heads/initrd/bin/oem-factory-reset

#!/bin/bash
# Automated setup of TPM, GPG keys, and disk

set -o pipefail

## External files sourced
. /etc/functions
. /etc/luks-functions
. /tmp/config

TRACE "Under /bin/oem-factory-reset"

# use TERM to exit on error
trap "exit 1" TERM
export TOP_PID=$$

## Static local variables

CLEAR="--clear"
CONTINUE="--yes-button Continue"
CANCEL="--no-button Cancel"
HEIGHT="0"
WIDTH="80"

USER_PIN_DEF=123456
ADMIN_PIN_DEF=12345678
TPM_PASS_DEF=12345678
USER_PIN=""
ADMIN_PIN=""
TPM_PASS=""

#Circumvent Librem Key/Nitrokey HOTP firmware bug https://github.com/osresearch/heads/issues/1167
MAX_HOTP_GPG_PIN_LENGTH=25

# What are the Security components affected by custom passwords
CUSTOM_PASS_AFFECTED_COMPONENTS=""

RSA_KEY_LENGTH=3072

GPG_USER_NAME="OEM Key"
GPG_KEY_NAME=`date +%Y%m%d%H%M%S`
GPG_USER_MAIL="oem-${GPG_KEY_NAME}@example.com"
GPG_USER_COMMENT="OEM-generated key"
SKIP_BOOT="n"

## functions

die() {

	local msg=$1
	if [ -n "$msg" ]; then
	    echo -e "\n$msg"
	fi
	kill -s TERM $TOP_PID
	exit 1
}

whiptail_error()
{
    local msg=$1
    if [ "$msg" = "" ]; then
        die "whiptail error: An error msg is required"
    fi
    whiptail $BG_COLOR_ERROR --msgbox "${msg}\n\n" $HEIGHT $WIDTH $BG_COLOR_ERROR --title "Error"
}

whiptail_error_die()
{
    whiptail_error "$@"
    die
}

gpg_key_reset()
{
    # Factory reset GPG card
    {
        echo admin
        echo factory-reset
        echo y
        echo yes
    } | gpg --command-fd=0 --status-fd=1 --pinentry-mode=loopback --card-edit \
        > /tmp/gpg_card_edit_output 2>&1
    if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
        ERROR=`cat /tmp/gpg_card_edit_output`
        whiptail_error_die "GPG Key factory reset failed!\n\n$ERROR"
    fi
    # If Nitrokey Storage is inserted, reset AES keys as well
    if lsusb | grep -q "20a0:4109" &&  [ -x /bin/hotp_verification ] ; then
        /bin/hotp_verification regenerate ${ADMIN_PIN_DEF}
    fi
    # Toggle forced sig (good security practice, forcing PIN request for each signature request)
    if gpg --card-status | grep "Signature PIN" | grep -q "not forced"; then
        {
            echo admin
            echo forcesig
            echo ${ADMIN_PIN_DEF}
        } | gpg --command-fd=0 --status-fd=1 --pinentry-mode=loopback --card-edit \
            > /tmp/gpg_card_edit_output 2>&1
        if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
            ERROR=`cat /tmp/gpg_card_edit_output`
            whiptail_error_die "GPG Key forcesig toggle on failed!\n\n$ERROR"
        fi
    fi
    # Set RSA key length
    {
        echo admin
        echo key-attr
        echo 1 # RSA
        echo ${RSA_KEY_LENGTH} #Signing key size set to RSA_KEY_LENGTH
        echo ${ADMIN_PIN_DEF}
        echo 1 # RSA
        echo ${RSA_KEY_LENGTH} #Encryption key size set to RSA_KEY_LENGTH
        echo ${ADMIN_PIN_DEF}
        echo 1 # RSA
        echo ${RSA_KEY_LENGTH} #Authentication key size set to RSA_KEY_LENGTH
        echo ${ADMIN_PIN_DEF}
    } | gpg --command-fd=0 --status-fd=1 --pinentry-mode=loopback --card-edit \
        > /tmp/gpg_card_edit_output 2>&1
    if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
        ERROR=`cat /tmp/gpg_card_edit_output`
        whiptail_error_die "Setting key attributed to RSA ${RSA_KEY_LENGTH} bits in USB security dongle failed."
    fi
    # Generate OEM GPG keys
    {
        echo admin
        echo generate
        echo n
        echo ${ADMIN_PIN_DEF}
        echo ${USER_PIN_DEF}
        echo 0
        echo y
        echo ${GPG_USER_NAME}
        echo ${GPG_USER_MAIL}
        echo ${GPG_USER_COMMENT}
    } | gpg --command-fd=0 --status-fd=2 --pinentry-mode=loopback --card-edit \
        > /tmp/gpg_card_edit_output 2>&1
    if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
        ERROR=`cat /tmp/gpg_card_edit_output`
        whiptail_error_die "GPG Key automatic keygen failed!\n\n$ERROR"
    fi
}

gpg_key_change_pin()
{
    # 1 = user PIN, 3 = admin PIN
    PIN_TYPE=$1
    PIN_ORIG=$2
    PIN_NEW=$3
    # Change PIN
    {
        echo admin
        echo passwd
        echo ${PIN_TYPE}
        echo ${PIN_ORIG}
        echo ${PIN_NEW}
        echo ${PIN_NEW}
        echo q
        echo q
    } | gpg --command-fd=0 --status-fd=2 --pinentry-mode=loopback --card-edit \
        > /tmp/gpg_card_edit_output 2>&1
    if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
        ERROR=`cat /tmp/gpg_card_edit_output | fold -s`
        whiptail_error_die "GPG Key PIN change failed!\n\n$ERROR"
    fi
}

generate_checksums()
{
    # ensure /boot mounted
    if ! grep -q /boot /proc/mounts ; then
        mount -o rw /boot || whiptail_error_die "Unable to mount /boot"
    else
        mount -o remount,rw /boot || whiptail_error_die "Unable to mount /boot"
    fi

    #Check if previous TPM Disk unlock Key was set
    if [ -e /boot/kexec_key_devices.txt ]; then
        TPM_DISK_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SET=1
    fi

    # clear any existing checksums/signatures
    rm /boot/kexec* 2>/dev/null

    # create Heads TPM counter
    if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ];then
	    if [ "$CONFIG_IGNORE_ROLLBACK" != "y" ]; then
		    tpmr counter_create \
			 -pwdo "$TPM_PASS" \
			 -pwdc '' \
			 -la -3135106223 \
			    | tee /tmp/counter \
			    || whiptail_error_die "Unable to create TPM counter"
		    TPM_COUNTER=`cut -d: -f1 < /tmp/counter`

		    # increment TPM counter
		    increment_tpm_counter $TPM_COUNTER >/dev/null 2>&1 \
			    || whiptail_error_die "Unable to increment tpm counter"

		    # create rollback file
		    sha256sum /tmp/counter-$TPM_COUNTER > /boot/kexec_rollback.txt 2>/dev/null \
			    || whiptail_error_die "Unable to create rollback file"
	    else
		    ## needs to exist for initial call to unseal-hotp
		    echo "0" > /boot/kexec_hotp_counter
	    fi
    fi

    # set default boot option only if no TPM Disk Unlock Key previously set
    if [ -z "$TPM_DISK_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SET" ]; then
        set_default_boot_option
    fi

    # generate hashes
    (
        set -e -o pipefail
        cd /boot
        find ./ -type f ! -path './kexec*' -print0 \
            | xargs -0 sha256sum > /boot/kexec_hashes.txt 2>/dev/null
        print_tree > /boot/kexec_tree.txt
    )
    [ $? -eq 0 ] || whiptail_error_die "Error generating kexec hashes"

    param_files=`find /boot/kexec*.txt`
    [ -z "$param_files" ] \
        && whiptail_error_die "No kexec parameter files to sign"

    # sign kexec boot files
    if sha256sum $param_files 2>/dev/null | gpg \
            --pinentry-mode loopback \
            --passphrase "$USER_PIN" \
            --digest-algo SHA256 \
            --detach-sign \
            -a \
            > /boot/kexec.sig 2>/tmp/error; then
        # successful - update the validated params
        if ! check_config /boot >/dev/null 2>/tmp/error ; then
            cat /tmp/error
            ret=1
        else
            ret=0
        fi
    else
        cat /tmp/error
        ret=1
    fi

    # done writing to /boot, switch back to RO
    mount -o ro,remount /boot

    if [ $ret = 1 ] ; then
        ERROR=$(tail -n 1 /tmp/error | fold -s)
        whiptail_error_die "Error signing kexec boot files:\n\n$ERROR"
    fi
}

set_default_boot_option()
{
    option_file="/tmp/kexec_options.txt"
    tmp_menu_file="/tmp/kexec/kexec_menu.txt"
    hash_file="/boot/kexec_default_hashes.txt"

    mkdir -p /tmp/kexec/
    rm $option_file 2>/dev/null
    # parse boot options from grub.cfg
    for i in `find /boot -name "grub.cfg"`; do
        kexec-parse-boot "/boot" "$i" >> $option_file
    done
    # FC29/30+ may use BLS format grub config files
    # https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/BootLoaderSpecByDefault
    # only parse these if $option_file is still empty
    if [ ! -s $option_file ] && [ -d "/boot/loader/entries" ]; then
      for i in `find /boot -name "grub.cfg"`; do
        kexec-parse-bls "/boot" "$i" "/boot/loader/entries" >> $option_file
      done
    fi
    [ ! -s $option_file ] \
        && whiptail_error_die "Failed to parse any boot options"

    # sort boot options
    sort -r $option_file | uniq > $tmp_menu_file

    ## save first option as default
    entry=`head -n 1 $tmp_menu_file | tail -1`

    # clear existing default configs
    rm "/boot/kexec_default.*.txt" 2>/dev/null

    # get correct index for entry
    index=$(grep -n "$entry" $option_file | cut -f1 -d ':')

    # write new config
    echo "$entry" > /boot/kexec_default.$index.txt

    # validate boot option
    ( cd /boot && /bin/kexec-boot -b "/boot" -e "$entry" -f \
        | xargs sha256sum > $hash_file 2>/dev/null ) \
        || whiptail_error_die "Failed to create hashes of boot files"
}

report_integrity_measurements()
{
    #check for GPG key in keyring
    GPG_KEY_COUNT=`gpg -k 2>/dev/null | wc -l`
    if [ $GPG_KEY_COUNT -ne 0 ]; then
        # Check and report TOTP
        # update the TOTP code every thirty seconds
        date=`date "+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S %Z"`
        seconds=`date "+%s"`
        half=`expr \( $seconds % 60 \) / 30`
        if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" != "y" ]; then
            TOTP="NO TPM"
        elif [ "$half" != "$last_half" ]; then
            last_half=$half;
            TOTP=`unseal-totp` > /dev/null 2>&1
        fi

        # Check and report on HOTP status
        if [ -x /bin/hotp_verification ]; then
            HOTP=`unseal-hotp` > /dev/null 2>&1
            enable_usb
            if ! hotp_verification info > /dev/null 2>&1 ; then
                whiptail $CONFIG_WARNING_BG_COLOR --title 'WARNING: Please insert your HOTP enabled USB Security dongle' --msgbox "Your HOTP enabled USB Security dongle was not detected.\n\nPlease remove it and insert it again." 0 80
            fi
            # Don't output HOTP codes to screen, so as to make replay attacks harder
            hotp_verification check $HOTP
            case "$?" in
                0 )
                    HOTP="Success"
                    ;;
                4 )
                    HOTP="Invalid code"
                    MAIN_MENU_BG_COLOR=$CONFIG_ERROR_BG_COLOR
                    ;;
                * )
                    HOTP="Error checking code, Insert USB Security dongle and retry"
                    MAIN_MENU_BG_COLOR=$CONFIG_WARNING_BG_COLOR
                    ;;
                esac
            else
                HOTP='N/A'
        fi
        # Check for detached signed digest and report on /boot integrity status
        check_config /boot force
        TMP_HASH_FILE="/tmp/kexec/kexec_hashes.txt"

	if ( cd /boot && sha256sum -c "$TMP_HASH_FILE" > /tmp/hash_output ); then
            HASH="OK"
            else
                HASH="ALTERED"
        fi

	    #Show results
	    whiptail $MAIN_MENU_BG_COLOR --title "Measured Integrity Report" --msgbox "$date\nTOTP: $TOTP | HOTP: $HOTP\n/BOOT INTEGRITY: $HASH\n\nPress OK to continue or Ctrl+Alt+Delete to reboot" 0 80
    fi
}


## main script start

# check for args
if [ "$1" != "" ]; then
    title_text=$1
else
    title_text="OEM Factory Reset / Re-Ownership"
fi
if [ "$2" != "" ]; then
    bg_color=$2
else
    bg_color=""
fi

# show warning prompt
if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
    TPM_STR="          * ERASE the TPM and own it with a password\n"
else
    TPM_STR=""
fi
if ! whiptail --yesno "
        This operation will automatically:\n
$TPM_STR
          * ERASE any keys or passwords on the GPG smart card,\n
            reset it to a factory state, generate new keys\n
            and optionally set custom PIN(s)\n
          * Add the new GPG key to the firmware and reflash it\n
          * Sign all of the files in /boot with the new GPG key\n\n
        It requires that you already have an OS installed on a\n
        dedicated /boot partition. Do you wish to continue?" \
        $HEIGHT $WIDTH $CONTINUE $CANCEL $CLEAR $bg_color --title "$title_text" ; then
    exit 1
fi

# We show current integrity measurements status and time
report_integrity_measurements

use_defaults=n
if [ "$CONFIG_OEMRESET_OFFER_DEFAULTS" = y ]; then
	echo -e -n "Would you like to use default configuration options?\nIf N, you will be prompted for each option [Y/n]: "
	read -n 1 use_defaults
fi

if [ "$use_defaults" == "n" -o "$use_defaults" == "N" ]; then
	# Re-ownership of encrypted disk key, content and passphrase
	echo -e -n "\n\nWould you like to change the current LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase?\n (Highly recommended if you didn't install the Operating System yourself, so that past provisioned passphrase would not permit to access content.\n  Note that without re-encrypting disk, a backuped header could be restored to access encrypted content with old passphrase) [y/N]: "
	read -n 1 prompt_output
	echo
	if [ "$prompt_output" == "y" \
			-o "$prompt_output" == "Y" ];then
		luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase_desired=1
		echo -e "\n"
	fi

	echo -e -n "Would you like to re-encrypt LUKS encrypted container and generate new Disk Recovery key?\n (Highly recommended if you didn't install the operating system yourself: this would prevent any LUKS backuped header to be restored to access encrypted data) [y/N]: "
	read -n 1 prompt_output
	echo
	if [ "$prompt_output" == "y" \
			-o "$prompt_output" == "Y" ];then
		test_luks_current_disk_recovery_key_passphrase
		luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_desired=1
		echo -e "\n"
	fi

	# Adapt message to be given to user in terms of security components that will be applied.
	if [ -n "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase_desired" -o -n "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase" ]; then
		CUSTOM_PASS_AFFECTED_COMPONENTS="LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase"
	fi
	if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
		CUSTOM_PASS_AFFECTED_COMPONENTS="$CUSTOM_PASS_AFFECTED_COMPONENTS
TPM Ownership password"
	fi
	CUSTOM_PASS_AFFECTED_COMPONENTS="$CUSTOM_PASS_AFFECTED_COMPONENTS
GPG Admin PIN
GPG User PIN"

	# Inform user of security components affected for the following prompts
	echo -e "The following security components will be provisioned with defaults or chosen PINs/passwords:
	$CUSTOM_PASS_AFFECTED_COMPONENTS\n"

	# Prompt to change default passwords
	echo -e -n "Would you like to set a single custom password that will be provisioned to previously stated security components? [y/N]: "
	read -n 1 prompt_output
	echo
	if [ "$prompt_output" == "y" \
			-o "$prompt_output" == "Y" ]; then
		echo -e "\nThe chosen custom password must be between 8 and $MAX_HOTP_GPG_PIN_LENGTH characters in length.\n"
		echo
		while [[  ${#CUSTOM_SINGLE_PASS} -lt 8 ]] || [[ ${#CUSTOM_SINGLE_PASS} -gt $MAX_HOTP_GPG_PIN_LENGTH ]] ; do
			echo -e -n "Enter the custom password: "
			read CUSTOM_SINGLE_PASS
		done
		echo
		TPM_PASS=$CUSTOM_SINGLE_PASS
		USER_PIN=$CUSTOM_SINGLE_PASS
		ADMIN_PIN=$CUSTOM_SINGLE_PASS
			
		# Only set if user said desired. Matches rest of logic
		if [ -n "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase_desired" ]; then
			luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase=$CUSTOM_SINGLE_PASS
		fi
	else
		echo -e -n "Would you like to set distinct PINs/passwords to be provisioned to previously stated security components? [y/N]: "
		read -n 1 prompt_output
		echo
		if [ "$prompt_output" == "y" \
				-o "$prompt_output" == "Y" ]; then
			echo -e "\nThey must be each at least 8 characters in length.\n"
			echo
			if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
				while [[  ${#TPM_PASS} -lt 8 ]] ; do
					echo -e -n "Enter desired TPM Ownership password: "
					read TPM_PASS
				done
			fi
			while [[ ${#ADMIN_PIN} -lt 8 ]] || [[ ${#ADMIN_PIN} -gt $MAX_HOTP_GPG_PIN_LENGTH ]] ; do
				echo -e -n "\nThis PIN should be between 8 to $MAX_HOTP_GPG_PIN_LENGTH characters in length.\n"
				echo -e -n "Enter desired GPG Admin PIN: "
				read ADMIN_PIN
			done
			while [[  ${#USER_PIN} -lt 8 ]] || [[ ${#USER_PIN} -gt 64 ]]; do
				echo -e -n "\nThis PIN should be between 8 to 64 characters in length.\n"
				echo -e -n "Enter desired GPG User PIN: "
				read USER_PIN
			done
			echo
		fi
	fi

	if [ -n "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase_desired" -a -z "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase" ]; then
		# We catch here if changing LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase was desired
		#  but yet undone. This is if not being covered by the single password
		echo -e "\nEnter desired replacement for current Disk Recovery Key passphrase (At least 8 characters long):"
		while [[ ${#luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase} -lt 8 ]]; do
		{
			read -r luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase
		};done
		#We test that current Disk Recovery Key passphrase is known prior of going further
		test_luks_current_disk_recovery_key_passphrase
		echo -e "\n"
	fi

	# Prompt to change default GnuPG key information
	echo -e -n "Would you like to set custom user information for the GnuPG key? [y/N]: "
	read -n 1 prompt_output
	echo
	if [ "$prompt_output" == "y" \
			-o "$prompt_output" == "Y" ]; then
		echo -e "\n\n"
		echo -e "We will generate a GnuPG (PGP) keypair identifiable with the following text form:"
		echo -e "Real Name (Comment) email@address.org"

		echo -e "\nEnter your Real Name (At least 5 characters long):"
		read -r GPG_USER_NAME
		while [[ ${#GPG_USER_NAME} -lt 5 ]]; do
		{
			echo -e "\nEnter your Real Name (At least 5 characters long):"
			read -r GPG_USER_NAME
		};done

		echo -e "\nEnter your email@adress.org:"
		read -r GPG_USER_MAIL
		while ! $(expr "$GPG_USER_MAIL" : '.*@' >/dev/null); do
		{
			echo -e "\nEnter your email@address.org:"
			read -r GPG_USER_MAIL
		};done

		echo -e "\nEnter Comment (Optional, to distinguish this key from others with same previous attributes. Must be smaller then 60 characters):"
		read -r GPG_USER_COMMENT
		while [[ ${#GPG_USER_COMMENT} -gt 60 ]]; do
		{
			echo -e "\nEnter Comment (Optional, to distinguish this key from others with same previous attributes. Must be smaller then 60 characters):"
			read -r GPG_USER_COMMENT
		};done
	fi
fi 

# If nothing is stored in custom variables, we set them to their defaults
if [ "$TPM_PASS" == "" ]; then TPM_PASS=$TPM_PASS_DEF; fi
if [ "$USER_PIN" == "" ]; then USER_PIN=$USER_PIN_DEF; fi
if [ "$ADMIN_PIN" == "" ]; then ADMIN_PIN=$ADMIN_PIN_DEF; fi

## sanity check the USB, GPG key, and boot device before proceeding further

# Prompt to insert USB drive if desired
echo -e -n "\nWould you like to export your public key to an USB drive? [y/N]: "
read -n 1 prompt_output
echo
if [ "$prompt_output" == "y" \
  -o "$prompt_output" == "Y" ] \
; then
    GPG_EXPORT=1
    # mount USB over /media only if not already mounted
    if ! grep -q /media /proc/mounts ; then
      # mount USB in rw
      if ! mount-usb rw 2>/tmp/error; then
        ERROR=$(tail -n 1 /tmp/error | fold -s)
        whiptail_error_die "Unable to mount USB on /media:\n\n${ERROR}"
      fi
    else
      #/media already mounted, make sure it is in r+w mode
      if ! mount -o remount,rw /media 2>/tmp/error; then
        ERROR=$(tail -n 1 /tmp/error | fold -s)
        whiptail_error_die "Unable to remount in read+write USB on /media:\n\n${ERROR}"
      fi
    fi
else
    GPG_EXPORT=0
    # needed for USB Security dongle below and is ensured via mount-usb in case of GPG_EXPORT=1
    enable_usb
fi

# ensure USB Security Dongle connected
echo -e "\nChecking for USB Security Dongle...\n"
# USB kernel modules already loaded via mount-usb
if ! gpg --card-status >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
    whiptail_error "Can't access USB Security Dongle; \nPlease remove and reinsert, then press Enter."
    if ! gpg --card-status >/dev/null 2>/tmp/error ; then
        ERROR=$(tail -n 1 /tmp/error | fold -s)
        whiptail_error_die "Unable to detect USB Security Dongle:\n\n${ERROR}"
    fi
fi

assert_signable

# Action time...

# detect and set /boot device
echo -e "\nDetecting and setting boot device...\n"
if ! detect_boot_device ; then
  SKIP_BOOT="y"
else
  echo -e "Boot device set to $CONFIG_BOOT_DEV\n"
fi

# update configs
if [[ "$SKIP_BOOT" == "n" ]]; then
  replace_config /etc/config.user "CONFIG_BOOT_DEV" "$CONFIG_BOOT_DEV"
  combine_configs
fi


if [ -n "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_desired" -a -n "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase_desired" ]; then
  #Reencryption of disk, disk recovery key and Disk Recovery Key passphrase change is requested
  luks_reencrypt
  luks_change_passphrase
elif [ -n "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_desired" -a -z "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase_desired" ]; then
  #Reencryption of disk was requested but not passphrase change
  luks_reencrypt
elif [ -z "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_desired" -a -n "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase_desired" ]; then
  #Passphrase change is requested without disk reencryption
  luks_change_passphrase
fi

## reset TPM and set password
if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
  echo -e "\nResetting TPM...\n"
  tpmr reset "$TPM_PASS" >/dev/null 2>/tmp/error
fi
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
	ERROR=$(tail -n 1 /tmp/error | fold -s)
	whiptail_error_die "Error resetting TPM:\n\n${ERROR}"
fi

# clear local keyring
rm /.gnupg/*.gpg 2>/dev/null
rm /.gnupg/*.kbx 2>/dev/null
gpg --list-keys >/dev/null 2>&1

## reset the GPG Key
echo -e "\nResetting GPG Key...\n(this will take around 3 minutes...)\n"
gpg_key_reset

# parse name of generated key
GPG_GEN_KEY=`grep -A1 pub /tmp/gpg_card_edit_output | tail -n1 | sed -nr 's/^([ ])*//p'`
PUBKEY="/tmp/${GPG_GEN_KEY}.asc"

#Applying custom GPG PINs
if [ "$USER_PIN" != "" -o "$ADMIN_PIN" != "" ]; then
  echo -e "\nChanging default GPG Admin PIN\n"
  gpg_key_change_pin "3" "$ADMIN_PIN_DEF" "$ADMIN_PIN"
  echo -e "\nChanging default GPG User PIN\n"
  gpg_key_change_pin "1" "$USER_PIN_DEF" "$USER_PIN"
fi

# export pubkey to file
if ! gpg --export --armor $GPG_GEN_KEY > "${PUBKEY}" 2>/tmp/error ; then
    ERROR=$(tail -n 1 /tmp/error | fold -s)
    whiptail_error_die "GPG Key gpg export to file failed!\n\n$ERROR"
fi

## export pubkey to USB
if [ $GPG_EXPORT -ne 0 ]; then
    echo -e "\nExporting generated key to USB...\n"
    # copy to USB
    if ! cp "${PUBKEY}" "/media/${GPG_GEN_KEY}.asc" 2>/tmp/error ; then
        ERROR=$(tail -n 1 /tmp/error | fold -s)
        whiptail_error_die "Key export error: unable to copy ${GPG_GEN_KEY}.asc to /media:\n\n$ERROR"
    fi
    mount -o remount,ro /media 2>/dev/null
fi

## flash generated key to ROM
echo -e "\nReading current firmware...\n(this will take a minute or two)\n"
/bin/flash.sh -r /tmp/oem-setup.rom >/dev/null 2>/tmp/error
if [ ! -s /tmp/oem-setup.rom ]; then
    ERROR=$(tail -n 1 /tmp/error | fold -s)
    whiptail_error_die "Error reading current firmware:\n\n$ERROR"
fi

# ensure key imported locally
if ! cat "$PUBKEY" | gpg --import >/dev/null 2>/tmp/error ; then
    ERROR=$(tail -n 1 /tmp/error | fold -s)
    whiptail_error_die "Error importing GPG key:\n\n$ERROR"
fi
# update /.gnupg/trustdb.gpg to ultimately trust all user provided public keys
if ! gpg --list-keys --fingerprint --with-colons 2>/dev/null \
        | sed -E -n -e 's/^fpr:::::::::([0-9A-F]+):$/\1:6:/p' \
        | gpg --import-ownertrust >/dev/null 2>/tmp/error ; then
    ERROR=$(tail -n 1 /tmp/error | fold -s)
    whiptail_error_die "Error importing GPG ownertrust:\n\n$ERROR"
fi
if ! gpg --update-trust >/dev/null 2>/tmp/error ; then
    ERROR=$(tail -n 1 /tmp/error | fold -s)
    whiptail_error_die "Error updating GPG ownertrust:\n\n$ERROR"
fi
# clear any existing heads/gpg files from current firmware
for i in `cbfs.sh -o /tmp/oem-setup.rom -l | grep -e "heads/"`; do
    cbfs.sh -o /tmp/oem-setup.rom -d $i
done
# add heads/gpg files to current firmware
if [ -e /.gnupg/pubring.kbx ];then
    cbfs.sh -o /tmp/oem-setup.rom -a "heads/initrd/.gnupg/pubring.kbx" -f /.gnupg/pubring.kbx
    if [ -e /.gnupg/pubring.gpg ];then
        rm /.gnupg/pubring.gpg
    fi
elif [ -e /.gnupg/pubring.gpg ];then
    cbfs.sh -o /tmp/oem-setup.rom -a "heads/initrd/.gnupg/pubring.gpg" -f /.gnupg/pubring.gpg
fi
if [ -e /.gnupg/trustdb.gpg ]; then
    cbfs.sh -o /tmp/oem-setup.rom -a "heads/initrd/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg" -f /.gnupg/trustdb.gpg
fi
# persist user config changes (boot device)
if [ -e /etc/config.user ]; then
    cbfs.sh -o /tmp/oem-setup.rom -a "heads/initrd/etc/config.user" -f /etc/config.user
fi
# flash updated firmware image
echo -e "\nAdding generated key to current firmware and re-flashing...\n"
if ! /bin/flash.sh /tmp/oem-setup.rom >/dev/null 2>/tmp/error ; then
    ERROR=$(tail -n 1 /tmp/error | fold -s)
    whiptail_error_die "Error flashing updated firmware image:\n\n$ERROR"
fi

## sign files in /boot and generate checksums
if [[ "$SKIP_BOOT" == "n" ]]; then
  echo -e "\nSigning boot files and generating checksums...\n"
  generate_checksums
fi

# Prepare whiptail output of provisioned secrets
if [ -z "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase" -o -z "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase_desired" ]; then
  luks_passphrase_changed=""
else
 luks_passphrase_changed="LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase:\n
     $luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase"
fi

if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
  tpm_password_changed="
    TPM Owner Password: $TPM_PASS\n"
else
  tpm_password_changed=""
fi

## Show to user current provisioned secrets prior of rebooting
whiptail --msgbox "
    $luks_passphrase_changed
    $tpm_password_changed
    GPG Admin PIN: $ADMIN_PIN\n
    GPG User PIN: $USER_PIN\n\n" \
    $HEIGHT $WIDTH --title "Provisioned secrets"

## all done -- reboot
whiptail --msgbox "
    OEM Factory Reset / Re-Ownership has completed successfully\n\n
    After rebooting, you will need to generate new TOTP/HOTP secrets\n
    when prompted in order to complete the setup process.\n\n
    Press Enter to reboot.\n" \
    $HEIGHT $WIDTH --title "OEM Factory Reset / Re-Ownership Complete"

# Clean LUKS secrets
luks_secrets_cleanup
unset luks_passphrase_changed
unset tpm_password_changed

reboot