mirror of
https://github.com/linuxboot/heads.git
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19a705c179
Signed-off-by: Matthew Drobnak <matthew@drobnak.com>
181 lines
6.1 KiB
Bash
Executable File
181 lines
6.1 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/bin/bash
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# Retrieve the sealed TOTP secret and initialize a USB Security Dongle with it
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. /etc/functions
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. /etc/gui_functions
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HOTP_SECRET="/tmp/secret/hotp.key"
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HOTP_COUNTER="/boot/kexec_hotp_counter"
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HOTP_KEY="/boot/kexec_hotp_key"
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mount_boot()
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{
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TRACE_FUNC
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# Mount local disk if it is not already mounted
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if ! grep -q /boot /proc/mounts; then
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if ! mount -o ro /boot; then
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whiptail_error --title 'ERROR' \
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--msgbox "Couldn't mount /boot.\n\nCheck the /boot device in configuration settings, or perform an OEM reset." 0 80
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return 1
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fi
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fi
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}
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TRACE_FUNC
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fatal_error()
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{
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echo -e "\nERROR: ${1}; press Enter to continue."
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read
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# get lsusb output for debugging
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DEBUG "lsusb output: $(lsusb)"
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die "$1"
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}
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# Use stored HOTP key branding (this might be useful after OEM reset)
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if [ -r /boot/kexec_hotp_key ]; then
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HOTPKEY_BRANDING="$(cat /boot/kexec_hotp_key)"
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else
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HOTPKEY_BRANDING="HOTP USB Security Dongle"
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fi
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if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
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DEBUG "Sealing HOTP secret reuses TOTP sealed secret..."
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tpmr unseal 4d47 0,1,2,3,4,7 312 "$HOTP_SECRET" \
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|| fatal_error "Unable to unseal HOTP secret"
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else
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# without a TPM, generate a secret based on the SHA-256 of the ROM
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secret_from_rom_hash > "$HOTP_SECRET" || die "Reading ROM failed"
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fi
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# Store counter in file instead of TPM for now, as it conflicts with Heads
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# config TPM counter as TPM 1.2 can only increment one counter between reboots
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# get current value of HOTP counter in TPM, create if absent
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mount_boot || exit 1
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#check_tpm_counter $HOTP_COUNTER hotp \
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#|| die "Unable to find/create TPM counter"
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#counter="$TPM_COUNTER"
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#
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#counter_value=$(read_tpm_counter $counter | cut -f2 -d ' ' | awk 'gsub("^000e","")')
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#if [ "$counter_value" == "" ]; then
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# die "Unable to read HOTP counter"
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#fi
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#counter_value=$(printf "%d" 0x${counter_value})
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counter_value=1
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enable_usb
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# While making sure the key is inserted, capture the status so we can check how
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# many PIN attempts remain
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if ! hotp_token_info="$(hotp_verification info)" ; then
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echo -e "\nInsert your $HOTPKEY_BRANDING and press Enter to configure it"
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read
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if ! hotp_token_info="$(hotp_verification info)" ; then
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# don't leak key on failure
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shred -n 10 -z -u "$HOTP_SECRET" 2> /dev/null
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fatal_error "Unable to find $HOTPKEY_BRANDING"
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fi
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fi
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# Set HOTP USB Security Dongle branding based on VID
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if lsusb | grep -q "20a0:" ; then
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HOTPKEY_BRANDING="Nitrokey"
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elif lsusb | grep -q "316d:" ; then
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HOTPKEY_BRANDING="Librem Key"
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else
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HOTPKEY_BRANDING="HOTP USB Security Dongle"
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fi
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# Truncate the secret if it is longer than the maximum HOTP secret
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truncate_max_bytes 20 "$HOTP_SECRET"
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# Check when the signing key was created to consider trying the default PIN
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# (Note: we must avoid using gpg --card-status here as the Nitrokey firmware
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# locks up, https://github.com/Nitrokey/nitrokey-pro-firmware/issues/54)
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gpg_key_create_time="$(gpg --list-keys --with-colons | grep -m 1 '^pub:' | cut -d: -f6)"
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gpg_key_create_time="${gpg_key_create_time:-0}"
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DEBUG "Signature key was created at $(date -d "@$gpg_key_create_time")"
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now_date="$(date '+%s')"
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# Get the number of admin PIN retry attempts remaining
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awk_admin_counter_regex='/^\s*Card counters: Admin (\d),.*$/'
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awk_get_admin_counter="$awk_admin_counter_regex"' { print gensub('"$awk_admin_counter_regex"', "\\1", "") }'
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admin_pin_retries="$(echo "$hotp_token_info" | awk "$awk_get_admin_counter")"
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admin_pin_retries="${admin_pin_retries:-0}"
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DEBUG "Admin PIN retry counter is $admin_pin_retries"
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# Try using factory default admin PIN for 1 month following OEM reset to ease
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# initial setup. But don't do it forever to encourage changing the PIN and
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# so PIN attempts are not consumed by the default attempt.
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admin_pin="12345678"
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month_secs="$((30*24*60*60))"
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admin_pin_status=1
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if [ "$((now_date - gpg_key_create_time))" -gt "$month_secs" ]; then
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# Remind what the default PIN was in case it still hasn't been changed
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echo "Not trying default PIN ($admin_pin)"
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# Never consume an attempt if there are less than 3 attempts left, otherwise
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# attempting the default PIN could cause an unexpected lockout before getting a
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# chance to enter the correct PIN
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elif [ "$admin_pin_retries" -lt 3 ]; then
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echo "Not trying default PIN ($admin_pin), only $admin_pin_retries attempt(s) left"
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else
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hotp_initialize "$admin_pin" $HOTP_SECRET $counter_value "$HOTPKEY_BRANDING" >/dev/null 2>&1
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admin_pin_status="$?"
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fi
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if [ "$admin_pin_status" -ne 0 ]; then
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# prompt user for PIN and retry
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echo ""
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read -s -p "Enter your $HOTPKEY_BRANDING Admin PIN: " admin_pin
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echo -e "\n"
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hotp_initialize "$admin_pin" $HOTP_SECRET $counter_value "$HOTPKEY_BRANDING"
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if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
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echo -e "\n"
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read -s -p "Error setting HOTP secret, re-enter Admin PIN and try again: " admin_pin
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echo -e "\n"
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if ! hotp_initialize "$admin_pin" $HOTP_SECRET $counter_value "$HOTPKEY_BRANDING" ; then
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# don't leak key on failure
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shred -n 10 -z -u "$HOTP_SECRET" 2> /dev/null
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if [ "$HOTPKEY_BRANDING" == "Nitrokey" ]; then
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fatal_error "Setting HOTP secret failed, to reset nitrokey pin use: nitropy nk3 secrets reset or the Nitrokey App 2"
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else
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fatal_error "Setting HOTP secret failed"
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fi
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fi
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fi
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else
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# remind user to change admin password
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echo -e "\nWARNING: default admin PIN detected: please change this as soon as possible."
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fi
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# HOTP key no longer needed
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shred -n 10 -z -u "$HOTP_SECRET" 2> /dev/null
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# Make sure our counter is incremented ahead of the next check
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#increment_tpm_counter $counter > /dev/null \
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#|| die "Unable to increment tpm counter"
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#increment_tpm_counter $counter > /dev/null \
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#|| die "Unable to increment tpm counter"
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mount -o remount,rw /boot
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counter_value=`expr $counter_value + 1`
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echo $counter_value > $HOTP_COUNTER \
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|| fatal_error "Unable to create hotp counter file"
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# Store/overwrite HOTP USB Security Dongle branding found out beforehand
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echo $HOTPKEY_BRANDING > $HOTP_KEY \
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|| die "Unable to store hotp key file"
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#sha256sum /tmp/counter-$counter > $HOTP_COUNTER \
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#|| die "Unable to create hotp counter file"
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mount -o remount,ro /boot
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echo -e "\n$HOTPKEY_BRANDING initialized successfully. Press Enter to continue."
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read
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exit 0
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