heads/initrd/etc/functions

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#!/bin/bash
# Shell functions for most initialization scripts
. /etc/ash_functions
# Print <hidden> or <empty> depending on whether $1 is empty. Useful to mask an
# optional password parameter.
mask_param() {
if [ -z "$1" ]; then
echo "<empty>"
else
echo "<hidden>"
fi
}
# Trace a command with DEBUG, then execute it.
# A password parameter can be masked by passing --mask-position N before the
# command to execute, the debug trace will just indicate whether the password
# was empty or nonempty (which is important when use of a password is optional).
# N=0 is the name of the command to be executed, N=1 is its first parameter,
# etc.
DO_WITH_DEBUG() {
if [ "$1" == "--mask-position" ]; then
mask_position="$2"
shift
shift
DEBUG_ARGS=("$@")
DEBUG_ARGS[$mask_position]="$(mask_param "${DEBUG_ARGS[$mask_position]}")"
DEBUG "${DEBUG_ARGS[@]}"
else
DEBUG "$@"
fi
"$@"
}
pcrs() {
if [ "$CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS" = "y" ]; then
tpm2 pcrread sha256
elif [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
head -8 /sys/class/tpm/tpm0/pcrs
fi
}
confirm_totp() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:confirm_totp"
prompt="$1"
last_half=X
unset totp_confirm
while true; do
# update the TOTP code every thirty seconds
date=$(date "+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
seconds=$(date "+%s")
half=$(expr \( $seconds % 60 \) / 30)
if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" != "y" ]; then
TOTP="NO TPM"
elif [ "$half" != "$last_half" ]; then
last_half=$half
TOTP=$(unseal-totp) ||
recovery "TOTP code generation failed"
fi
echo -n "$date $TOTP: "
# read the first character, non-blocking
read \
-t 1 \
-n 1 \
-s \
-p "$prompt" \
totp_confirm &&
break
# nothing typed, redraw the line
echo -ne '\r'
done
# clean up with a newline
echo
}
reseal_tpm_disk_decryption_key() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:reseal_tpm_disk_decryption_key"
#For robustness, exit early if TPM Disk Unlock Key is prohibited in board configs
if [ "$CONFIG_TPM_DISK_UNLOCK_KEY" == "n" ]; then
DEBUG "TPM Disk Unlock Key is prohibited in board configs"
return
else
DEBUG "TPM Disk Unlock Key is allowed in board configs. Continuing"
fi
if ! grep -q /boot /proc/mounts; then
mount -o ro /boot ||
recovery "Unable to mount /boot"
fi
if [ -s /boot/kexec_key_devices.txt ] || [ -s /boot/kexec_key_lvm.txt ]; then
warn "TPM sealed Disk Unlock Key secret needs to be resealed alongside TOTP/HOTP secret"
echo "Resealing TPM LUKS Disk Unlock Key to be unsealed by TPM Disk Unlock Key passphrase"
while ! kexec-seal-key /boot; do
warn "Recovery Disk Encryption key passphrase/TPM Owner Password may be invalid. Please try again"
done
warn "LUKS header hash changed under /boot/kexec_luks_hdr_hash.txt"
echo "Updating checksums and signing all files under /boot/kexec.sig"
while ! update_checksums; do
warn "Checksums were not signed. Preceding errors should explain possible causes"
done
warn "Rebooting in 3 seconds to enable booting default boot option"
sleep 3
reboot
else
DEBUG "No TPM disk decryption key to reseal"
fi
}
# Enable USB storage (if not already enabled), and wait for storage devices to
# be detected. If USB storage was already enabled, no wait occurs, this would
# have happened already when USB storage was enabled.
enable_usb_storage() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:enable_usb_storage"
if ! lsmod | grep -q usb_storage; then
timeout=0
echo "Scanning for USB storage devices..."
insmod /lib/modules/usb-storage.ko >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
die "usb_storage: module load failed"
while [[ $(list_usb_storage | wc -l) -eq 0 ]]; do
[[ $timeout -ge 8 ]] && break
sleep 1
timeout=$(($timeout + 1))
done
fi
}
list_usb_storage() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:list_usb_storage"
# List all USB storage devices, including partitions unless we received argument stating we want drives only
# The output is a list of device names, one per line.
if [ "$1" = "disks" ]; then
DEBUG "Listing USB storage devices (disks only) since list_usb_storage was called with 'disks' argument"
else
DEBUG "Listing USB storage devices (including partitions)"
fi
stat -c %N /sys/block/sd* 2>/dev/null | grep usb |
cut -f1 -d ' ' |
sed "s/[']//g" |
while read b; do
# Ignore devices of size 0, such as empty SD card
# readers on laptops attached via USB.
if [ "$(cat "$b/size")" -gt 0 ]; then
DEBUG "USB storage device of size greater then 0: $b"
echo "$b"
fi
done |
sed "s|/sys/block|/dev|" |
while read b; do
# If the device has a partition table, ignore it and
# include the partitions instead - even if the kernel
# hasn't detected the partitions yet. Such a device is
# never usable directly, and this allows the "wait for
# disks" loop in mount-usb to correctly wait for the
# partitions.
# This check: [ $(fdisk -l "$b" | wc -l) -eq 5 ]
# covers the case of a device without partition table but
# formatted as fat32, which contains a sortof partition table.
# this causes fdisk to not print the invalid partition table
# message and instead it'll print an empty table with header.
# In both cases the output is 5 lines: 3 about device info,
# 1 empty line and the 5th will be the table header or the
# unvalid message.
DISK_DATA=$(fdisk -l "$b")
if echo "$DISK_DATA" | grep -q "doesn't contain a valid partition table" || [ $(echo "$DISK_DATA" | wc -l) -eq 5 ]; then
# No partition table, include this device
DEBUG "USB storage device without partition table: $b"
echo "$b"
#Bypass the check for partitions if we want only disks
elif [ "$1" = "disks" ]; then
# disks only were requested, so we don't list partitions
DEBUG "USB storage device with partition table: $b"
DEBUG "We asked for disks only, so we don't want to list partitions"
echo "$b"
else
# Has a partition table, include partitions
DEBUG "USB storage device with partition table: $b"
ls -1 "$b"* | awk 'NR!=1 {print $0}'
fi
done
}
# Prompt for an owner password if it is not already set in tpm_password. Sets
# tpm_password. Tools should optionally accept a TPM password on the command
# line, since some flows need it multiple times and only one prompt is ideal.
prompt_tpm_owner_password() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:prompt_tpm_owner_password"
if [ -s /tmp/secret/tpm_owner_password ]; then
DEBUG "/tmp/secret/tpm_owner_password already cached in file. Reusing"
tpm_owner_password=$(cat /tmp/secret/tpm_owner_password)
return 0
fi
read -s -p "TPM Owner Password: " tpm_owner_password
echo # new line after password prompt
# Cache the password externally to be reused by who needs it
DEBUG "Caching TPM Owner Password to /tmp/secret/tpm_owner_password"
mkdir -p /tmp/secret || die "Unable to create /tmp/secret"
echo -n "$tpm_owner_password" >/tmp/secret/tpm_owner_password || die "Unable to cache TPM owner_password under /tmp/secret/tpm_owner_password"
}
# Prompt for a new owner password when resetting the TPM. Returned in
# key_password. The password must be 1-32 characters and must be entered twice,
# the script will loop until this is met.
prompt_new_owner_password() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:prompt_new_owner_password"
local tpm_owner_password2
tpm_owner_password=1
tpm_owner_password2=2
while [ "$tpm_owner_password" != "$tpm_owner_password2" ] || [ "${#tpm_owner_password}" -gt 32 ] || [ -z "$tpm_owner_password" ]; do
read -s -p "New TPM Owner Password (2 words suggested, 1-32 characters max): " tpm_owner_password
echo
read -s -p "Repeat chosen TPM Owner Password: " tpm_owner_password2
echo
if [ "$tpm_owner_password" != "$tpm_owner_password2" ]; then
echo "Passphrases entered do not match. Try again!"
echo
fi
done
# Cache the password externally to be reused by who needs it
DEBUG "Caching TPM Owner Password to /tmp/secret/tpm_owner_password"
mkdir -p /tmp/secret || die "Unable to create /tmp/secret"
echo -n "$tpm_owner_password" >/tmp/secret/tpm_owner_password || die "Unable to cache TPM password under /tmp/secret"
}
check_tpm_counter() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:check_tpm_counter"
LABEL=${2:-3135106223}
tpm_password="$3"
# if the /boot.hashes file already exists, read the TPM counter ID
# from it.
if [ -r "$1" ]; then
TPM_COUNTER=$(grep counter- "$1" | cut -d- -f2)
else
warn "$1 does not exist; creating new TPM counter"
prompt_tpm_owner_password
tpmr counter_create \
-pwdo "$tpm_password" \
-pwdc '' \
-la $LABEL |
tee /tmp/counter ||
{
DEBUG "Failed to create TPM counter. Shredding TPM owner password"
#TODO: refactor tpmr to wipe tpm_owner_password when invalid
# As of today, the callers are responsible to wipe it
# prompt_tpm_owner_password caches the password until externally invalidated
shred -n 10 -z -u /tmp/secret/tpm_owner_password
:
die "Unable to create TPM counter" 2>/dev/null
}
TPM_COUNTER=$(cut -d: -f1 </tmp/counter)
fi
if [ -z "$TPM_COUNTER" ]; then
die "$1: TPM Counter not found?"
fi
}
read_tpm_counter() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:read_tpm_counter"
tpmr counter_read -ix "$1" | tee "/tmp/counter-$1" ||
die "Counter read failed"
}
increment_tpm_counter() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:increment_tpm_counter"
tpmr counter_increment -ix "$1" -pwdc '' |
tee /tmp/counter-$1 ||
die "TPM counter increment failed for rollback prevention. Please reset the TPM"
}
check_config() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:check_config"
if [ ! -d /tmp/kexec ]; then
mkdir /tmp/kexec ||
die 'Failed to make kexec tmp dir'
else
rm -rf /tmp/kexec/* ||
die 'Failed to empty kexec tmp dir'
fi
if [ ! -r $1/kexec.sig -a "$CONFIG_BASIC" != "y" ]; then
return
fi
if [ $(find $1/kexec*.txt | wc -l) -eq 0 ]; then
return
fi
if [ "$2" != "force" ]; then
if ! sha256sum $(find $1/kexec*.txt) | gpgv $1/kexec.sig -; then
die 'Invalid signature on kexec boot params'
fi
fi
echo "+++ Found verified kexec boot params"
cp $1/kexec*.txt /tmp/kexec ||
die "Failed to copy kexec boot params to tmp"
}
# Replace a file in a ROM (add it if the file does not exist)
replace_rom_file() {
ROM="$1"
ROM_FILE="$2"
NEW_FILE="$3"
if (cbfs.sh -o "$ROM" -l | grep -q "$ROM_FILE"); then
cbfs.sh -o "$ROM" -d "$ROM_FILE"
fi
cbfs.sh -o "$ROM" -a "$ROM_FILE" -f "$NEW_FILE"
}
replace_config() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:replace_config"
CONFIG_FILE=$1
CONFIG_OPTION=$2
NEW_SETTING=$3
touch $CONFIG_FILE
# first pull out the existing option from the global config and place in a tmp file
awk "gsub(\"^export ${CONFIG_OPTION}=.*\",\"export ${CONFIG_OPTION}=\\\"${NEW_SETTING}\\\"\")" /tmp/config >${CONFIG_FILE}.tmp
awk "gsub(\"^${CONFIG_OPTION}=.*\",\"${CONFIG_OPTION}=\\\"${NEW_SETTING}\\\"\")" /tmp/config >>${CONFIG_FILE}.tmp
# then copy any remaining settings from the existing config file, minus the option you changed
grep -v "^export ${CONFIG_OPTION}=" ${CONFIG_FILE} | grep -v "^${CONFIG_OPTION}=" >>${CONFIG_FILE}.tmp || true
sort ${CONFIG_FILE}.tmp | uniq >${CONFIG_FILE}
rm -f ${CONFIG_FILE}.tmp
}
# Generate a secret for TPM-less HOTP by reading the ROM. Output is the
# sha256sum of the ROM (binary, not printable), which can be truncated to the
# supported secret length.
secret_from_rom_hash() {
local ROM_IMAGE="/tmp/coreboot-notpm.rom"
echo -e "\nTPM not detected; measuring ROM directly\n" 1>&2
# Read the ROM if we haven't read it yet
if [ ! -f "${ROM_IMAGE}" ]; then
flash.sh -r "${ROM_IMAGE}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 1
fi
sha256sum "${ROM_IMAGE}" | cut -f1 -d ' ' | fromhex_plain
}
update_checksums() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:update_checksums"
# ensure /boot mounted
if ! grep -q /boot /proc/mounts; then
mount -o ro /boot ||
recovery "Unable to mount /boot"
fi
# remount RW
mount -o rw,remount /boot
# sign and auto-roll config counter
extparam=
if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
if [ "$CONFIG_IGNORE_ROLLBACK" != "y" ]; then
extparam=-r
fi
fi
if ! kexec-sign-config -p /boot -u $extparam; then
rv=1
else
rv=0
fi
# switch back to ro mode
mount -o ro,remount /boot
return $rv
}
print_tree() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:print_tree"
find ./ ! -path './kexec*' -print0 | sort -z
}
# Escape zero-delimited standard input to safely display it to the user in e.g.
# `whiptail`, `less`, `echo`, `cat`. Doesn't produce shell-escaped output.
# Most printable characters are passed verbatim (exception: \).
# These escapes are used to replace their corresponding characters: #n#r#t#v#b
# Other characters are rendered as hexadecimal escapes.
# escape_zero [prefix] [escape character]
# prefix: \0 in the input will result in \n[prefix]
# escape character: character to use for escapes (default: #); \ may be interpreted by `whiptail`
escape_zero() {
local prefix="$1"
local echar="${2:-#}"
local todo=""
local echar_hex="$(echo -n "$echar" | xxd -p -c1)"
[ ${#echar_hex} -eq 2 ] || die "Invalid escape character $echar passed to escape_zero(). Programming error?!"
echo -e -n "$prefix"
xxd -p -c1 | tr -d '\n' |
{
while IFS= read -r -n2 -d ''; do
if [ -n "$todo" ]; then
#REPLY == " " is EOF
[[ "$REPLY" == " " ]] && echo '' || echo -e -n "$todo"
todo=""
fi
case "$REPLY" in
00)
todo="\n$prefix"
;;
08)
echo -n "${echar}b"
;;
09)
echo -n "${echar}t"
;;
0a)
echo -n "${echar}n"
;;
0b)
echo -n "${echar}v"
;;
0d)
echo -n "${echar}r"
;;
"$echar_hex")
echo -n "$echar$echar"
;;
#interpreted characters:
2[0-9a-f] | 3[0-9a-f] | 4[0-9a-f] | 5[0-9abd-f] | 6[0-9a-f] | 7[0-9a-e])
echo -e -n '\x'"$REPLY"
;;
# All others are escaped
*)
echo -n "${echar}x$REPLY"
;;
esac
done
}
}
# Currently heads doesn't support signing file names with certain characters
# due to https://bugs.busybox.net/show_bug.cgi?id=14226. Also, certain characters
# may be intepreted by `whiptail`, `less` et al (e.g. \n, \b, ...).
assert_signable() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:assert_signable"
# ensure /boot mounted
if ! grep -q /boot /proc/mounts; then
mount -o ro /boot || die "Unable to mount /boot"
fi
find /boot -print0 >/tmp/signable.ref
local del='\001-\037\134\177-\377'
LC_ALL=C tr -d "$del" </tmp/signable.ref >/tmp/signable.del || die "Failed to execute tr."
if ! cmp -s "/tmp/signable.ref" "/tmp/signable.del" &>/dev/null; then
local user_out="/tmp/hash_output_mismatches"
local add="Please investigate!"
[ -f "$user_out" ] && add="Please investigate the following relative paths to /boot (where # are sanitized invalid characters):"$'\n'"$(cat "$user_out")"
recovery "Some /boot file names contain characters that are currently not supported by heads: $del"$'\n'"$add"
fi
rm -f /tmp/signable.*
}
verify_checksums() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:verify_checksums"
local boot_dir="$1"
local gui="${2:-y}"
(
set +e -o pipefail
local ret=0
cd "$boot_dir" || ret=1
sha256sum -c "$TMP_HASH_FILE" >/tmp/hash_output || ret=1
# also make sure that the file & directory structure didn't change
# (sha256sum won't detect added files)
print_tree >/tmp/tree_output || ret=1
if ! cmp -s "$TMP_TREE_FILE" /tmp/tree_output &>/dev/null; then
ret=1
[[ "$gui" != "y" ]] && exit "$ret"
# produce a diff that can safely be presented to the user
# this is relatively hard as file names may e.g. contain backslashes etc.,
# which are interpreted by whiptail, less, ...
escape_zero "(new) " <"$TMP_TREE_FILE" >"${TMP_TREE_FILE}.user"
escape_zero "(new) " </tmp/tree_output >/tmp/tree_output.user
diff "${TMP_TREE_FILE}.user" /tmp/tree_output.user | grep -E '^\+\(new\).*$' | sed -r 's/^\+\(new\)/(new)/g' >>/tmp/hash_output
rm -f "${TMP_TREE_FILE}.user"
rm -f /tmp/tree_output.user
fi
exit $ret
)
return $?
}
# detect and set /boot device
# mount /boot if successful
detect_boot_device() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:detect_boot_device"
# unmount /boot to be safe
cd / && umount /boot 2>/dev/null
# check $CONFIG_BOOT_DEV if set/valid
if [ -e "$CONFIG_BOOT_DEV" ]; then
if mount -o ro $CONFIG_BOOT_DEV /boot >/dev/null 2>&1; then
if ls -d /boot/grub* >/dev/null 2>&1; then
# CONFIG_BOOT_DEV is valid device and contains an installed OS
return 0
fi
fi
fi
# generate list of possible boot devices
fdisk -l | grep "Disk /dev/" | cut -f2 -d " " | cut -f1 -d ":" >/tmp/disklist
# filter out extraneous options
>/tmp/boot_device_list
for i in $(cat /tmp/disklist); do
# remove block device from list if numeric partitions exist, since not bootable
DEV_NUM_PARTITIONS=$(($(ls -1 $i* | wc -l) - 1))
if [ ${DEV_NUM_PARTITIONS} -eq 0 ]; then
echo $i >>/tmp/boot_device_list
else
ls $i* | tail -${DEV_NUM_PARTITIONS} >>/tmp/boot_device_list
fi
done
# iterate thru possible options and check for grub dir
for i in $(cat /tmp/boot_device_list); do
umount /boot 2>/dev/null
if mount -o ro $i /boot >/dev/null 2>&1; then
if ls -d /boot/grub* >/dev/null 2>&1; then
CONFIG_BOOT_DEV="$i"
return 0
fi
fi
done
# no valid boot device found
echo "Unable to locate /boot files on any mounted disk"
umount /boot 2>/dev/null
return 1
}
scan_boot_options() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:scan_boot_options"
local bootdir config option_file
bootdir="$1"
config="$2"
option_file="$3"
if [ -r $option_file ]; then rm $option_file; fi
for i in $(find $bootdir -name "$config"); do
DO_WITH_DEBUG kexec-parse-boot "$bootdir" "$i" >>$option_file
done
# FC29/30+ may use BLS format grub config files
# https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/BootLoaderSpecByDefault
# only parse these if $option_file is still empty
if [ ! -s $option_file ] && [ -d "$bootdir/loader/entries" ]; then
for i in $(find $bootdir -name "$config"); do
kexec-parse-bls "$bootdir" "$i" "$bootdir/loader/entries" >>$option_file
done
fi
}
calc() {
awk "BEGIN { print "$*" }"
}
# truncate a file to a size only if it is longer (busybox truncate lacks '<' and
# always sets the file size)
truncate_max_bytes() {
local bytes="$1"
local file="$2"
if [ "$(stat -c %s "$file")" -gt "$bytes" ]; then
truncate -s "$bytes" "$file"
fi
}
# Busybox xxd -p pads the last line with spaces to 60 columns, which not only
# trips up many scripts, it's very difficult to diagnose by looking at the
# output. Delete line breaks and spaces to really get plain hex output.
tohex_plain() {
xxd -p | tr -d '\n '
}
# Busybox xxd -p -r silently truncates lines longer than 60 hex chars.
# Shorter lines are OK, spaces are OK, and even splitting a byte across lines is
# allowed, so just fold the text to maximum 60 column lines.
# Note that also unlike GNU xxd, non-hex chars in input corrupt the output (GNU
# xxd ignores them).
fromhex_plain() {
fold -w 60 | xxd -p -r
}
print_battery_health() {
if [ -d /sys/class/power_supply/BAT* ]; then
battery_health=$(calc $(cat /sys/class/power_supply/BAT*/charge_full)/$(cat /sys/class/power_supply/BAT*/charge_full_design)*100 | awk -F "." {'print $1'})
echo "$battery_health"
fi
}
print_battery_charge() {
if [ -d /sys/class/power_supply/BAT* ]; then
battery_charge=$(calc $(cat /sys/class/power_supply/BAT*/charge_now)/$(cat /sys/class/power_supply/BAT*/charge_full)*100 | awk -F "." {'print $1'})
echo "$battery_charge"
fi
}
generate_random_mac_address() {
#Borrowed from https://stackoverflow.com/questions/42660218/bash-generate-random-mac-address-unicast
hexdump -n 6 -ve '1/1 "%.2x "' /dev/urandom | awk -v a="2,6,a,e" -v r="$RANDOM" 'BEGIN{srand(r);}NR==1{split(a,b,",");r=int(rand()*4+1);printf "%s%s:%s:%s:%s:%s:%s\n",substr($1,0,1),b[r],$2,$3,$4,$5,$6}'
}
# Add a command to be invoked at exit. (Note that trap EXIT replaces any
# existing handler.) Commands are invoked in reverse order, so they can be used
# to clean up resources, etc.
# The parameters are all executed as-is and do _not_ require additional quoting
# (unlike trap). E.g.:
# at_exit shred "$file" #<-- file is expanded when calling at_exit, no extra quoting needed
at_exit() {
AT_EXIT_HANDLERS+=("$@") # Command and args
AT_EXIT_HANDLERS+=("$#") # Number of elements in this command
}
# Array of all exit handler command arguments with lengths of each command at
# the end. For example:
# at_exit echo hello
# at_exit echo a b c
# results in:
# AT_EXIT_HANDLERS=(echo hello 2 echo a b c 4)
AT_EXIT_HANDLERS=()
# Each handler is an array AT_EXIT_HANDLER_{i}
run_at_exit_handlers() {
local cmd_pos cmd_len
cmd_pos="${#AT_EXIT_HANDLERS[@]}"
# Silence trace if there are no handlers, this is common and occurs a lot
[ "$cmd_pos" -gt 0 ] && DEBUG "Running at_exit handlers"
while [ "$cmd_pos" -gt 0 ]; do
cmd_pos="$((cmd_pos - 1))"
cmd_len="${AT_EXIT_HANDLERS[$cmd_pos]}"
cmd_pos="$((cmd_pos - cmd_len))"
"${AT_EXIT_HANDLERS[@]:$cmd_pos:$cmd_len}"
done
}
trap run_at_exit_handlers EXIT