Provide tpmr commands pcrread, pcrsize, calcfuturepcr, and seal for
both TPM1 and TPM2.
Combine seal logic for TPM1/TPM2 in seal-totp, kexec-seal-key. This is
essentially the TPM2 logic now that tpmr provides the same wrapped
commands for both TPM1 and TPM2.
Remove algorithm prefix from PCR list in tpmr unseal for consistency
with tpmr seal.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
Provide tpmr unseal to unseal a file with TPM1 or TPM2. For TPM1, it
wraps tpm nv_readvalue and tpm unsealfile. For TPM2, it wraps tpm2
unseal.
kexec-unseal-key, seal-hotpkey, unseal-hotp, and unseal-totp no longer
need to differentiate TPM1/TPM2.
Fixes spurious shred errors on TPM2 that only apply to TPM1 (temporary
sealed secret file and shred are now internal to tpmr).
Fixes TPM1 disk unlock key unsealing due to logic errors relating to
exit status of tpmr unseal or tpm unsealfile (now always uses status of
tpmr unseal).
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
When sealing/unsealing with a password, use a policy including both the
specified PCRs and the object password. Fixes sealing and unsealing
disk unlock key.
tpm2 seems to have a bug in parameter decryption when using a policy
session and password in this way, disable encryption in the policy
session as a workaround.
Flags still need to be set on the sealed object correctly, as the
password is normally allowed on its own as an alternative to policy
auth.
Add -Q to some tpm2 invocations to silence diagnostics on stdout.
Pass filename for unsealed secret rather than capturing from stdout
for robustness against tpm2 diagnostics on stdout.
Fix unseal result check in kexec-unseal-key.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
Most logic throughout Heads doesn't need to know TPM1 versus TPM2 (and
shouldn't, the differences should be localized). Some checks were
incorrect and are fixed by this change. Most checks are now unchanged
relative to master.
There are not that many places outside of tpmr that need to
differentiate TPM1 and TPM2. Some of those are duplicate code that
should be consolidated (seal-hotpkey, unseal-totp, unseal-hotp), and
some more are probably good candidates for abstracting in tpmr so the
business logic doesn't have to know TPM1 vs. TPM2.
Previously, CONFIG_TPM could be variously 'y', 'n', or empty. Now it
is always 'y' or 'n', and 'y' means "any TPM". Board configs are
unchanged, setting CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS=y implies CONFIG_TPM=y so this
doesn't have to be duplicated and can't be mistakenly mismatched.
There were a few checks for CONFIG_TPM = n that only coincidentally
worked for TPM2 because CONFIG_TPM was empty (not 'n'). This test is
now OK, but the checks were also cleaned up to '!= "y"' for robustness.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
-coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations)
-swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config
-Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized)
This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads
-------------
WiP
TODO:
- libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built
- Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing
- init tries to bind fd and fails currently
- Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output
- When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail)
- seal-hotpkey is not working properly
- setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM)
- We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase.
- primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup
- would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only
- tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help.
- Implementing them would be better
- REVIEW TODOS IN CODE
- READD CIRCLECI CONFIG
Current state:
- TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid)
- TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without.
- TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails.
- Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens)
- Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
- Add TRACE function tracing output under etc/functions, depending on CONFIG_ENABLE_FUNCTION_TRACING_OUTPUT enabled in board configs
- Replace current DEBUG to TRACE calls in code, reserving DEBUG calls for more verbose debugging later on (output of variables etc)
- add 'export CONFIG_ENABLE_FUNCTION_TRACING_OUTPUT=y' in qemu-coreboot(fb)whiptail-tpm1(-hotp) boards to see it in action
