heads/initrd/bin/kexec-seal-key
Thierry Laurion 94b77e8704
WiP: staging changes
Insights:
- We should use oem generated pubkey naming to distinguish between oem/user generated keys and try to use default PINs also for GPG User to sign with default PIN and warn even if it works/doesn't, urging users to do reownership
- Point is that oem factory reset does in the direction of using randomized PINs, while continuing to use those for a user should be strongly discouraged

Signed-off-by: Thierry Laurion <insurgo@riseup.net>
2024-12-21 13:19:07 -05:00

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#!/bin/bash
# This will generate a disk encryption key and seal / encrypt
# with the current PCRs and then store it in the TPM NVRAM.
# It will then need to be bundled into initrd that is booted.
set -e -o pipefail
. /etc/functions
find_drk_key_slot() {
local temp_drk_key_slot=""
local keyslot
for keyslot in "${luks_used_keyslots[@]}"; do
if [ -z "$temp_drk_key_slot" ]; then
DEBUG "Testing LUKS key slot $keyslot against $DISK_RECOVERY_KEY_FILE for Disk Recovery Key slot..."
if DO_WITH_DEBUG cryptsetup open --test-passphrase --key-slot "$keyslot" --key-file "$DISK_RECOVERY_KEY_FILE" "$dev"; then
temp_drk_key_slot="$keyslot"
DEBUG "Disk Recovery key slot is $temp_drk_key_slot"
break
fi
fi
done
echo "$temp_drk_key_slot"
}
TPM_INDEX=3
TPM_SIZE=312
DUK_KEY_FILE="/tmp/secret/secret.key"
TPM_SEALED="/tmp/secret/secret.sealed"
DISK_RECOVERY_KEY_FILE="/tmp/secret/recovery.key"
. /etc/functions
. /tmp/config
TRACE_FUNC
paramsdir=$1
if [ -z "$paramsdir" ]; then
die "Usage $0 /boot"
fi
KEY_DEVICES="$paramsdir/kexec_key_devices.txt"
KEY_LVM="$paramsdir/kexec_key_lvm.txt"
key_devices=$(cat "$KEY_DEVICES" | cut -d\ -f1 | tr '\n' ' ')
if [ ! -r "$KEY_DEVICES" ]; then
die "No devices defined for disk encryption"
else
DEBUG "Devices defined for disk encryption: $key_devices"
fi
if [ -r "$KEY_LVM" ]; then
# Activate the LVM volume group
VOLUME_GROUP=$(cat $KEY_LVM)
if [ -z "$VOLUME_GROUP" ]; then
die "No LVM volume group defined for activation"
fi
lvm vgchange -a y $VOLUME_GROUP ||
die "$VOLUME_GROUP: unable to activate volume group"
else
DEBUG "No LVM volume group defined for activation"
fi
DEBUG "$(pcrs)"
luks_drk_passphrase_valid=0
for dev in $key_devices ; do
attempts=0
while [ $attempts -lt 3 ]; do
if [ "$luks_drk_passphrase_valid" == "0" ]; then
# Ask for the passphrase only once
read -s -p "Enter LUKS Disk Recovery Key (DRK) passphrase that can unlock: $key_devices: " disk_recovery_key_passphrase
#Using he provided passphrase as the DRK "keyfile" for unattended operations
echo -n "$disk_recovery_key_passphrase" >"$DISK_RECOVERY_KEY_FILE"
echo
fi
DEBUG "Testing $DISK_RECOVERY_KEY_FILE keyfile created from provided passphrase against $dev individual key slots"
if cryptsetup open $dev --test-passphrase --key-file "$DISK_RECOVERY_KEY_FILE" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "++++++ $dev: LUKS device unlocked successfully with the DRK passphrase"
luks_drk_passphrase_valid=1
break
else
attempts=$((attempts + 1))
if [ "$attempts" == "3" ] && [ "$luks_drk_passphrase_valid" == "0" ]; then
die "Failed to unlock LUKS device $dev with the provided passphrase. Exiting..."
elif [ "$attempts" != "3" ] && [ "$luks_drk_passphrase_valid" == "1" ]; then
#We failed unlocking with DRK passphrase another LUKS container
die "LUKS device $key_devices cannot all be unlocked with same passphrase. Please make $key_devices devices unlockable with the same passphrase. Exiting"
else
warn "Failed to unlock LUKS device $dev with the provided passphrase. Please try again."
fi
fi
done
done
attempts=0
while [ $attempts -lt 3 ]; do
read -s -p "New LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key (DUK) passphrase for booting: " key_password
echo
read -s -p "Repeat LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key (DUK) passphrase for booting: " key_password2
echo
if [ "$key_password" != "$key_password2" ]; then
attempts=$((attempts + 1))
if [ "$attempts" == "3" ]; then
die "Disk Unlock Key (DUK) passphrases do not match. Exiting..."
else
warn "Disk Unlock Key (DUK) passphrases do not match. Please try again."
fi
else
break
fi
done
# Generate key file
echo "++++++ Generating new randomized 128 bytes key file that will be sealed/unsealed by LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key passphrase"
dd \
if=/dev/urandom \
of="$DUK_KEY_FILE" \
bs=1 \
count=128 \
2>/dev/null ||
die "Unable to generate 128 random bytes"
previous_luks_header_version=0
for dev in $key_devices; do
# Check and store LUKS version of the devices to be used later
luks_version=$(cryptsetup luksDump "$dev" | grep "Version" | cut -d: -f2 | tr -d '[:space:]')
if [ "$luks_version" == "2" ] && [ "$previous_luks_header_version" == "1" ]; then
die "$dev: LUKSv2 device detected while LUKSv1 device was detected previously. Exiting..."
fi
if [ "$luks_version" == "1" ] && [ "$previous_luks_header_version" == "2" ]; then
die "$dev: LUKSv1 device detected while LUKSv2 device was detected previously. Exiting..."
fi
if [ "$luks_version" == "2" ]; then
# LUKSv2 last key slot is 31
duk_keyslot=31
regex="^\s+([0-9]+):\s*luks2"
sed_command="s/^\s\+\([0-9]\+\):\s*luks2/\1/g"
previous_luks_header_version=2
DEBUG "$dev: LUKSv2 device detected"
elif [ "$luks_version" == "1" ]; then
# LUKSv1 last key slot is 7
duk_keyslot=7
regex="Key Slot ([0-9]+): ENABLED"
sed_command='s/Key Slot \([0-9]\+\): ENABLED/\1/'
previous_luks_header_version=1
DEBUG "$dev: LUKSv1 device detected"
else
die "$dev: Unsupported LUKS version $luks_version"
fi
# drk_key_slot will be the slot number where the passphrase was tested against as valid. We will keep that slot
drk_key_slot="-1"
# Get all the key slots that are used on $dev
luks_used_keyslots=($(cryptsetup luksDump "$dev" | grep -E "$regex" | sed "$sed_command"))
DEBUG "$dev LUKS key slots: ${luks_used_keyslots[*]}"
#Find the key slot that can be unlocked with the provided passphrase
drk_key_slot=$(find_drk_key_slot)
# If we didn't find the DRK key slot, we exit (this should never happen)
if [ "$drk_key_slot" == "-1" ]; then
die "$dev: Unable to find a key slot that can be unlocked with provided passphrase. Exiting..."
fi
# If the key slot is not the expected DUK or DRK key slot, we will ask the user to confirm the wipe
for keyslot in "${luks_used_keyslots[@]}"; do
if [ "$keyslot" != "$drk_key_slot" ]; then
#set wipe_desired to no by default
wipe_desired="no"
if [ "$keyslot" != "$drk_key_slot" ] && [ "$keyslot" == "1" ]; then
wipe_desired="yes"
DEBUG "LUKS key slot $keyslot not DRK. Will wipe this DUK key slot silently"
elif [ "$keyslot" != "$drk_key_slot" ] && [ "$keyslot" != "$duk_keyslot" ]; then
# Heads expects key slot LUKSv1:7 or LUKSv2:31 to be used for TPM DUK setup.
# Ask user to confirm otherwise
warn "LUKS key slot $keyslot is not typical ($duk_keyslot expected) for TPM Disk Unlock Key setup"
read -p "Are you sure you want to wipe it? [y/N] " -n 1 -r
echo
# If user does not confirm, skip this slot
if [[ $REPLY =~ ^[Yy]$ ]]; then
wipe_desired="yes"
fi
elif [ "$keyslot" == "$duk_keyslot" ]; then
# If key slot is the expected DUK keyslot, we wipe it silently
DEBUG "LUKS key slot $keyslot is the expected DUK key slot. Will wipe this DUK key slot silently"
wipe_desired="yes"
fi
if [ "$wipe_desired" == "yes" ] && [ "$keyslot" != "$drk_key_slot" ]; then
echo "++++++ $dev: Wiping LUKS key slot $keyslot"
DO_WITH_DEBUG cryptsetup luksKillSlot \
--key-file "$DISK_RECOVERY_KEY_FILE" \
$dev $keyslot ||
warn "$dev: removal of LUKS slot $keyslot failed: Continuing"
fi
fi
done
echo "++++++ $dev: Adding LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key to LUKS key slot $duk_keyslot"
DO_WITH_DEBUG cryptsetup luksAddKey \
--key-file "$DISK_RECOVERY_KEY_FILE" \
--new-key-slot $duk_keyslot \
$dev "$DUK_KEY_FILE" ||
die "$dev: Unable to add LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key to LUKS key slot $duk_keyslot"
done
# Now that we have setup the new keys, measure the PCRs
# We don't care what ends up in PCR 6; we just want
# to get the /tmp/luksDump.txt file. We use PCR16
# since it should still be zero
echo "$key_devices" | xargs /bin/qubes-measure-luks ||
die "Unable to measure the LUKS headers"
pcrf="/tmp/secret/pcrf.bin"
tpmr pcrread 0 "$pcrf"
tpmr pcrread -a 1 "$pcrf"
tpmr pcrread -a 2 "$pcrf"
tpmr pcrread -a 3 "$pcrf"
# Note that PCR 4 needs to be set with the "normal-boot" path value, read it from event log.
tpmr calcfuturepcr 4 >>"$pcrf"
if [ "$CONFIG_USER_USB_KEYBOARD" = "y" -o -r /lib/modules/libata.ko -o -x /bin/hotp_verification ]; then
DEBUG "Sealing LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key with PCR5 involvement (additional kernel modules are loaded per board config)..."
# Here, we take pcr 5 into consideration if modules are expected to be measured+loaded
tpmr pcrread -a 5 "$pcrf"
else
DEBUG "Sealing LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key with PCR5=0 (NO additional kernel modules are loaded per board config)..."
#no kernel modules are expected to be measured+loaded
tpmr calcfuturepcr 5 >>"$pcrf"
fi
# Precompute the value for pcr 6
DEBUG "Precomputing TPM future value for PCR6 sealing/unsealing of LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key..."
tpmr calcfuturepcr 6 "/tmp/luksDump.txt" >>"$pcrf"
# We take into consideration user files in cbfs
tpmr pcrread -a 7 "$pcrf"
DO_WITH_DEBUG --mask-position 7 \
tpmr seal "$DUK_KEY_FILE" "$TPM_INDEX" 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7 "$pcrf" \
"$TPM_SIZE" "$key_password" || die "Unable to write LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key to NVRAM"
# should be okay if this fails
shred -n 10 -z -u "$pcrf" 2>/dev/null ||
warn "Failed to delete pcrf file - continuing"
shred -n 10 -z -u "$DUK_KEY_FILE" 2>/dev/null ||
warn "Failed to delete key file - continuing"
mount -o rw,remount $paramsdir || warn "Failed to remount $paramsdir in RW - continuing"
cp -f /tmp/luksDump.txt "$paramsdir/kexec_lukshdr_hash.txt" ||
warn "Failed to copy LUKS header hashes to /boot - continuing"
mount -o ro,remount $paramsdir || warn "Failed to remount $paramsdir in RO - continuing"