#!/bin/bash # Retrieve the sealed TOTP secret and initialize a USB Security Dongle with it . /etc/functions . /etc/gui_functions HOTP_SECRET="/tmp/secret/hotp.key" HOTP_COUNTER="/boot/kexec_hotp_counter" HOTP_KEY="/boot/kexec_hotp_key" mount_boot() { TRACE_FUNC # Mount local disk if it is not already mounted if ! grep -q /boot /proc/mounts; then if ! mount -o ro /boot; then whiptail_error --title 'ERROR' \ --msgbox "Couldn't mount /boot.\n\nCheck the /boot device in configuration settings, or perform an OEM reset." 0 80 return 1 fi fi } TRACE_FUNC fatal_error() { echo -e "\nERROR: ${1}; press Enter to continue." read # get lsusb output for debugging DEBUG "lsusb output: $(lsusb)" die "$1" } # Use stored HOTP key branding (this might be useful after OEM reset) if [ -r /boot/kexec_hotp_key ]; then HOTPKEY_BRANDING="$(cat /boot/kexec_hotp_key)" else HOTPKEY_BRANDING="HOTP USB Security Dongle" fi if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then DEBUG "Sealing HOTP secret reuses TOTP sealed secret..." tpmr unseal 4d47 0,1,2,3,4,7 312 "$HOTP_SECRET" \ || fatal_error "Unable to unseal HOTP secret" else # without a TPM, generate a secret based on the SHA-256 of the ROM secret_from_rom_hash > "$HOTP_SECRET" || die "Reading ROM failed" fi # Store counter in file instead of TPM for now, as it conflicts with Heads # config TPM counter as TPM 1.2 can only increment one counter between reboots # get current value of HOTP counter in TPM, create if absent mount_boot || exit 1 #check_tpm_counter $HOTP_COUNTER hotp \ #|| die "Unable to find/create TPM counter" #counter="$TPM_COUNTER" # #counter_value=$(read_tpm_counter $counter | cut -f2 -d ' ' | awk 'gsub("^000e","")') #if [ "$counter_value" == "" ]; then # die "Unable to read HOTP counter" #fi #counter_value=$(printf "%d" 0x${counter_value}) counter_value=1 enable_usb # While making sure the key is inserted, capture the status so we can check how # many PIN attempts remain if ! hotp_token_info="$(hotp_verification info)" ; then echo -e "\nInsert your $HOTPKEY_BRANDING and press Enter to configure it" read if ! hotp_token_info="$(hotp_verification info)" ; then # don't leak key on failure shred -n 10 -z -u "$HOTP_SECRET" 2> /dev/null fatal_error "Unable to find $HOTPKEY_BRANDING" fi fi # Set HOTP USB Security Dongle branding based on VID if lsusb | grep -q "20a0:" ; then HOTPKEY_BRANDING="Nitrokey" elif lsusb | grep -q "316d:" ; then HOTPKEY_BRANDING="Librem Key" else HOTPKEY_BRANDING="HOTP USB Security Dongle" fi # Truncate the secret if it is longer than the maximum HOTP secret truncate_max_bytes 20 "$HOTP_SECRET" # Check when the signing key was created to consider trying the default PIN # (Note: we must avoid using gpg --card-status here as the Nitrokey firmware # locks up, https://github.com/Nitrokey/nitrokey-pro-firmware/issues/54) gpg_key_create_time="$(gpg --list-keys --with-colons | grep -m 1 '^pub:' | cut -d: -f6)" gpg_key_create_time="${gpg_key_create_time:-0}" DEBUG "Signature key was created at $(date -d "@$gpg_key_create_time")" now_date="$(date '+%s')" # Get the number of admin PIN retry attempts remaining awk_admin_counter_regex='/^\s*Card counters: Admin (\d),.*$/' awk_get_admin_counter="$awk_admin_counter_regex"' { print gensub('"$awk_admin_counter_regex"', "\\1", "") }' admin_pin_retries="$(echo "$hotp_token_info" | awk "$awk_get_admin_counter")" admin_pin_retries="${admin_pin_retries:-0}" DEBUG "Admin PIN retry counter is $admin_pin_retries" # Try using factory default admin PIN for 1 month following OEM reset to ease # initial setup. But don't do it forever to encourage changing the PIN and # so PIN attempts are not consumed by the default attempt. admin_pin="12345678" month_secs="$((30*24*60*60))" admin_pin_status=1 if [ "$((now_date - gpg_key_create_time))" -gt "$month_secs" ]; then # Remind what the default PIN was in case it still hasn't been changed echo "Not trying default PIN ($admin_pin)" # Never consume an attempt if there are less than 3 attempts left, otherwise # attempting the default PIN could cause an unexpected lockout before getting a # chance to enter the correct PIN elif [ "$admin_pin_retries" -lt 3 ]; then echo "Not trying default PIN ($admin_pin), only $admin_pin_retries attempt(s) left" else hotp_initialize "$admin_pin" $HOTP_SECRET $counter_value "$HOTPKEY_BRANDING" >/dev/null 2>&1 admin_pin_status="$?" fi if [ "$admin_pin_status" -ne 0 ]; then # prompt user for PIN and retry echo "" read -s -p "Enter your $HOTPKEY_BRANDING Admin PIN: " admin_pin echo -e "\n" hotp_initialize "$admin_pin" $HOTP_SECRET $counter_value "$HOTPKEY_BRANDING" if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then echo -e "\n" read -s -p "Error setting HOTP secret, re-enter Admin PIN and try again: " admin_pin echo -e "\n" if ! hotp_initialize "$admin_pin" $HOTP_SECRET $counter_value "$HOTPKEY_BRANDING" ; then # don't leak key on failure shred -n 10 -z -u "$HOTP_SECRET" 2> /dev/null if [ "$HOTPKEY_BRANDING" == "Nitrokey" ]; then fatal_error "Setting HOTP secret failed, to reset nitrokey pin use: nitropy nk3 secrets reset or the Nitrokey App 2" else fatal_error "Setting HOTP secret failed" fi fi fi else # remind user to change admin password echo -e "\nWARNING: default admin PIN detected: please change this as soon as possible." fi # HOTP key no longer needed shred -n 10 -z -u "$HOTP_SECRET" 2> /dev/null # Make sure our counter is incremented ahead of the next check #increment_tpm_counter $counter > /dev/null \ #|| die "Unable to increment tpm counter" #increment_tpm_counter $counter > /dev/null \ #|| die "Unable to increment tpm counter" mount -o remount,rw /boot counter_value=`expr $counter_value + 1` echo $counter_value > $HOTP_COUNTER \ || fatal_error "Unable to create hotp counter file" # Store/overwrite HOTP USB Security Dongle branding found out beforehand echo $HOTPKEY_BRANDING > $HOTP_KEY \ || die "Unable to store hotp key file" #sha256sum /tmp/counter-$counter > $HOTP_COUNTER \ #|| die "Unable to create hotp counter file" mount -o remount,ro /boot echo -e "\n$HOTPKEY_BRANDING initialized successfully. Press Enter to continue." read exit 0