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69 lines
2.6 KiB
Diff
69 lines
2.6 KiB
Diff
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From: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
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Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:51 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: extend protection against mixed key and
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fragment cache attacks
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For some chips/drivers, e.g., QCA6174 with ath10k, the decryption is
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done by the hardware, and the Protected bit in the Frame Control field
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is cleared in the lower level driver before the frame is passed to
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mac80211. In such cases, the condition for ieee80211_has_protected() is
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not met in ieee80211_rx_h_defragment() of mac80211 and the new security
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validation steps are not executed.
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Extend mac80211 to cover the case where the Protected bit has been
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cleared, but the frame is indicated as having been decrypted by the
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hardware. This extends protection against mixed key and fragment cache
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attack for additional drivers/chips. This fixes CVE-2020-24586 and
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CVE-2020-24587 for such cases.
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Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI WLAN.RM.4.4.1-00110-QCARMSWP-1
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Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
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Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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---
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--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
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+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
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@@ -2239,6 +2239,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
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unsigned int frag, seq;
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struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *entry;
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struct sk_buff *skb;
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+ struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(rx->skb);
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hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
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fc = hdr->frame_control;
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@@ -2297,7 +2298,9 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
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sizeof(rx->key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue]));
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BUILD_BUG_ON(IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN !=
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IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
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- } else if (rx->key && ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) {
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+ } else if (rx->key &&
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+ (ieee80211_has_protected(fc) ||
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+ (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))) {
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entry->is_protected = true;
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entry->key_color = rx->key->color;
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}
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@@ -2342,13 +2345,19 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802
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return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
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memcpy(entry->last_pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
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} else if (entry->is_protected &&
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- (!rx->key || !ieee80211_has_protected(fc) ||
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+ (!rx->key ||
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+ (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc) &&
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+ !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) ||
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rx->key->color != entry->key_color)) {
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/* Drop this as a mixed key or fragment cache attack, even
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* if for TKIP Michael MIC should protect us, and WEP is a
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* lost cause anyway.
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*/
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return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
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+ } else if (entry->is_protected && rx->key &&
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+ entry->key_color != rx->key->color &&
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+ (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
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+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
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}
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skb_pull(rx->skb, ieee80211_hdrlen(fc));
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