2009-10-02 22:02:37 +00:00
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--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/regd.c
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+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/regd.c
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2017-03-22 19:24:32 +00:00
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@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
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#include "regd_common.h"
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static int __ath_regd_init(struct ath_regulatory *reg);
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+static struct reg_dmn_pair_mapping *ath_get_regpair(int regdmn);
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/*
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* This is a set of common rules used by our world regulatory domains.
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@@ -116,6 +117,9 @@ static const struct ieee80211_regdomain
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2016-10-24 06:58:46 +00:00
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static bool dynamic_country_user_possible(struct ath_regulatory *reg)
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{
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+ if (IS_ENABLED(CPTCFG_ATH_USER_REGD))
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+ return true;
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+
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if (IS_ENABLED(CPTCFG_ATH_REG_DYNAMIC_USER_CERT_TESTING))
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return true;
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2017-03-22 19:24:32 +00:00
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@@ -188,6 +192,8 @@ static bool dynamic_country_user_possibl
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2016-10-24 06:58:46 +00:00
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static bool ath_reg_dyn_country_user_allow(struct ath_regulatory *reg)
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{
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+ if (IS_ENABLED(CPTCFG_ATH_USER_REGD))
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+ return true;
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if (!IS_ENABLED(CPTCFG_ATH_REG_DYNAMIC_USER_REG_HINTS))
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return false;
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if (!dynamic_country_user_possible(reg))
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2017-08-22 21:59:48 +00:00
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@@ -345,6 +351,9 @@ ath_reg_apply_beaconing_flags(struct wip
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2013-01-09 12:45:28 +00:00
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struct ieee80211_channel *ch;
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unsigned int i;
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2009-10-02 22:02:37 +00:00
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2016-10-24 06:58:46 +00:00
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+ if (IS_ENABLED(CPTCFG_ATH_USER_REGD))
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+ return;
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2010-10-19 21:49:42 +00:00
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+
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2016-05-14 15:38:56 +00:00
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for (band = 0; band < NUM_NL80211_BANDS; band++) {
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2010-10-19 21:49:42 +00:00
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if (!wiphy->bands[band])
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2014-01-30 13:21:36 +00:00
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continue;
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2017-08-22 21:59:48 +00:00
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@@ -378,6 +387,9 @@ ath_reg_apply_ir_flags(struct wiphy *wip
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2014-01-30 13:21:36 +00:00
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{
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struct ieee80211_supported_band *sband;
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2009-10-02 22:02:37 +00:00
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2016-10-24 06:58:46 +00:00
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+ if (IS_ENABLED(CPTCFG_ATH_USER_REGD))
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+ return;
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2009-10-02 22:02:37 +00:00
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+
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2016-05-14 15:38:56 +00:00
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sband = wiphy->bands[NL80211_BAND_2GHZ];
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2011-11-18 11:27:19 +00:00
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if (!sband)
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return;
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2017-08-22 21:59:48 +00:00
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@@ -407,6 +419,9 @@ static void ath_reg_apply_radar_flags(st
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2010-10-19 21:49:42 +00:00
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struct ieee80211_channel *ch;
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unsigned int i;
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2016-10-24 06:58:46 +00:00
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+ if (IS_ENABLED(CPTCFG_ATH_USER_REGD))
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+ return;
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2009-10-02 22:02:37 +00:00
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+
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2016-05-14 15:38:56 +00:00
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if (!wiphy->bands[NL80211_BAND_5GHZ])
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2010-10-19 21:49:42 +00:00
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return;
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2018-02-28 20:10:32 +00:00
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@@ -639,6 +654,10 @@ ath_regd_init_wiphy(struct ath_regulator
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2010-10-19 21:49:42 +00:00
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const struct ieee80211_regdomain *regd;
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2014-10-23 13:33:18 +00:00
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wiphy->reg_notifier = reg_notifier;
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+
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2016-10-24 06:58:46 +00:00
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+ if (IS_ENABLED(CPTCFG_ATH_USER_REGD))
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+ return 0;
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2009-10-02 22:02:37 +00:00
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+
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2014-01-30 13:21:36 +00:00
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wiphy->regulatory_flags |= REGULATORY_STRICT_REG |
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REGULATORY_CUSTOM_REG;
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2014-10-23 13:33:18 +00:00
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2013-06-15 20:14:06 +00:00
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--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/Kconfig
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+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/Kconfig
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2019-07-06 22:08:20 +00:00
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@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ config WLAN_VENDOR_ATH
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2013-06-15 20:14:06 +00:00
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2015-12-04 22:39:37 +00:00
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if WLAN_VENDOR_ATH
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2013-06-15 20:14:06 +00:00
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+config ATH_USER_REGD
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+ bool "Do not enforce EEPROM regulatory restrictions"
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+
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config ATH_DEBUG
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bool "Atheros wireless debugging"
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2020-06-20 21:11:17 +00:00
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help
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2017-08-22 21:59:48 +00:00
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--- a/local-symbols
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+++ b/local-symbols
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mac80211: backport upstream fixes for FragAttacks
From the patch series description:
Several security issues in the 802.11 implementations were found by
Mathy Vanhoef (New York University Abu Dhabi), who has published all
the details at
https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/usenix2021.pdf
Specifically, the following CVEs were assigned:
* CVE-2020-24586 - Fragmentation cache not cleared on reconnection
* CVE-2020-24587 - Reassembling fragments encrypted under different
keys
* CVE-2020-24588 - Accepting non-SPP A-MSDU frames, which leads to
payload being parsed as an L2 frame under an
A-MSDU bit toggling attack
* CVE-2020-26139 - Forwarding EAPOL from unauthenticated sender
* CVE-2020-26140 - Accepting plaintext data frames in protected
networks
* CVE-2020-26141 - Not verifying TKIP MIC of fragmented frames
* CVE-2020-26142 - Processing fragmented frames as full frames
* CVE-2020-26143 - Accepting fragmented plaintext frames in
protected networks
* CVE-2020-26144 - Always accepting unencrypted A-MSDU frames that
start with RFC1042 header with EAPOL ethertype
* CVE-2020-26145 - Accepting plaintext broadcast fragments as full
frames
* CVE-2020-26146 - Reassembling encrypted fragments with non-consecutive
packet numbers
* CVE-2020-26147 - Reassembling mixed encrypted/plaintext fragments
In general, the scope of these attacks is that they may allow an
attacker to
* inject L2 frames that they can more or less control (depending on the
vulnerability and attack method) into an otherwise protected network;
* exfiltrate (some) network data under certain conditions, this is
specific to the fragmentation issues.
A subset of these issues is known to apply to the Linux IEEE 802.11
implementation (mac80211). Where it is affected, the attached patches
fix the issues, even if not all of them reference the exact CVE IDs.
In addition, driver and/or firmware updates may be necessary, as well
as potentially more fixes to mac80211, depending on how drivers are
using it.
Specifically, for Intel devices, firmware needs to be updated to the
most recently released versions (which was done without any reference
to the security issues) to address some of the vulnerabilities.
To have a single set of patches, I'm also including patches for the
ath10k and ath11k drivers here.
We currently don't have information about how other drivers are, if
at all, affected.
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
2021-05-12 12:28:37 +00:00
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@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ ADM8211=
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2013-06-30 10:44:19 +00:00
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ATH_COMMON=
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2015-12-04 22:39:37 +00:00
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WLAN_VENDOR_ATH=
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2013-06-30 10:44:19 +00:00
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ATH_DEBUG=
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+ATH_USER_REGD=
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2014-10-18 17:38:59 +00:00
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ATH_TRACEPOINTS=
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2013-11-12 22:11:33 +00:00
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ATH_REG_DYNAMIC_USER_REG_HINTS=
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ATH_REG_DYNAMIC_USER_CERT_TESTING=
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