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https://github.com/linuxboot/heads.git
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536f4a1623
gui-init: do not consume two unseal attempt to unseal both totp and hotp + cosmetic changes (slow down TPM DA lockout) kexec-seal-key: Add DEBUG statement for PCR precalc seal-totp: add DEBUG statements regarding skipping of PCR5 and PCR6 involvement into TOTP/HOTP sealing ops seal-hotpkey: Add DEBUG statements related to reuse of TOTP sealed secret tpmr: add DO_WITH_DEBUG calls to output pcrread and extend calls tpmr: typo correction stating TRACE calls for tpm2 where it was for tpm1 tpmr: add DO_WITH_DEBUG calls for calcfuturepcr functions: Cosmetic fix on pause_recovery asking user to press Enter to go to recovery shell on host console when board defines CONFIG_BOOT_RECOVERY_SERIAL Not so related but part of output review and corrections: kexec-insert-key: cosmetic changes prepending "+++" to disk related changes kexec-save-default: cosmetic changes prepending "+++" to disk related changes config/coreboot-qemu-tpm*.config: add ccache support for faster coreboot rebuild times
124 lines
3.7 KiB
Bash
Executable File
124 lines
3.7 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/bin/bash
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# This will generate a disk encryption key and seal / ecncrypt
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# with the current PCRs and then store it in the TPM NVRAM.
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# It will then need to be bundled into initrd that is booted.
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set -e -o pipefail
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. /etc/functions
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TPM_INDEX=3
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TPM_SIZE=312
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KEY_FILE="/tmp/secret/secret.key"
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TPM_SEALED="/tmp/secret/secret.sealed"
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RECOVERY_KEY="/tmp/secret/recovery.key"
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. /etc/functions
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. /tmp/config
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TRACE "Under kexec-seal-key"
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paramsdir=$1
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if [ -z "$paramsdir" ]; then
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die "Usage $0 /boot"
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fi
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KEY_DEVICES="$paramsdir/kexec_key_devices.txt"
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KEY_LVM="$paramsdir/kexec_key_lvm.txt"
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if [ ! -r "$KEY_DEVICES" ]; then
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die "No devices defined for disk encryption"
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fi
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if [ -r "$KEY_LVM" ]; then
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# Activate the LVM volume group
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VOLUME_GROUP=`cat $KEY_LVM`
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if [ -z "$VOLUME_GROUP" ]; then
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die "No LVM volume group defined for activation"
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fi
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lvm vgchange -a y $VOLUME_GROUP \
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|| die "$VOLUME_GROUP: unable to activate volume group"
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fi
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DEBUG "$(pcrs)"
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# LUKS Key slot 0 is the manual recovery pass phrase
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# that they user entered when they installed OS,
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# key slot 1 is the one that we've generated.
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read -s -p "Enter disk recovery key: " disk_password
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echo -n "$disk_password" > "$RECOVERY_KEY"
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echo
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read -s -p "New disk unlock password for booting: " key_password
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echo
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read -s -p "Repeat unlock code: " key_password2
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echo
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if [ "$key_password" != "$key_password2" ]; then
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die "Key passwords do not match"
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fi
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# Generate key file
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dd \
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if=/dev/urandom \
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of="$KEY_FILE" \
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bs=1 \
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count=128 \
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2>/dev/null \
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|| die "Unable to generate 128 random bytes"
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# Remove all the old keys from slot 1
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for dev in `cat "$KEY_DEVICES" | cut -d\ -f1`; do
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echo "++++++ $dev: Removing old key slot"
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cryptsetup luksKillSlot \
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--key-file "$RECOVERY_KEY" \
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$dev 1 \
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|| warn "$dev: ignoring problem"
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echo "++++++ $dev: Adding key"
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cryptsetup luksAddKey \
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--key-file "$RECOVERY_KEY" \
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--key-slot 1 \
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$dev "$KEY_FILE" \
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|| die "$dev: Unable to add key"
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done
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# Now that we have setup the new keys, measure the PCRs
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# We don't care what ends up in PCR 6; we just want
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# to get the /tmp/luksDump.txt file. We use PCR16
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# since it should still be zero
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cat "$KEY_DEVICES" | cut -d\ -f1 | xargs /bin/qubes-measure-luks \
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|| die "Unable to measure the LUKS headers"
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pcrf="/tmp/secret/pcrf.bin"
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tpmr pcrread 0 "$pcrf"
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tpmr pcrread -a 1 "$pcrf"
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tpmr pcrread -a 2 "$pcrf"
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tpmr pcrread -a 3 "$pcrf"
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# Note that PCR 4 needs to be set with the "normal-boot" path value, which is 0.
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dd if=/dev/zero bs="$(tpmr pcrsize)" count=1 status=none >> "$pcrf"
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if [ "$CONFIG_USB_KEYBOARD" = "y" -o -r /lib/modules/libata.ko -o -x /bin/hotp_verification ]; then
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DEBUG "Sealing TPM disk unlock key with PCR5 involvement (additional kernel modules are loaded per board config)..."
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# Here, we take pcr 5 into consideration if modules are expected to be measured+loaded
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tpmr pcrread -a 5 "$pcrf"
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else
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DEBUG "Sealing TPM disk unlock key with PCR5=0 (NO additional kernel modules are loaded per board config)..."
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#no kernel modules are expected to be measured+loaded
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dd if=/dev/zero bs="$(tpmr pcrsize)" count=1 status=none >> "$pcrf"
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fi
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# Precompute the value for pcr 6
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DEBUG "Precomputing TPM future value for PCR6 sealing/unsealing of TPM disk unlock key..."
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tpmr calcfuturepcr -a "/tmp/luksDump.txt" "$pcrf"
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# We take into consideration user files in cbfs
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tpmr pcrread -a 7 "$pcrf"
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DO_WITH_DEBUG --mask-position 7 \
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tpmr seal "$KEY_FILE" "$TPM_INDEX" 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7 "$pcrf" \
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"$TPM_SIZE" "$key_password"
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# should be okay if this fails
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shred -n 10 -z -u "$pcrf".* 2> /dev/null || true
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shred -n 10 -z -u "$KEY_FILE" 2> /dev/null \
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|| warn "Failed to delete key file - continuing"
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cp /tmp/luksDump.txt "$paramsdir/kexec_lukshdr_hash.txt" \
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|| warn "Failed to have hashes of LUKS header - continuing"
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