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heads/patches/coreboot-4.11/0001-Add-Heads-TPM-measured-boot-support.patch
Thierry Laurion 3b99caa996 coreboot-4.11 patches: remove unwanted .orig artifacts that seems to be making CircleCI fail in the past days. 
Heads build system is reextracting archives and reapplying patches on each iteration.
CircleCI optimizes building time by providing cache mechanisms and forces users to build a target under an hour.
This is to force Open Source projects (free tier) to not be leechers of the free tier.

In the past days, CircleCI bails on building coreboot 4.11 boards because some files being cached are already being present (created files from patches).
In those, two files were unwanted artifacts, recreated on top of coreboot 4.11 extracted original files (undesired .orig files), while bailing on the creating of src/security/tpm/sha1.c from patches/coreboot-4.11/0001-Add-Heads-TPM-measured-boot-support.patch.

Hopefully, this is CircleCI having a maximum of 3 automatically entered input (it fails on the 3rd)... And this fix will permit src/security/tpm/sha1.c and src/security/tpm/sha1.h to be skipped if existing.
Below, we see that CircleCI fills patch prompts with EOF 2 times, and then waits for input and then timeouts.

Here is the failing log trace from https://app.circleci.com/pipelines/github/tlaurion/heads/990/workflows/f2a430fd-dc8c-4e95-abe3-364a0e825533/jobs/4914/parallel-runs/0/steps/0-103:

Exerpt of that log:
if [ -d patches/coreboot-4.11 ] && [ -r patches/coreboot-4.11 ] ; then for patch in patches/coreboot-4.11/*.patch ; do echo "Applying patch file : $patch " ; ( cd /root/project/build/coreboot-4.11/ ; patch -p1 ) < $patch || exit 1 ; done ; fi
Applying patch file : patches/coreboot-4.11/0000-cpu-x86-smm-Use-PRIxPTR-to-print-uintptr_t.patch
patching file src/cpu/x86/smm/tseg_region.c
Applying patch file : patches/coreboot-4.11/0001-Add-Heads-TPM-measured-boot-support.patch
patching file src/Kconfig
The next patch would create the file src/Kconfig.orig,
which already exists!  Assume -R? [n] EOF
Apply anyway? [n] EOF
Skipping patch.
1 out of 1 hunk ignored
patching file src/include/program_loading.h
patching file src/lib/cbfs.c
patching file src/lib/hardwaremain.c
Hunk #2 succeeded at 549 (offset 8 lines).
patching file src/lib/rmodule.c
patching file src/security/tpm/Makefile.inc
The next patch would create the file src/security/tpm/sha1.c,
which already exists!  Assume -R? [n] make: *** [Makefile:507: /root/project/build/coreboot-4.11/.canary] Hangup

context deadline exceeded
2022-02-23 16:59:26 -05:00

477 lines
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From 48784d452a85ee282823d1d8c8d3d4eec56de3a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Martin Kepplinger <martink@posteo.de>
Date: Wed, 15 May 2019 11:55:24 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Add Heads TPM measured boot support
Change-Id: I3a64998de2fbb7f2059cb8c68cfbf949b0665665
Signed-off-by: Martin Kepplinger <martink@posteo.de>
---
src/Kconfig | 15 +++
src/include/program_loading.h | 2 +
src/lib/cbfs.c | 19 ++-
src/lib/hardwaremain.c | 8 ++
src/lib/rmodule.c | 3 +-
src/security/tpm/Makefile.inc | 5 +
src/security/tpm/sha1.c | 180 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/security/tpm/sha1.h | 47 ++++++++
src/security/tpm/tspi/tspi.c | 2 +-
src/security/tpm/tss.h | 5 +
src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-1.2/tss.c | 19 +++
11 files changed, 299 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/security/tpm/sha1.c
create mode 100644 src/security/tpm/sha1.h
diff --git a/src/Kconfig b/src/Kconfig
index c0315239fc..48e53dc239 100644
--- a/src/Kconfig
+++ b/src/Kconfig
@@ -332,6 +332,21 @@ config BOOTSPLASH_FILE
config HAVE_RAMPAYLOAD
bool
+config MEASURED_BOOT
+ bool "Enable TPM measured boot"
+ default n
+ select TPM1
+ depends on MAINBOARD_HAS_LPC_TPM
+ depends on !VBOOT
+ help
+ Enable this option to measure the bootblock, romstage and
+ CBFS files into TPM PCRs. This does not verify these values
+ (that is the job of something like vboot), but makes it possible
+ for the payload to validate the boot path and allow something
+ like Heads to attest to the user that the system is likely safe.
+
+ You probably want to say N.
+
config RAMPAYLOAD
bool "Enable coreboot flow without executing ramstage"
default y if ARCH_X86
diff --git a/src/include/program_loading.h b/src/include/program_loading.h
index 1b71fadb1b..afd8ba0c54 100644
--- a/src/include/program_loading.h
+++ b/src/include/program_loading.h
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ enum {
/* Last segment of program. Can be used to take different actions for
* cache maintenance of a program load. */
SEG_FINAL = 1 << 0,
+ /* Indicate that the program segment should not be measured */
+ SEG_NO_MEASURE = 1 << 1,
};
enum prog_type {
diff --git a/src/lib/cbfs.c b/src/lib/cbfs.c
index fbe6e43496..b0a4f8843a 100644
--- a/src/lib/cbfs.c
+++ b/src/lib/cbfs.c
@@ -97,7 +97,13 @@ void *cbfs_boot_map_with_leak(const char *name, uint32_t type, size_t *size)
if (size != NULL)
*size = fsize;
- return rdev_mmap(&fh.data, 0, fsize);
+ void *buffer = rdev_mmap(&fh.data, 0, fsize);
+
+#ifndef __SMM__
+ prog_segment_loaded((uintptr_t)buffer, fsize, 0);
+#endif
+
+ return buffer;
}
int cbfs_locate_file_in_region(struct cbfsf *fh, const char *region_name,
@@ -125,7 +131,8 @@ size_t cbfs_load_and_decompress(const struct region_device *rdev, size_t offset,
return 0;
if (rdev_readat(rdev, buffer, offset, in_size) != in_size)
return 0;
- return in_size;
+ out_size = in_size;
+ break;
case CBFS_COMPRESS_LZ4:
if ((ENV_BOOTBLOCK || ENV_VERSTAGE) &&
@@ -143,7 +150,7 @@ size_t cbfs_load_and_decompress(const struct region_device *rdev, size_t offset,
timestamp_add_now(TS_START_ULZ4F);
out_size = ulz4fn(compr_start, in_size, buffer, buffer_size);
timestamp_add_now(TS_END_ULZ4F);
- return out_size;
+ break;
case CBFS_COMPRESS_LZMA:
/* We assume here romstage and postcar are never compressed. */
@@ -165,11 +172,15 @@ size_t cbfs_load_and_decompress(const struct region_device *rdev, size_t offset,
rdev_munmap(rdev, map);
- return out_size;
+ break;
default:
return 0;
}
+
+ prog_segment_loaded((uintptr_t)buffer, out_size, 0);
+
+ return out_size;
}
static inline int tohex4(unsigned int c)
diff --git a/src/lib/hardwaremain.c b/src/lib/hardwaremain.c
index 51ff330d84..358d3e40b3 100644
--- a/src/lib/hardwaremain.c
+++ b/src/lib/hardwaremain.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <boot/tables.h>
#include <program_loading.h>
+#include <security/tpm/tss.h>
#if CONFIG(HAVE_ACPI_RESUME)
#include <arch/acpi.h>
#endif
@@ -540,3 +541,10 @@ void boot_state_current_unblock(void)
{
boot_state_unblock(current_phase.state_id, current_phase.seq);
}
+
+// ramstage measurements go into PCR3 if we are doing measured boot
+void platform_segment_loaded(uintptr_t start, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+ if (CONFIG(MEASURED_BOOT) && !(flags & SEG_NO_MEASURE))
+ tlcl_measure(2, (const void *) start, size);
+}
diff --git a/src/lib/rmodule.c b/src/lib/rmodule.c
index 56529d2fb2..2702b9d36e 100644
--- a/src/lib/rmodule.c
+++ b/src/lib/rmodule.c
@@ -197,7 +197,8 @@ int rmodule_load(void *base, struct rmodule *module)
rmodule_clear_bss(module);
prog_segment_loaded((uintptr_t)module->location,
- rmodule_memory_size(module), SEG_FINAL);
+ rmodule_memory_size(module),
+ SEG_FINAL | SEG_NO_MEASURE);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/Makefile.inc b/src/security/tpm/Makefile.inc
index a2d32cff89..e9a785b797 100644
--- a/src/security/tpm/Makefile.inc
+++ b/src/security/tpm/Makefile.inc
@@ -18,6 +18,11 @@ romstage-y += tspi/tspi.c
verstage-$(CONFIG_VBOOT) += tspi/tspi.c
postcar-$(CONFIG_VBOOT) += tspi/tspi.c
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_MEASURED_BOOT),y)
+romstage-y += sha1.c
+ramstage-y += sha1.c
+endif # CONFIG_MEASURED_BOOT
+
ramstage-$(CONFIG_VBOOT_MEASURED_BOOT) += tspi/log.c
romstage-$(CONFIG_VBOOT_MEASURED_BOOT) += tspi/log.c
verstage-$(CONFIG_VBOOT_MEASURED_BOOT) += tspi/log.c
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/sha1.c b/src/security/tpm/sha1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9879f729b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/tpm/sha1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2010 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
+ * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+ * found in the LICENSE file.
+ *
+ * SHA-1 implementation largely based on libmincrypt in the the Android
+ * Open Source Project (platorm/system/core.git/libmincrypt/sha.c
+ */
+
+#include <security/tpm/sha1.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+static uint32_t ror27(uint32_t val)
+{
+ return (val >> 27) | (val << 5);
+}
+static uint32_t ror2(uint32_t val)
+{
+ return (val >> 2) | (val << 30);
+}
+static uint32_t ror31(uint32_t val)
+{
+ return (val >> 31) | (val << 1);
+}
+
+static void sha1_transform(struct sha1_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ uint32_t W[80];
+ register uint32_t A, B, C, D, E;
+ int t;
+
+ A = ctx->state[0];
+ B = ctx->state[1];
+ C = ctx->state[2];
+ D = ctx->state[3];
+ E = ctx->state[4];
+
+#define SHA_F1(A, B, C, D, E, t) do { \
+ E += ror27(A) + \
+ (W[t] = __builtin_bswap32(ctx->buf.w[t])) + \
+ (D^(B&(C^D))) + 0x5A827999; \
+ B = ror2(B); \
+ } while (0)
+
+ for (t = 0; t < 15; t += 5) {
+ SHA_F1(A, B, C, D, E, t + 0);
+ SHA_F1(E, A, B, C, D, t + 1);
+ SHA_F1(D, E, A, B, C, t + 2);
+ SHA_F1(C, D, E, A, B, t + 3);
+ SHA_F1(B, C, D, E, A, t + 4);
+ }
+ SHA_F1(A, B, C, D, E, t + 0); /* 16th one, t == 15 */
+
+#undef SHA_F1
+
+#define SHA_F1(A, B, C, D, E, t) do { \
+ E += ror27(A) + \
+ (W[t] = ror31(W[t-3] ^ W[t-8] ^ W[t-14] ^ W[t-16])) + \
+ (D^(B&(C^D))) + 0x5A827999; \
+ B = ror2(B); \
+ } while (0)
+
+ SHA_F1(E, A, B, C, D, t + 1);
+ SHA_F1(D, E, A, B, C, t + 2);
+ SHA_F1(C, D, E, A, B, t + 3);
+ SHA_F1(B, C, D, E, A, t + 4);
+
+#undef SHA_F1
+
+#define SHA_F2(A, B, C, D, E, t) do { \
+ E += ror27(A) + \
+ (W[t] = ror31(W[t-3] ^ W[t-8] ^ W[t-14] ^ W[t-16])) + \
+ (B^C^D) + 0x6ED9EBA1; \
+ B = ror2(B); \
+ } while (0)
+
+ for (t = 20; t < 40; t += 5) {
+ SHA_F2(A, B, C, D, E, t + 0);
+ SHA_F2(E, A, B, C, D, t + 1);
+ SHA_F2(D, E, A, B, C, t + 2);
+ SHA_F2(C, D, E, A, B, t + 3);
+ SHA_F2(B, C, D, E, A, t + 4);
+ }
+
+#undef SHA_F2
+
+#define SHA_F3(A, B, C, D, E, t) do { \
+ E += ror27(A) + \
+ (W[t] = ror31(W[t-3] ^ W[t-8] ^ W[t-14] ^ W[t-16])) + \
+ ((B&C)|(D&(B|C))) + 0x8F1BBCDC; \
+ B = ror2(B); \
+ } while (0)
+
+ for (; t < 60; t += 5) {
+ SHA_F3(A, B, C, D, E, t + 0);
+ SHA_F3(E, A, B, C, D, t + 1);
+ SHA_F3(D, E, A, B, C, t + 2);
+ SHA_F3(C, D, E, A, B, t + 3);
+ SHA_F3(B, C, D, E, A, t + 4);
+ }
+
+#undef SHA_F3
+
+#define SHA_F4(A, B, C, D, E, t) do { \
+ E += ror27(A) + \
+ (W[t] = ror31(W[t-3] ^ W[t-8] ^ W[t-14] ^ W[t-16])) + \
+ (B^C^D) + 0xCA62C1D6; \
+ B = ror2(B); \
+ } while (0)
+
+ for (; t < 80; t += 5) {
+ SHA_F4(A, B, C, D, E, t + 0);
+ SHA_F4(E, A, B, C, D, t + 1);
+ SHA_F4(D, E, A, B, C, t + 2);
+ SHA_F4(C, D, E, A, B, t + 3);
+ SHA_F4(B, C, D, E, A, t + 4);
+ }
+
+#undef SHA_F4
+
+ ctx->state[0] += A;
+ ctx->state[1] += B;
+ ctx->state[2] += C;
+ ctx->state[3] += D;
+ ctx->state[4] += E;
+}
+
+void sha1_update(struct sha1_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len)
+{
+ int i = ctx->count % sizeof(ctx->buf);
+ const uint8_t *p = (const uint8_t *)data;
+
+ ctx->count += len;
+
+ while (len > sizeof(ctx->buf) - i) {
+ memcpy(&ctx->buf.b[i], p, sizeof(ctx->buf) - i);
+ len -= sizeof(ctx->buf) - i;
+ p += sizeof(ctx->buf) - i;
+ sha1_transform(ctx);
+ i = 0;
+ }
+
+ while (len--) {
+ ctx->buf.b[i++] = *p++;
+ if (i == sizeof(ctx->buf)) {
+ sha1_transform(ctx);
+ i = 0;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+
+uint8_t *sha1_final(struct sha1_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ uint32_t cnt = ctx->count * 8;
+ int i;
+
+ sha1_update(ctx, (uint8_t *)"\x80", 1);
+ while ((ctx->count % sizeof(ctx->buf)) != (sizeof(ctx->buf) - 8))
+ sha1_update(ctx, (uint8_t *)"\0", 1);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
+ uint8_t tmp = cnt >> ((7 - i) * 8);
+ sha1_update(ctx, &tmp, 1);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++)
+ ctx->buf.w[i] = __builtin_bswap32(ctx->state[i]);
+
+ return ctx->buf.b;
+}
+
+void sha1_init(struct sha1_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301;
+ ctx->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89;
+ ctx->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE;
+ ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476;
+ ctx->state[4] = 0xC3D2E1F0;
+ ctx->count = 0;
+}
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/sha1.h b/src/security/tpm/sha1.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bc3faa58ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/tpm/sha1.h
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2014 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
+ * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+ * found in the LICENSE file.
+ */
+
+/* SHA-1 functions */
+
+#ifndef _sha1_h_
+#define _sha1_h_
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <commonlib/helpers.h>
+
+#define SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE 20
+#define SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE 64
+
+/*
+ * FIXME the DIV_ROUND_UP statement expression blows up here:
+ In file included from src/security/tpm/sha1.h:12,
+ from src/security/tpm/sha1.c:9:
+ src/commonlib/include/commonlib/helpers.h:81:28: error: braced-group
+ within expression allowed only inside a function
+ #define DIV_ROUND_UP(x, y) ({ \
+ ^
+ src/security/tpm/sha1.h:23:14: note: in expansion of macro'DIV_ROUND_UP'
+ uint32_t w[DIV_ROUND_UP(SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE, sizeof(uint32_t))];
+ ^~~~~~~~~~~~
+ make[1]: *** [Makefile:356: x230/romstage/security/tpm/sha1.o] Error 1
+ */
+#undef DIV_ROUND_UP
+#define DIV_ROUND_UP(x, y) (((x) + (y) - 1) / (y))
+
+/* SHA-1 context */
+struct sha1_ctx {
+ uint32_t count;
+ uint32_t state[5];
+ union {
+ uint8_t b[SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ uint32_t w[DIV_ROUND_UP(SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE, sizeof(uint32_t))];
+ } buf;
+};
+
+void sha1_init(struct sha1_ctx *ctx);
+void sha1_update(struct sha1_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len);
+uint8_t *sha1_final(struct sha1_ctx *ctx);
+
+#endif /* _sha1_h_ */
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tspi/tspi.c b/src/security/tpm/tspi/tspi.c
index 966b8b7c77..9076ced37a 100644
--- a/src/security/tpm/tspi/tspi.c
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tspi/tspi.c
@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@
#include <security/tpm/tspi.h>
#include <security/tpm/tss.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
-#if CONFIG(VBOOT)
#include <vb2_api.h>
+#if CONFIG(VBOOT)
#include <vb2_sha.h>
#include <assert.h>
#endif
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tss.h b/src/security/tpm/tss.h
index 336935d911..90a96621ed 100644
--- a/src/security/tpm/tss.h
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tss.h
@@ -52,6 +52,11 @@ uint32_t tlcl_get_flags(uint8_t *disable, uint8_t *deactivated,
*/
uint32_t tlcl_get_permanent_flags(TPM_PERMANENT_FLAGS *pflags);
+/**
+ * Perform a SHA1 hash on a region and extend a PCR with the hash.
+ */
+uint32_t tlcl_measure(int pcr_num, const void *start, size_t len);
+
#endif
#if CONFIG(TPM2)
diff --git a/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-1.2/tss.c b/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-1.2/tss.c
index b11d6a3d16..ef4f4d8b86 100644
--- a/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-1.2/tss.c
+++ b/src/security/tpm/tss/tcg-1.2/tss.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <arch/early_variables.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <security/tpm/sha1.h>
#include <security/tpm/tis.h>
#include <vb2_api.h>
#include <security/tpm/tss.h>
@@ -361,3 +362,21 @@ uint32_t tlcl_extend(int pcr_num, const uint8_t *in_digest,
kPcrDigestLength);
return result;
}
+
+uint32_t tlcl_measure(int pcr_num, const void *start, size_t len)
+{
+ VBDEBUG("TPM: pcr %d measure %p @ %zu: ", pcr_num, start, len);
+
+ struct sha1_ctx sha;
+ sha1_init(&sha);
+ sha1_update(&sha, start, len);
+
+ const uint8_t *hash = sha1_final(&sha);
+ for (unsigned int i = 0; i < SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; i++)
+ VBDEBUG("%02x", hash[i]);
+ VBDEBUG("\n");
+
+ //hexdump(start, 128);
+
+ return tlcl_extend(pcr_num, hash, NULL);
+}
--
2.20.1
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