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155 lines
4.1 KiB
Bash
Executable File
155 lines
4.1 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/bin/sh
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# This will generate a disk encryption key and seal / ecncrypt
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# with the current PCRs and then store it in the TPM NVRAM.
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# It will then need to be bundled into initrd that is booted.
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set -e -o pipefail
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TPM_INDEX=3
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TPM_SIZE=312
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KEY_FILE="/tmp/secret/secret.key"
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TPM_SEALED="/tmp/secret/secret.sealed"
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RECOVERY_KEY="/tmp/secret/recovery.key"
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. /etc/functions
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. /tmp/config
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paramsdir=$1
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if [ -z "$paramsdir" ]; then
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die "Usage $0 /boot"
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fi
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KEY_DEVICES="$paramsdir/kexec_key_devices.txt"
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KEY_LVM="$paramsdir/kexec_key_lvm.txt"
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if [ ! -r "$KEY_DEVICES" ]; then
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die "No devices defined for disk encryption"
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fi
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if [ -r "$KEY_LVM" ]; then
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# Activate the LVM volume group
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VOLUME_GROUP=`cat $KEY_LVM`
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if [ -z "$VOLUME_GROUP" ]; then
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die "No LVM volume group defined for activation"
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fi
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lvm vgchange -a y $VOLUME_GROUP \
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|| die "$VOLUME_GROUP: unable to activate volume group"
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fi
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# Key slot 0 is the manual recovery pass phrase
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# that they user entered when they installed Qubes,
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# key slot 1 is the one that we've generated.
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read -s -p "Enter disk recovery key: " disk_password
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echo -n "$disk_password" > "$RECOVERY_KEY"
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echo
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read -s -p "New disk unlock password for booting: " key_password
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echo
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read -s -p "Repeat unlock code: " key_password2
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echo
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if [ "$key_password" != "$key_password2" ]; then
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die "Key passwords do not match"
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fi
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# Generate key file
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dd \
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if=/dev/urandom \
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of="$KEY_FILE" \
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bs=1 \
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count=128 \
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2>/dev/null \
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|| die "Unable to generate 128 random bytes"
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# Remove all the old keys from slot 1
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for dev in `cat "$KEY_DEVICES" | cut -d\ -f1`; do
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echo "++++++ $dev: Removing old key slot"
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cryptsetup luksKillSlot \
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--key-file "$RECOVERY_KEY" \
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$dev 1 \
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|| warn "$dev: ignoring problem"
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echo "++++++ $dev: Adding key"
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cryptsetup luksAddKey \
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--key-file "$RECOVERY_KEY" \
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--key-slot 1 \
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$dev "$KEY_FILE" \
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|| die "$dev: Unable to add key"
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done
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# Now that we have setup the new keys, measure the PCRs
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# We don't care what ends up in PCR 6; we just want
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# to get the /tmp/luksDump.txt file. We use PCR16
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# since it should still be zero
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cat "$KEY_DEVICES" | cut -d\ -f1 | xargs /bin/qubes-measure-luks \
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|| die "Unable to measure the LUKS headers"
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luks_pcr=`tpm calcfuturepcr -ix 16 -if /tmp/luksDump.txt`
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# HOTP USB Secrity Dongle loads USB modules which changes PCR5.
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# In the event HOTP USB Security Dongle is enabled, skip verification of PCR5
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if [ -x /bin/hotp_verification ]; then
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pcr_5="X"
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else
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pcr_5="0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
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fi
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# Note that PCR 4 needs to be set with the "normal-boot"
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# path value, which we do not have right now since we are
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# in a recovery shell.
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# used to be -ix 4 f8fa3b6e32e7c6fe04c366e74636e505b28f3b0d \
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# now just all zeros in a normal boot
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# PCR 5 must be all zero since no kernel modules should have
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# been loaded during a normal boot, but might have been
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# loaded in the recovery shell.
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# Otherwise use the current values of the PCRs, which will be read
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# from the TPM as part of the sealing ("X").
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tpm sealfile2 \
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-if "$KEY_FILE" \
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-of "$TPM_SEALED" \
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-pwdd "$key_password" \
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-hk 40000000 \
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-ix 0 X \
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-ix 1 X \
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-ix 2 X \
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-ix 3 X \
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-ix 4 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 \
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-ix 5 $pcr_5 \
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-ix 6 $luks_pcr \
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-ix 7 X \
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|| die "Unable to seal secret"
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shred -n 10 -z -u "$KEY_FILE" 2> /dev/null \
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|| die "Failed to delete key file"
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# try it without the owner password first
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if ! tpm nv_writevalue \
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-in $TPM_INDEX \
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-if "$TPM_SEALED" \
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; then
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# to create an nvram space we need the TPM owner password
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# and the TPM physical presence must be asserted.
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#
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# The permissions are 0 since there is nothing special
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# about the sealed file
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tpm physicalpresence -s \
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|| warn "Warning: Unable to assert physical presence"
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read -s -p "TPM Owner password: " tpm_password
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echo
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tpm nv_definespace \
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-in $TPM_INDEX \
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-sz $TPM_SIZE \
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-pwdo "$tpm_password" \
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-per 0 \
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|| warn "Warning: Unable to define NVRAM space; trying anyway"
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tpm nv_writevalue \
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-in $TPM_INDEX \
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-if "$TPM_SEALED" \
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|| die "Unable to write sealed secret to NVRAM"
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fi
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shred -n 10 -z -u "$TPM_SEALED" 2> /dev/null \
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|| warn "Failed to delete the sealed secret - continuing"
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