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0cef8e1edc
cryptsetup2 2.6.1 is a new release that supports reencryption of Q4.2 release LUKS2 volumes created at installation.
This is a critical feature for the Qubes OS 4.2 release for added data at rest protection
Cryptsetup 2.6.x internal changes:
- Argon2 used externally and internally: requires a lot of RAM and CPU to derivate passphrase to key validated in key slots.
- This is used to rate limit efficiently bruteforcing of LUKS key slots, requiring each offline brute force attempt to consume ~15-30 seconds per attempt
- OF course, strong passphrases are still recommended, but bruteforcing LUKSv2 containers with Argon2 would require immense time, ram and CPU even to bruteforce low entropy passphrase/PINs.
- passphrase change doesn't permit LUKS key slot specification anymore: key slot rotates (new one consusumed per op: then old one wiped internally. EG: LUKS key slot 1 created, then 0 deleted)
- reencryption doesn't permit old call arguments. No more direct-io; inadmissively slow through AIO (async) calls, need workarounds for good enough perfs (arguments + newer kernel with cloudfare fixes in tree)
cryptsetup 2.6.1 requires:
- lvm2 2.03.23, which is also included in this PR.
- requires libaio, which is also included in this PR (could be hacked out but deep dependency at first sight: left in)
- requires util-linux 2.39
- patches for reproducible builds are included for above 3 packages.
luks-functions was updated to support the new cryptsetup2 version calls/changes
- reencryption happen in direct-io, offline mode and without locking, requiring linux 5.10.9+ to bypass linux queues
- from tests, this is best for performance and reliability in single-user mode
- LUKS container ops now validate Disk Recovery Key (DRK) passphrase prior and DRK key slot prior of going forward if needed, failing early.
- Heads don't expect DRK to be in static key slot anymore, and finds the DRK key slot dynamically.
- If reencrytipn/passphrase change: make sure all LUKS containers on same block device can be unlocked with same DRK
- Reencryption: requires to know which key slot to reencrypt.
- Find LUKS key slot that unlocks with DRK passphrase unlock prior of reencrypt call
- Passphrase change: no slot can be passed, but key slot of DRK rotates.
kexec-seal-key
- TPM LUKS Disk Unlock Key key slots have changed to be set in max slots per LUKS version (LUKSv1:7 /LUKSv2: 31)
- If key slot != default LUKS version's keyslot outside of DRK key slot: prompt the user before wiping that key slot, otherwise wipe automatically
- This takes for granted that the DRK key slot alone is needed on the system and Heads controls the LUKS key slots.
- If user has something else going on, ie: Using USB Security dongle + TPM DUK, then the user will need to say no when wiping keys.
- It was suggested to leave LUKS key slots outside of DRK alone, but then: what to do when all key slots would be used?
- Alternative implementation could be to only prompt users to wipe keyslots other then DRK when key slots are all used (LUKSv1: 0-7, LUKSv2: 0-31)
- But then cleanup would need to happen prior of operations (LUKS passphrase change, TPM DUK setup) and could be problematic.
- LUKS containers now checked to be same LUKS version prior of permitting to set TPM DUK and will refuse to go forward of different versions.
TODO:
- async (AIO) calls are not used. direct-io is used instead. libaio could be hacked out
- this could be subject to future work
Notes:
- time to deprecated legacy boards the do not enough space for the new space requirements
- x230-legacy, x230-legacy-flash, x230-hotp-legacy
- t430-legacy, t430-legacy-flash, t430-hotp-legacy already deprecated
Unrelated:
- typos fixes found along the way
Signed-off-by: Thierry Laurion <insurgo@riseup.net>
67 lines
1.9 KiB
Makefile
67 lines
1.9 KiB
Makefile
# Configuration for a X230 running Qubes 4.1 and other Linux Based OSes (through kexec)
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#
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# Deactivated to fit in coreboot's CONFIG_CBFS_SIZE=0x700000 :
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# dropbear support(ssh client/server)
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# e1000e (ethernet driver)
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export CONFIG_COREBOOT=y
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export CONFIG_COREBOOT_VERSION=24.02.01
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export CONFIG_LINUX_VERSION=5.10.5
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CONFIG_COREBOOT_CONFIG=config/coreboot-UNMAINTAINED_x230-legacy.config
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CONFIG_LINUX_CONFIG=config/linux-UNMAINTAINED_x230-legacy.config
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#Additional hardware support
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CONFIG_LINUX_USB=y
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CONFIG_LINUX_E1000E=n
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CONFIG_CRYPTSETUP2=y
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CONFIG_FLASHPROG=y
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CONFIG_FLASHTOOLS=y
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CONFIG_GPG2=y
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CONFIG_KEXEC=y
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CONFIG_UTIL_LINUX=y
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CONFIG_LVM2=y
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CONFIG_MBEDTLS=y
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CONFIG_PCIUTILS=y
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#Remote attestation support
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#TPM based requirements
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export CONFIG_TPM=y
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CONFIG_POPT=y
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CONFIG_QRENCODE=y
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CONFIG_TPMTOTP=y
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#HOTP based remote attestation for supported USB Security dongle
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#With/Without TPM support
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CONFIG_HOTPKEY=n
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#Nitrokey Storage admin tool
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CONFIG_NKSTORECLI=n
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#GUI Support
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#Console based Whiptail support(Console based, no FB):
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CONFIG_SLANG=y
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CONFIG_NEWT=y
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#FBWhiptail based (Graphical):
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#CONFIG_CAIRO=y
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#CONFIG_FBWHIPTAIL=y
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#Additional tools:
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#SSH server (requires ethernet drivers, eg: CONFIG_LINUX_E1000E)
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CONFIG_DROPBEAR=n
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export CONFIG_BOOTSCRIPT=/bin/gui-init
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export CONFIG_BOOT_REQ_HASH=n
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export CONFIG_BOOT_REQ_ROLLBACK=n
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export CONFIG_BOOT_KERNEL_ADD=""
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export CONFIG_BOOT_KERNEL_REMOVE="intel_iommu=on intel_iommu=igfx_off"
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export CONFIG_BOARD_NAME="Thinkpad X230-legacy"
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export CONFIG_FLASH_OPTIONS="flashprog --progress --programmer internal --ifd --image bios"
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# This board has two SPI flash chips, an 8 MB that holds the IFD,
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# the ME image and part of the coreboot image, and a 4 MB one that
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# has the rest of the coreboot and the reset vector.
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#
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# Only flashing to the bios region is safe to do. The easiest is to
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# flash internally when the IFD is unlocked for writing, and x230-flash
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# is installed first.
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