Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Jonathon Hall
decd45f361
openssl: Trim optional algorithms
Disable all optional algorithms except SM3.  (SHA and AES are not
optional.)  tpm2-tss uses SHA, AES, and SM3.  Reduces size of libcrypto
by almost 1 MB, saves about 140 KB in ROM.

Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
2023-03-10 17:07:00 -05:00
Jonathon Hall
5588a47d56
modules/openssl: Update to 3.0.8, reduce size
Update OpenSSL to 3.0.8.  Build with -Os.  Install only libcrypto,
libssl is not currently needed.  Don't buid tests.

Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
2023-03-08 12:45:55 -05:00
Thierry Laurion
6923fb5e20
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards
-coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations)
-swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config
-Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized)
This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads

-------------
WiP

TODO:
- libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built
- Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing
- init tries to bind fd and fails currently
- Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output
- When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail)

- seal-hotpkey is not working properly
- setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM)
  - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase.
- primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup
- would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only
- tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help.
  - Implementing them would be better
- REVIEW TODOS IN CODE
- READD CIRCLECI CONFIG

Current state:
- TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid)
- TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without.
 - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails.

- Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens)
 - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2023-03-08 12:45:43 -05:00