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b500505312
Most logic throughout Heads doesn't need to know TPM1 versus TPM2 (and shouldn't, the differences should be localized). Some checks were incorrect and are fixed by this change. Most checks are now unchanged relative to master. There are not that many places outside of tpmr that need to differentiate TPM1 and TPM2. Some of those are duplicate code that should be consolidated (seal-hotpkey, unseal-totp, unseal-hotp), and some more are probably good candidates for abstracting in tpmr so the business logic doesn't have to know TPM1 vs. TPM2. Previously, CONFIG_TPM could be variously 'y', 'n', or empty. Now it is always 'y' or 'n', and 'y' means "any TPM". Board configs are unchanged, setting CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS=y implies CONFIG_TPM=y so this doesn't have to be duplicated and can't be mistakenly mismatched. There were a few checks for CONFIG_TPM = n that only coincidentally worked for TPM2 because CONFIG_TPM was empty (not 'n'). This test is now OK, but the checks were also cleaned up to '!= "y"' for robustness. Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
131 lines
3.6 KiB
Bash
Executable File
131 lines
3.6 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/bin/bash
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# Retrieve the sealed TOTP secret and initialize a USB Security dongle with it
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. /etc/functions
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HOTP_SEALED="/tmp/secret/hotp.sealed"
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HOTP_SECRET="/tmp/secret/hotp.key"
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HOTP_COUNTER="/boot/kexec_hotp_counter"
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HOTP_KEY="/boot/kexec_hotp_key"
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mount_boot()
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{
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TRACE "Under /bin/seal-htopkey:mount_boot"
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# Mount local disk if it is not already mounted
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if ! grep -q /boot /proc/mounts ; then
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mount -o ro /boot \
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|| recovery "Unable to mount /boot"
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fi
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}
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TRACE "Under /bin/seal-hotpkey"
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# Use stored HOTP key branding (this might be useful after OEM reset)
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if [ -r /boot/kexec_hotp_key ]; then
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HOTPKEY_BRANDING="$(cat /boot/kexec_hotp_key)"
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else
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HOTPKEY_BRANDING="HOTP USB Security Dongle"
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fi
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if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ] && [ "$CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS" != "y" ]; then
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tpm nv_readvalue \
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-in 4d47 \
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-sz 312 \
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-of "$HOTP_SEALED" \
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|| die "Unable to retrieve sealed file from TPM NV"
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tpm unsealfile \
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-hk 40000000 \
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-if "$HOTP_SEALED" \
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-of "$HOTP_SECRET" \
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|| die "Unable to unseal HOTP secret"
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elif [ "$CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS" = "y" ]; then
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tpmr unseal 0x81004d47 sha256:0,1,2,3,4,7 > "$HOTP_SECRET" \
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|| die "Unable to unseal HOTP secret"
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fi
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shred -n 10 -z -u "$HOTP_SEALED" 2> /dev/null
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# Store counter in file instead of TPM for now, as it conflicts with Heads
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# config TPM counter as TPM 1.2 can only increment one counter between reboots
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# get current value of HOTP counter in TPM, create if absent
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mount_boot
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#check_tpm_counter $HOTP_COUNTER hotp \
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#|| die "Unable to find/create TPM counter"
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#counter="$TPM_COUNTER"
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#
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#counter_value=$(read_tpm_counter $counter | cut -f2 -d ' ' | awk 'gsub("^000e","")')
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#if [ "$counter_value" == "" ]; then
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# die "Unable to read HOTP counter"
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#fi
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#counter_value=$(printf "%d" 0x${counter_value})
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counter_value=1
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enable_usb
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if ! hotp_verification info ; then
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echo "Insert your $HOTPKEY_BRANDING and press Enter to configure it"
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read
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if ! hotp_verification info ; then
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# don't leak key on failure
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shred -n 10 -z -u "$HOTP_SECRET" 2> /dev/null
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die "Unable to find $HOTPKEY_BRANDING"
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fi
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fi
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# Set HOTP USB Security Dongle branding based on VID
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if lsusb | grep -q "20a0:" ; then
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HOTPKEY_BRANDING="Nitrokey"
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elif lsusb | grep -q "316d:" ; then
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HOTPKEY_BRANDING="Librem Key"
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else
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HOTPKEY_BRANDING="HOTP USB Security Dongle"
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fi
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echo -e ""
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read -s -p "Enter your $HOTPKEY_BRANDING Admin PIN: " admin_pin
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echo -e "\n"
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hotp_initialize "$admin_pin" $HOTP_SECRET $counter_value "$HOTPKEY_BRANDING"
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if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
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echo -e "\n"
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read -s -p "Error setting HOTP secret, re-enter Admin PIN and try again: " admin_pin
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echo -e "\n"
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if ! hotp_initialize "$admin_pin" $HOTP_SECRET $counter_value "$HOTPKEY_BRANDING" ; then
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# don't leak key on failure
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shred -n 10 -z -u "$HOTP_SECRET" 2> /dev/null
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die "Setting HOTP secret failed"
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fi
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fi
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# HOTP key no longer needed
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shred -n 10 -z -u "$HOTP_SECRET" 2> /dev/null
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# Make sure our counter is incremented ahead of the next check
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#increment_tpm_counter $counter > /dev/null \
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#|| die "Unable to increment tpm counter"
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#increment_tpm_counter $counter > /dev/null \
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#|| die "Unable to increment tpm counter"
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mount -o remount,rw /boot
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counter_value=`expr $counter_value + 1`
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echo $counter_value > $HOTP_COUNTER \
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|| die "Unable to create hotp counter file"
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# Store/overwrite HOTP USB Security Dongle branding found out beforehand
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echo $HOTPKEY_BRANDING > $HOTP_KEY \
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|| die "Unable to store hotp key file"
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#sha256sum /tmp/counter-$counter > $HOTP_COUNTER \
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#|| die "Unable to create hotp counter file"
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mount -o remount,ro /boot
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echo -e "\n$HOTPKEY_BRANDING initialized successfully. Press Enter to continue."
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read
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exit 0
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