#!/bin/bash # Automated setup of TPM, GPG keys, and disk set -o pipefail ## External files sourced . /etc/functions . /etc/luks-functions . /tmp/config TRACE "Under /bin/oem-factory-reset" # use TERM to exit on error trap "exit 1" TERM export TOP_PID=$$ ## Static local variables CLEAR="--clear" CONTINUE="--yes-button Continue" CANCEL="--no-button Cancel" HEIGHT="0" WIDTH="80" USER_PIN_DEF=123456 ADMIN_PIN_DEF=12345678 TPM_PASS_DEF=12345678 USER_PIN="" ADMIN_PIN="" TPM_PASS="" #Circumvent Librem Key/Nitrokey HOTP firmware bug https://github.com/osresearch/heads/issues/1167 MAX_HOTP_GPG_PIN_LENGTH=25 # What are the Security components affected by custom passwords CUSTOM_PASS_AFFECTED_COMPONENTS="" RSA_KEY_LENGTH=3072 GPG_USER_NAME="OEM Key" GPG_KEY_NAME=`date +%Y%m%d%H%M%S` GPG_USER_MAIL="oem-${GPG_KEY_NAME}@example.com" GPG_USER_COMMENT="OEM-generated key" SKIP_BOOT="n" ## functions die() { local msg=$1 if [ -n "$msg" ]; then echo -e "\n$msg" fi kill -s TERM $TOP_PID exit 1 } whiptail_error() { local msg=$1 if [ "$msg" = "" ]; then die "whiptail error: An error msg is required" fi whiptail $BG_COLOR_ERROR --msgbox "${msg}\n\n" $HEIGHT $WIDTH $BG_COLOR_ERROR --title "Error" } whiptail_error_die() { whiptail_error "$@" die } gpg_key_reset() { # Factory reset GPG card { echo admin echo factory-reset echo y echo yes } | gpg --command-fd=0 --status-fd=1 --pinentry-mode=loopback --card-edit \ > /tmp/gpg_card_edit_output 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then ERROR=`cat /tmp/gpg_card_edit_output` whiptail_error_die "GPG Key factory reset failed!\n\n$ERROR" fi # If Nitrokey Storage is inserted, reset AES keys as well if lsusb | grep -q "20a0:4109" && [ -x /bin/hotp_verification ] ; then /bin/hotp_verification regenerate ${ADMIN_PIN_DEF} fi # Toggle forced sig (good security practice, forcing PIN request for each signature request) if gpg --card-status | grep "Signature PIN" | grep -q "not forced"; then { echo admin echo forcesig echo ${ADMIN_PIN_DEF} } | gpg --command-fd=0 --status-fd=1 --pinentry-mode=loopback --card-edit \ > /tmp/gpg_card_edit_output 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then ERROR=`cat /tmp/gpg_card_edit_output` whiptail_error_die "GPG Key forcesig toggle on failed!\n\n$ERROR" fi fi # Set RSA key length { echo admin echo key-attr echo 1 # RSA echo ${RSA_KEY_LENGTH} #Signing key size set to RSA_KEY_LENGTH echo ${ADMIN_PIN_DEF} echo 1 # RSA echo ${RSA_KEY_LENGTH} #Encryption key size set to RSA_KEY_LENGTH echo ${ADMIN_PIN_DEF} echo 1 # RSA echo ${RSA_KEY_LENGTH} #Authentication key size set to RSA_KEY_LENGTH echo ${ADMIN_PIN_DEF} } | gpg --command-fd=0 --status-fd=1 --pinentry-mode=loopback --card-edit \ > /tmp/gpg_card_edit_output 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then ERROR=`cat /tmp/gpg_card_edit_output` whiptail_error_die "Setting key attributed to RSA ${RSA_KEY_LENGTH} bits in USB security dongle failed." fi # Generate OEM GPG keys { echo admin echo generate echo n echo ${ADMIN_PIN_DEF} echo ${USER_PIN_DEF} echo 0 echo ${GPG_USER_NAME} echo ${GPG_USER_MAIL} echo ${GPG_USER_COMMENT} echo ${USER_PIN_DEF} } | gpg --command-fd=0 --status-fd=2 --pinentry-mode=loopback --card-edit \ > /tmp/gpg_card_edit_output 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then ERROR=`cat /tmp/gpg_card_edit_output` whiptail_error_die "GPG Key automatic keygen failed!\n\n$ERROR" fi } gpg_key_change_pin() { # 1 = user PIN, 3 = admin PIN PIN_TYPE=$1 PIN_ORIG=$2 PIN_NEW=$3 # Change PIN { echo admin echo passwd echo ${PIN_TYPE} echo ${PIN_ORIG} echo ${PIN_NEW} echo ${PIN_NEW} echo q echo q } | gpg --command-fd=0 --status-fd=2 --pinentry-mode=loopback --card-edit \ > /tmp/gpg_card_edit_output 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then ERROR=`cat /tmp/gpg_card_edit_output | fold -s` whiptail_error_die "GPG Key PIN change failed!\n\n$ERROR" fi } generate_checksums() { # ensure /boot mounted if ! grep -q /boot /proc/mounts ; then mount -o rw /boot || whiptail_error_die "Unable to mount /boot" else mount -o remount,rw /boot || whiptail_error_die "Unable to mount /boot" fi #Check if previous TPM Disk unlock Key was set if [ -e /boot/kexec_key_devices.txt ]; then TPM_DISK_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SET=1 fi # clear any existing checksums/signatures rm /boot/kexec* 2>/dev/null # create Heads TPM counter if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ];then if [ "$CONFIG_IGNORE_ROLLBACK" != "y" ]; then tpmr counter_create \ -pwdo "$TPM_PASS" \ -pwdc '' \ -la -3135106223 \ | tee /tmp/counter \ || whiptail_error_die "Unable to create TPM counter" TPM_COUNTER=`cut -d: -f1 < /tmp/counter` # increment TPM counter increment_tpm_counter $TPM_COUNTER >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || whiptail_error_die "Unable to increment tpm counter" # create rollback file sha256sum /tmp/counter-$TPM_COUNTER > /boot/kexec_rollback.txt 2>/dev/null \ || whiptail_error_die "Unable to create rollback file" else ## needs to exist for initial call to unseal-hotp echo "0" > /boot/kexec_hotp_counter fi fi # set default boot option only if no TPM Disk Unlock Key previously set if [ -z "$TPM_DISK_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SET" ]; then set_default_boot_option fi # generate hashes ( set -e -o pipefail cd /boot find ./ -type f ! -path './kexec*' -print0 \ | xargs -0 sha256sum > /boot/kexec_hashes.txt 2>/dev/null print_tree > /boot/kexec_tree.txt ) [ $? -eq 0 ] || whiptail_error_die "Error generating kexec hashes" param_files=`find /boot/kexec*.txt` [ -z "$param_files" ] \ && whiptail_error_die "No kexec parameter files to sign" # sign kexec boot files if sha256sum $param_files 2>/dev/null | gpg \ --pinentry-mode loopback \ --passphrase "$USER_PIN" \ --digest-algo SHA256 \ --detach-sign \ -a \ > /boot/kexec.sig 2>/tmp/error; then # successful - update the validated params if ! check_config /boot >/dev/null 2>/tmp/error ; then cat /tmp/error ret=1 else ret=0 fi else cat /tmp/error ret=1 fi # done writing to /boot, switch back to RO mount -o ro,remount /boot if [ $ret = 1 ] ; then ERROR=$(tail -n 1 /tmp/error | fold -s) whiptail_error_die "Error signing kexec boot files:\n\n$ERROR" fi } set_default_boot_option() { option_file="/tmp/kexec_options.txt" tmp_menu_file="/tmp/kexec/kexec_menu.txt" hash_file="/boot/kexec_default_hashes.txt" mkdir -p /tmp/kexec/ rm $option_file 2>/dev/null # parse boot options from grub.cfg for i in `find /boot -name "grub.cfg"`; do kexec-parse-boot "/boot" "$i" >> $option_file done # FC29/30+ may use BLS format grub config files # https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/BootLoaderSpecByDefault # only parse these if $option_file is still empty if [ ! -s $option_file ] && [ -d "/boot/loader/entries" ]; then for i in `find /boot -name "grub.cfg"`; do kexec-parse-bls "/boot" "$i" "/boot/loader/entries" >> $option_file done fi [ ! -s $option_file ] \ && whiptail_error_die "Failed to parse any boot options" # sort boot options sort -r $option_file | uniq > $tmp_menu_file ## save first option as default entry=`head -n 1 $tmp_menu_file | tail -1` # clear existing default configs rm "/boot/kexec_default.*.txt" 2>/dev/null # get correct index for entry index=$(grep -n "$entry" $option_file | cut -f1 -d ':') # write new config echo "$entry" > /boot/kexec_default.$index.txt # validate boot option ( cd /boot && /bin/kexec-boot -b "/boot" -e "$entry" -f \ | xargs sha256sum > $hash_file 2>/dev/null ) \ || whiptail_error_die "Failed to create hashes of boot files" } report_integrity_measurements() { #check for GPG key in keyring GPG_KEY_COUNT=`gpg -k 2>/dev/null | wc -l` if [ $GPG_KEY_COUNT -ne 0 ]; then # Check and report TOTP # update the TOTP code every thirty seconds date=`date "+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S %Z"` seconds=`date "+%s"` half=`expr \( $seconds % 60 \) / 30` if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" != "y" ]; then TOTP="NO TPM" elif [ "$half" != "$last_half" ]; then last_half=$half; TOTP=`unseal-totp` > /dev/null 2>&1 fi # Check and report on HOTP status if [ -x /bin/hotp_verification ]; then HOTP=`unseal-hotp` > /dev/null 2>&1 enable_usb if ! hotp_verification info > /dev/null 2>&1 ; then whiptail $CONFIG_WARNING_BG_COLOR --title 'WARNING: Please insert your HOTP enabled USB Security dongle' --msgbox "Your HOTP enabled USB Security dongle was not detected.\n\nPlease remove it and insert it again." 0 80 fi # Don't output HOTP codes to screen, so as to make replay attacks harder hotp_verification check $HOTP case "$?" in 0 ) HOTP="Success" ;; 4 ) HOTP="Invalid code" MAIN_MENU_BG_COLOR=$CONFIG_ERROR_BG_COLOR ;; * ) HOTP="Error checking code, Insert USB Security dongle and retry" MAIN_MENU_BG_COLOR=$CONFIG_WARNING_BG_COLOR ;; esac else HOTP='N/A' fi # Check for detached signed digest and report on /boot integrity status check_config /boot force TMP_HASH_FILE="/tmp/kexec/kexec_hashes.txt" if ( cd /boot && sha256sum -c "$TMP_HASH_FILE" > /tmp/hash_output ); then HASH="OK" else HASH="ALTERED" fi #Show results whiptail $MAIN_MENU_BG_COLOR --title "Measured Integrity Report" --msgbox "$date\nTOTP: $TOTP | HOTP: $HOTP\n/BOOT INTEGRITY: $HASH\n\nPress OK to continue or Ctrl+Alt+Delete to reboot" 0 80 fi } ## main script start # check for args if [ "$1" != "" ]; then title_text=$1 else title_text="OEM Factory Reset / Re-Ownership" fi if [ "$2" != "" ]; then bg_color=$2 else bg_color="" fi # show warning prompt if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then TPM_STR=" * ERASE the TPM and own it with a password\n" else TPM_STR="" fi if ! whiptail --yesno " This operation will automatically:\n $TPM_STR * ERASE any keys or passwords on the GPG smart card,\n reset it to a factory state, generate new keys\n and optionally set custom PIN(s)\n * Add the new GPG key to the firmware and reflash it\n * Sign all of the files in /boot with the new GPG key\n\n It requires that you already have an OS installed on a\n dedicated /boot partition. Do you wish to continue?" \ $HEIGHT $WIDTH $CONTINUE $CANCEL $CLEAR $bg_color --title "$title_text" ; then exit 1 fi # We show current integrity measurements status and time report_integrity_measurements use_defaults=n if [ "$CONFIG_OEMRESET_OFFER_DEFAULTS" = y ]; then echo -e -n "Would you like to use default configuration options?\nIf N, you will be prompted for each option [Y/n]: " read -n 1 use_defaults fi if [ "$use_defaults" == "n" -o "$use_defaults" == "N" ]; then # Re-ownership of encrypted disk key, content and passphrase echo -e -n "\n\nWould you like to change the current LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase?\n (Highly recommended if you didn't install the Operating System yourself, so that past provisioned passphrase would not permit to access content.\n Note that without re-encrypting disk, a backuped header could be restored to access encrypted content with old passphrase) [y/N]: " read -n 1 prompt_output echo if [ "$prompt_output" == "y" \ -o "$prompt_output" == "Y" ];then luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase_desired=1 echo -e "\n" fi echo -e -n "Would you like to re-encrypt LUKS encrypted container and generate new Disk Recovery key?\n (Highly recommended if you didn't install the operating system yourself: this would prevent any LUKS backuped header to be restored to access encrypted data) [y/N]: " read -n 1 prompt_output echo if [ "$prompt_output" == "y" \ -o "$prompt_output" == "Y" ];then test_luks_current_disk_recovery_key_passphrase luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_desired=1 echo -e "\n" fi # Adapt message to be given to user in terms of security components that will be applied. if [ -n "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase_desired" -o -n "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase" ]; then CUSTOM_PASS_AFFECTED_COMPONENTS="LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase" fi if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then CUSTOM_PASS_AFFECTED_COMPONENTS="$CUSTOM_PASS_AFFECTED_COMPONENTS TPM Ownership password" fi CUSTOM_PASS_AFFECTED_COMPONENTS="$CUSTOM_PASS_AFFECTED_COMPONENTS GPG Admin PIN GPG User PIN" # Inform user of security components affected for the following prompts echo -e "The following security components will be provisioned with defaults or chosen PINs/passwords: $CUSTOM_PASS_AFFECTED_COMPONENTS\n" # Prompt to change default passwords echo -e -n "Would you like to set a single custom password that will be provisioned to previously stated security components? [y/N]: " read -n 1 prompt_output echo if [ "$prompt_output" == "y" \ -o "$prompt_output" == "Y" ]; then echo -e "\nThe chosen custom password must be between 8 and $MAX_HOTP_GPG_PIN_LENGTH characters in length.\n" echo while [[ ${#CUSTOM_SINGLE_PASS} -lt 8 ]] || [[ ${#CUSTOM_SINGLE_PASS} -gt $MAX_HOTP_GPG_PIN_LENGTH ]] ; do echo -e -n "Enter the custom password: " read CUSTOM_SINGLE_PASS done echo TPM_PASS=$CUSTOM_SINGLE_PASS USER_PIN=$CUSTOM_SINGLE_PASS ADMIN_PIN=$CUSTOM_SINGLE_PASS # Only set if user said desired. Matches rest of logic if [ -n "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase_desired" ]; then luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase=$CUSTOM_SINGLE_PASS fi else echo -e -n "Would you like to set distinct PINs/passwords to be provisioned to previously stated security components? [y/N]: " read -n 1 prompt_output echo if [ "$prompt_output" == "y" \ -o "$prompt_output" == "Y" ]; then echo -e "\nThey must be each at least 8 characters in length.\n" echo if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then while [[ ${#TPM_PASS} -lt 8 ]] ; do echo -e -n "Enter desired TPM Ownership password: " read TPM_PASS done fi while [[ ${#ADMIN_PIN} -lt 8 ]] || [[ ${#ADMIN_PIN} -gt $MAX_HOTP_GPG_PIN_LENGTH ]] ; do echo -e -n "\nThis PIN should be between 8 to $MAX_HOTP_GPG_PIN_LENGTH characters in length.\n" echo -e -n "Enter desired GPG Admin PIN: " read ADMIN_PIN done while [[ ${#USER_PIN} -lt 8 ]] || [[ ${#USER_PIN} -gt 64 ]]; do echo -e -n "\nThis PIN should be between 8 to 64 characters in length.\n" echo -e -n "Enter desired GPG User PIN: " read USER_PIN done echo fi fi if [ -n "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase_desired" -a -z "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase" ]; then # We catch here if changing LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase was desired # but yet undone. This is if not being covered by the single password echo -e "\nEnter desired replacement for current Disk Recovery Key passphrase (At least 8 characters long):" while [[ ${#luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase} -lt 8 ]]; do { read -r luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase };done #We test that current Disk Recovery Key passphrase is known prior of going further test_luks_current_disk_recovery_key_passphrase echo -e "\n" fi # Prompt to change default GnuPG key information echo -e -n "Would you like to set custom user information for the GnuPG key? [y/N]: " read -n 1 prompt_output echo if [ "$prompt_output" == "y" \ -o "$prompt_output" == "Y" ]; then echo -e "\n\n" echo -e "We will generate a GnuPG (PGP) keypair identifiable with the following text form:" echo -e "Real Name (Comment) email@address.org" echo -e "\nEnter your Real Name (Optional):" read -r GPG_USER_NAME echo -e "\nEnter your email@adress.org:" read -r GPG_USER_MAIL while ! $(expr "$GPG_USER_MAIL" : '.*@' >/dev/null); do { echo -e "\nEnter your email@address.org:" read -r GPG_USER_MAIL };done echo -e "\nEnter Comment (Optional, to distinguish this key from others with same previous attributes. Must be smaller then 60 characters):" read -r GPG_USER_COMMENT while [[ ${#GPG_USER_COMMENT} -gt 60 ]]; do { echo -e "\nEnter Comment (Optional, to distinguish this key from others with same previous attributes. Must be smaller then 60 characters):" read -r GPG_USER_COMMENT };done fi fi # If nothing is stored in custom variables, we set them to their defaults if [ "$TPM_PASS" == "" ]; then TPM_PASS=$TPM_PASS_DEF; fi if [ "$USER_PIN" == "" ]; then USER_PIN=$USER_PIN_DEF; fi if [ "$ADMIN_PIN" == "" ]; then ADMIN_PIN=$ADMIN_PIN_DEF; fi ## sanity check the USB, GPG key, and boot device before proceeding further # Prompt to insert USB drive if desired echo -e -n "\nWould you like to export your public key to an USB drive? [y/N]: " read -n 1 prompt_output echo if [ "$prompt_output" == "y" \ -o "$prompt_output" == "Y" ] \ ; then GPG_EXPORT=1 # mount USB over /media only if not already mounted if ! grep -q /media /proc/mounts ; then # mount USB in rw if ! mount-usb rw 2>/tmp/error; then ERROR=$(tail -n 1 /tmp/error | fold -s) whiptail_error_die "Unable to mount USB on /media:\n\n${ERROR}" fi else #/media already mounted, make sure it is in r+w mode if ! mount -o remount,rw /media 2>/tmp/error; then ERROR=$(tail -n 1 /tmp/error | fold -s) whiptail_error_die "Unable to remount in read+write USB on /media:\n\n${ERROR}" fi fi else GPG_EXPORT=0 # needed for USB Security dongle below and is ensured via mount-usb in case of GPG_EXPORT=1 enable_usb fi # ensure USB Security Dongle connected echo -e "\nChecking for USB Security Dongle...\n" # USB kernel modules already loaded via mount-usb if ! gpg --card-status >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then whiptail_error "Can't access USB Security Dongle; \nPlease remove and reinsert, then press Enter." if ! gpg --card-status >/dev/null 2>/tmp/error ; then ERROR=$(tail -n 1 /tmp/error | fold -s) whiptail_error_die "Unable to detect USB Security Dongle:\n\n${ERROR}" fi fi assert_signable # Action time... # detect and set /boot device echo -e "\nDetecting and setting boot device...\n" if ! detect_boot_device ; then SKIP_BOOT="y" else echo -e "Boot device set to $CONFIG_BOOT_DEV\n" fi # update configs if [[ "$SKIP_BOOT" == "n" ]]; then replace_config /etc/config.user "CONFIG_BOOT_DEV" "$CONFIG_BOOT_DEV" combine_configs fi if [ -n "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_desired" -a -n "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase_desired" ]; then #Reencryption of disk, disk recovery key and Disk Recovery Key passphrase change is requested luks_reencrypt luks_change_passphrase elif [ -n "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_desired" -a -z "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase_desired" ]; then #Reencryption of disk was requested but not passphrase change luks_reencrypt elif [ -z "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_desired" -a -n "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase_desired" ]; then #Passphrase change is requested without disk reencryption luks_change_passphrase fi ## reset TPM and set password if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then echo -e "\nResetting TPM...\n" tpmr reset "$TPM_PASS" >/dev/null 2>/tmp/error fi if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then ERROR=$(tail -n 1 /tmp/error | fold -s) whiptail_error_die "Error resetting TPM:\n\n${ERROR}" fi # clear local keyring rm /.gnupg/*.gpg 2>/dev/null rm /.gnupg/*.kbx 2>/dev/null gpg --list-keys >/dev/null 2>&1 ## reset the GPG Key echo -e "\nResetting GPG Key...\n(this will take around 3 minutes...)\n" gpg_key_reset # parse name of generated key GPG_GEN_KEY=`grep -A1 pub /tmp/gpg_card_edit_output | tail -n1 | sed -nr 's/^([ ])*//p'` PUBKEY="/tmp/${GPG_GEN_KEY}.asc" #Applying custom GPG PINs if [ "$USER_PIN" != "" -o "$ADMIN_PIN" != "" ]; then echo -e "\nChanging default GPG Admin PIN\n" gpg_key_change_pin "3" "$ADMIN_PIN_DEF" "$ADMIN_PIN" echo -e "\nChanging default GPG User PIN\n" gpg_key_change_pin "1" "$USER_PIN_DEF" "$USER_PIN" fi # export pubkey to file if ! gpg --export --armor $GPG_GEN_KEY > "${PUBKEY}" 2>/tmp/error ; then ERROR=$(tail -n 1 /tmp/error | fold -s) whiptail_error_die "GPG Key gpg export to file failed!\n\n$ERROR" fi ## export pubkey to USB if [ $GPG_EXPORT -ne 0 ]; then echo -e "\nExporting generated key to USB...\n" # copy to USB if ! cp "${PUBKEY}" "/media/${GPG_GEN_KEY}.asc" 2>/tmp/error ; then ERROR=$(tail -n 1 /tmp/error | fold -s) whiptail_error_die "Key export error: unable to copy ${GPG_GEN_KEY}.asc to /media:\n\n$ERROR" fi mount -o remount,ro /media 2>/dev/null fi ## flash generated key to ROM echo -e "\nReading current firmware...\n(this will take a minute or two)\n" /bin/flash.sh -r /tmp/oem-setup.rom >/dev/null 2>/tmp/error if [ ! -s /tmp/oem-setup.rom ]; then ERROR=$(tail -n 1 /tmp/error | fold -s) whiptail_error_die "Error reading current firmware:\n\n$ERROR" fi # ensure key imported locally if ! cat "$PUBKEY" | gpg --import >/dev/null 2>/tmp/error ; then ERROR=$(tail -n 1 /tmp/error | fold -s) whiptail_error_die "Error importing GPG key:\n\n$ERROR" fi # update /.gnupg/trustdb.gpg to ultimately trust all user provided public keys if ! gpg --list-keys --fingerprint --with-colons 2>/dev/null \ | sed -E -n -e 's/^fpr:::::::::([0-9A-F]+):$/\1:6:/p' \ | gpg --import-ownertrust >/dev/null 2>/tmp/error ; then ERROR=$(tail -n 1 /tmp/error | fold -s) whiptail_error_die "Error importing GPG ownertrust:\n\n$ERROR" fi if ! gpg --update-trust >/dev/null 2>/tmp/error ; then ERROR=$(tail -n 1 /tmp/error | fold -s) whiptail_error_die "Error updating GPG ownertrust:\n\n$ERROR" fi # clear any existing heads/gpg files from current firmware for i in `cbfs.sh -o /tmp/oem-setup.rom -l | grep -e "heads/"`; do cbfs.sh -o /tmp/oem-setup.rom -d $i done # add heads/gpg files to current firmware if [ -e /.gnupg/pubring.kbx ];then cbfs.sh -o /tmp/oem-setup.rom -a "heads/initrd/.gnupg/pubring.kbx" -f /.gnupg/pubring.kbx if [ -e /.gnupg/pubring.gpg ];then rm /.gnupg/pubring.gpg fi elif [ -e /.gnupg/pubring.gpg ];then cbfs.sh -o /tmp/oem-setup.rom -a "heads/initrd/.gnupg/pubring.gpg" -f /.gnupg/pubring.gpg fi if [ -e /.gnupg/trustdb.gpg ]; then cbfs.sh -o /tmp/oem-setup.rom -a "heads/initrd/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg" -f /.gnupg/trustdb.gpg fi # persist user config changes (boot device) if [ -e /etc/config.user ]; then cbfs.sh -o /tmp/oem-setup.rom -a "heads/initrd/etc/config.user" -f /etc/config.user fi # flash updated firmware image echo -e "\nAdding generated key to current firmware and re-flashing...\n" if ! /bin/flash.sh /tmp/oem-setup.rom >/dev/null 2>/tmp/error ; then ERROR=$(tail -n 1 /tmp/error | fold -s) whiptail_error_die "Error flashing updated firmware image:\n\n$ERROR" fi ## sign files in /boot and generate checksums if [[ "$SKIP_BOOT" == "n" ]]; then echo -e "\nSigning boot files and generating checksums...\n" generate_checksums fi # Prepare whiptail output of provisioned secrets if [ -z "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase" -o -z "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase_desired" ]; then luks_passphrase_changed="" else luks_passphrase_changed="LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase:\n $luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase" fi if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then tpm_password_changed=" TPM Owner Password: $TPM_PASS\n" else tpm_password_changed="" fi ## Show to user current provisioned secrets prior of rebooting whiptail --msgbox " $luks_passphrase_changed $tpm_password_changed GPG Admin PIN: $ADMIN_PIN\n GPG User PIN: $USER_PIN\n\n" \ $HEIGHT $WIDTH --title "Provisioned secrets" ## all done -- reboot whiptail --msgbox " OEM Factory Reset / Re-Ownership has completed successfully\n\n After rebooting, you will need to generate new TOTP/HOTP secrets\n when prompted in order to complete the setup process.\n\n Press Enter to reboot.\n" \ $HEIGHT $WIDTH --title "OEM Factory Reset / Re-Ownership Complete" # Clean LUKS secrets luks_secrets_cleanup unset luks_passphrase_changed unset tpm_password_changed reboot