, j += 4)
|
||||
+ m[i] = (data[j] << 24) | (data[j + 1] << 16) | (data[j + 2] << 8) | (data[j + 3]);
|
||||
+ for ( ; i < 64; ++i)
|
||||
+ m[i] = SIG1(m[i - 2]) + m[i - 7] + SIG0(m[i - 15]) + m[i - 16];
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ a = ctx->state[0];
|
||||
+ b = ctx->state[1];
|
||||
+ c = ctx->state[2];
|
||||
+ d = ctx->state[3];
|
||||
+ e = ctx->state[4];
|
||||
+ f = ctx->state[5];
|
||||
+ g = ctx->state[6];
|
||||
+ h = ctx->state[7];
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; ++i)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ t1 = h + EP1(e) + CH(e,f,g) + k[i] + m[i];
|
||||
+ t2 = EP0(a) + MAJ(a,b,c);
|
||||
+ h = g;
|
||||
+ g = f;
|
||||
+ f = e;
|
||||
+ e = d + t1;
|
||||
+ d = c;
|
||||
+ c = b;
|
||||
+ b = a;
|
||||
+ a = t1 + t2;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ ctx->state[0] += a;
|
||||
+ ctx->state[1] += b;
|
||||
+ ctx->state[2] += c;
|
||||
+ ctx->state[3] += d;
|
||||
+ ctx->state[4] += e;
|
||||
+ ctx->state[5] += f;
|
||||
+ ctx->state[6] += g;
|
||||
+ ctx->state[7] += h;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+static void sha256_init(SHA256_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ ctx->datalen = 0;
|
||||
+ ctx->bitlen = 0;
|
||||
+ ctx->state[0] = 0x6a09e667;
|
||||
+ ctx->state[1] = 0xbb67ae85;
|
||||
+ ctx->state[2] = 0x3c6ef372;
|
||||
+ ctx->state[3] = 0xa54ff53a;
|
||||
+ ctx->state[4] = 0x510e527f;
|
||||
+ ctx->state[5] = 0x9b05688c;
|
||||
+ ctx->state[6] = 0x1f83d9ab;
|
||||
+ ctx->state[7] = 0x5be0cd19;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+static void sha256_update(SHA256_CTX *ctx, const BYTE data[], size_t len)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ WORD i;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ ctx->data[ctx->datalen] = data[i];
|
||||
+ ctx->datalen++;
|
||||
+ if (ctx->datalen == 64) {
|
||||
+ sha256_transform(ctx, ctx->data);
|
||||
+ ctx->bitlen += 512;
|
||||
+ ctx->datalen = 0;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+static void sha256_final(SHA256_CTX *ctx, BYTE hash[])
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ WORD i;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ i = ctx->datalen;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Pad whatever data is left in the buffer.
|
||||
+ if (ctx->datalen < 56)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ ctx->data[i++] = 0x80;
|
||||
+ while (i < 56)
|
||||
+ ctx->data[i++] = 0x00;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ else
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ ctx->data[i++] = 0x80;
|
||||
+ while (i < 64)
|
||||
+ ctx->data[i++] = 0x00;
|
||||
+ sha256_transform(ctx, ctx->data);
|
||||
+ memset(ctx->data, 0, 56);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Append to the padding the total message's length in bits and transform.
|
||||
+ ctx->bitlen += ctx->datalen * 8;
|
||||
+ ctx->data[63] = ctx->bitlen;
|
||||
+ ctx->data[62] = ctx->bitlen >> 8;
|
||||
+ ctx->data[61] = ctx->bitlen >> 16;
|
||||
+ ctx->data[60] = ctx->bitlen >> 24;
|
||||
+ ctx->data[59] = ctx->bitlen >> 32;
|
||||
+ ctx->data[58] = ctx->bitlen >> 40;
|
||||
+ ctx->data[57] = ctx->bitlen >> 48;
|
||||
+ ctx->data[56] = ctx->bitlen >> 56;
|
||||
+ sha256_transform(ctx, ctx->data);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Since this implementation uses little endian byte ordering and SHA uses big endian,
|
||||
+ // reverse all the bytes when copying the final state to the output hash.
|
||||
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ hash[i] = (ctx->state[0] >> (24 - i * 8)) & 0x000000ff;
|
||||
+ hash[i + 4] = (ctx->state[1] >> (24 - i * 8)) & 0x000000ff;
|
||||
+ hash[i + 8] = (ctx->state[2] >> (24 - i * 8)) & 0x000000ff;
|
||||
+ hash[i + 12] = (ctx->state[3] >> (24 - i * 8)) & 0x000000ff;
|
||||
+ hash[i + 16] = (ctx->state[4] >> (24 - i * 8)) & 0x000000ff;
|
||||
+ hash[i + 20] = (ctx->state[5] >> (24 - i * 8)) & 0x000000ff;
|
||||
+ hash[i + 24] = (ctx->state[6] >> (24 - i * 8)) & 0x000000ff;
|
||||
+ hash[i + 28] = (ctx->state[7] >> (24 - i * 8)) & 0x000000ff;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
--- a/src/rfc1035.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/rfc1035.c
|
||||
@@ -333,55 +333,6 @@ unsigned char *skip_section(unsigned cha
|
||||
return ansp;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
-/* CRC the question section. This is used to safely detect query
|
||||
- retransmission and to detect answers to questions we didn't ask, which
|
||||
- might be poisoning attacks. Note that we decode the name rather
|
||||
- than CRC the raw bytes, since replies might be compressed differently.
|
||||
- We ignore case in the names for the same reason. Return all-ones
|
||||
- if there is not question section. */
|
||||
-#ifndef HAVE_DNSSEC
|
||||
-unsigned int questions_crc(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name)
|
||||
-{
|
||||
- int q;
|
||||
- unsigned int crc = 0xffffffff;
|
||||
- unsigned char *p1, *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
|
||||
-
|
||||
- for (q = ntohs(header->qdcount); q != 0; q--)
|
||||
- {
|
||||
- if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 4))
|
||||
- return crc; /* bad packet */
|
||||
-
|
||||
- for (p1 = (unsigned char *)name; *p1; p1++)
|
||||
- {
|
||||
- int i = 8;
|
||||
- char c = *p1;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z')
|
||||
- c += 'a' - 'A';
|
||||
-
|
||||
- crc ^= c << 24;
|
||||
- while (i--)
|
||||
- crc = crc & 0x80000000 ? (crc << 1) ^ 0x04c11db7 : crc << 1;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
-
|
||||
- /* CRC the class and type as well */
|
||||
- for (p1 = p; p1 < p+4; p1++)
|
||||
- {
|
||||
- int i = 8;
|
||||
- crc ^= *p1 << 24;
|
||||
- while (i--)
|
||||
- crc = crc & 0x80000000 ? (crc << 1) ^ 0x04c11db7 : crc << 1;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
-
|
||||
- p += 4;
|
||||
- if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, 0))
|
||||
- return crc; /* bad packet */
|
||||
- }
|
||||
-
|
||||
- return crc;
|
||||
-}
|
||||
-#endif
|
||||
-
|
||||
size_t resize_packet(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *pheader, size_t hlen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned char *ansp = skip_questions(header, plen);
|
@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
|
||||
From 059aded0700309308dafd9720b0313ce52f6e189 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2020 23:09:15 +0000
|
||||
Subject: Optimse RR digest calculation in DNSSEC.
|
||||
|
||||
If an RR is of a type which doesn't need canonicalisation,
|
||||
bypass the relatively slow canonicalisation code, and insert
|
||||
it direct into the digest.
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/dnssec.c | 82 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
|
||||
1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/src/dnssec.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/dnssec.c
|
||||
@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, st
|
||||
hash->update(ctx, (unsigned int)wire_len, (unsigned char*)keyname);
|
||||
from_wire(keyname);
|
||||
|
||||
-#define RRBUFLEN 300 /* Most RRs are smaller than this. */
|
||||
+#define RRBUFLEN 128 /* Most RRs are smaller than this. */
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < rrsetidx; ++i)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -597,50 +597,66 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, st
|
||||
hash->update(ctx, (unsigned int)wire_len, (unsigned char *)name_start);
|
||||
hash->update(ctx, 4, p); /* class and type */
|
||||
hash->update(ctx, 4, (unsigned char *)&nsigttl);
|
||||
-
|
||||
- p += 8; /* skip class, type, ttl */
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ p += 8; /* skip type, class, ttl */
|
||||
GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
|
||||
if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
|
||||
return STAT_BOGUS;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- /* canonicalise rdata and calculate length of same, use
|
||||
- name buffer as workspace for get_rdata. */
|
||||
- state.ip = p;
|
||||
- state.op = NULL;
|
||||
- state.desc = rr_desc;
|
||||
- state.buff = name;
|
||||
- state.end = p + rdlen;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- for (j = 0; get_rdata(header, plen, &state); j++)
|
||||
- if (j < RRBUFLEN)
|
||||
- rrbuf[j] = *state.op;
|
||||
|
||||
- len = htons((u16)j);
|
||||
- hash->update(ctx, 2, (unsigned char *)&len);
|
||||
-
|
||||
- /* If the RR is shorter than RRBUFLEN (most of them, in practice)
|
||||
- then we can just digest it now. If it exceeds RRBUFLEN we have to
|
||||
- go back to the start and do it in chunks. */
|
||||
- if (j >= RRBUFLEN)
|
||||
+ /* Optimisation for RR types which need no cannonicalisation.
|
||||
+ This includes DNSKEY DS NSEC and NSEC3, which are also long, so
|
||||
+ it saves lots of calls to get_rdata, and avoids the pessimal
|
||||
+ segmented insertion, even with a small rrbuf[].
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ If canonicalisation is not needed, a simple insertion into the hash works.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ if (*rr_desc == (u16)-1)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ len = htons(rdlen);
|
||||
+ hash->update(ctx, 2, (unsigned char *)&len);
|
||||
+ hash->update(ctx, rdlen, p);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ else
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ /* canonicalise rdata and calculate length of same, use
|
||||
+ name buffer as workspace for get_rdata. */
|
||||
state.ip = p;
|
||||
state.op = NULL;
|
||||
state.desc = rr_desc;
|
||||
-
|
||||
+ state.buff = name;
|
||||
+ state.end = p + rdlen;
|
||||
+
|
||||
for (j = 0; get_rdata(header, plen, &state); j++)
|
||||
+ if (j < RRBUFLEN)
|
||||
+ rrbuf[j] = *state.op;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ len = htons((u16)j);
|
||||
+ hash->update(ctx, 2, (unsigned char *)&len);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* If the RR is shorter than RRBUFLEN (most of them, in practice)
|
||||
+ then we can just digest it now. If it exceeds RRBUFLEN we have to
|
||||
+ go back to the start and do it in chunks. */
|
||||
+ if (j >= RRBUFLEN)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- rrbuf[j] = *state.op;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- if (j == RRBUFLEN - 1)
|
||||
- {
|
||||
- hash->update(ctx, RRBUFLEN, rrbuf);
|
||||
- j = -1;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
+ state.ip = p;
|
||||
+ state.op = NULL;
|
||||
+ state.desc = rr_desc;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ for (j = 0; get_rdata(header, plen, &state); j++)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ rrbuf[j] = *state.op;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (j == RRBUFLEN - 1)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ hash->update(ctx, RRBUFLEN, rrbuf);
|
||||
+ j = -1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (j != 0)
|
||||
+ hash->update(ctx, j, rrbuf);
|
||||
}
|
||||
-
|
||||
- if (j != 0)
|
||||
- hash->update(ctx, j, rrbuf);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hash->digest(ctx, hash->digest_size, digest);
|
@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
|
||||
From 824461192ca5098043f9ca4ddeba7df1f65b30ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
|
||||
Date: Sun, 15 Nov 2020 22:13:25 +0000
|
||||
Subject: Add missing check for NULL return from allocate_rfd().
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/forward.c | 18 ++++++++++--------
|
||||
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/src/forward.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/forward.c
|
||||
@@ -815,7 +815,6 @@ void reply_query(int fd, int family, tim
|
||||
int is_sign;
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
|
||||
- /* For DNSSEC originated queries, just retry the query to the same server. */
|
||||
if (forward->flags & (FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY | FREC_DS_QUERY))
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct server *start;
|
||||
@@ -841,6 +840,8 @@ void reply_query(int fd, int family, tim
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+ fd = -1;
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (start->sfd)
|
||||
fd = start->sfd->fd;
|
||||
else
|
||||
@@ -848,19 +849,21 @@ void reply_query(int fd, int family, tim
|
||||
if (start->addr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* may have changed family */
|
||||
- if (!forward->rfd6)
|
||||
- forward->rfd6 = allocate_rfd(AF_INET6);
|
||||
- fd = forward->rfd6->fd;
|
||||
+ if (forward->rfd6 || (forward->rfd6 = allocate_rfd(AF_INET6)))
|
||||
+ fd = forward->rfd6->fd;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* may have changed family */
|
||||
- if (!forward->rfd4)
|
||||
- forward->rfd4 = allocate_rfd(AF_INET);
|
||||
- fd = forward->rfd4->fd;
|
||||
+ if (forward->rfd4 || (forward->rfd4 = allocate_rfd(AF_INET)))
|
||||
+ fd = forward->rfd4->fd;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ /* Can't get socket. */
|
||||
+ if (fd == -1)
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
+
|
||||
while (retry_send(sendto(fd, (char *)header, plen, 0,
|
||||
&start->addr.sa,
|
||||
sa_len(&start->addr))));
|
||||
@@ -2261,7 +2264,6 @@ struct frec *get_new_frec(time_t now, in
|
||||
return f; /* OK if malloc fails and this is NULL */
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
-/* crc is all-ones if not known. */
|
||||
static struct frec *lookup_frec(unsigned short id, int fd, int family, void *hash)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct frec *f;
|
@ -0,0 +1,352 @@
|
||||
From 15b60ddf935a531269bb8c68198de012a4967156 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2020 18:34:55 +0000
|
||||
Subject: Handle multiple identical near simultaneous DNS queries better.
|
||||
|
||||
Previously, such queries would all be forwarded
|
||||
independently. This is, in theory, inefficent but in practise
|
||||
not a problem, _except_ that is means that an answer for any
|
||||
of the forwarded queries will be accepted and cached.
|
||||
An attacker can send a query multiple times, and for each repeat,
|
||||
another {port, ID} becomes capable of accepting the answer he is
|
||||
sending in the blind, to random IDs and ports. The chance of a
|
||||
succesful attack is therefore multiplied by the number of repeats
|
||||
of the query. The new behaviour detects repeated queries and
|
||||
merely stores the clients sending repeats so that when the
|
||||
first query completes, the answer can be sent to all the
|
||||
clients who asked. Refer: CERT VU#434904.
|
||||
---
|
||||
CHANGELOG | 16 +++++-
|
||||
src/dnsmasq.h | 19 ++++---
|
||||
src/forward.c | 142 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
|
||||
3 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/CHANGELOG
|
||||
+++ b/CHANGELOG
|
||||
@@ -4,13 +4,27 @@
|
||||
|
||||
Be sure to only accept UDP DNS query replies at the address
|
||||
from which the query was originated. This keeps as much entropy
|
||||
- in the {query-ID, random-port} tuple as possible, help defeat
|
||||
+ in the {query-ID, random-port} tuple as possible, to help defeat
|
||||
cache poisoning attacks. Refer: CERT VU#434904.
|
||||
|
||||
Use the SHA-256 hash function to verify that DNS answers
|
||||
received are for the questions originally asked. This replaces
|
||||
the slightly insecure SHA-1 (when compiled with DNSSEC) or
|
||||
the very insecure CRC32 (otherwise). Refer: CERT VU#434904.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Handle multiple identical near simultaneous DNS queries better.
|
||||
+ Previously, such queries would all be forwarded
|
||||
+ independently. This is, in theory, inefficent but in practise
|
||||
+ not a problem, _except_ that is means that an answer for any
|
||||
+ of the forwarded queries will be accepted and cached.
|
||||
+ An attacker can send a query multiple times, and for each repeat,
|
||||
+ another {port, ID} becomes capable of accepting the answer he is
|
||||
+ sending in the blind, to random IDs and ports. The chance of a
|
||||
+ succesful attack is therefore multiplied by the number of repeats
|
||||
+ of the query. The new behaviour detects repeated queries and
|
||||
+ merely stores the clients sending repeats so that when the
|
||||
+ first query completes, the answer can be sent to all the
|
||||
+ clients who asked. Refer: CERT VU#434904.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
version 2.81
|
||||
--- a/src/dnsmasq.h
|
||||
+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
|
||||
@@ -642,19 +642,24 @@ struct hostsfile {
|
||||
#define FREC_DO_QUESTION 64
|
||||
#define FREC_ADDED_PHEADER 128
|
||||
#define FREC_TEST_PKTSZ 256
|
||||
-#define FREC_HAS_EXTRADATA 512
|
||||
+#define FREC_HAS_EXTRADATA 512
|
||||
+#define FREC_HAS_PHEADER 1024
|
||||
|
||||
#define HASH_SIZE 32 /* SHA-256 digest size */
|
||||
|
||||
struct frec {
|
||||
- union mysockaddr source;
|
||||
- union all_addr dest;
|
||||
+ struct frec_src {
|
||||
+ union mysockaddr source;
|
||||
+ union all_addr dest;
|
||||
+ unsigned int iface, log_id;
|
||||
+ unsigned short orig_id;
|
||||
+ struct frec_src *next;
|
||||
+ } frec_src;
|
||||
struct server *sentto; /* NULL means free */
|
||||
struct randfd *rfd4;
|
||||
struct randfd *rfd6;
|
||||
- unsigned int iface;
|
||||
- unsigned short orig_id, new_id;
|
||||
- int log_id, fd, forwardall, flags;
|
||||
+ unsigned short new_id;
|
||||
+ int fd, forwardall, flags;
|
||||
time_t time;
|
||||
unsigned char *hash[HASH_SIZE];
|
||||
#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
|
||||
@@ -1069,6 +1074,8 @@ extern struct daemon {
|
||||
int back_to_the_future;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
struct frec *frec_list;
|
||||
+ struct frec_src *free_frec_src;
|
||||
+ int frec_src_count;
|
||||
struct serverfd *sfds;
|
||||
struct irec *interfaces;
|
||||
struct listener *listeners;
|
||||
--- a/src/forward.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/forward.c
|
||||
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ static struct frec *lookup_frec(unsigned
|
||||
static struct frec *lookup_frec_by_sender(unsigned short id,
|
||||
union mysockaddr *addr,
|
||||
void *hash);
|
||||
+static struct frec *lookup_frec_by_query(void *hash, unsigned int flags);
|
||||
+
|
||||
static unsigned short get_id(void);
|
||||
static void free_frec(struct frec *f);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -247,6 +249,7 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, unio
|
||||
int type = SERV_DO_DNSSEC, norebind = 0;
|
||||
union all_addr *addrp = NULL;
|
||||
unsigned int flags = 0;
|
||||
+ unsigned int fwd_flags = 0;
|
||||
struct server *start = NULL;
|
||||
void *hash = hash_questions(header, plen, daemon->namebuff);
|
||||
#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
|
||||
@@ -255,7 +258,18 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, unio
|
||||
unsigned int gotname = extract_request(header, plen, daemon->namebuff, NULL);
|
||||
unsigned char *oph = find_pseudoheader(header, plen, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
||||
(void)do_bit;
|
||||
-
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (header->hb4 & HB4_CD)
|
||||
+ fwd_flags |= FREC_CHECKING_DISABLED;
|
||||
+ if (ad_reqd)
|
||||
+ fwd_flags |= FREC_AD_QUESTION;
|
||||
+ if (oph)
|
||||
+ fwd_flags |= FREC_HAS_PHEADER;
|
||||
+#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
|
||||
+ if (do_bit)
|
||||
+ fwd_flags |= FREC_DO_QUESTION;
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* may be no servers available. */
|
||||
if (forward || (forward = lookup_frec_by_sender(ntohs(header->id), udpaddr, hash)))
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -328,6 +342,39 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, unio
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ /* Query from new source, but the same query may be in progress
|
||||
+ from another source. If so, just add this client to the
|
||||
+ list that will get the reply.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Note that is the EDNS client subnet option is in use, we can't do this,
|
||||
+ as the clients (and therefore query EDNS options) will be different
|
||||
+ for each query. The EDNS subnet code has checks to avoid
|
||||
+ attacks in this case. */
|
||||
+ if (!option_bool(OPT_CLIENT_SUBNET) && (forward = lookup_frec_by_query(hash, fwd_flags)))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ /* Note whine_malloc() zeros memory. */
|
||||
+ if (!daemon->free_frec_src &&
|
||||
+ daemon->frec_src_count < daemon->ftabsize &&
|
||||
+ (daemon->free_frec_src = whine_malloc(sizeof(struct frec_src))))
|
||||
+ daemon->frec_src_count++;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* If we've been spammed with many duplicates, just drop the query. */
|
||||
+ if (daemon->free_frec_src)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ struct frec_src *new = daemon->free_frec_src;
|
||||
+ daemon->free_frec_src = new->next;
|
||||
+ new->next = forward->frec_src.next;
|
||||
+ forward->frec_src.next = new;
|
||||
+ new->orig_id = ntohs(header->id);
|
||||
+ new->source = *udpaddr;
|
||||
+ new->dest = *dst_addr;
|
||||
+ new->log_id = daemon->log_id;
|
||||
+ new->iface = dst_iface;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return 1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (gotname)
|
||||
flags = search_servers(now, &addrp, gotname, daemon->namebuff, &type, &domain, &norebind);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -335,22 +382,22 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, unio
|
||||
do_dnssec = type & SERV_DO_DNSSEC;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
type &= ~SERV_DO_DNSSEC;
|
||||
-
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (daemon->servers && !flags)
|
||||
forward = get_new_frec(now, NULL, 0);
|
||||
/* table full - flags == 0, return REFUSED */
|
||||
|
||||
if (forward)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- forward->source = *udpaddr;
|
||||
- forward->dest = *dst_addr;
|
||||
- forward->iface = dst_iface;
|
||||
- forward->orig_id = ntohs(header->id);
|
||||
+ forward->frec_src.source = *udpaddr;
|
||||
+ forward->frec_src.orig_id = ntohs(header->id);
|
||||
+ forward->frec_src.dest = *dst_addr;
|
||||
+ forward->frec_src.iface = dst_iface;
|
||||
forward->new_id = get_id();
|
||||
forward->fd = udpfd;
|
||||
memcpy(forward->hash, hash, HASH_SIZE);
|
||||
forward->forwardall = 0;
|
||||
- forward->flags = 0;
|
||||
+ forward->flags = fwd_flags;
|
||||
if (norebind)
|
||||
forward->flags |= FREC_NOREBIND;
|
||||
if (header->hb4 & HB4_CD)
|
||||
@@ -405,9 +452,9 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, unio
|
||||
unsigned char *pheader;
|
||||
|
||||
/* If a query is retried, use the log_id for the retry when logging the answer. */
|
||||
- forward->log_id = daemon->log_id;
|
||||
+ forward->frec_src.log_id = daemon->log_id;
|
||||
|
||||
- plen = add_edns0_config(header, plen, ((unsigned char *)header) + PACKETSZ, &forward->source, now, &subnet);
|
||||
+ plen = add_edns0_config(header, plen, ((unsigned char *)header) + PACKETSZ, &forward->frec_src.source, now, &subnet);
|
||||
|
||||
if (subnet)
|
||||
forward->flags |= FREC_HAS_SUBNET;
|
||||
@@ -544,7 +591,7 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, unio
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
/* could not send on, prepare to return */
|
||||
- header->id = htons(forward->orig_id);
|
||||
+ header->id = htons(forward->frec_src.orig_id);
|
||||
free_frec(forward); /* cancel */
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -796,8 +843,8 @@ void reply_query(int fd, int family, tim
|
||||
|
||||
/* log_query gets called indirectly all over the place, so
|
||||
pass these in global variables - sorry. */
|
||||
- daemon->log_display_id = forward->log_id;
|
||||
- daemon->log_source_addr = &forward->source;
|
||||
+ daemon->log_display_id = forward->frec_src.log_id;
|
||||
+ daemon->log_source_addr = &forward->frec_src.source;
|
||||
|
||||
if (daemon->ignore_addr && RCODE(header) == NOERROR &&
|
||||
check_for_ignored_address(header, n, daemon->ignore_addr))
|
||||
@@ -1065,6 +1112,7 @@ void reply_query(int fd, int family, tim
|
||||
new->sentto = server;
|
||||
new->rfd4 = NULL;
|
||||
new->rfd6 = NULL;
|
||||
+ new->frec_src.next = NULL;
|
||||
new->flags &= ~(FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY | FREC_DS_QUERY | FREC_HAS_EXTRADATA);
|
||||
new->forwardall = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1199,9 +1247,11 @@ void reply_query(int fd, int family, tim
|
||||
|
||||
if ((nn = process_reply(header, now, forward->sentto, (size_t)n, check_rebind, no_cache_dnssec, cache_secure, bogusanswer,
|
||||
forward->flags & FREC_AD_QUESTION, forward->flags & FREC_DO_QUESTION,
|
||||
- forward->flags & FREC_ADDED_PHEADER, forward->flags & FREC_HAS_SUBNET, &forward->source)))
|
||||
+ forward->flags & FREC_ADDED_PHEADER, forward->flags & FREC_HAS_SUBNET, &forward->frec_src.source)))
|
||||
{
|
||||
- header->id = htons(forward->orig_id);
|
||||
+ struct frec_src *src;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ header->id = htons(forward->frec_src.orig_id);
|
||||
header->hb4 |= HB4_RA; /* recursion if available */
|
||||
#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
|
||||
/* We added an EDNSO header for the purpose of getting DNSSEC RRs, and set the value of the UDP payload size
|
||||
@@ -1217,13 +1267,26 @@ void reply_query(int fd, int family, tim
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
+ for (src = &forward->frec_src; src; src = src->next)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ header->id = htons(src->orig_id);
|
||||
+
|
||||
#ifdef HAVE_DUMPFILE
|
||||
- dump_packet(DUMP_REPLY, daemon->packet, (size_t)nn, NULL, &forward->source);
|
||||
+ dump_packet(DUMP_REPLY, daemon->packet, (size_t)nn, NULL, &src->source);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
-
|
||||
- send_from(forward->fd, option_bool(OPT_NOWILD) || option_bool (OPT_CLEVERBIND), daemon->packet, nn,
|
||||
- &forward->source, &forward->dest, forward->iface);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ send_from(forward->fd, option_bool(OPT_NOWILD) || option_bool (OPT_CLEVERBIND), daemon->packet, nn,
|
||||
+ &src->source, &src->dest, src->iface);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (option_bool(OPT_EXTRALOG) && src != &forward->frec_src)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ daemon->log_display_id = src->log_id;
|
||||
+ daemon->log_source_addr = &src->source;
|
||||
+ log_query(F_UPSTREAM, "query", NULL, "duplicate");
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
+
|
||||
free_frec(forward); /* cancel */
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -2153,6 +2216,17 @@ void free_rfd(struct randfd *rfd)
|
||||
|
||||
static void free_frec(struct frec *f)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ struct frec_src *src, *tmp;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* add back to freelist of not the record builtin to every frec. */
|
||||
+ for (src = f->frec_src.next; src; src = tmp)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ tmp = src->next;
|
||||
+ src->next = daemon->free_frec_src;
|
||||
+ daemon->free_frec_src = src;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ f->frec_src.next = NULL;
|
||||
free_rfd(f->rfd4);
|
||||
f->rfd4 = NULL;
|
||||
f->sentto = NULL;
|
||||
@@ -2292,17 +2366,39 @@ static struct frec *lookup_frec_by_sende
|
||||
void *hash)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct frec *f;
|
||||
+ struct frec_src *src;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ for (f = daemon->frec_list; f; f = f->next)
|
||||
+ if (f->sentto &&
|
||||
+ !(f->flags & (FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY | FREC_DS_QUERY)) &&
|
||||
+ memcmp(hash, f->hash, HASH_SIZE) == 0)
|
||||
+ for (src = &f->frec_src; src; src = src->next)
|
||||
+ if (src->orig_id == id &&
|
||||
+ sockaddr_isequal(&src->source, addr))
|
||||
+ return f;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return NULL;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+static struct frec *lookup_frec_by_query(void *hash, unsigned int flags)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ struct frec *f;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* FREC_DNSKEY and FREC_DS_QUERY are never set in flags, so the test below
|
||||
+ ensures that no frec created for internal DNSSEC query can be returned here. */
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#define FLAGMASK (FREC_CHECKING_DISABLED | FREC_AD_QUESTION | FREC_DO_QUESTION \
|
||||
+ | FREC_HAS_PHEADER | FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY | FREC_DS_QUERY)
|
||||
|
||||
for(f = daemon->frec_list; f; f = f->next)
|
||||
if (f->sentto &&
|
||||
- f->orig_id == id &&
|
||||
- memcmp(hash, f->hash, HASH_SIZE) == 0 &&
|
||||
- sockaddr_isequal(&f->source, addr))
|
||||
+ (f->flags & FLAGMASK) == flags &&
|
||||
+ memcmp(hash, f->hash, HASH_SIZE) == 0)
|
||||
return f;
|
||||
-
|
||||
+
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
-
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* Send query packet again, if we can. */
|
||||
void resend_query()
|
||||
{
|
@ -0,0 +1,350 @@
|
||||
From 25e63f1e56f5acdcf91893a1b92ad1e0f2f552d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 25 Nov 2020 21:17:52 +0000
|
||||
Subject: Handle caching with EDNS options better.
|
||||
|
||||
If we add the EDNS client subnet option, or the client's
|
||||
MAC address, then the reply we get back may very depending on
|
||||
that. Since the cache is ignorant of such things, it's not safe to
|
||||
cache such replies. This patch determines when a dangerous EDNS
|
||||
option is being added and disables caching.
|
||||
|
||||
Note that for much the same reason, we can't combine multiple
|
||||
queries for the same question when dangerous EDNS options are
|
||||
being added, and the code now handles that in the same way. This
|
||||
query combining is required for security against cache poisoning,
|
||||
so disabling the cache has a security function as well as a
|
||||
correctness one.
|
||||
---
|
||||
man/dnsmasq.8 | 4 +--
|
||||
src/dnsmasq.h | 3 ++-
|
||||
src/edns0.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
|
||||
src/forward.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++----------
|
||||
4 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/man/dnsmasq.8
|
||||
+++ b/man/dnsmasq.8
|
||||
@@ -690,8 +690,8 @@ still marks the request so that no upstr
|
||||
address information either. The default is zero for both IPv4 and
|
||||
IPv6. Note that upstream nameservers may be configured to return
|
||||
different results based on this information, but the dnsmasq cache
|
||||
-does not take account. If a dnsmasq instance is configured such that
|
||||
-different results may be encountered, caching should be disabled.
|
||||
+does not take account. Caching is therefore disabled for such replies,
|
||||
+unless the subnet address being added is constant.
|
||||
|
||||
For example,
|
||||
.B --add-subnet=24,96
|
||||
--- a/src/dnsmasq.h
|
||||
+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
|
||||
@@ -644,6 +644,7 @@ struct hostsfile {
|
||||
#define FREC_TEST_PKTSZ 256
|
||||
#define FREC_HAS_EXTRADATA 512
|
||||
#define FREC_HAS_PHEADER 1024
|
||||
+#define FREC_NO_CACHE 2048
|
||||
|
||||
#define HASH_SIZE 32 /* SHA-256 digest size */
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1628,7 +1629,7 @@ size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_heade
|
||||
unsigned short udp_sz, int optno, unsigned char *opt, size_t optlen, int set_do, int replace);
|
||||
size_t add_do_bit(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *limit);
|
||||
size_t add_edns0_config(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *limit,
|
||||
- union mysockaddr *source, time_t now, int *check_subnet);
|
||||
+ union mysockaddr *source, time_t now, int *check_subnet, int *cacheable);
|
||||
int check_source(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *pseudoheader, union mysockaddr *peer);
|
||||
|
||||
/* arp.c */
|
||||
--- a/src/edns0.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/edns0.c
|
||||
@@ -264,7 +264,8 @@ static void encoder(unsigned char *in, c
|
||||
out[3] = char64(in[2]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
-static size_t add_dns_client(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *limit, union mysockaddr *l3, time_t now)
|
||||
+static size_t add_dns_client(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *limit,
|
||||
+ union mysockaddr *l3, time_t now, int *cacheablep)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int maclen, replace = 2; /* can't get mac address, just delete any incoming. */
|
||||
unsigned char mac[DHCP_CHADDR_MAX];
|
||||
@@ -273,6 +274,7 @@ static size_t add_dns_client(struct dns_
|
||||
if ((maclen = find_mac(l3, mac, 1, now)) == 6)
|
||||
{
|
||||
replace = 1;
|
||||
+ *cacheablep = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (option_bool(OPT_MAC_HEX))
|
||||
print_mac(encode, mac, maclen);
|
||||
@@ -288,14 +290,18 @@ static size_t add_dns_client(struct dns_
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
-static size_t add_mac(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *limit, union mysockaddr *l3, time_t now)
|
||||
+static size_t add_mac(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *limit,
|
||||
+ union mysockaddr *l3, time_t now, int *cacheablep)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int maclen;
|
||||
unsigned char mac[DHCP_CHADDR_MAX];
|
||||
|
||||
if ((maclen = find_mac(l3, mac, 1, now)) != 0)
|
||||
- plen = add_pseudoheader(header, plen, limit, PACKETSZ, EDNS0_OPTION_MAC, mac, maclen, 0, 0);
|
||||
-
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ *cacheablep = 0;
|
||||
+ plen = add_pseudoheader(header, plen, limit, PACKETSZ, EDNS0_OPTION_MAC, mac, maclen, 0, 0);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
return plen;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -313,17 +319,18 @@ static void *get_addrp(union mysockaddr
|
||||
return &addr->in.sin_addr;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
-static size_t calc_subnet_opt(struct subnet_opt *opt, union mysockaddr *source)
|
||||
+static size_t calc_subnet_opt(struct subnet_opt *opt, union mysockaddr *source, int *cacheablep)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-vandergaast-edns-client-subnet-02 */
|
||||
|
||||
int len;
|
||||
void *addrp = NULL;
|
||||
int sa_family = source->sa.sa_family;
|
||||
-
|
||||
+ int cacheable = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
opt->source_netmask = 0;
|
||||
opt->scope_netmask = 0;
|
||||
-
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (source->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6 && daemon->add_subnet6)
|
||||
{
|
||||
opt->source_netmask = daemon->add_subnet6->mask;
|
||||
@@ -331,6 +338,7 @@ static size_t calc_subnet_opt(struct sub
|
||||
{
|
||||
sa_family = daemon->add_subnet6->addr.sa.sa_family;
|
||||
addrp = get_addrp(&daemon->add_subnet6->addr, sa_family);
|
||||
+ cacheable = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
addrp = &source->in6.sin6_addr;
|
||||
@@ -343,6 +351,7 @@ static size_t calc_subnet_opt(struct sub
|
||||
{
|
||||
sa_family = daemon->add_subnet4->addr.sa.sa_family;
|
||||
addrp = get_addrp(&daemon->add_subnet4->addr, sa_family);
|
||||
+ cacheable = 1; /* Address is constant */
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
addrp = &source->in.sin_addr;
|
||||
@@ -350,8 +359,6 @@ static size_t calc_subnet_opt(struct sub
|
||||
|
||||
opt->family = htons(sa_family == AF_INET6 ? 2 : 1);
|
||||
|
||||
- len = 0;
|
||||
-
|
||||
if (addrp && opt->source_netmask != 0)
|
||||
{
|
||||
len = ((opt->source_netmask - 1) >> 3) + 1;
|
||||
@@ -359,18 +366,26 @@ static size_t calc_subnet_opt(struct sub
|
||||
if (opt->source_netmask & 7)
|
||||
opt->addr[len-1] &= 0xff << (8 - (opt->source_netmask & 7));
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ else
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ cacheable = 1; /* No address ever supplied. */
|
||||
+ len = 0;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (cacheablep)
|
||||
+ *cacheablep = cacheable;
|
||||
|
||||
return len + 4;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
-static size_t add_source_addr(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *limit, union mysockaddr *source)
|
||||
+static size_t add_source_addr(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *limit, union mysockaddr *source, int *cacheable)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-vandergaast-edns-client-subnet-02 */
|
||||
|
||||
int len;
|
||||
struct subnet_opt opt;
|
||||
|
||||
- len = calc_subnet_opt(&opt, source);
|
||||
+ len = calc_subnet_opt(&opt, source, cacheable);
|
||||
return add_pseudoheader(header, plen, (unsigned char *)limit, PACKETSZ, EDNS0_OPTION_CLIENT_SUBNET, (unsigned char *)&opt, len, 0, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -383,18 +398,18 @@ int check_source(struct dns_header *head
|
||||
unsigned char *p;
|
||||
int code, i, rdlen;
|
||||
|
||||
- calc_len = calc_subnet_opt(&opt, peer);
|
||||
-
|
||||
- if (!(p = skip_name(pseudoheader, header, plen, 10)))
|
||||
- return 1;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- p += 8; /* skip UDP length and RCODE */
|
||||
+ calc_len = calc_subnet_opt(&opt, peer, NULL);
|
||||
|
||||
- GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
|
||||
- if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
|
||||
- return 1; /* bad packet */
|
||||
-
|
||||
- /* check if option there */
|
||||
+ if (!(p = skip_name(pseudoheader, header, plen, 10)))
|
||||
+ return 1;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ p += 8; /* skip UDP length and RCODE */
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
|
||||
+ if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
|
||||
+ return 1; /* bad packet */
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* check if option there */
|
||||
for (i = 0; i + 4 < rdlen; i += len + 4)
|
||||
{
|
||||
GETSHORT(code, p);
|
||||
@@ -412,24 +427,28 @@ int check_source(struct dns_header *head
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+/* Set *check_subnet if we add a client subnet option, which needs to checked
|
||||
+ in the reply. Set *cacheable to zero if we add an option which the answer
|
||||
+ may depend on. */
|
||||
size_t add_edns0_config(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *limit,
|
||||
- union mysockaddr *source, time_t now, int *check_subnet)
|
||||
+ union mysockaddr *source, time_t now, int *check_subnet, int *cacheable)
|
||||
{
|
||||
*check_subnet = 0;
|
||||
-
|
||||
+ *cacheable = 1;
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (option_bool(OPT_ADD_MAC))
|
||||
- plen = add_mac(header, plen, limit, source, now);
|
||||
+ plen = add_mac(header, plen, limit, source, now, cacheable);
|
||||
|
||||
if (option_bool(OPT_MAC_B64) || option_bool(OPT_MAC_HEX))
|
||||
- plen = add_dns_client(header, plen, limit, source, now);
|
||||
-
|
||||
+ plen = add_dns_client(header, plen, limit, source, now, cacheable);
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (daemon->dns_client_id)
|
||||
plen = add_pseudoheader(header, plen, limit, PACKETSZ, EDNS0_OPTION_NOMCPEID,
|
||||
(unsigned char *)daemon->dns_client_id, strlen(daemon->dns_client_id), 0, 1);
|
||||
|
||||
if (option_bool(OPT_CLIENT_SUBNET))
|
||||
{
|
||||
- plen = add_source_addr(header, plen, limit, source);
|
||||
+ plen = add_source_addr(header, plen, limit, source, cacheable);
|
||||
*check_subnet = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/src/forward.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/forward.c
|
||||
@@ -344,13 +344,10 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, unio
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* Query from new source, but the same query may be in progress
|
||||
from another source. If so, just add this client to the
|
||||
- list that will get the reply.
|
||||
+ list that will get the reply.*/
|
||||
|
||||
- Note that is the EDNS client subnet option is in use, we can't do this,
|
||||
- as the clients (and therefore query EDNS options) will be different
|
||||
- for each query. The EDNS subnet code has checks to avoid
|
||||
- attacks in this case. */
|
||||
- if (!option_bool(OPT_CLIENT_SUBNET) && (forward = lookup_frec_by_query(hash, fwd_flags)))
|
||||
+ if (!option_bool(OPT_ADD_MAC) && !option_bool(OPT_MAC_B64) &&
|
||||
+ (forward = lookup_frec_by_query(hash, fwd_flags)))
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* Note whine_malloc() zeros memory. */
|
||||
if (!daemon->free_frec_src &&
|
||||
@@ -447,18 +444,21 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, unio
|
||||
if (!flags && forward)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct server *firstsentto = start;
|
||||
- int subnet, forwarded = 0;
|
||||
+ int subnet, cacheable, forwarded = 0;
|
||||
size_t edns0_len;
|
||||
unsigned char *pheader;
|
||||
|
||||
/* If a query is retried, use the log_id for the retry when logging the answer. */
|
||||
forward->frec_src.log_id = daemon->log_id;
|
||||
|
||||
- plen = add_edns0_config(header, plen, ((unsigned char *)header) + PACKETSZ, &forward->frec_src.source, now, &subnet);
|
||||
+ plen = add_edns0_config(header, plen, ((unsigned char *)header) + PACKETSZ, &forward->frec_src.source, now, &subnet, &cacheable);
|
||||
|
||||
if (subnet)
|
||||
forward->flags |= FREC_HAS_SUBNET;
|
||||
-
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (!cacheable)
|
||||
+ forward->flags |= FREC_NO_CACHE;
|
||||
+
|
||||
#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
|
||||
if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && do_dnssec)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ static size_t process_reply(struct dns_h
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
-
|
||||
+
|
||||
if ((pheader = find_pseudoheader(header, n, &plen, &sizep, &is_sign, NULL)))
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* Get extended RCODE. */
|
||||
@@ -1244,6 +1244,11 @@ void reply_query(int fd, int family, tim
|
||||
header->hb4 |= HB4_CD;
|
||||
else
|
||||
header->hb4 &= ~HB4_CD;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* Never cache answers which are contingent on the source or MAC address EDSN0 option,
|
||||
+ since the cache is ignorant of such things. */
|
||||
+ if (forward->flags & FREC_NO_CACHE)
|
||||
+ no_cache_dnssec = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((nn = process_reply(header, now, forward->sentto, (size_t)n, check_rebind, no_cache_dnssec, cache_secure, bogusanswer,
|
||||
forward->flags & FREC_AD_QUESTION, forward->flags & FREC_DO_QUESTION,
|
||||
@@ -1788,7 +1793,7 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, ti
|
||||
int local_auth = 0;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
int checking_disabled, do_bit, added_pheader = 0, have_pseudoheader = 0;
|
||||
- int check_subnet, no_cache_dnssec = 0, cache_secure = 0, bogusanswer = 0;
|
||||
+ int check_subnet, cacheable, no_cache_dnssec = 0, cache_secure = 0, bogusanswer = 0;
|
||||
size_t m;
|
||||
unsigned short qtype;
|
||||
unsigned int gotname;
|
||||
@@ -1959,7 +1964,7 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, ti
|
||||
char *domain = NULL;
|
||||
unsigned char *oph = find_pseudoheader(header, size, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
||||
|
||||
- size = add_edns0_config(header, size, ((unsigned char *) header) + 65536, &peer_addr, now, &check_subnet);
|
||||
+ size = add_edns0_config(header, size, ((unsigned char *) header) + 65536, &peer_addr, now, &check_subnet, &cacheable);
|
||||
|
||||
if (gotname)
|
||||
flags = search_servers(now, &addrp, gotname, daemon->namebuff, &type, &domain, &norebind);
|
||||
@@ -2122,6 +2127,11 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, ti
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ /* Never cache answers which are contingent on the source or MAC address EDSN0 option,
|
||||
+ since the cache is ignorant of such things. */
|
||||
+ if (!cacheable)
|
||||
+ no_cache_dnssec = 1;
|
||||
+
|
||||
m = process_reply(header, now, last_server, (unsigned int)m,
|
||||
option_bool(OPT_NO_REBIND) && !norebind, no_cache_dnssec, cache_secure, bogusanswer,
|
||||
ad_reqd, do_bit, added_pheader, check_subnet, &peer_addr);
|
||||
@@ -2385,10 +2395,13 @@ static struct frec *lookup_frec_by_query
|
||||
struct frec *f;
|
||||
|
||||
/* FREC_DNSKEY and FREC_DS_QUERY are never set in flags, so the test below
|
||||
- ensures that no frec created for internal DNSSEC query can be returned here. */
|
||||
+ ensures that no frec created for internal DNSSEC query can be returned here.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ Similarly FREC_NO_CACHE is never set in flags, so a query which is
|
||||
+ contigent on a particular source address EDNS0 option will never be matched. */
|
||||
|
||||
#define FLAGMASK (FREC_CHECKING_DISABLED | FREC_AD_QUESTION | FREC_DO_QUESTION \
|
||||
- | FREC_HAS_PHEADER | FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY | FREC_DS_QUERY)
|
||||
+ | FREC_HAS_PHEADER | FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY | FREC_DS_QUERY | FREC_NO_CACHE)
|
||||
|
||||
for(f = daemon->frec_list; f; f = f->next)
|
||||
if (f->sentto &&
|
@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
|
||||
From 2024f9729713fd657d65e64c2e4e471baa0a3e5b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20Men=C5=A1=C3=ADk?= <pemensik@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 25 Nov 2020 17:18:55 +0100
|
||||
Subject: Support hash function from nettle (only)
|
||||
|
||||
Unlike COPTS=-DHAVE_DNSSEC, allow usage of just sha256 function from
|
||||
nettle, but keep DNSSEC disabled at build time. Skips use of internal
|
||||
hash implementation without support for validation built-in.
|
||||
---
|
||||
Makefile | 8 +++++---
|
||||
bld/pkg-wrapper | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
|
||||
src/config.h | 8 ++++++++
|
||||
src/crypto.c | 7 +++++++
|
||||
src/dnsmasq.h | 2 +-
|
||||
src/hash_questions.c | 2 +-
|
||||
6 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/Makefile
|
||||
+++ b/Makefile
|
||||
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ top?=$(CURDIR)
|
||||
|
||||
dbus_cflags = `echo $(COPTS) | $(top)/bld/pkg-wrapper HAVE_DBUS $(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags dbus-1`
|
||||
dbus_libs = `echo $(COPTS) | $(top)/bld/pkg-wrapper HAVE_DBUS $(PKG_CONFIG) --libs dbus-1`
|
||||
-ubus_libs = `echo $(COPTS) | $(top)/bld/pkg-wrapper HAVE_UBUS "" --copy -lubox -lubus`
|
||||
+ubus_libs = `echo $(COPTS) | $(top)/bld/pkg-wrapper HAVE_UBUS "" --copy '-lubox -lubus'`
|
||||
idn_cflags = `echo $(COPTS) | $(top)/bld/pkg-wrapper HAVE_IDN $(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags libidn`
|
||||
idn_libs = `echo $(COPTS) | $(top)/bld/pkg-wrapper HAVE_IDN $(PKG_CONFIG) --libs libidn`
|
||||
idn2_cflags = `echo $(COPTS) | $(top)/bld/pkg-wrapper HAVE_LIBIDN2 $(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags libidn2`
|
||||
@@ -62,8 +62,10 @@ ct_cflags = `echo $(COPTS) | $(top)/
|
||||
ct_libs = `echo $(COPTS) | $(top)/bld/pkg-wrapper HAVE_CONNTRACK $(PKG_CONFIG) --libs libnetfilter_conntrack`
|
||||
lua_cflags = `echo $(COPTS) | $(top)/bld/pkg-wrapper HAVE_LUASCRIPT $(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags lua5.2`
|
||||
lua_libs = `echo $(COPTS) | $(top)/bld/pkg-wrapper HAVE_LUASCRIPT $(PKG_CONFIG) --libs lua5.2`
|
||||
-nettle_cflags = `echo $(COPTS) | $(top)/bld/pkg-wrapper HAVE_DNSSEC $(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags nettle hogweed`
|
||||
-nettle_libs = `echo $(COPTS) | $(top)/bld/pkg-wrapper HAVE_DNSSEC $(PKG_CONFIG) --libs nettle hogweed`
|
||||
+nettle_cflags = `echo $(COPTS) | $(top)/bld/pkg-wrapper HAVE_DNSSEC $(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags 'nettle hogweed' \
|
||||
+ HAVE_NETTLEHASH $(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags nettle`
|
||||
+nettle_libs = `echo $(COPTS) | $(top)/bld/pkg-wrapper HAVE_DNSSEC $(PKG_CONFIG) --libs 'nettle hogweed' \
|
||||
+ HAVE_NETTLEHASH $(PKG_CONFIG) --libs nettle`
|
||||
gmp_libs = `echo $(COPTS) | $(top)/bld/pkg-wrapper HAVE_DNSSEC NO_GMP --copy -lgmp`
|
||||
sunos_libs = `if uname | grep SunOS >/dev/null 2>&1; then echo -lsocket -lnsl -lposix4; fi`
|
||||
version = -DVERSION='\"`$(top)/bld/get-version $(top)`\"'
|
||||
--- a/bld/pkg-wrapper
|
||||
+++ b/bld/pkg-wrapper
|
||||
@@ -1,35 +1,37 @@
|
||||
#!/bin/sh
|
||||
|
||||
-search=$1
|
||||
-shift
|
||||
-pkg=$1
|
||||
-shift
|
||||
-op=$1
|
||||
-shift
|
||||
-
|
||||
in=`cat`
|
||||
|
||||
-if grep "^\#[[:space:]]*define[[:space:]]*$search" config.h >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
|
||||
- echo $in | grep $search >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
+search()
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ grep "^\#[[:space:]]*define[[:space:]]*$1" config.h >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
|
||||
+ echo $in | grep $1 >/dev/null 2>&1
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+while [ "$#" -gt 0 ]; do
|
||||
+ search=$1
|
||||
+ pkg=$2
|
||||
+ op=$3
|
||||
+ lib=$4
|
||||
+ shift 4
|
||||
+if search "$search"; then
|
||||
+
|
||||
# Nasty, nasty, in --copy, arg 2 (if non-empty) is another config to search for, used with NO_GMP
|
||||
if [ $op = "--copy" ]; then
|
||||
if [ -z "$pkg" ]; then
|
||||
- pkg="$*"
|
||||
- elif grep "^\#[[:space:]]*define[[:space:]]*$pkg" config.h >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
|
||||
- echo $in | grep $pkg >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
+ pkg="$lib"
|
||||
+ elif search "$pkg"; then
|
||||
pkg=""
|
||||
else
|
||||
- pkg="$*"
|
||||
+ pkg="$lib"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
- elif grep "^\#[[:space:]]*define[[:space:]]*${search}_STATIC" config.h >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
|
||||
- echo $in | grep ${search}_STATIC >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
- pkg=`$pkg --static $op $*`
|
||||
+ elif search "${search}_STATIC"; then
|
||||
+ pkg=`$pkg --static $op $lib`
|
||||
else
|
||||
- pkg=`$pkg $op $*`
|
||||
+ pkg=`$pkg $op $lib`
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
- if grep "^\#[[:space:]]*define[[:space:]]*${search}_STATIC" config.h >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
|
||||
- echo $in | grep ${search}_STATIC >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
+ if search "${search}_STATIC"; then
|
||||
if [ $op = "--libs" ] || [ $op = "--copy" ]; then
|
||||
echo "-Wl,-Bstatic $pkg -Wl,-Bdynamic"
|
||||
else
|
||||
@@ -40,3 +42,4 @@ if grep "^\#[[:space:]]*define[[:space:]
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
+done
|
||||
--- a/src/config.h
|
||||
+++ b/src/config.h
|
||||
@@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ HAVE_AUTH
|
||||
define this to include the facility to act as an authoritative DNS
|
||||
server for one or more zones.
|
||||
|
||||
+HAVE_NETTLEHASH
|
||||
+ include just hash function from nettle, but no DNSSEC.
|
||||
+
|
||||
HAVE_DNSSEC
|
||||
include DNSSEC validator.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -184,6 +187,7 @@ RESOLVFILE
|
||||
/* #define HAVE_IDN */
|
||||
/* #define HAVE_LIBIDN2 */
|
||||
/* #define HAVE_CONNTRACK */
|
||||
+/* #define HAVE_NETTLEHASH */
|
||||
/* #define HAVE_DNSSEC */
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -408,6 +412,10 @@ static char *compile_opts =
|
||||
"no-"
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
"auth "
|
||||
+#if !defined(HAVE_NETTLEHASH) && !defined(HAVE_DNSSEC)
|
||||
+"no-"
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+"nettlehash "
|
||||
#ifndef HAVE_DNSSEC
|
||||
"no-"
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
--- a/src/crypto.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/crypto.c
|
||||
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@
|
||||
#include <nettle/ecdsa.h>
|
||||
#include <nettle/ecc-curve.h>
|
||||
#include <nettle/eddsa.h>
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#if defined(HAVE_DNSSEC) || defined(HAVE_NETTLEHASH)
|
||||
#include <nettle/nettle-meta.h>
|
||||
#include <nettle/bignum.h>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -165,6 +168,10 @@ int hash_init(const struct nettle_hash *
|
||||
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
|
||||
|
||||
static int dnsmasq_rsa_verify(struct blockdata *key_data, unsigned int key_len, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
|
||||
unsigned char *digest, size_t digest_len, int algo)
|
||||
--- a/src/dnsmasq.h
|
||||
+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
|
||||
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ extern int capget(cap_user_header_t head
|
||||
#include <priv.h>
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
-#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
|
||||
+#if defined(HAVE_DNSSEC) || defined(HAVE_NETTLEHASH)
|
||||
# include <nettle/nettle-meta.h>
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/src/hash_questions.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/hash_questions.c
|
||||
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
#include "dnsmasq.h"
|
||||
|
||||
-#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
|
||||
+#if defined(HAVE_DNSSEC) || defined(HAVE_NETTLEHASH)
|
||||
unsigned char *hash_questions(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int q;
|
@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
|
||||
From 6a6e06fbb0d4690507ceaf2bb6f0d8910f3d4914 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 18:35:11 +0000
|
||||
Subject: Small cleanups in frec_src datastucture handling.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/forward.c | 22 +++++++++++++---------
|
||||
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/src/forward.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/forward.c
|
||||
@@ -353,7 +353,10 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, unio
|
||||
if (!daemon->free_frec_src &&
|
||||
daemon->frec_src_count < daemon->ftabsize &&
|
||||
(daemon->free_frec_src = whine_malloc(sizeof(struct frec_src))))
|
||||
- daemon->frec_src_count++;
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ daemon->frec_src_count++;
|
||||
+ daemon->free_frec_src->next = NULL;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
/* If we've been spammed with many duplicates, just drop the query. */
|
||||
if (daemon->free_frec_src)
|
||||
@@ -390,6 +393,7 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, unio
|
||||
forward->frec_src.orig_id = ntohs(header->id);
|
||||
forward->frec_src.dest = *dst_addr;
|
||||
forward->frec_src.iface = dst_iface;
|
||||
+ forward->frec_src.next = NULL;
|
||||
forward->new_id = get_id();
|
||||
forward->fd = udpfd;
|
||||
memcpy(forward->hash, hash, HASH_SIZE);
|
||||
@@ -2226,16 +2230,16 @@ void free_rfd(struct randfd *rfd)
|
||||
|
||||
static void free_frec(struct frec *f)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- struct frec_src *src, *tmp;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- /* add back to freelist of not the record builtin to every frec. */
|
||||
- for (src = f->frec_src.next; src; src = tmp)
|
||||
+ struct frec_src *last;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* add back to freelist if not the record builtin to every frec. */
|
||||
+ for (last = f->frec_src.next; last && last->next; last = last->next) ;
|
||||
+ if (last)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- tmp = src->next;
|
||||
- src->next = daemon->free_frec_src;
|
||||
- daemon->free_frec_src = src;
|
||||
+ last->next = daemon->free_frec_src;
|
||||
+ daemon->free_frec_src = f->frec_src.next;
|
||||
}
|
||||
-
|
||||
+
|
||||
f->frec_src.next = NULL;
|
||||
free_rfd(f->rfd4);
|
||||
f->rfd4 = NULL;
|
@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
|
||||
From e01e09c7125b40646aff4a582672e711a18a69a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2021 22:50:03 +0000
|
||||
Subject: Add CVE numbers to security update descriptions in CHANGELOG
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
CHANGELOG | 9 +++++----
|
||||
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/CHANGELOG
|
||||
+++ b/CHANGELOG
|
||||
@@ -1,16 +1,17 @@
|
||||
Fix a remote buffer overflow problem in the DNSSEC code. Any
|
||||
dnsmasq with DNSSEC compiled in and enabled is vulnerable to this,
|
||||
- referenced by CERT VU#434904.
|
||||
+ referenced by CVE-2020-25681, CVE-2020-25682, CVE-2020-25683
|
||||
+ CVE-2020-25687.
|
||||
|
||||
Be sure to only accept UDP DNS query replies at the address
|
||||
from which the query was originated. This keeps as much entropy
|
||||
in the {query-ID, random-port} tuple as possible, to help defeat
|
||||
- cache poisoning attacks. Refer: CERT VU#434904.
|
||||
+ cache poisoning attacks. Refer: CVE-2020-25684.
|
||||
|
||||
Use the SHA-256 hash function to verify that DNS answers
|
||||
received are for the questions originally asked. This replaces
|
||||
the slightly insecure SHA-1 (when compiled with DNSSEC) or
|
||||
- the very insecure CRC32 (otherwise). Refer: CERT VU#434904.
|
||||
+ the very insecure CRC32 (otherwise). Refer: CVE-2020-25685.
|
||||
|
||||
Handle multiple identical near simultaneous DNS queries better.
|
||||
Previously, such queries would all be forwarded
|
||||
@@ -24,7 +25,7 @@
|
||||
of the query. The new behaviour detects repeated queries and
|
||||
merely stores the clients sending repeats so that when the
|
||||
first query completes, the answer can be sent to all the
|
||||
- clients who asked. Refer: CERT VU#434904.
|
||||
+ clients who asked. Refer: CVE-2020-25686.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
version 2.81
|
@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
|
||||
From 503f68dbc437df20a45aab440e6fad92062af229 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2021 21:53:29 +0000
|
||||
Subject: Fix warning message logic.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/hash_questions.c | 2 +-
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/src/hash_questions.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/hash_questions.c
|
||||
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ unsigned char *hash_questions(struct dns
|
||||
static unsigned char dummy[HASH_SIZE];
|
||||
static int warned = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
- if (warned)
|
||||
+ if (!warned)
|
||||
my_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Failed to create SHA-256 hash object"));
|
||||
warned = 1;
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
|
||||
From cc0b4489c782f6b90ca118abb18e716a7a831289 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2021 22:21:52 +0000
|
||||
Subject: Update to new struct frec fields in conntrack code.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/forward.c | 4 ++--
|
||||
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/src/forward.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/forward.c
|
||||
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, unio
|
||||
if (option_bool(OPT_CONNTRACK))
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned int mark;
|
||||
- if (get_incoming_mark(&forward->source, &forward->dest, 0, &mark))
|
||||
+ if (get_incoming_mark(&forward->frec_src.source, &forward->frec_src.dest, 0, &mark))
|
||||
setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_MARK, &mark, sizeof(unsigned int));
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
@@ -1178,7 +1178,7 @@ void reply_query(int fd, int family, tim
|
||||
if (option_bool(OPT_CONNTRACK))
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned int mark;
|
||||
- if (get_incoming_mark(&orig->source, &orig->dest, 0, &mark))
|
||||
+ if (get_incoming_mark(&orig->frec_src.source, &orig->frec_src.dest, 0, &mark))
|
||||
setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_MARK, &mark, sizeof(unsigned int));
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/src/crypto.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/crypto.c
|
||||
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ static int dnsmasq_ecdsa_verify(struct b
|
||||
@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ static int dnsmasq_ecdsa_verify(struct b
|
||||
if (!(key_256 = whine_malloc(sizeof(struct ecc_point))))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
key = key_256;
|
||||
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ static int dnsmasq_ecdsa_verify(struct b
|
||||
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ static int dnsmasq_ecdsa_verify(struct b
|
||||
if (!(key_384 = whine_malloc(sizeof(struct ecc_point))))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user