Merge pull request #1292 from tlaurion/tpm2_retry

TPM2/TPM1 support (testing and bug fixes needed through qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm[1,2](-hotp) testing boards!
2025-01-18 02:39:59 +00:00 · 2023-03-13 16:22:13 -04:00 · 2023-03-13 16:22:13 -04:00 · d24def4b59
commit d24def4b59
parent 6300e30504 4754a754dc
76 changed files with 2097 additions and 502 deletions
--- a/.circleci/config.yml
+++ b/.circleci/config.yml
@ -470,6 +470,13 @@ workflows:
          requires:
            - x230-hotp-maximized

+      - build:
+          name: qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm2-hotp
+          target: qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm2-hotp
+          subcommand: ""
+          requires:
+            - x230-hotp-maximized
+
      - build:
          name: librem_13v2
          target: librem_13v2
--- a/15
+++ b/15
@ -52,6 +52,9 @@ include $(CONFIG)
 # Unless otherwise specified, we are building for heads
 CONFIG_HEADS	?= y

+# Unless otherwise specified, we are building bash to have non-interactive shell for scripts (arrays and bashisms)
+CONFIG_BASH	?= y
+
 # Determine arch part for a host triplet
 ifeq "$(CONFIG_TARGET_ARCH)" "x86"
 MUSL_ARCH := x86_64
@ -118,6 +121,8 @@ SHELL := /usr/bin/env bash
 include modules/musl-cross

 musl_dep	:= musl-cross
+target		:= $(shell echo $(CROSS) | grep -Eoe '([^/]*?)-linux-musl')
+arch		:= $(subst -linux-musl, , $(target))
 heads_cc	:= $(CROSS)gcc \
 	-fdebug-prefix-map=$(pwd)=heads \
 	-gno-record-gcc-switches \
@ -143,7 +148,9 @@ CROSS_TOOLS := \
 	CC="$(heads_cc)" \
 	$(CROSS_TOOLS_NOCC) \

-
+# Targets to build payload only
+.PHONY: payload
+payload: $(build)/$(BOARD)/bzImage $(build)/$(initrd_dir)/initrd.cpio.xz

 ifeq ($(CONFIG_COREBOOT), y)

@ -158,7 +165,7 @@ else
 $(error "$(BOARD): neither CONFIG_COREBOOT nor CONFIG_LINUXBOOT is set?")
 endif

-all:
+all payload:
 	@sha256sum $< | tee -a "$(HASHES)"

 # Disable all built in rules
@ -462,7 +469,9 @@ bin_modules-$(CONFIG_FBWHIPTAIL) += fbwhiptail
 bin_modules-$(CONFIG_HOTPKEY) += hotp-verification
 bin_modules-$(CONFIG_MSRTOOLS) += msrtools
 bin_modules-$(CONFIG_NKSTORECLI) += nkstorecli
-bin_modules-$(CONFIG_UTIL_LINUX) += util-linux
+bin_modules-$(CONFIG_OPENSSL) += openssl
+bin_modules-$(CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS) += tpm2-tools
+bin_modules-$(CONFIG_BASH) += bash

 $(foreach m, $(bin_modules-y), \
 	$(call map,initrd_bin_add,$(call bins,$m)) \
--- a/boards/qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1-hotp/qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1-hotp.md
+++ b/boards/qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1-hotp/qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1-hotp.md
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-qemu-coreboot-(fb)whiptail-tpm1-(hotp) board
+qemu-coreboot-(fb)whiptail-tpm[1,2](-hotp) boards
 ===

 The `qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1-hotp` configuration (and their variants) permits testing of most features of Heads.  
--- a/boards/qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm2-hotp/qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm2-hotp.config
+++ b/boards/qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm2-hotp/qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm2-hotp.config
@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+# Configuration for building a coreboot ROM that works in
+# the qemu emulator in graphical mode thanks to FBWhiptail
+# This version requires a supported HOTP Security dongle (Nitrokey Pro/Storage or Librem Key)
+#
+# TPM can be used with a qemu software TPM (TIS, 2.0).
+export CONFIG_COREBOOT=y
+export CONFIG_COREBOOT_VERSION=4.13
+export CONFIG_LINUX_VERSION=5.10.5
+
+#Enable DEBUG output
+export CONFIG_DEBUG_OUTPUT=y
+export CONFIG_ENABLE_FUNCTION_TRACING_OUTPUT=y
+
+CONFIG_COREBOOT_CONFIG=config/coreboot-qemu-tpm2.config
+CONFIG_LINUX_CONFIG=config/linux-qemu.config
+
+ifeq "$(CONFIG_UROOT)" "y"
+CONFIG_BUSYBOX=n
+else
+CONFIG_KEXEC=y
+CONFIG_QRENCODE=y
+CONFIG_TPMTOTP=y
+CONFIG_POPT=y
+CONFIG_FLASHTOOLS=y
+CONFIG_FLASHROM=y
+CONFIG_PCIUTILS=y
+CONFIG_UTIL_LINUX=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTSETUP2=y
+CONFIG_GPG2=y
+CONFIG_LVM2=y
+CONFIG_MBEDTLS=y
+CONFIG_DROPBEAR=y
+CONFIG_MSRTOOLS=y
+CONFIG_HOTPKEY=y
+
+#Uncomment only one of the following block
+#Required for graphical gui-init (FBWhiptail)
+CONFIG_CAIRO=y
+CONFIG_FBWHIPTAIL=y
+#
+#text-based init (generic-init and gui-init)
+#CONFIG_NEWT=y
+#CONFIG_SLANG=y
+
+endif
+
+export CONFIG_LINUX_USB_COMPANION_CONTROLLER=y
+CONFIG_LINUX_USB=y
+CONFIG_LINUX_E1000=y
+
+#Uncomment only one BOOTSCRIPT:
+#Whiptail-based init (text-based or FBWhiptail)
+export CONFIG_BOOTSCRIPT=/bin/gui-init
+#
+#text-based original init:
+#export CONFIG_BOOTSCRIPT=/bin/generic-init
+export CONFIG_BOOT_REQ_HASH=n
+export CONFIG_BOOT_REQ_ROLLBACK=n
+export CONFIG_BOOT_RECOVERY_SERIAL="/dev/ttyS0"
+export CONFIG_BOOT_KERNEL_ADD="console=ttyS0 console=tty systemd.zram=0"
+export CONFIG_BOOT_KERNEL_REMOVE="quiet rhgb splash"
+
+#TPM2 requirements
+export CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS=y
+export CONFIG_PRIMARY_KEY_TYPE=ecc
+export CONFIG_TPM2_CAPTURE_PCAP=y
+CONFIG_TPM2_TSS=y
+CONFIG_OPENSSL=y
+
+export CONFIG_BOOT_DEV="/dev/vda1"
+export CONFIG_BOARD_NAME="qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm2-hotp"
+
+# Use the GPG-injected ROM if a key was given, since we can't reflash a GPG
+# keyring in QEMU.  Otherwise use the plain ROM, some things can still be tested
+# that way without a GPG key.
+ifneq "$(PUBKEY_ASC)" ""
+QEMU_BOOT_ROM := $(build)/$(BOARD)/$(CB_OUTPUT_FILE_GPG_INJ)
+else
+QEMU_BOOT_ROM := $(build)/$(BOARD)/$(CB_OUTPUT_FILE)
+endif
+
+#borrowed from https://github.com/orangecms/webboot/blob/boot-via-qemu/run-webboot.sh
+TPMDIR=$(build)/$(BOARD)/vtpm
+$(TPMDIR)/.manufacture:
+	mkdir -p "$(TPMDIR)"
+	swtpm_setup --create-config-files skip-if-exist
+	swtpm_setup --tpm-state "$(TPMDIR)" --create-platform-cert --lock-nvram --tpm2
+	touch "$(TPMDIR)/.manufacture"
+ROOT_DISK_IMG=$(build)/$(BOARD)/root.qcow2
+# Default to 20G disk
+QEMU_DISK_SIZE?=20G
+$(ROOT_DISK_IMG):
+	qemu-img create -f qcow2 "$(ROOT_DISK_IMG)" $(QEMU_DISK_SIZE)
+# Remember the amount of memory so it doesn't have to be specified every time.
+# Default to 4G, most bootable OSes are not usable with less.
+QEMU_MEMORY_SIZE?=4G
+MEMORY_SIZE_FILE=$(build)/$(BOARD)/memory
+$(MEMORY_SIZE_FILE):
+	@echo "$(QEMU_MEMORY_SIZE)" >"$(MEMORY_SIZE_FILE)"
+USB_FD_IMG=$(build)/$(BOARD)/usb_fd.raw
+$(USB_FD_IMG):
+	dd if=/dev/zero bs=1M of="$(USB_FD_IMG)" bs=1M count=128
+	# Debian obnoxiously does not include /usr/sbin in PATH for non-root, even
+	# though it is meaningful to use mkfs.vfat (etc.) as non-root
+	MKFS_VFAT=mkfs.vfat; \
+	[ -x /usr/sbin/mkfs.vfat ] && MKFS_VFAT=/usr/sbin/mkfs.vfat; \
+	"$$MKFS_VFAT" "$(USB_FD_IMG)"
+# Pass INSTALL_IMG=<path_to_img.iso> to attach an installer as a USB flash drive instead
+# of the temporary flash drive for exporting GPG keys.
+ifneq "$(INSTALL_IMG)" ""
+QEMU_USB_FD_IMG := $(INSTALL_IMG)
+else
+QEMU_USB_FD_IMG := $(USB_FD_IMG)
+endif
+# To forward a USB token, set USB_TOKEN to one of the following:
+# - NitrokeyPro - forwards a Nitrokey Pro by VID:PID
+# - LibremKey - forwards a Librem Key by VID:PID
+# - <other> - Provide the QEMU usb-host parameters, such as
+#   'hostbus=<#>,hostport=<#>' or 'vendorid=<#>,productid=<#>'
+ifeq "$(USB_TOKEN)" "NitrokeyPro"
+QEMU_USB_TOKEN_DEV := -device usb-host,vendorid=8352,productid=16648
+else ifeq "$(USB_TOKEN)" "NitrokeyStorage"
+QEMU_USB_TOKEN_DEV := -device usb-host,vendorid=8352,productid=16649
+else ifeq "$(USB_TOKEN)" "Nitrokey3NFC"
+QEMU_USB_TOKEN_DEV := -device usb-host,vendorid=8352,productid=17074
+else ifeq "$(USB_TOKEN)" "LibremKey"
+QEMU_USB_TOKEN_DEV := -device usb-host,vendorid=12653,productid=19531
+else ifneq "$(USB_TOKEN)" ""
+QEMU_USB_TOKEN_DEV := -device "usb-host,$(USB_TOKEN)"
+endif
+
+run: $(TPMDIR)/.manufacture $(ROOT_DISK_IMG) $(MEMORY_SIZE_FILE) $(USB_FD_IMG)
+	swtpm socket \
+		--tpm2 \
+		--tpmstate dir="$(TPMDIR)" \
+		--flags "startup-clear" \
+		--terminate \
+		--ctrl type=unixio,path="$(TPMDIR)/sock" &
+	sleep 0.5
+
+	-qemu-system-x86_64 -drive file="$(ROOT_DISK_IMG)",if=virtio \
+		--machine q35,accel=kvm:tcg \
+		-rtc base=utc \
+		-smp "$$(nproc)" \
+		-vga virtio \
+		-full-screen \
+		-m "$$(cat "$(MEMORY_SIZE_FILE)")" \
+		-serial stdio \
+		--bios "$(QEMU_BOOT_ROM)" \
+		-object rng-random,filename=/dev/urandom,id=rng0 \
+		-device virtio-rng-pci,rng=rng0 \
+		-netdev user,id=u1 -device e1000,netdev=u1 \
+		-chardev socket,id=chrtpm,path="$(TPMDIR)/sock" \
+		-tpmdev emulator,id=tpm0,chardev=chrtpm \
+		-device tpm-tis,tpmdev=tpm0 \
+		-device qemu-xhci,id=usb \
+		-device usb-tablet \
+		-drive file="$(QEMU_USB_FD_IMG)",if=none,id=usb-fd-drive,format=raw \
+		-device usb-storage,bus=usb.0,drive=usb-fd-drive \
+		$(QEMU_USB_TOKEN_DEV) \
+
+	stty sane
+	@echo
--- a/boards/qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm2-hotp/qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm2-hotp.md
+++ b/boards/qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm2-hotp/qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm2-hotp.md
@ -0,0 +1 @@
+../qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1-hotp/qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1-hotp.md
--- a/boards/qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm2/qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm2.config
+++ b/boards/qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm2/qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm2.config
@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+# Configuration for building a coreboot ROM that works in
+# the qemu emulator in graphical mode thanks to FBWhiptail
+#
+# TPM can be used with a qemu software TPM (TIS, 2.0).
+export CONFIG_COREBOOT=y
+export CONFIG_COREBOOT_VERSION=4.13
+export CONFIG_LINUX_VERSION=5.10.5
+
+#Enable DEBUG output
+export CONFIG_DEBUG_OUTPUT=y
+export CONFIG_ENABLE_FUNCTION_TRACING_OUTPUT=y
+
+CONFIG_COREBOOT_CONFIG=config/coreboot-qemu-tpm2.config
+CONFIG_LINUX_CONFIG=config/linux-qemu.config
+
+ifeq "$(CONFIG_UROOT)" "y"
+CONFIG_BUSYBOX=n
+else
+CONFIG_KEXEC=y
+CONFIG_QRENCODE=y
+CONFIG_TPMTOTP=y
+CONFIG_POPT=y
+CONFIG_FLASHTOOLS=y
+CONFIG_FLASHROM=y
+CONFIG_PCIUTILS=y
+CONFIG_UTIL_LINUX=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTSETUP2=y
+CONFIG_GPG2=y
+CONFIG_LVM2=y
+CONFIG_MBEDTLS=y
+CONFIG_DROPBEAR=y
+CONFIG_MSRTOOLS=y
+CONFIG_HOTPKEY=n
+
+#Uncomment only one of the following block
+#Required for graphical gui-init (FBWhiptail)
+CONFIG_CAIRO=y
+CONFIG_FBWHIPTAIL=y
+#
+#text-based init (generic-init and gui-init)
+#CONFIG_NEWT=y
+#CONFIG_SLANG=y
+
+endif
+
+export CONFIG_LINUX_USB_COMPANION_CONTROLLER=y
+CONFIG_LINUX_USB=y
+CONFIG_LINUX_E1000=y
+
+#Uncomment only one BOOTSCRIPT:
+#Whiptail-based init (text-based or FBWhiptail)
+export CONFIG_BOOTSCRIPT=/bin/gui-init
+#
+#text-based original init:
+#export CONFIG_BOOTSCRIPT=/bin/generic-init
+export CONFIG_BOOT_REQ_HASH=n
+export CONFIG_BOOT_REQ_ROLLBACK=n
+export CONFIG_BOOT_RECOVERY_SERIAL="/dev/ttyS0"
+export CONFIG_BOOT_KERNEL_ADD="console=ttyS0 console=tty systemd.zram=0"
+export CONFIG_BOOT_KERNEL_REMOVE="quiet rhgb splash"
+
+#TPM2 requirements
+export CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS=y
+export CONFIG_PRIMARY_KEY_TYPE=ecc
+export CONFIG_TPM2_CAPTURE_PCAP=y
+CONFIG_TPM2_TSS=y
+CONFIG_OPENSSL=y
+
+export CONFIG_BOOT_DEV="/dev/vda1"
+export CONFIG_BOARD_NAME="qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm2"
+
+# Use the GPG-injected ROM if a key was given, since we can't reflash a GPG
+# keyring in QEMU.  Otherwise use the plain ROM, some things can still be tested
+# that way without a GPG key.
+ifneq "$(PUBKEY_ASC)" ""
+QEMU_BOOT_ROM := $(build)/$(BOARD)/$(CB_OUTPUT_FILE_GPG_INJ)
+else
+QEMU_BOOT_ROM := $(build)/$(BOARD)/$(CB_OUTPUT_FILE)
+endif
+
+#borrowed from https://github.com/orangecms/webboot/blob/boot-via-qemu/run-webboot.sh
+TPMDIR=$(build)/$(BOARD)/vtpm
+$(TPMDIR)/.manufacture:
+	mkdir -p "$(TPMDIR)"
+	swtpm_setup --create-config-files skip-if-exist
+	swtpm_setup --tpm-state "$(TPMDIR)" --create-platform-cert --lock-nvram --tpm2
+	touch "$(TPMDIR)/.manufacture"
+ROOT_DISK_IMG=$(build)/$(BOARD)/root.qcow2
+# Default to 20G disk
+QEMU_DISK_SIZE?=20G
+$(ROOT_DISK_IMG):
+	qemu-img create -f qcow2 "$(ROOT_DISK_IMG)" $(QEMU_DISK_SIZE)
+# Remember the amount of memory so it doesn't have to be specified every time.
+# Default to 4G, most bootable OSes are not usable with less.
+QEMU_MEMORY_SIZE?=4G
+MEMORY_SIZE_FILE=$(build)/$(BOARD)/memory
+$(MEMORY_SIZE_FILE):
+	@echo "$(QEMU_MEMORY_SIZE)" >"$(MEMORY_SIZE_FILE)"
+USB_FD_IMG=$(build)/$(BOARD)/usb_fd.raw
+$(USB_FD_IMG):
+	dd if=/dev/zero bs=1M of="$(USB_FD_IMG)" bs=1M count=128
+	# Debian obnoxiously does not include /usr/sbin in PATH for non-root, even
+	# though it is meaningful to use mkfs.vfat (etc.) as non-root
+	MKFS_VFAT=mkfs.vfat; \
+	[ -x /usr/sbin/mkfs.vfat ] && MKFS_VFAT=/usr/sbin/mkfs.vfat; \
+	"$$MKFS_VFAT" "$(USB_FD_IMG)"
+# Pass INSTALL_IMG=<path_to_img.iso> to attach an installer as a USB flash drive instead
+# of the temporary flash drive for exporting GPG keys.
+ifneq "$(INSTALL_IMG)" ""
+QEMU_USB_FD_IMG := $(INSTALL_IMG)
+else
+QEMU_USB_FD_IMG := $(USB_FD_IMG)
+endif
+# To forward a USB token, set USB_TOKEN to one of the following:
+# - NitrokeyPro - forwards a Nitrokey Pro by VID:PID
+# - LibremKey - forwards a Librem Key by VID:PID
+# - <other> - Provide the QEMU usb-host parameters, such as
+#   'hostbus=<#>,hostport=<#>' or 'vendorid=<#>,productid=<#>'
+ifeq "$(USB_TOKEN)" "NitrokeyPro"
+QEMU_USB_TOKEN_DEV := -device usb-host,vendorid=8352,productid=16648
+else ifeq "$(USB_TOKEN)" "NitrokeyStorage"
+QEMU_USB_TOKEN_DEV := -device usb-host,vendorid=8352,productid=16649
+else ifeq "$(USB_TOKEN)" "Nitrokey3NFC"
+QEMU_USB_TOKEN_DEV := -device usb-host,vendorid=8352,productid=17074
+else ifeq "$(USB_TOKEN)" "LibremKey"
+QEMU_USB_TOKEN_DEV := -device usb-host,vendorid=12653,productid=19531
+else ifneq "$(USB_TOKEN)" ""
+QEMU_USB_TOKEN_DEV := -device "usb-host,$(USB_TOKEN)"
+endif
+
+run: $(TPMDIR)/.manufacture $(ROOT_DISK_IMG) $(MEMORY_SIZE_FILE) $(USB_FD_IMG)
+	swtpm socket \
+		--tpm2 \
+		--tpmstate dir="$(TPMDIR)" \
+		--flags "startup-clear" \
+		--terminate \
+		--ctrl type=unixio,path="$(TPMDIR)/sock" &
+	sleep 0.5
+
+	-qemu-system-x86_64 -drive file="$(ROOT_DISK_IMG)",if=virtio \
+		--machine q35,accel=kvm:tcg \
+		-rtc base=utc \
+		-smp "$$(nproc)" \
+		-vga virtio \
+		-full-screen \
+		-m "$$(cat "$(MEMORY_SIZE_FILE)")" \
+		-serial stdio \
+		--bios "$(QEMU_BOOT_ROM)" \
+		-object rng-random,filename=/dev/urandom,id=rng0 \
+		-device virtio-rng-pci,rng=rng0 \
+		-netdev user,id=u1 -device e1000,netdev=u1 \
+		-chardev socket,id=chrtpm,path="$(TPMDIR)/sock" \
+		-tpmdev emulator,id=tpm0,chardev=chrtpm \
+		-device tpm-tis,tpmdev=tpm0 \
+		-device qemu-xhci,id=usb \
+		-device usb-tablet \
+		-drive file="$(QEMU_USB_FD_IMG)",if=none,id=usb-fd-drive,format=raw \
+		-device usb-storage,bus=usb.0,drive=usb-fd-drive \
+		$(QEMU_USB_TOKEN_DEV) \
+
+	stty sane
+	@echo
--- a/boards/qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm2/qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm2.md
+++ b/boards/qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm2/qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm2.md
@ -0,0 +1 @@
+../qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1-hotp/qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1-hotp.md
--- a/boards/qemu-coreboot-whiptail-tpm1/qemu-coreboot-whiptail-tpm1.md
+++ b/boards/qemu-coreboot-whiptail-tpm1/qemu-coreboot-whiptail-tpm1.md
@ -1 +1 @@
-../qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1-hotp/qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1-hotp.md
+boards/qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1-hotp/qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1-hotp.md
--- a/boards/qemu-coreboot-whiptail-tpm2-hotp/qemu-coreboot-whiptail-tpm2-hotp.config
+++ b/boards/qemu-coreboot-whiptail-tpm2-hotp/qemu-coreboot-whiptail-tpm2-hotp.config
@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+# Configuration for building a coreboot ROM that works in
+# the qemu emulator in console mode thanks to Whiptail
+# This version requires a supported HOTP Security dongle (Nitrokey Pro/Storage or Librem Key)
+#
+# TPM can be used with a qemu software TPM (TIS, 2.0).
+export CONFIG_COREBOOT=y
+export CONFIG_COREBOOT_VERSION=4.13
+export CONFIG_LINUX_VERSION=5.10.5
+
+#Enable DEBUG output
+export CONFIG_DEBUG_OUTPUT=y
+export CONFIG_ENABLE_FUNCTION_TRACING_OUTPUT=y
+
+CONFIG_COREBOOT_CONFIG=config/coreboot-qemu-tpm2.config
+CONFIG_LINUX_CONFIG=config/linux-qemu.config
+
+ifeq "$(CONFIG_UROOT)" "y"
+CONFIG_BUSYBOX=n
+else
+CONFIG_KEXEC=y
+CONFIG_QRENCODE=y
+CONFIG_TPMTOTP=y
+CONFIG_POPT=y
+CONFIG_FLASHTOOLS=y
+CONFIG_FLASHROM=y
+CONFIG_PCIUTILS=y
+CONFIG_UTIL_LINUX=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTSETUP2=y
+CONFIG_GPG2=y
+CONFIG_LVM2=y
+CONFIG_MBEDTLS=y
+CONFIG_DROPBEAR=y
+CONFIG_MSRTOOLS=y
+#CONFIG_HOTPKEY=y
+
+#Uncomment only one of the following block
+#Required for graphical gui-init (FBWhiptail)
+#CONFIG_CAIRO=y
+#CONFIG_FBWHIPTAIL=y
+#
+#text-based init (generic-init and gui-init)
+CONFIG_NEWT=y
+CONFIG_SLANG=y
+
+endif
+
+export CONFIG_LINUX_USB_COMPANION_CONTROLLER=y
+CONFIG_LINUX_USB=y
+CONFIG_LINUX_E1000=y
+
+#Uncomment only one BOOTSCRIPT:
+#Whiptail-based init (text-based or FBWhiptail)
+export CONFIG_BOOTSCRIPT=/bin/gui-init
+#
+#text-based original init:
+#export CONFIG_BOOTSCRIPT=/bin/generic-init
+export CONFIG_BOOT_REQ_HASH=n
+export CONFIG_BOOT_REQ_ROLLBACK=n
+export CONFIG_BOOT_RECOVERY_SERIAL="/dev/ttyS0"
+export CONFIG_BOOT_KERNEL_ADD="console=ttyS0 console=tty systemd.zram=0"
+export CONFIG_BOOT_KERNEL_REMOVE="quiet rhgb splash"
+
+#TPM2 requirements
+export CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS=y
+export CONFIG_PRIMARY_KEY_TYPE=ecc
+export CONFIG_TPM2_CAPTURE_PCAP=y
+CONFIG_TPM2_TSS=y
+CONFIG_OPENSSL=y
+
+export CONFIG_BOOT_DEV="/dev/vda1"
+export CONFIG_BOARD_NAME="qemu-coreboot-whiptail-tpm2-hotp"
+
+# Use the GPG-injected ROM if a key was given, since we can't reflash a GPG
+# keyring in QEMU.  Otherwise use the plain ROM, some things can still be tested
+# that way without a GPG key.
+ifneq "$(PUBKEY_ASC)" ""
+QEMU_BOOT_ROM := $(build)/$(BOARD)/$(CB_OUTPUT_FILE_GPG_INJ)
+else
+QEMU_BOOT_ROM := $(build)/$(BOARD)/$(CB_OUTPUT_FILE)
+endif
+
+#borrowed from https://github.com/orangecms/webboot/blob/boot-via-qemu/run-webboot.sh
+TPMDIR=$(build)/$(BOARD)/vtpm
+$(TPMDIR)/.manufacture:
+	mkdir -p "$(TPMDIR)"
+	swtpm_setup --create-config-files skip-if-exist
+	swtpm_setup --tpm-state "$(TPMDIR)" --create-platform-cert --lock-nvram --tpm2
+	touch "$(TPMDIR)/.manufacture"
+ROOT_DISK_IMG=$(build)/$(BOARD)/root.qcow2
+# Default to 20G disk
+QEMU_DISK_SIZE?=20G
+$(ROOT_DISK_IMG):
+	qemu-img create -f qcow2 "$(ROOT_DISK_IMG)" $(QEMU_DISK_SIZE)
+# Remember the amount of memory so it doesn't have to be specified every time.
+# Default to 4G, most bootable OSes are not usable with less.
+QEMU_MEMORY_SIZE?=4G
+MEMORY_SIZE_FILE=$(build)/$(BOARD)/memory
+$(MEMORY_SIZE_FILE):
+	@echo "$(QEMU_MEMORY_SIZE)" >"$(MEMORY_SIZE_FILE)"
+USB_FD_IMG=$(build)/$(BOARD)/usb_fd.raw
+$(USB_FD_IMG):
+	dd if=/dev/zero bs=1M of="$(USB_FD_IMG)" bs=1M count=128
+	# Debian obnoxiously does not include /usr/sbin in PATH for non-root, even
+	# though it is meaningful to use mkfs.vfat (etc.) as non-root
+	MKFS_VFAT=mkfs.vfat; \
+	[ -x /usr/sbin/mkfs.vfat ] && MKFS_VFAT=/usr/sbin/mkfs.vfat; \
+	"$$MKFS_VFAT" "$(USB_FD_IMG)"
+# Pass INSTALL_IMG=<path_to_img.iso> to attach an installer as a USB flash drive instead
+# of the temporary flash drive for exporting GPG keys.
+ifneq "$(INSTALL_IMG)" ""
+QEMU_USB_FD_IMG := $(INSTALL_IMG)
+else
+QEMU_USB_FD_IMG := $(USB_FD_IMG)
+endif
+# To forward a USB token, set USB_TOKEN to one of the following:
+# - NitrokeyPro - forwards a Nitrokey Pro by VID:PID
+# - LibremKey - forwards a Librem Key by VID:PID
+# - <other> - Provide the QEMU usb-host parameters, such as
+#   'hostbus=<#>,hostport=<#>' or 'vendorid=<#>,productid=<#>'
+ifeq "$(USB_TOKEN)" "NitrokeyPro"
+QEMU_USB_TOKEN_DEV := -device usb-host,vendorid=8352,productid=16648
+else ifeq "$(USB_TOKEN)" "NitrokeyStorage"
+QEMU_USB_TOKEN_DEV := -device usb-host,vendorid=8352,productid=16649
+else ifeq "$(USB_TOKEN)" "Nitrokey3NFC"
+QEMU_USB_TOKEN_DEV := -device usb-host,vendorid=8352,productid=17074
+else ifeq "$(USB_TOKEN)" "LibremKey"
+QEMU_USB_TOKEN_DEV := -device usb-host,vendorid=12653,productid=19531
+else ifneq "$(USB_TOKEN)" ""
+QEMU_USB_TOKEN_DEV := -device "usb-host,$(USB_TOKEN)"
+endif
+
+run: $(TPMDIR)/.manufacture $(ROOT_DISK_IMG) $(MEMORY_SIZE_FILE) $(USB_FD_IMG)
+	swtpm socket \
+		--tpm2 \
+		--tpmstate dir="$(TPMDIR)" \
+		--flags "startup-clear" \
+		--terminate \
+		--ctrl type=unixio,path="$(TPMDIR)/sock" &
+	sleep 0.5
+
+	-qemu-system-x86_64 -drive file="$(ROOT_DISK_IMG)",if=virtio \
+		--machine q35,accel=kvm:tcg \
+		-rtc base=utc \
+		-smp "$$(nproc)" \
+		-vga virtio \
+		-full-screen \
+		-m "$$(cat "$(MEMORY_SIZE_FILE)")" \
+		-serial stdio \
+		--bios "$(QEMU_BOOT_ROM)" \
+		-object rng-random,filename=/dev/urandom,id=rng0 \
+		-device virtio-rng-pci,rng=rng0 \
+		-netdev user,id=u1 -device e1000,netdev=u1 \
+		-chardev socket,id=chrtpm,path="$(TPMDIR)/sock" \
+		-tpmdev emulator,id=tpm0,chardev=chrtpm \
+		-device tpm-tis,tpmdev=tpm0 \
+		-device qemu-xhci,id=usb \
+		-device usb-tablet \
+		-drive file="$(QEMU_USB_FD_IMG)",if=none,id=usb-fd-drive,format=raw \
+		-device usb-storage,bus=usb.0,drive=usb-fd-drive \
+		$(QEMU_USB_TOKEN_DEV) \
+
+	stty sane
+	@echo
--- a/boards/qemu-coreboot-whiptail-tpm2-hotp/qemu-coreboot-whiptail-tpm2-hotp.md
+++ b/boards/qemu-coreboot-whiptail-tpm2-hotp/qemu-coreboot-whiptail-tpm2-hotp.md
@ -0,0 +1 @@
+../qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1-hotp/qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1-hotp.md
--- a/boards/qemu-coreboot-whiptail-tpm2/qemu-coreboot-whiptail-tpm2.config
+++ b/boards/qemu-coreboot-whiptail-tpm2/qemu-coreboot-whiptail-tpm2.config
@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+# Configuration for building a coreboot ROM that works in
+# the qemu emulator in console mode thanks to Whiptail
+#
+# TPM can be used with a qemu software TPM (TIS, 2.0).
+export CONFIG_COREBOOT=y
+export CONFIG_COREBOOT_VERSION=4.13
+export CONFIG_LINUX_VERSION=5.10.5
+
+#Enable DEBUG output
+export CONFIG_DEBUG_OUTPUT=y
+export CONFIG_ENABLE_FUNCTION_TRACING_OUTPUT=y
+
+CONFIG_COREBOOT_CONFIG=config/coreboot-qemu-tpm2.config
+CONFIG_LINUX_CONFIG=config/linux-qemu.config
+
+ifeq "$(CONFIG_UROOT)" "y"
+CONFIG_BUSYBOX=n
+else
+CONFIG_KEXEC=y
+CONFIG_QRENCODE=y
+CONFIG_TPMTOTP=y
+CONFIG_POPT=y
+CONFIG_FLASHTOOLS=y
+CONFIG_FLASHROM=y
+CONFIG_PCIUTILS=y
+CONFIG_UTIL_LINUX=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTSETUP2=y
+CONFIG_GPG2=y
+CONFIG_LVM2=y
+CONFIG_MBEDTLS=y
+CONFIG_DROPBEAR=y
+CONFIG_MSRTOOLS=y
+#CONFIG_HOTPKEY=y
+
+#Uncomment only one of the following block
+#Required for graphical gui-init (FBWhiptail)
+#CONFIG_CAIRO=y
+#CONFIG_FBWHIPTAIL=y
+#
+#text-based init (generic-init and gui-init)
+CONFIG_NEWT=y
+CONFIG_SLANG=y
+
+endif
+
+export CONFIG_LINUX_USB_COMPANION_CONTROLLER=y
+CONFIG_LINUX_USB=y
+CONFIG_LINUX_E1000=y
+
+#Uncomment only one BOOTSCRIPT:
+#Whiptail-based init (text-based or FBWhiptail)
+export CONFIG_BOOTSCRIPT=/bin/gui-init
+#
+#text-based original init:
+#export CONFIG_BOOTSCRIPT=/bin/generic-init
+export CONFIG_BOOT_REQ_HASH=n
+export CONFIG_BOOT_REQ_ROLLBACK=n
+export CONFIG_BOOT_RECOVERY_SERIAL="/dev/ttyS0"
+export CONFIG_BOOT_KERNEL_ADD="console=ttyS0 console=tty systemd.zram=0"
+export CONFIG_BOOT_KERNEL_REMOVE="quiet rhgb splash"
+
+#TPM2 requirements
+export CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS=y
+export CONFIG_PRIMARY_KEY_TYPE=ecc
+export CONFIG_TPM2_CAPTURE_PCAP=y
+CONFIG_TPM2_TSS=y
+CONFIG_OPENSSL=y
+
+export CONFIG_BOOT_DEV="/dev/vda1"
+export CONFIG_BOARD_NAME="qemu-coreboot-whiptail-tpm2"
+
+# Use the GPG-injected ROM if a key was given, since we can't reflash a GPG
+# keyring in QEMU.  Otherwise use the plain ROM, some things can still be tested
+# that way without a GPG key.
+ifneq "$(PUBKEY_ASC)" ""
+QEMU_BOOT_ROM := $(build)/$(BOARD)/$(CB_OUTPUT_FILE_GPG_INJ)
+else
+QEMU_BOOT_ROM := $(build)/$(BOARD)/$(CB_OUTPUT_FILE)
+endif
+
+#borrowed from https://github.com/orangecms/webboot/blob/boot-via-qemu/run-webboot.sh
+TPMDIR=$(build)/$(BOARD)/vtpm
+$(TPMDIR)/.manufacture:
+	mkdir -p "$(TPMDIR)"
+	swtpm_setup --create-config-files skip-if-exist
+	swtpm_setup --tpm-state "$(TPMDIR)" --create-platform-cert --lock-nvram --tpm2
+	touch "$(TPMDIR)/.manufacture"
+ROOT_DISK_IMG=$(build)/$(BOARD)/root.qcow2
+# Default to 20G disk
+QEMU_DISK_SIZE?=20G
+$(ROOT_DISK_IMG):
+	qemu-img create -f qcow2 "$(ROOT_DISK_IMG)" $(QEMU_DISK_SIZE)
+# Remember the amount of memory so it doesn't have to be specified every time.
+# Default to 4G, most bootable OSes are not usable with less.
+QEMU_MEMORY_SIZE?=4G
+MEMORY_SIZE_FILE=$(build)/$(BOARD)/memory
+$(MEMORY_SIZE_FILE):
+	@echo "$(QEMU_MEMORY_SIZE)" >"$(MEMORY_SIZE_FILE)"
+USB_FD_IMG=$(build)/$(BOARD)/usb_fd.raw
+$(USB_FD_IMG):
+	dd if=/dev/zero bs=1M of="$(USB_FD_IMG)" bs=1M count=128
+	# Debian obnoxiously does not include /usr/sbin in PATH for non-root, even
+	# though it is meaningful to use mkfs.vfat (etc.) as non-root
+	MKFS_VFAT=mkfs.vfat; \
+	[ -x /usr/sbin/mkfs.vfat ] && MKFS_VFAT=/usr/sbin/mkfs.vfat; \
+	"$$MKFS_VFAT" "$(USB_FD_IMG)"
+# Pass INSTALL_IMG=<path_to_img.iso> to attach an installer as a USB flash drive instead
+# of the temporary flash drive for exporting GPG keys.
+ifneq "$(INSTALL_IMG)" ""
+QEMU_USB_FD_IMG := $(INSTALL_IMG)
+else
+QEMU_USB_FD_IMG := $(USB_FD_IMG)
+endif
+# To forward a USB token, set USB_TOKEN to one of the following:
+# - NitrokeyPro - forwards a Nitrokey Pro by VID:PID
+# - LibremKey - forwards a Librem Key by VID:PID
+# - <other> - Provide the QEMU usb-host parameters, such as
+#   'hostbus=<#>,hostport=<#>' or 'vendorid=<#>,productid=<#>'
+ifeq "$(USB_TOKEN)" "NitrokeyPro"
+QEMU_USB_TOKEN_DEV := -device usb-host,vendorid=8352,productid=16648
+else ifeq "$(USB_TOKEN)" "NitrokeyStorage"
+QEMU_USB_TOKEN_DEV := -device usb-host,vendorid=8352,productid=16649
+else ifeq "$(USB_TOKEN)" "Nitrokey3NFC"
+QEMU_USB_TOKEN_DEV := -device usb-host,vendorid=8352,productid=17074
+else ifeq "$(USB_TOKEN)" "LibremKey"
+QEMU_USB_TOKEN_DEV := -device usb-host,vendorid=12653,productid=19531
+else ifneq "$(USB_TOKEN)" ""
+QEMU_USB_TOKEN_DEV := -device "usb-host,$(USB_TOKEN)"
+endif
+
+run: $(TPMDIR)/.manufacture $(ROOT_DISK_IMG) $(MEMORY_SIZE_FILE) $(USB_FD_IMG)
+	swtpm socket \
+		--tpm2 \
+		--tpmstate dir="$(TPMDIR)" \
+		--flags "startup-clear" \
+		--terminate \
+		--ctrl type=unixio,path="$(TPMDIR)/sock" &
+	sleep 0.5
+
+	-qemu-system-x86_64 -drive file="$(ROOT_DISK_IMG)",if=virtio \
+		--machine q35,accel=kvm:tcg \
+		-rtc base=utc \
+		-smp "$$(nproc)" \
+		-vga virtio \
+		-full-screen \
+		-m "$$(cat "$(MEMORY_SIZE_FILE)")" \
+		-serial stdio \
+		--bios "$(QEMU_BOOT_ROM)" \
+		-object rng-random,filename=/dev/urandom,id=rng0 \
+		-device virtio-rng-pci,rng=rng0 \
+		-netdev user,id=u1 -device e1000,netdev=u1 \
+		-chardev socket,id=chrtpm,path="$(TPMDIR)/sock" \
+		-tpmdev emulator,id=tpm0,chardev=chrtpm \
+		-device tpm-tis,tpmdev=tpm0 \
+		-device qemu-xhci,id=usb \
+		-device usb-tablet \
+		-drive file="$(QEMU_USB_FD_IMG)",if=none,id=usb-fd-drive,format=raw \
+		-device usb-storage,bus=usb.0,drive=usb-fd-drive \
+		$(QEMU_USB_TOKEN_DEV) \
+
+	stty sane
+	@echo
--- a/boards/qemu-coreboot-whiptail-tpm2/qemu-coreboot-whiptail-tpm2.md
+++ b/boards/qemu-coreboot-whiptail-tpm2/qemu-coreboot-whiptail-tpm2.md
@ -0,0 +1 @@
+../qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1-hotp/qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1-hotp.md
--- a/boards/t430-legacy-flash/t430-legacy-flash.config
+++ b/boards/t430-legacy-flash/t430-legacy-flash.config
@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ export CONFIG_COREBOOT=y
 export CONFIG_COREBOOT_VERSION=4.13
 export CONFIG_LINUX_VERSION=4.14.62

+CONFIG_BASH=n
 CONFIG_FLASHROM=y
 #CONFIG_GPG=y
 #CONFIG_FLASHTOOLS=y
@ -17,7 +18,7 @@ CONFIG_LINUX_CONFIG=config/linux-x230-flash.config
 CONFIG_LINUX_USB=y
 #CONFIG_LINUX_E1000E=y

-export CONFIG_BOOTSCRIPT=/bin/t430-flash.init
+export CONFIG_BOOTSCRIPT=/bin/xx30-flash.init
 export CONFIG_BOARD_NAME="ThinkPad T430-legacy-flash"
 export CONFIG_FLASHROM_OPTIONS="--force --noverify-all -p internal --ifd --image bios"

--- a/boards/x230-legacy-flash/x230-legacy-flash.config
+++ b/boards/x230-legacy-flash/x230-legacy-flash.config
@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ export CONFIG_COREBOOT=y
 export CONFIG_COREBOOT_VERSION=4.13
 export CONFIG_LINUX_VERSION=4.14.62

+CONFIG_BASH=n
 CONFIG_FLASHROM=y
 #CONFIG_GPG=y
 #CONFIG_FLASHTOOLS=y
@ -17,7 +18,7 @@ CONFIG_LINUX_CONFIG=config/linux-x230-flash.config
 CONFIG_LINUX_USB=y
 #CONFIG_LINUX_E1000E=y

-export CONFIG_BOOTSCRIPT=/bin/x230-flash.init
+export CONFIG_BOOTSCRIPT=/bin/xx30-flash.init
 export CONFIG_BOARD_NAME="ThinkPad X230-legacy-flash"
 export CONFIG_FLASHROM_OPTIONS="--force --noverify-all -p internal --ifd --image bios"

--- a/config/busybox.config
+++ b/config/busybox.config
@ -282,9 +282,9 @@ CONFIG_PASTE=y
 # CONFIG_PRINTENV is not set
 CONFIG_PRINTF=y
 CONFIG_PWD=y
-# CONFIG_READLINK is not set
-# CONFIG_FEATURE_READLINK_FOLLOW is not set
-# CONFIG_REALPATH is not set
+CONFIG_READLINK=y
+CONFIG_FEATURE_READLINK_FOLLOW=y
+CONFIG_REALPATH=y
 CONFIG_RM=y
 CONFIG_RMDIR=y
 CONFIG_SEQ=y
@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ CONFIG_LOADKMAP=y
 # CONFIG_START_STOP_DAEMON is not set
 # CONFIG_FEATURE_START_STOP_DAEMON_LONG_OPTIONS is not set
 # CONFIG_FEATURE_START_STOP_DAEMON_FANCY is not set
-# CONFIG_WHICH is not set
+CONFIG_WHICH=y

 #
 # klibc-utils
@ -1096,7 +1096,7 @@ CONFIG_SV_DEFAULT_SERVICE_DIR=""
 CONFIG_SH_IS_ASH=y
 # CONFIG_SH_IS_HUSH is not set
 # CONFIG_SH_IS_NONE is not set
-CONFIG_BASH_IS_ASH=y
+# CONFIG_BASH_IS_ASH is not set
 # CONFIG_BASH_IS_HUSH is not set
 # CONFIG_BASH_IS_NONE is not set
 CONFIG_SHELL_ASH=y
--- a/config/coreboot-qemu-tpm1.config
+++ b/config/coreboot-qemu-tpm1.config
@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+CONFIG_CCACHE=y
 # CONFIG_INCLUDE_CONFIG_FILE is not set
 CONFIG_ONBOARD_VGA_IS_PRIMARY=y
 CONFIG_CBFS_SIZE=0x980000
--- a/config/coreboot-qemu-tpm2.config
+++ b/config/coreboot-qemu-tpm2.config
@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+CONFIG_CCACHE=y
+# CONFIG_INCLUDE_CONFIG_FILE is not set
+CONFIG_ONBOARD_VGA_IS_PRIMARY=y
+CONFIG_CBFS_SIZE=0xfe0000
+# CONFIG_POST_IO is not set
+# CONFIG_POST_DEVICE is not set
+CONFIG_BOARD_EMULATION_QEMU_X86_Q35=y
+# CONFIG_CONSOLE_SERIAL is not set
+CONFIG_LINUX_COMMAND_LINE="debug console=ttyS0,115200 console=tty"
+CONFIG_COREBOOT_ROMSIZE_KB_16384=y
+CONFIG_PCIEXP_ASPM=y
+CONFIG_PCIEXP_COMMON_CLOCK=y
+CONFIG_UART_PCI_ADDR=0
+CONFIG_DRIVERS_PS2_KEYBOARD=y
+CONFIG_USER_TPM2=y
+CONFIG_TPM_MEASURED_BOOT=y
+CONFIG_DEFAULT_CONSOLE_LOGLEVEL_6=y
+CONFIG_PAYLOAD_LINUX=y
+CONFIG_PAYLOAD_FILE="@BOARD_BUILD_DIR@/bzImage"
+CONFIG_LINUX_INITRD="@BOARD_BUILD_DIR@/initrd.cpio.xz"
--- a/initrd/bin/cbfs-init
+++ b/initrd/bin/cbfs-init
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/ash
+#!/bin/bash
 set -e -o pipefail
 . /etc/functions

@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ for cbfsname in `echo $cbfsfiles`; do
 			TMPFILE=/tmp/cbfs.$$
 			echo "$filename" > $TMPFILE
 			cat $filename >> $TMPFILE
-			tpm extend -ix "$CONFIG_PCR" -if $TMPFILE \
+			tpmr extend -ix "$CONFIG_PCR" -if $TMPFILE \
 			|| die "$filename: tpm extend failed"
 		fi
 	fi
--- a/initrd/bin/cbfs.sh
+++ b/initrd/bin/cbfs.sh
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 set -e -o pipefail
 . /etc/functions
 . /tmp/config
--- a/initrd/bin/config-gui.sh
+++ b/initrd/bin/config-gui.sh
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 #
 set -e -o pipefail
 . /etc/functions
--- a/initrd/bin/flash-gui.sh
+++ b/initrd/bin/flash-gui.sh
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 #
 set -e -o pipefail
 . /etc/functions
--- a/initrd/bin/flash.sh
+++ b/initrd/bin/flash.sh
@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/ash
 #
 # based off of flashrom-x230
 #
+# NOTE: This script is used on legacy-flash boards and runs with busybox ash,
+# not bash
 set -e -o pipefail
-. /etc/functions
+. /etc/ash_functions
 . /tmp/config

 TRACE "Under /bin/flash.sh"
--- a/initrd/bin/flashrom-kgpe-d16-openbmc.sh
+++ b/initrd/bin/flashrom-kgpe-d16-openbmc.sh
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 . /etc/functions

 TRACE "Under /bin/flashrom-kgpe-d16-openbmc.sh"
--- a/initrd/bin/generic-init
+++ b/initrd/bin/generic-init
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 # Boot from a local disk installation

 . /etc/functions
--- a/initrd/bin/gpg-gui.sh
+++ b/initrd/bin/gpg-gui.sh
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 #
 set -e -o pipefail
 . /etc/functions
--- a/initrd/bin/gpgv
+++ b/initrd/bin/gpgv
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 # if we are using the full GPG we need a wrapper for the gpgv executable
 . /etc/functions

--- a/initrd/bin/gui-init
+++ b/initrd/bin/gui-init
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 # Boot from a local disk installation

 BOARD_NAME=${CONFIG_BOARD_NAME:-${CONFIG_BOARD}} 
@ -148,11 +148,12 @@ prompt_update_checksums()
  fi
 }

-generate_totp_htop()
+generate_totp_hotp()
 {
-  TRACE "Under /bin/gui-init:generate_totp_htop"
+  tpm_password="$1"	# May be empty, will prompt if needed and empty
+  TRACE "Under /bin/gui-init:generate_totp_hotp"
  echo "Scan the QR code to add the new TOTP secret"
-  if /bin/seal-totp "$BOARD_NAME"; then
+  if /bin/seal-totp "$BOARD_NAME" "$tpm_password"; then
    if [ -x /bin/hotp_verification ]; then
      echo "Once you have scanned the QR code, hit Enter to configure your HOTP USB Security Dongle (e.g. Librem Key or Nitrokey)"
      read
@ -164,7 +165,7 @@ generate_totp_htop()
    # clear screen
    printf "\033c"
  else
-    warn "Sealing of measurements inside of TPM failed. You might want to take ownership of TPM by resetting it."
+    warn "Unsealing TOTP/HOTP secret from previous sealed measurements failed. Try "Generate new HOTP/TOTP secret" option if you updated firmware content."
  fi
 }

@ -173,7 +174,7 @@ update_totp()
  TRACE "Under /bin/gui-init:update_totp"
  # update the TOTP code
  date=`date "+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S %Z"`
-  if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = n ]; then
+  if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" != "y" ]; then
    TOTP="NO TPM"
  else
    TOTP=`unseal-totp`
@ -182,6 +183,12 @@ update_totp()
      if [ "$skip_to_menu" = "true" ]; then
        return 1  # Already asked to skip to menu from a prior error
      fi
+      
+      DEBUG "CONFIG_TPM: $CONFIG_TPM"
+      DEBUG "CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS: $CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS"
+      DEBUG "Show PCRs"
+      DEBUG "$(pcrs)"
+
      whiptail $BG_COLOR_ERROR --title "ERROR: TOTP Generation Failed!" \
        --menu "    ERROR: Heads couldn't generate the TOTP code.\n
  If you have just completed a Factory Reset, or just reflashed
@ -201,7 +208,7 @@ update_totp()
        g )
          if (whiptail $BG_COLOR_WARNING --title 'Generate new TOTP/HOTP secret' \
              --yesno "This will erase your old secret and replace it with a new one!\n\nDo you want to proceed?" 0 80) then
-            generate_totp_htop && update_totp && BG_COLOR_MAIN_MENU=""
+            generate_totp_hotp && update_totp && BG_COLOR_MAIN_MENU=""
          fi
          ;;
        i )
@ -360,8 +367,7 @@ show_main_menu()
      attempt_default_boot
      ;;
    r )
-      update_totp
-      update_hotp
+      update_totp && update_hotp
      ;;
    o )
      show_options_menu
@ -474,7 +480,7 @@ show_tpm_totp_hotp_options_menu()
  option=$(cat /tmp/whiptail)
  case "$option" in 
    g )
-      generate_totp_htop
+      generate_totp_hotp
      ;;
    r )
      reset_tpm
@ -510,15 +516,24 @@ reset_tpm()
  if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
    if (whiptail $BG_COLOR_WARNING --title 'Reset the TPM' \
        --yesno "This will clear the TPM and TPM password, replace them with new ones!\n\nDo you want to proceed?" 0 80) then
-      /bin/tpm-reset
+
+      if ! prompt_new_owner_password; then
+        echo "Press Enter to return to the menu..."
+        read
+        echo
+        return 1
+      fi
+
+      tpmr reset "$key_password"

      # now that the TPM is reset, remove invalid TPM counter files
      mount_boot
      mount -o rw,remount /boot
      rm -f /boot/kexec_rollback.txt
+      rm -f /boot/kexec_primhdl_hash.txt

      # create Heads TPM counter before any others
-      check_tpm_counter /boot/kexec_rollback.txt \
+      check_tpm_counter /boot/kexec_rollback.txt "" "$key_password" \
      || die "Unable to find/create tpm counter"
      counter="$TPM_COUNTER"

@ -529,7 +544,7 @@ reset_tpm()
      || die "Unable to create rollback file"
      mount -o ro,remount /boot

-      generate_totp_htop
+      generate_totp_hotp "$key_password"
    else
      echo "Returning to the main menu"
    fi
--- a/initrd/bin/kexec-boot
+++ b/initrd/bin/kexec-boot
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 # Launches kexec from saved configuration entries
 set -e -o pipefail
 . /tmp/config
@ -134,5 +134,9 @@ echo "$kexeccmd"
 eval "$kexeccmd" \
 || die "Failed to load the new kernel"

+if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
+	tpmr kexec_finalize
+fi
+
 echo "Starting the new kernel"
 exec kexec -e
--- a/initrd/bin/kexec-insert-key
+++ b/initrd/bin/kexec-insert-key
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 # Unseal a disk key from TPM and add to a new initramfs
 set -e -o pipefail
 . /etc/functions
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ if ! kexec-unseal-key "$INITRD_DIR/secret.key" ; then
 fi

 # Override PCR 4 so that user can't read the key
-tpm extend -ix 4 -ic generic \
+tpmr extend -ix 4 -ic generic \
 	|| die 'Unable to scramble PCR'

 # Check to continue
@ -78,8 +78,8 @@ dd if="$INITRD" of="$SECRET_CPIO" bs=512 conv=sync \
 if [ "$unseal_failed" = "n" ]; then
 	# kexec-save-default might have created crypttab overrides to be injected in initramfs through additional cpio 
 	if [ -r "$bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt" ]; then
-		echo "$bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt found..."
-		echo "Preparing initramfs crypttab overrides as defined under $bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt to be injected through cpio at next kexec call..."
+		echo "+++ $bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt found..."
+		echo "+++ Preparing initramfs crypttab overrides as defined under $bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt to be injected through cpio at next kexec call..."
 		# kexec-save-default has found crypttab files under initrd and saved them
 		cat "$bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt" | while read line; do
 			crypttab_file=$(echo "$line" | awk -F ':' {'print $1'})
@ -87,14 +87,14 @@ if [ "$unseal_failed" = "n" ]; then
 			# Replace each initrd crypttab file with modified entry containing /secret.key path
 			mkdir -p "$INITRD_DIR/$(dirname $crypttab_file)"
 			echo "$crypttab_entry" | tee -a "$INITRD_DIR/$crypttab_file" > /dev/null
-			echo "initramfs's $crypttab_file will be overriden with $crypttab_entry"
+			echo "+++ initramfs's $crypttab_file will be overriden with: $crypttab_entry"
 		done
 	else
 		# No crypttab files were found under selected default boot option's initrd file
 		crypttab_file="etc/crypttab"
 		mkdir -p "$INITRD_DIR/$(dirname $crypttab_file)"
 		# overwrite crypttab to mirror behavior of seal-key
-		echo "The following /etc/crypttab lines will be passed through cpio into kexec call for default boot option:"
+		echo "+++ The following /etc/crypttab lines will be passed through cpio into kexec call for default boot option:"
 		for uuid in `cat "$TMP_KEY_DEVICES" | cut -d\  -f2`; do
 			# NOTE: discard operation (TRIM) is activated by default if no crypptab found in initrd
 			echo "luks-$uuid UUID=$uuid /secret.key luks,discard" | tee -a "$INITRD_DIR/$crypttab_file"
--- a/initrd/bin/kexec-iso-init
+++ b/initrd/bin/kexec-iso-init
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 # Boot from signed ISO
 set -e -o pipefail
 . /etc/functions
--- a/initrd/bin/kexec-parse-bls
+++ b/initrd/bin/kexec-parse-bls
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 set -e -o pipefail
 . /etc/functions
 TRACE "Under /bin/kexec-parse-bls"
--- a/initrd/bin/kexec-parse-boot
+++ b/initrd/bin/kexec-parse-boot
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 set -e -o pipefail
 . /etc/functions

--- a/initrd/bin/kexec-save-default
+++ b/initrd/bin/kexec-save-default
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 # Save these options to be the persistent default
 set -e -o pipefail
 . /tmp/config
@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ paramsdir="${paramsdir%%/}"
 TMP_MENU_FILE="/tmp/kexec/kexec_menu.txt"
 ENTRY_FILE="$paramsdir/kexec_default.$index.txt"
 HASH_FILE="$paramsdir/kexec_default_hashes.txt"
+PRIMHASH_FILE="$paramsdir/kexec_primhdl_hash.txt"

 if [ ! -r "$TMP_MENU_FILE" ]; then
 	die "No menu options available, please run kexec-select-boot"
@ -47,7 +48,7 @@ fi
 KEY_DEVICES="$paramsdir/kexec_key_devices.txt"
 KEY_LVM="$paramsdir/kexec_key_lvm.txt"
 save_key="n"
-if [[ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" && "$CONFIG_TPM_NO_LUKS_DISK_UNLOCK" != "y" ]]; then
+if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ] && [ "$CONFIG_TPM_NO_LUKS_DISK_UNLOCK" != "y" ]; then
 	if [ ! -r "$KEY_DEVICES" ]; then
 		read \
 			-n 1 \
@ -93,14 +94,14 @@ if [[ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" && "$CONFIG_TPM_NO_LUKS_DISK_UNLOCK" != "y" ]]; then
 		lvm vgscan || true

 		read \
-			-p "Encrypted LVM group? ($lvm_suggest): " \
+			-p "LVM group containing Encrypted LVs (retype to keep)? ($lvm_suggest): " \
 			lvm_volume_group

 		echo "+++ Block devices (blkid): "
 		blkid || true

 		read \
-			-p "Encrypted devices? ($devices_suggest): " \
+			-p "Encrypted devices (retype to keep)? ($devices_suggest): " \
 			key_devices

 		save_key_params="-s -p $paramsdev"
@ -122,6 +123,12 @@ if [ ! -d $paramsdir ]; then
 	mkdir -p $paramsdir \
 	|| die "Failed to create params directory"
 fi
+
+if [ "$CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS" = "y" ]; then
+	sha256sum /tmp/primary.handle > "$PRIMHASH_FILE" \
+		|| die "ERROR: Failed to Hash TPM2 primary key handle!"
+fi
+
 rm $paramsdir/kexec_default.*.txt 2>/dev/null || true
 echo "$entry" > $ENTRY_FILE
 ( cd $bootdir && kexec-boot -b "$bootdir" -e "$entry" -f| \
@ -139,14 +146,14 @@ if [ "$save_key" = "y" ]; then
 	current_default_initrd=$(cat /boot/kexec_default_hashes.txt | grep initr | awk -F " " {'print $NF'} | sed 's/\.\//\/boot\//g')
 	
 	# Get crypttab files paths from initrd
-	echo "Checking current selected default boot's $current_default_initrd for existing crypttab files..."
+	echo "+++ Checking current selected default boot's $current_default_initrd for existing crypttab files..."
 	# First either decompress or use the original if it's not compressed
 	initrd_decompressed="/tmp/initrd_extract/initrd_decompressed.cpio"
 	zcat < "$current_default_initrd" > "$initrd_decompressed" 2> /dev/null || initrd_decompressed="$current_default_initrd"
 	crypttab_files=$(cpio --list --quiet < "$initrd_decompressed" | grep crypttab 2> /dev/null) || true
 	
 	if [ ! -z "$crypttab_files" ]; then
-		echo "Extracting current selected default boot's $current_default_initrd for found crypttab files analysis..."
+		echo "+++ Extracting current selected default boot's $current_default_initrd for found crypttab files analysis..."
 		cpio -id --quiet < $initrd_decompressed $crypttab_files 2> /dev/null
 		rm -f $bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt || true
 		
@ -165,12 +172,12 @@ if [ "$save_key" = "y" ]; then
 		cd - > /dev/null

 		#insert current default boot's initrd crypttab locations into tracking file to be overwritten into initramfs at kexec-inject-key
-		echo "The following OS crypttab file:entry were modified from default boot's initrd:"
+		echo "+++ The following OS crypttab file:entry were modified from default boot's initrd:"
 		cat $bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt
-		echo "Heads added /secret.key in those entries and saved them under $bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt"
-		echo "Those overrides will be part of detached signed digests and used to prepare cpio injected at kexec of selected default boot entry."
+		echo "+++ Heads added /secret.key in those entries and saved them under $bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt"
+		echo "+++ Those overrides will be part of detached signed digests and used to prepare cpio injected at kexec of selected default boot entry."
 	else
-		echo "No crypttab file found in extracted initrd. Removing $bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt"
+		echo "+++ No crypttab file found in extracted initrd. Removing $bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt"
 		rm -f "$bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt" || true
 	fi
 	# Cleanup
@ -179,8 +186,10 @@ fi

 # sign and auto-roll config counter
 extparam=
-if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
-	extparam=-r
+if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ];then
+	if [ "$CONFIG_IGNORE_ROLLBACK" != "y" ]; then
+		extparam=-r
+	fi
 fi
 kexec-sign-config -p $paramsdir $extparam \
 || die "Failed to sign default config"
--- a/initrd/bin/kexec-save-key
+++ b/initrd/bin/kexec-save-key
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 # Generate a TPM key used to unlock LUKS disks
 set -e -o pipefail
 . /etc/functions
@ -61,8 +61,12 @@ kexec-seal-key $paramsdir \
 || die "Failed to save and generate key in TPM"

 if [ "$skip_sign" != "y" ]; then
+	extparam=
+	if [ "$CONFIG_IGNORE_ROLLBACK" != "y" ]; then
+		extparam=-r
+	fi
 	# sign and auto-roll config counter
-	kexec-sign-config -p $paramsdir -r \
+	kexec-sign-config -p $paramsdir $extparam \
 	|| die "Failed to sign updated config"
 fi

--- a/initrd/bin/kexec-seal-key
+++ b/initrd/bin/kexec-seal-key
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 # This will generate a disk encryption key and seal / ecncrypt
 # with the current PCRs and then store it in the TPM NVRAM.
 # It will then need to be bundled into initrd that is booted.
@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ RECOVERY_KEY="/tmp/secret/recovery.key"
 . /etc/functions
 . /tmp/config

+TRACE "Under kexec-seal-key"
+
 paramsdir=$1
 if [ -z "$paramsdir" ]; then
 	die "Usage $0 /boot"
@ -36,8 +38,10 @@ if [ -r "$KEY_LVM" ]; then
 		|| die "$VOLUME_GROUP: unable to activate volume group"
 fi

-# Key slot 0 is the manual recovery pass phrase
-# that they user entered when they installed Qubes,
+DEBUG "$(pcrs)"
+
+# LUKS Key slot 0 is the manual recovery pass phrase
+# that they user entered when they installed OS,
 # key slot 1 is the one that we've generated.
 read -s -p "Enter disk recovery key: " disk_password
 echo -n "$disk_password" > "$RECOVERY_KEY"
@ -83,73 +87,37 @@ done
 # since it should still be zero
 cat "$KEY_DEVICES" | cut -d\  -f1 | xargs /bin/qubes-measure-luks \
 	|| die "Unable to measure the LUKS headers"
-luks_pcr=`tpm calcfuturepcr -ix 16 -if /tmp/luksDump.txt`

-# HOTP USB Secrity Dongle loads USB modules which changes PCR5.
-# In the event HOTP USB Security Dongle is enabled, skip verification of PCR5
-if [ -x /bin/hotp_verification ]; then
-  pcr_5="X"
+pcrf="/tmp/secret/pcrf.bin"
+tpmr pcrread 0 "$pcrf"
+tpmr pcrread -a 1 "$pcrf"
+tpmr pcrread -a 2 "$pcrf"
+tpmr pcrread -a 3 "$pcrf"
+# Note that PCR 4 needs to be set with the "normal-boot" path value, which is 0.
+dd if=/dev/zero bs="$(tpmr pcrsize)" count=1 status=none >> "$pcrf"
+if [ "$CONFIG_USB_KEYBOARD" = "y" -o -r /lib/modules/libata.ko -o -x /bin/hotp_verification ]; then
+	DEBUG "Sealing TPM disk unlock key with PCR5 involvement (additional kernel modules are loaded per board config)..."
+	# Here, we take pcr 5 into consideration if modules are expected to be measured+loaded
+	tpmr pcrread -a 5 "$pcrf"
 else
-  pcr_5="0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+	DEBUG "Sealing TPM disk unlock key with PCR5=0 (NO additional kernel modules are loaded per board config)..."
+	#no kernel modules are expected to be measured+loaded
+	dd if=/dev/zero bs="$(tpmr pcrsize)" count=1 status=none >> "$pcrf"
 fi
+# Precompute the value for pcr 6
+DEBUG "Precomputing TPM future value for PCR6 sealing/unsealing of TPM disk unlock key..."
+tpmr calcfuturepcr -a "/tmp/luksDump.txt" "$pcrf"
+# We take into consideration user files in cbfs
+tpmr pcrread -a 7 "$pcrf"

-# Note that PCR 4 needs to be set with the "normal-boot"
-# path value, which we do not have right now since we are
-# in a recovery shell.
-# used to be -ix 4 f8fa3b6e32e7c6fe04c366e74636e505b28f3b0d \
-# now just all zeros in a normal boot
-# PCR 5 must be all zero since no kernel modules should have
-# been loaded during a normal boot, but might have been
-# loaded in the recovery shell.
-# Otherwise use the current values of the PCRs, which will be read
-# from the TPM as part of the sealing ("X").
-tpm sealfile2 \
-	-if "$KEY_FILE" \
-	-of "$TPM_SEALED" \
-	-pwdd "$key_password" \
-	-hk 40000000 \
-	-ix 0 X \
-	-ix 1 X \
-	-ix 2 X \
-	-ix 3 X \
-	-ix 4 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 \
-	-ix 5 $pcr_5 \
-	-ix 6 $luks_pcr \
-	-ix 7 X \
-|| die "Unable to seal secret"
+DO_WITH_DEBUG --mask-position 7 \
+	tpmr seal "$KEY_FILE" "$TPM_INDEX" 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7 "$pcrf" \
+	"$TPM_SIZE" "$key_password"

+# should be okay if this fails
+shred -n 10 -z -u "$pcrf".* 2> /dev/null || true
 shred -n 10 -z -u "$KEY_FILE" 2> /dev/null \
-|| die "Failed to delete key file"
+|| warn "Failed to delete key file - continuing"

-# try it without the owner password first
-if ! tpm nv_writevalue \
-	-in $TPM_INDEX \
-	-if "$TPM_SEALED" \
-; then
-	# to create an nvram space we need the TPM owner password
-	# and the TPM physical presence must be asserted.
-	#
-	# The permissions are 0 since there is nothing special
-	# about the sealed file
-	tpm physicalpresence -s \
-	|| warn "Warning: Unable to assert physical presence"
-
-	read -s -p "TPM Owner password: " tpm_password
-	echo
-
-	tpm nv_definespace \
-		-in $TPM_INDEX \
-		-sz $TPM_SIZE \
-		-pwdo "$tpm_password" \
-		-per 0 \
-	|| warn "Warning: Unable to define NVRAM space; trying anyway"
-
-
-	tpm nv_writevalue \
-		-in $TPM_INDEX \
-		-if "$TPM_SEALED" \
-	|| die "Unable to write sealed secret to NVRAM"
-fi
-
-shred -n 10 -z -u "$TPM_SEALED" 2> /dev/null \
-|| warn "Failed to delete the sealed secret - continuing"
+cp /tmp/luksDump.txt "$paramsdir/kexec_lukshdr_hash.txt" \
+|| warn "Failed to have hashes of LUKS header - continuing"
--- a/initrd/bin/kexec-select-boot
+++ b/initrd/bin/kexec-select-boot
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 # Generic configurable boot script via kexec
 set -e -o pipefail
 . /tmp/config
@ -50,6 +50,22 @@ bootdir="${bootdir%%/}"
 paramsdev="${paramsdev%%/}"
 paramsdir="${paramsdir%%/}"

+PRIMHASH_FILE="$paramsdir/kexec_primhdl_hash.txt"
+if [ "$CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS" = "y" ]; then
+	if [ -r "$PRIMHASH_FILE" ]; then
+		sha256sum -c "$PRIMHASH_FILE" \
+			|| {
+			echo "FATAL: Hash of TPM2 primary key handle mismatch!";
+			echo "If you have not intentionally regenerated TPM2 primary key,";
+			warn "your system may have been compromised!";
+		}
+	else
+		echo "WARNING: Hash of TPM2 primary key handle does not exist!"
+		echo "Please rebuild the boot hash tree."
+		default_failed="y"
+	fi
+fi
+
 verify_global_hashes()
 {
 	echo "+++ Checking verified boot hash file "
@ -281,8 +297,15 @@ user_select() {
 		else
 			echo "+++ Rebooting to start the new default option"
 			sleep 2
-			reboot \
-			|| die "!!! Failed to reboot system"
+			if [ "$CONFIG_DEBUG_OUTPUT" != "y" ]; then
+				reboot \
+				|| die "!!! Failed to reboot system"
+			else
+				DEBUG "Rebooting is required prior of booting default boot entry"
+				# Instead of rebooting, drop to a recovery shell
+				# for a chance to inspect debug output
+				recovery "Entering recovery to permit inspection of /tmp/debug.log output, reboot to continue"
+			fi
 		fi
 	fi

@ -299,23 +322,22 @@ do_boot()
 		die "!!! Missing required boot hashes"
 	fi

-	if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" \
-		-a -r "$TMP_KEY_DEVICES" ]; then
+	if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ] && [ -r "$TMP_KEY_DEVICES" ]; then
 		INITRD=`kexec-boot -b "$bootdir" -e "$option" -i` \
-		|| die "!!! Failed to extract the initrd from boot option"
+			|| die "!!! Failed to extract the initrd from boot option"
 		if [ -z "$INITRD" ]; then
 			die "!!! No initrd file found in boot option"
 		fi

 		kexec-insert-key $INITRD \
-		|| die "!!! Failed to insert disk key into a new initrd"
+			|| die "!!! Failed to insert disk key into a new initrd"

 		kexec-boot -b "$bootdir" -e "$option" \
 			-a "$add" -r "$remove" -o "/tmp/secret/initrd.cpio" \
-		|| die "!!! Failed to boot w/ options: $option"
+			|| die "!!! Failed to boot w/ options: $option"
 	else
 		kexec-boot -b "$bootdir" -e "$option" -a "$add" -r "$remove" \
-		|| die "!!! Failed to boot w/ options: $option"
+			|| die "!!! Failed to boot w/ options: $option"
 	fi
 }

@ -344,11 +366,12 @@ while true; do
 		user_select
 	fi

-	if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" \
-		-a ! -r "$TMP_KEY_DEVICES" ]; then
-		# Extend PCR4 as soon as possible
-		tpm extend -ix 4 -ic generic \
-		|| die "Failed to extend PCR 4"
+	if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
+		if [ ! -r "$TMP_KEY_DEVICES" ]; then
+			# Extend PCR4 as soon as possible
+			tpmr extend -ix 4 -ic generic \
+				|| die "Failed to extend PCR 4"
+		fi
 	fi

 	# if no saved options, scan the boot directory and generate
@ -368,7 +391,7 @@ while true; do
 			fi
 		fi

-		if [ -r "$TMP_ROLLBACK_FILE" ]; then
+		if [ "$CONFIG_IGNORE_ROLLBACK" != "y" -a -r "$TMP_ROLLBACK_FILE" ]; then
 			# in the case of iso boot with a rollback file, do not assume valid
 			valid_rollback="n"

--- a/initrd/bin/kexec-sign-config
+++ b/initrd/bin/kexec-sign-config
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 # Sign a valid directory of kexec params
 set -e -o pipefail
 . /tmp/config
--- a/initrd/bin/kexec-unseal-key
+++ b/initrd/bin/kexec-unseal-key
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 # This will unseal and unecncrypt the drive encryption key from the TPM
 # The TOTP secret will be shown to the user on each encryption attempt.
 # It will then need to be bundled into initrd that is booted with Qubes.
@ -9,37 +9,34 @@ TPM_INDEX=3
 TPM_SIZE=312

 . /etc/functions
+
+TRACE "Under kexec-unseal-key"
+
 mkdir -p /tmp/secret

-sealed_file="/tmp/secret/sealed.key"
 key_file="$1"

 if [ -z "$key_file" ]; then
 	key_file="/tmp/secret/secret.key"
 fi

-tpm nv_readvalue \
-	-in "$TPM_INDEX" \
-	-sz "$TPM_SIZE" \
-	-of "$sealed_file" \
-|| die "Unable to read key from TPM NVRAM"
+DEBUG "CONFIG_TPM: $CONFIG_TPM"
+DEBUG "CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS: $CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS"
+DEBUG "Show PCRs"
+DEBUG "$(pcrs)"

 for tries in 1 2 3; do
 	read -s -p "Enter unlock password (blank to abort): " tpm_password
 	echo
-
 	if [ -z "$tpm_password" ]; then
 		die "Aborting unseal disk encryption key"
 	fi

-	if tpm unsealfile \
-		-if "$sealed_file" \
-		-of "$key_file" \
-		-pwdd "$tpm_password" \
-		-hk 40000000 \
-	; then
-		# should be okay if this fails
-		shred -n 10 -z -u /tmp/secret/sealed 2> /dev/null || true
+	DO_WITH_DEBUG --mask-position 6 \
+		tpmr unseal "$TPM_INDEX" "0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7" "$TPM_SIZE" \
+		"$key_file" "$tpm_password"
+
+	if [ "$?" -eq 0 ]; then
 		exit 0
 	fi

--- a/initrd/bin/key-init
+++ b/initrd/bin/key-init
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/ash
+#!/bin/bash
 set -e -o pipefail
 . /etc/functions

--- a/initrd/bin/media-scan
+++ b/initrd/bin/media-scan
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 # Scan for USB installation options
 set -e -o pipefail
 . /etc/functions
--- a/initrd/bin/mount-usb
+++ b/initrd/bin/mount-usb
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 # Mount a USB device
 . /etc/functions

--- a/initrd/bin/network-init-recovery
+++ b/initrd/bin/network-init-recovery
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/ash
+#!/bin/bash

 . /etc/functions

--- a/initrd/bin/oem-factory-reset
+++ b/initrd/bin/oem-factory-reset
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 # Automated setup of TPM, GPG keys, and disk

 TRACE "Under /bin/oem-factory-reset"
@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ die() {
 	exit 1
 }

-whiptail_error() 
+whiptail_error()
 {
    local msg=$1
    if [ "$msg" = "" ]; then
@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ whiptail_error()
    whiptail $BG_COLOR_ERROR --msgbox "${msg}\n\n" $HEIGHT $WIDTH $BG_COLOR_ERROR --title "Error"
 }

-whiptail_error_die() 
+whiptail_error_die()
 {
    whiptail_error "$@"
    die
@ -131,11 +131,11 @@ gpg_key_reset()
        echo ${USER_PIN_DEF}
        echo 0
        echo y
-        echo ${GPG_USER_NAME} 
+        echo ${GPG_USER_NAME}
        echo ${GPG_USER_MAIL}
        echo ${GPG_USER_COMMENT}
    } | gpg --command-fd=0 --status-fd=2 --pinentry-mode=loopback --card-edit \
-        > /tmp/gpg_card_edit_output 2>/dev/null 
+        > /tmp/gpg_card_edit_output 2>/dev/null
    if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
        ERROR=`cat /tmp/gpg_card_edit_output`
        whiptail_error_die "GPG Key automatic keygen failed!\n\n$ERROR"
@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ gpg_key_change_pin()
        echo q
        echo q
    } | gpg --command-fd=0 --status-fd=2 --pinentry-mode=loopback --card-edit \
-        > /tmp/gpg_card_edit_output 2>/dev/null 
+        > /tmp/gpg_card_edit_output 2>/dev/null
    if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
        ERROR=`cat /tmp/gpg_card_edit_output | fold -s`
        whiptail_error_die "GPG Key PIN change failed!\n\n$ERROR"
@ -184,26 +184,28 @@ generate_checksums()
    rm /boot/kexec* 2>/dev/null

    # create Heads TPM counter
-    if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
-      tpm counter_create \
-          -pwdo "$TPM_PASS" \
-          -pwdc '' \
-          -la -3135106223 \
-          | tee /tmp/counter \
-          || whiptail_error_die "Unable to create TPM counter"
-      TPM_COUNTER=`cut -d: -f1 < /tmp/counter`
+    if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ];then
+	    if [ "$CONFIG_IGNORE_ROLLBACK" != "y" ]; then
+		    tpmr counter_create \
+			 -pwdo "$TPM_PASS_DEF" \
+			 -pwdc '' \
+			 -la -3135106223 \
+			    | tee /tmp/counter \
+			    || whiptail_error_die "Unable to create TPM counter"
+		    TPM_COUNTER=`cut -d: -f1 < /tmp/counter`

-      # increment TPM counter
-      increment_tpm_counter $TPM_COUNTER >/dev/null 2>&1 \
-          || whiptail_error_die "Unable to increment tpm counter"
+		    # increment TPM counter
+		    increment_tpm_counter $TPM_COUNTER >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+			    || whiptail_error_die "Unable to increment tpm counter"

-      # create rollback file
-      sha256sum /tmp/counter-$TPM_COUNTER > /boot/kexec_rollback.txt 2>/dev/null \
-          || whiptail_error_die "Unable to create rollback file"
-    else
-      ## needs to exist for initial call to unseal-hotp
-      echo "0" > /boot/kexec_hotp_counter
-    fi 
+		    # create rollback file
+		    sha256sum /tmp/counter-$TPM_COUNTER > /boot/kexec_rollback.txt 2>/dev/null \
+			    || whiptail_error_die "Unable to create rollback file"
+	    else
+		    ## needs to exist for initial call to unseal-hotp
+		    echo "0" > /boot/kexec_hotp_counter
+	    fi
+    fi

    # set default boot option only if no TPM Disk Unlock Key previously set
    if [ -z "$TPM_DISK_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SET" ]; then
@ -307,7 +309,7 @@ report_integrity_measurements()
        date=`date "+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S %Z"`
        seconds=`date "+%s"`
        half=`expr \( $seconds % 60 \) / 30`
-        if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = n ]; then
+        if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" != "y" ]; then
            TOTP="NO TPM"
        elif [ "$half" != "$last_half" ]; then
            last_half=$half;
@ -608,14 +610,11 @@ fi
 ## reset TPM and set password
 if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
  echo -e "\nResetting TPM...\n"
-  {
-      echo $TPM_PASS
-      echo $TPM_PASS
-  } | /bin/tpm-reset >/dev/null 2>/tmp/error
-  if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
-      ERROR=$(tail -n 1 /tmp/error | fold -s)
-      whiptail_error_die "Error resetting TPM:\n\n${ERROR}"
-  fi
+  tpmr reset "$TPM_PASS" >/dev/null 2>/tmp/error
+fi
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+	ERROR=$(tail -n 1 /tmp/error | fold -s)
+	whiptail_error_die "Error resetting TPM:\n\n${ERROR}"
 fi

 # clear local keyring
--- a/initrd/bin/oem-system-info-xx30
+++ b/initrd/bin/oem-system-info-xx30
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 # System Info

 BOARD_NAME=${CONFIG_BOARD_NAME:-${CONFIG_BOARD}} 
--- a/initrd/bin/poweroff
+++ b/initrd/bin/poweroff
@ -1,8 +1,13 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-. /etc/functions
+#!/bin/ash
+. /etc/ash_functions

 TRACE "Under /bin/poweroff"

+# Shut down TPM
+if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
+	tpmr shutdown
+fi
+
 # Sync all mounted filesystems
 echo s > /proc/sysrq-trigger

--- a/initrd/bin/qubes-measure-luks
+++ b/initrd/bin/qubes-measure-luks
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 # Measure all of the luks disk encryption headers into
 # a PCR so that we can detect disk swap attacks.
 . /etc/functions
@ -17,5 +17,5 @@ done
 sha256sum /tmp/lukshdr-* > /tmp/luksDump.txt || die "Unable to hash luks headers"
 rm /tmp/lukshdr-*

-tpm extend -ix 6 -if /tmp/luksDump.txt \
+tpmr extend -ix 6 -if /tmp/luksDump.txt \
 || die "Unable to extend PCR"
--- a/initrd/bin/reboot
+++ b/initrd/bin/reboot
@ -1,8 +1,13 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-. /etc/functions
+#!/bin/ash
+. /etc/ash_functions

 TRACE "Under /bin/reboot"

+# Shut down TPM
+if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
+	tpmr shutdown
+fi
+
 # Sync all mounted filesystems
 echo s > /proc/sysrq-trigger

--- a/initrd/bin/seal-hotpkey
+++ b/initrd/bin/seal-hotpkey
@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 # Retrieve the sealed TOTP secret and initialize a USB Security dongle with it

 . /etc/functions

-HOTP_SEALED="/tmp/secret/hotp.sealed"
 HOTP_SECRET="/tmp/secret/hotp.key"
 HOTP_COUNTER="/boot/kexec_hotp_counter"
 HOTP_KEY="/boot/kexec_hotp_key"
@ -27,19 +26,11 @@ else
 	HOTPKEY_BRANDING="HOTP USB Security Dongle"
 fi

-tpm nv_readvalue \
-	-in 4d47 \
-	-sz 312 \
-	-of "$HOTP_SEALED" \
-|| die "Unable to retrieve sealed file from TPM NV"
-
-tpm unsealfile  \
-	-hk 40000000 \
-	-if "$HOTP_SEALED" \
-	-of "$HOTP_SECRET" \
-|| die "Unable to unseal HOTP secret"
-
-shred -n 10 -z -u "$HOTP_SEALED" 2> /dev/null
+if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
+	DEBUG "Sealing HOTP secret reuses TOTP sealed secret..."
+	tpmr unseal 4d47 0,1,2,3,4,7 312 "$HOTP_SECRET" \
+		|| die "Unable to unseal HOTP secret"
+fi

 # Store counter in file instead of TPM for now, as it conflicts with Heads
 # config TPM counter as TPM 1.2 can only increment one counter between reboots
--- a/initrd/bin/seal-totp
+++ b/initrd/bin/seal-totp
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 # Generate a random secret, seal it with the PCRs
 # and write it to the TPM NVRAM.
 #
@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ HOST="$1"
 if [ -z "$HOST" ]; then
 	HOST="TPMTOTP"
 fi
+TPM_PASSWORD="$2"

 TOTP_SECRET="/tmp/secret/totp.key"
 TOTP_SEALED="/tmp/secret/totp.sealed"
@ -28,61 +29,21 @@ dd \
 || die "Unable to generate 20 random bytes"

 secret="`base32 < $TOTP_SECRET`"
-
-# Use the current values of the PCRs, which will be read
-# from the TPM as part of the sealing ("X").
-# PCR4 == 0 means that we are still in the boot process and
-# not a recovery shell.
-# should this read the storage root key?
-if ! tpm sealfile2 \
-	-if "$TOTP_SECRET" \
-	-of "$TOTP_SEALED" \
-	-hk 40000000 \
-	-ix 0 X \
-	-ix 1 X \
-	-ix 2 X \
-	-ix 3 X \
-	-ix 4 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 \
-	-ix 7 X \
-; then
-	shred -n 10 -z -u "$TOTP_SECRET" 2> /dev/null
-	die "Unable to seal secret"
-fi
-
-shred -n 10 -z -u "$TOTP_SECRET" 2> /dev/null
-
-
-# to create an nvram space we need the TPM owner password
-# and the TPM physical presence must be asserted.
-#
-# The permissions are 0 since there is nothing special
-# about the sealed file
-tpm physicalpresence -s \
-|| warn "Warning: Unable to assert physical presence"
-
-# Try to write it without the password first, and then create
-# the NVRAM space using the owner password if it fails for some reason.
-if ! tpm nv_writevalue \
-	-in $TPM_NVRAM_SPACE \
-	-if "$TOTP_SEALED" \
-; then
-	warn 'NVRAM space does not exist? Owner password is required'
-	read -s -p "TPM Owner password: " tpm_password
-	echo
-
-	tpm nv_definespace \
-		-in $TPM_NVRAM_SPACE \
-		-sz 312 \
-		-pwdo "$tpm_password" \
-		-per 0 \
-	|| die "Unable to define NVRAM space"
-
-	tpm nv_writevalue \
-		-in $TPM_NVRAM_SPACE \
-		-if "$TOTP_SEALED" \
+pcrf="/tmp/secret/pcrf.bin"
+tpmr pcrread 0 "$pcrf"
+tpmr pcrread -a 1 "$pcrf"
+tpmr pcrread -a 2 "$pcrf"
+tpmr pcrread -a 3 "$pcrf"
+# pcr 4 is expected to be zero (boot mode: init)
+dd if=/dev/zero bs="$(tpmr pcrsize)" count=1 status=none >> "$pcrf"
+# pcr 5 (kernel modules loaded) is not measured at sealing/unsealing of totp
+DEBUG "Sealing TOTP neglecting PCR5 involvement (Dynamically loaded kernel modules are not firmware integrity attestation related)"
+# pcr 6 (drive luks header) is not measured at sealing/unsealing of totp
+DEBUG "Sealing TOTP without PCR6 involvement (LUKS header consistency is not firmware integrity attestation related)"
+# pcr 7 is containing measurements of user injected stuff in cbfs
+tpmr pcrread -a 7 "$pcrf"
+tpmr seal "$TOTP_SECRET" "$TPM_NVRAM_SPACE" 0,1,2,3,4,7 "$pcrf" 312 "" "$TPM_PASSWORD" \
 	|| die "Unable to write sealed secret to NVRAM"
-fi
-
 shred -n 10 -z -u "$TOTP_SEALED" 2> /dev/null

 url="otpauth://totp/$HOST?secret=$secret"
--- a/initrd/bin/t430-flash.init
+++ b/initrd/bin/t430-flash.init
@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-# Initialize the USB and network device drivers,
-# invoke a recovery shell and prompt the user for how to proceed
-
-. /etc/functions
-. /tmp/config
-
-insmod /lib/modules/ehci-hcd.ko
-insmod /lib/modules/ehci-pci.ko
-insmod /lib/modules/xhci-hcd.ko
-insmod /lib/modules/xhci-pci.ko
-insmod /lib/modules/e1000e.ko
-insmod /lib/modules/usb-storage.ko
-
-tpm extend -ix 4 -ic recovery
-sleep 2
-
-echo '***** Starting recovery shell'
-echo ''
-echo 'To install from flash drive:'
-echo ''
-echo '  mount -o ro /dev/sdb1 /media'
-echo '  flash.sh /media/t430.rom'
-echo ''
-
-exec /bin/ash
--- a/initrd/bin/tpm-reset
+++ b/initrd/bin/tpm-reset
@ -1,34 +1,10 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 . /etc/functions

 echo '*****'
 echo '***** WARNING: This will erase all keys and secrets from the TPM'
 echo '*****'

-read -s -p "New TPM owner password: " key_password
-echo
+prompt_new_owner_password

-if [ -z "$key_password" ]; then
-	die "Empty owner password is not allowed"
-fi
-
-read -s -p "Repeat owner password: " key_password2
-echo
-
-
-if [ "$key_password" != "$key_password2" ]; then
-	die "Key passwords do not match"
-fi
-
-# Make sure the TPM is ready to be reset
-tpm physicalpresence -s
-tpm physicalenable
-tpm physicalsetdeactivated -c
-tpm forceclear
-tpm physicalenable
-tpm takeown -pwdo "$key_password"
-
-# And now turn it all back on
-tpm physicalpresence -s
-tpm physicalenable
-tpm physicalsetdeactivated -c
+tpmr reset "$key_password"
--- a/initrd/bin/tpmr
+++ b/initrd/bin/tpmr
@ -0,0 +1,633 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# TPM Wrapper - to unify tpm and tpm2 subcommands
+
+. /etc/functions
+
+SECRET_DIR="/tmp/secret"
+PRIMARY_HANDLE="0x81000000"
+ENC_SESSION_FILE="enc.ctx"
+DEC_SESSION_FILE="dec.ctx"
+PRIMARY_HANDLE_FILE="primary.handle"
+
+# PCR size in bytes.  Set when we determine what TPM version is in use.
+# TPM1 PCRs are always 20 bytes.  TPM2 is allowed to provide multiple PCR banks
+# with different algorithms - we always use SHA-256, so they are 32 bytes.
+PCR_SIZE=
+
+# Export CONFIG_TPM2_CAPTURE_PCAP=y from your board config to capture tpm2 pcaps to
+# /tmp/tpm0.pcap; Wireshark can inspect these.  (This must be enabled at build
+# time so the pcap TCTI driver is included.)
+if [ -n "$CONFIG_TPM2_CAPTURE_PCAP" ]; then
+	export TPM2TOOLS_TCTI="pcap:device:/dev/tpmrm0"
+	export TCTI_PCAP_FILE="/tmp/tpm0.pcap"
+fi
+
+set -e -o pipefail
+if [ -r "/tmp/config" ]; then
+	. /tmp/config
+else
+	. /etc/config
+fi
+
+TRACE "Under /bin/tpmr"
+
+# Busybox xxd lacks -r, and we get hex dumps from TPM1 commands.  This converts
+# a hex dump to binary data using sed and printf
+hex2bin() {
+	sed 's/\([0-9A-F]\{2\}\)/\\\\\\x\1/gI' | xargs printf
+}
+
+# Render a password as 'hex:<hexdump>' for use with tpm2-tools.  Passwords
+# should always be passed this way to avoid ambiguity.  (Passing with no prefix
+# would choke if the password happened to start with 'file:' or 'hex:'.  Passing
+# as a file still chokes if the password begins with 'hex:', oddly tpm2-tools
+# accepts 'hex:' in the file content.)
+tpm2_password_hex() {
+	echo "hex:$(echo -n "$1" | xxd -p | tr -d ' \n')"
+}
+
+# usage: tpmr pcrread [-a] <index> <file>
+# Reads PCR binary data and writes to file.
+# -a: Append to file.  Default is to overwrite.
+tpm2_pcrread() {
+	TRACE "Under /bin/tpmr:tpm2_pcrread"
+	if [ "$1" = "-a" ]; then
+		APPEND=y
+		shift
+	fi
+
+	index="$1"
+	file="$2"
+
+	if [ -z "$APPEND" ]; then
+		# Don't append - truncate file now so real command always
+		# appends
+		true >"$file"
+	fi
+
+	DO_WITH_DEBUG tpm2 pcrread -Q -o >(cat >>"$file") "sha256:$index"
+}
+tpm1_pcrread() {
+	TRACE "Under /bin/tpmr:tpm1_pcrread"
+	if [ "$1" = "-a" ]; then
+		APPEND=y
+		shift
+	fi
+
+	index="$1"
+	file="$2"
+
+	if [ -z "$APPEND" ]; then
+		# Don't append - truncate file now so real command always
+		# appends
+		true >"$file"
+	fi
+
+	DO_WITH_DEBUG tpm pcrread -ix "$index" | hex2bin >>"$file"
+}
+
+# usage: tpmr calcfuturepcr [-a] <input_file> <output_file>
+# Uses the scratch PCR to calculate a future PCR value (TPM2 23, TPM1 16). The
+# data in input file are hashed into a PCR, and the PCR value is placed in
+# output_file.
+# -a: Append to output_file.  Default is to overwrite
+tpm2_calcfuturepcr() {
+	TRACE "Under /bin/tpmr:tpm2_calcfuturepcr"
+	if [ "$1" = "-a" ]; then
+		APPEND=y
+		shift
+	fi
+
+	input_file="$1"
+	output_file="$2"
+
+	if [ -z "$APPEND" ]; then
+		true >"$output_file"
+	fi
+
+	tpm2 pcrreset -Q 23
+	DO_WITH_DEBUG tpmr extend -ix 23 -if "$input_file"
+	DO_WITH_DEBUG tpm2 pcrread -Q -o >(cat >>"$output_file") sha256:23
+	tpm2 pcrreset -Q 23
+}
+tpm1_calcfuturepcr() {
+	TRACE "Under /bin/tpmr:tpm1_calcfuturepcr"
+	if [ "$1" = "-a" ]; then
+		APPEND=y
+		shift
+	fi
+
+	input_file="$1"
+	output_file="$2"
+
+	if [ -z "$APPEND" ]; then
+		true >"$output_file"
+	fi
+
+	DO_WITH_DEBUG tpm calcfuturepcr -ix 16 -if "$input_file" | hex2bin >>"$output_file"
+}
+
+tpm2_extend() {
+	TRACE "Under /bin/tpmr:tpm2_extend"
+	while true; do
+		case "$1" in
+			-ix)
+				index="$2"
+				shift 2;;
+			-ic)
+				hash="$(echo -n "$2"|sha256sum|cut -d' ' -f1)"
+				shift 2;;
+			-if)
+				hash="$(sha256sum "$2"|cut -d' ' -f1)"
+				shift 2;;
+			*)
+				break;;
+		esac
+	done
+	tpm2 pcrextend "$index:sha256=$hash"
+	DO_WITH_DEBUG tpm2 pcrread "sha256:$index"
+}
+
+tpm2_counter_read() {
+	TRACE "Under /bin/tpmr:tpm2_counter_read"
+	while true; do
+		case "$1" in
+			-ix)
+				index="$2"
+				shift 2;;
+			*)
+				break;;
+		esac
+	done
+	echo "$index: `tpm2 nvread 0x$index | xxd -pc8`"
+}
+
+tpm2_counter_inc() {
+	TRACE "Under /bin/tpmr:tpm2_counter_inc"
+	while true; do
+		case "$1" in
+			-ix)
+				index="$2"
+				shift 2;;
+			-pwdc)
+				pwd="$2"
+				shift 2;;
+			*)
+				break;;
+		esac
+	done
+	tpm2 nvincrement "0x$index" > /dev/console
+	echo "$index: `tpm2 nvread 0x$index | xxd -pc8`"
+}
+
+tpm2_counter_cre() {
+	TRACE "Under /bin/tpmr:tpm2_counter_cre"
+	while true; do
+		case "$1" in
+			-pwdo)
+				pwdo="$2"
+				shift 2;;
+			-pwdof)
+				pwdo="file:$2"
+				shift 2;;
+			-pwdc)
+				pwd="$2"
+				shift 2;;
+			-la)
+				label="$2"
+				shift 2;;
+			*)
+				break;;
+		esac
+	done
+	rand_index="1`dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1 count=3 | xxd -pc3`"
+	tpm2 nvdefine -C o -s 8 -a "ownerread|authread|authwrite|nt=1" \
+		-P "$(tpm2_password_hex "$pwdo")" "0x$rand_index" > /dev/console
+	echo "$rand_index: (valid after an increment)"
+}
+
+tpm2_startsession() {
+	TRACE "Under /bin/tpmr:tpm2_startsession"
+	mkdir -p "$SECRET_DIR"
+	tpm2 flushcontext -Q \
+		--transient-object \
+		|| die "tpm2_flushcontext: unable to flush transient handles"
+
+	tpm2 flushcontext -Q \
+		--loaded-session \
+		|| die "tpm2_flushcontext: unable to flush sessions"
+
+	tpm2 flushcontext -Q \
+		--saved-session \
+		|| die "tpm2_flushcontext: unable to flush saved session"
+	tpm2 readpublic -Q -c "$PRIMARY_HANDLE" -t "/tmp/$PRIMARY_HANDLE_FILE"
+	tpm2 startauthsession -Q -c "/tmp/$PRIMARY_HANDLE_FILE" --hmac-session -S "/tmp/$ENC_SESSION_FILE"
+	tpm2 startauthsession -Q -c "/tmp/$PRIMARY_HANDLE_FILE" --hmac-session -S "/tmp/$DEC_SESSION_FILE"
+	tpm2 sessionconfig -Q --disable-encrypt "/tmp/$DEC_SESSION_FILE"
+}
+
+# Use cleanup_session() with at_exit to release a TPM2 session and delete the
+# session file.  E.g.:
+#   at_exit cleanup_session "$SESSION_FILE"
+cleanup_session() {
+	TRACE "Under /bin/tpmr:cleanup_session"
+	session_file="$1"
+	if [ -f "$session_file" ]; then
+		DEBUG "Clean up session: $session_file"
+		# Nothing else we can do if this fails, still remove the file
+		tpm2 flushcontext -Q "$session_file" || DEBUG "Flush failed for session $session_file"
+		rm -f "$session_file"
+	else
+		DEBUG "No need to clean up session: $session_file"
+	fi
+}
+
+# Clean up a file by shredding it.  No-op if the file wasn't created.  Use with
+# at_exit, e.g.:
+#   at_exit cleanup_shred "$FILE"
+cleanup_shred() {
+	TRACE "Under /bin/tpmr:cleanup_shred"
+	shred -n 10 -z -u "$1" 2>/dev/null || true
+}
+
+# tpm2_seal: Seal a file against PCR values and, optionally, a password.
+# If a password is given, both the PCRs and password are required to unseal the
+# file.  PCRs are provided as a PCR list and data file.  PCR data must be
+# provided - TPM2 allows the TPM to fall back to current PCR values, but it is
+# not required to support this.
+tpm2_seal() {
+	TRACE "Under /bin/tpmr:tpm2_seal"
+	file="$1" #$KEY_FILE
+	index="$2"
+	pcrl="$3" #0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7 (does not include algorithm prefix)
+	pcrf="$4"
+	sealed_size="$5"	# Not used for TPM2
+	pass="$6"	# May be empty to seal with no password
+	tpm_password="$7"	# Owner password - will prompt if needed and not empty
+	# Owner password is always needed for TPM2.
+
+	mkdir -p "$SECRET_DIR"
+	bname="`basename $file`"
+
+	# Pad with up to 6 zeros, i.e. '0x81000001', '0x81001234', etc.
+	handle="$(printf "0x81%6s" "$index" | tr ' ' 0)"
+
+	DEBUG "tpm2_seal: file=$file handle=$handle pcrl=$pcrl pcrf=$pcrf pass=$(mask_param "$pass")"
+
+	# Create a policy requiring both PCRs and the object's authentication
+	# value using a trial session.
+	TRIAL_SESSION=/tmp/sealfile_trial.session
+	AUTH_POLICY=/tmp/sealfile_auth.policy
+	rm -f "$TRIAL_SESSION" "$AUTH_POLICY"
+	tpm2 startauthsession -g sha256 -S "$TRIAL_SESSION"
+	# We have to clean up the session
+	at_exit cleanup_session "$TRIAL_SESSION"
+	# Save the policy hash in case the password policy is not used (we have
+	# to get this from the last step, whichever it is).
+	tpm2 policypcr -Q -l "sha256:$pcrl" -f "$pcrf" -S "$TRIAL_SESSION" -L "$AUTH_POLICY"
+	CREATE_PASS_ARGS=()
+	if [ "$pass" ]; then
+		# Add an object authorization policy (the object authorization
+		# will be the password).  Save the digest, this is the resulting
+		# policy.
+		tpm2 policypassword -Q -S "$TRIAL_SESSION" -L "$AUTH_POLICY"
+		# Pass the password to create later.  Pass the sha256sum of the
+		# password to the TPM so the password is not limited to 32 chars
+		# in length.
+		CREATE_PASS_ARGS=(-p "$(tpm2_password_hex "$pass")")
+	fi
+
+	# Create the object with this policy and the auth value.
+	# NOTE: We disable USERWITHAUTH and enable ADMINWITHPOLICY so the
+	# password cannot be used on its own, the PCRs are also required.
+	# (The default is to allow either policy auth _or_ password auth.  In
+	# this case the policy includes the password, and we don't want to allow
+	# the password on its own.)
+	tpm2 create -Q -C "/tmp/$PRIMARY_HANDLE_FILE" \
+		-i "$file" \
+		-u "$SECRET_DIR/$bname.priv" \
+		-r "$SECRET_DIR/$bname.pub" \
+		-L "$AUTH_POLICY" \
+		-S "/tmp/$DEC_SESSION_FILE" \
+		-a "fixedtpm|fixedparent|adminwithpolicy" \
+		"${CREATE_PASS_ARGS[@]}"
+
+	tpm2 load -Q -C "/tmp/$PRIMARY_HANDLE_FILE" \
+		-u "$SECRET_DIR/$bname.priv" -r "$SECRET_DIR/$bname.pub" \
+		-c "$SECRET_DIR/$bname.seal.ctx"
+	prompt_tpm_password
+	# remove possible data occupying this handle
+	tpm2 evictcontrol -Q -C o -P "$(tpm2_password_hex "$tpm_password")" \
+		-c "$handle" 2>/dev/null || true
+	DO_WITH_DEBUG --mask-position 6 \
+		tpm2 evictcontrol -Q -C o -P "$(tpm2_password_hex "$tpm_password")" \
+		-c "$SECRET_DIR/$bname.seal.ctx" "$handle"
+}
+tpm1_seal() {
+	TRACE "Under /bin/tpmr:tpm1_seal"
+	file="$1"
+	index="$2"
+	pcrl="$3" #0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7 (does not include algorithm prefix)
+	pcrf="$4"
+	sealed_size="$5"
+	pass="$6"	# May be empty to seal with no password
+	tpm_password="$7"	# Owner password - will prompt if needed and not empty
+
+	sealed_file="$SECRET_DIR/tpm1_seal_sealed.bin"
+	at_exit cleanup_shred "$sealed_file"
+
+	POLICY_ARGS=()
+
+	# If a password was given, add it to the policy arguments
+	if [ "$pass" ]; then
+		POLICY_ARGS+=(-pwdd "$pass")
+	fi
+
+	# Transform the PCR list and PCR file to discrete arguments
+	IFS=',' read -r -a PCR_LIST <<<"$pcrl"
+	pcr_file_index=0
+	for pcr in "${PCR_LIST[@]}"; do
+		# Read each PCR_SIZE block from the file and pass as hex
+		POLICY_ARGS+=(-ix "$pcr"
+			"$(dd if="$pcrf" skip="$pcr_file_index" bs="$PCR_SIZE" count=1 status=none | xxd -p | tr -d ' ')"
+			)
+		pcr_file_index=$((pcr_file_index+1))
+	done
+
+	tpm sealfile2 \
+		-if "$file" \
+		-of "$sealed_file" \
+		-hk 40000000 \
+		"${POLICY_ARGS[@]}"
+
+	# try it without the owner password first
+	if ! tpm nv_writevalue -in "$index" -if "$sealed_file"; then
+		# to create an nvram space we need the TPM owner password
+		# and the TPM physical presence must be asserted.
+		#
+		# The permissions are 0 since there is nothing special
+		# about the sealed file
+		tpm physicalpresence -s \
+			|| warn "Warning: Unable to assert physical presence"
+
+		prompt_tpm_password
+
+		tpm nv_definespace -in "$index" -sz "$sealed_size" \
+			-pwdo "$tpm_password" -per 0 \
+			|| warn "Warning: Unable to define NVRAM space; trying anyway"
+
+
+		tpm nv_writevalue -in "$index" -if "$sealed_file" \
+			|| die "Unable to write sealed secret to NVRAM"
+	fi
+}
+
+# Unseal a file sealed by tpm2_seal.  The PCR list must be provided, the
+# password must be provided if one was used to seal (and cannot be provided if
+# no password was used to seal).
+tpm2_unseal() {
+	TRACE "Under /bin/tpmr:tpm2_unseal"
+	index="$1"
+	pcrl="$2" #0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7 (does not include algorithm prefix)
+	sealed_size="$3"
+	file="$4"
+	pass="$5"
+
+	# TPM2 doesn't care about sealed_size, only TPM1 needs that.  We don't
+	# have to separately read the sealed file on TPM2.
+
+	# Pad with up to 6 zeros, i.e. '0x81000001', '0x81001234', etc.
+	handle="$(printf "0x81%6s" "$index" | tr ' ' 0)"
+
+	DEBUG "tpm2_unseal: handle=$handle pcrl=$pcrl file=$file pass=$(mask_param "$pass")"
+
+	# If we don't have the primary handle (TPM hasn't been reset), tpm2 will
+	# print nonsense error messages about an unexpected handle value.  We
+	# can't do anything without a primary handle.
+	if [ ! -f "/tmp/$PRIMARY_HANDLE_FILE" ]; then
+		DEBUG "tpm2_unseal: No primary handle, cannot attempt to unseal"
+		exit 1
+	fi
+
+	POLICY_SESSION=/tmp/unsealfile_policy.session
+	rm -f "$POLICY_SESSION"
+	tpm2 startauthsession -Q -g sha256 -S "$POLICY_SESSION" --policy-session
+	at_exit cleanup_session "$POLICY_SESSION"
+	# Check the PCR policy
+	tpm2 policypcr -Q -l "sha256:$pcrl" -S "$POLICY_SESSION"
+	UNSEAL_PASS_SUFFIX=""
+
+	if [ "$pass" ]; then
+		# Add the object authorization policy (the actual password is
+		# provided later, but we must include this so the policy we
+		# attempt to use is correct).
+		tpm2 policypassword -Q -S "$POLICY_SESSION"
+		# When unsealing, include the password with the auth session
+		UNSEAL_PASS_SUFFIX="+$(tpm2_password_hex "$pass")"
+	fi
+
+	tpm2 unseal -Q -c "$handle" -p "session:$POLICY_SESSION$UNSEAL_PASS_SUFFIX" \
+		-S "/tmp/$ENC_SESSION_FILE" > "$file"
+}
+tpm1_unseal() {
+	TRACE "Under /bin/tpmr:tpm1_unseal"
+	index="$1"
+	pcrl="$2"
+	sealed_size="$3"
+	file="$4"
+	pass="$5"
+
+	# pcrl (the PCR list) is unused in TPM1.  The TPM itself knows which
+	# PCRs were used to seal and checks them.  We can't verify that it's
+	# correct either, so just ignore it in TPM1.
+
+	sealed_file="$SECRET_DIR/tpm1_unseal_sealed.bin"
+	at_exit cleanup_shred "$sealed_file"
+
+	rm -f "$sealed_file"
+
+	tpm nv_readvalue \
+		-in "$index" \
+		-sz "$sealed_size" \
+		-of "$sealed_file" \
+		|| die "Unable to read sealed file from TPM NVRAM"
+
+	PASS_ARGS=()
+	if [ "$pass" ]; then
+		PASS_ARGS=(-pwdd "$pass")
+	fi
+
+	tpm unsealfile \
+		-if "$sealed_file" \
+		-of "$file" \
+		"${PASS_ARGS[@]}" \
+		-hk 40000000
+}
+
+tpm2_reset() {
+	TRACE "Under /bin/tpmr:tpm2_reset"
+	key_password="$1"
+	mkdir -p "$SECRET_DIR"
+	tpm2 clear -c platform || warn "Unable to clear TPM on platform hierarchy!"
+	tpm2 changeauth -c owner "$(tpm2_password_hex "$key_password")"
+	tpm2 changeauth -c endorsement "$(tpm2_password_hex "$key_password")"
+	tpm2 createprimary -C owner -g sha256 -G "${CONFIG_PRIMARY_KEY_TYPE:-rsa}" \
+		-c "$SECRET_DIR/primary.ctx" -P "$(tpm2_password_hex "$key_password")"
+	tpm2 evictcontrol -C owner -c "$SECRET_DIR/primary.ctx" "$PRIMARY_HANDLE" \
+		-P "$(tpm2_password_hex "$key_password")"
+	shred -u "$SECRET_DIR/primary.ctx"
+	tpm2_startsession
+
+	# Set the dictionary attack parameters.  TPM2 defaults vary widely, we
+	# want consistent behavior on any TPM.
+	# * --max-tries=10: Allow 10 failures before lockout.  This allows the
+	#   user to quickly "burst" 10 failures without significantly impacting
+	#   the rate allowed for a dictionary attacker.
+	#   Most TPM2 flows ask for the owner password 2-4 times, so this allows
+	#   a handful of mistypes and some headroom for an expected unseal
+	#   failure if firmware is updated.
+	#   Remember that an auth failure is also counted any time an unclean
+	#   shutdown occurs (see TPM2 spec part 1, section 19.8.6, "Non-orderly
+	#   Shutdown").
+	# * --recovery-time=3600: Forget an auth failure every 1 hour.
+	# * --lockout-recovery-time: After a failed lockout recovery auth, the
+	#   TPM must be reset to try again.
+	#
+	# Heads does not offer a way to reset dictionary attack lockout, instead
+	# the TPM can be reset and new secrets sealed.
+	tpm2 dictionarylockout -Q --setup-parameters \
+		--max-tries=10 \
+		--recovery-time=3600 \
+		--lockout-recovery-time=0 \
+		--auth="session:/tmp/$ENC_SESSION_FILE"
+
+	# Set a random DA lockout password, so the DA lockout can't be cleared
+	# with a password.  Heads doesn't offer dictionary attach reset, instead
+	# the TPM can be reset and new secrets sealed.
+	#
+	# The default lockout password is empty, so we must set this, and we
+	# don't need to provide any auth (use the default empty password).
+	tpm2 changeauth -Q -c lockout \
+		"hex:$(dd if=/dev/urandom bs=32 count=1 status=none | xxd -p | tr -d ' \n')"
+}
+tpm1_reset() {
+	TRACE "Under /bin/tpmr:tpm1_reset"
+	key_password="$1"
+
+	# Make sure the TPM is ready to be reset
+	tpm physicalpresence -s
+	tpm physicalenable
+	tpm physicalsetdeactivated -c
+	tpm forceclear
+	tpm physicalenable
+	tpm takeown -pwdo "$key_password"
+
+	# And now turn it all back on
+	tpm physicalpresence -s
+	tpm physicalenable
+	tpm physicalsetdeactivated -c
+}
+
+# Perform final cleanup before boot and lock the platform heirarchy.
+tpm2_kexec_finalize() {
+	TRACE "Under /bin/tpmr:tpm2_kexec_finalize"
+
+	# Flush sessions and transient objects
+	tpm2 flushcontext -Q --transient-object \
+		|| warn "tpm2_flushcontext: unable to flush transient handles"
+	tpm2 flushcontext -Q --loaded-session \
+		|| warn "tpm2_flushcontext: unable to flush sessions"
+	tpm2 flushcontext -Q --saved-session \
+		|| warn "tpm2_flushcontext: unable to flush saved session"
+
+	# Add a random passphrase to platform hierarchy to prevent TPM2 from
+	# being cleared in the OS.
+	# This passphrase is only effective before the next boot.
+	echo "Locking TPM2 platform hierarchy..."
+	randpass=$(dd if=/dev/urandom bs=4 count=1 status=none | xxd -p)
+	tpm2 changeauth -c platform "$randpass" \
+		|| warn "Failed to lock platform hierarchy of TPM2!"
+}
+
+tpm2_shutdown() {
+	TRACE "Under /bin/tpmr:tpm2_shutdown"
+
+	# Prepare for shutdown.
+	# This is a "clear" shutdown (do not preserve runtime state) since we
+	# are not going to resume later, we are powering off (or rebooting).
+	tpm2 shutdown -Q --clear
+}
+
+if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" != "y" ]; then
+	echo >&2 "No TPM!"
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+# TPM1 - most commands forward directly to tpm, but some are still wrapped for
+# consistency with tpm2.
+if [ "$CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS" != "y" ]; then
+	PCR_SIZE=20	# TPM1 PCRs are always SHA-1
+	subcmd="$1"
+	# Don't shift yet, for most commands we will just forward to tpm.
+	case "$subcmd" in
+		pcrread)
+			shift; tpm1_pcrread "$@";;
+		pcrsize)
+			echo "$PCR_SIZE";;
+		calcfuturepcr)
+			shift; tpm1_calcfuturepcr "$@";;
+		seal)
+			shift; tpm1_seal "$@";;
+		startsession)
+			;;	# Nothing on TPM1.
+		unseal)
+			shift; tpm1_unseal "$@";;
+		reset)
+			shift; tpm1_reset "$@";;
+		kexec_finalize)
+			;;	# Nothing on TPM1.
+		shutdown)
+			;;	# Nothing on TPM1.
+		*)
+			DEBUG "Direct translation from tpmr to tpm1 call"
+			DO_WITH_DEBUG exec tpm "$@"
+			;;
+	esac
+	exit 0
+fi
+
+# TPM2 - all commands implemented as wrappers around tpm2
+PCR_SIZE=32	# We use the SHA-256 PCRs
+subcmd="$1"
+shift 1
+case "$subcmd" in
+	pcrread)
+		tpm2_pcrread "$@";;
+	pcrsize)
+		echo "$PCR_SIZE";;
+	calcfuturepcr)
+		tpm2_calcfuturepcr "$@";;
+	extend)
+		tpm2_extend "$@";;
+	counter_read)
+		tpm2_counter_read "$@";;
+	counter_increment)
+		tpm2_counter_inc "$@";;
+	counter_create)
+		tpm2_counter_cre "$@";;
+	seal)
+		tpm2_seal "$@";;
+	startsession)
+		tpm2_startsession "$@";;
+	unseal)
+		tpm2_unseal "$@";;
+	reset)
+		tpm2_reset "$@";;
+	kexec_finalize)
+		tpm2_kexec_finalize "$@";;
+	shutdown)
+		tpm2_shutdown "$@";;
+	*)
+		echo "Command $subcmd not wrapped!"
+		exit 1
+esac
--- a/initrd/bin/uefi-init
+++ b/initrd/bin/uefi-init
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/ash
+#!/bin/bash
 set -e -o pipefail
 . /etc/functions

@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ if [ -n "GUID" ]; then
 	|| die "Failed to read config GUID from ROM"

 	if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
-		tpm extend -ix "$CONFIG_PCR" -if $TMPFILE \
+		tpmr extend -ix "$CONFIG_PCR" -if $TMPFILE \
 		|| die "$filename: tpm extend failed"
 	fi

--- a/initrd/bin/unseal-hotp
+++ b/initrd/bin/unseal-hotp
@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 # Retrieve the sealed file and counter from the NVRAM, unseal it and compute the hotp

 . /etc/functions

-HOTP_SEALED="/tmp/secret/hotp.sealed"
 HOTP_SECRET="/tmp/secret/hotp.key"
 HOTP_COUNTER="/boot/kexec_hotp_counter"

@ -38,20 +37,10 @@ if [ "$counter_value" == "" ]; then
 fi

 #counter_value=$(printf "%d" 0x${counter_value})
-
-tpm nv_readvalue \
-	-in 4d47 \
-	-sz 312 \
-	-of "$HOTP_SEALED" \
-|| die "Unable to retrieve sealed file from TPM NV"
-
-tpm unsealfile  \
-	-hk 40000000 \
-	-if "$HOTP_SEALED" \
-	-of "$HOTP_SECRET" \
-|| die "Unable to unseal HOTP secret"
-
-shred -n 10 -z -u "$HOTP_SEALED" 2> /dev/null
+if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
+	DEBUG "Unsealing HOTP secret reuses TOTP sealed secret..."
+	tpmr unseal 4d47 0,1,2,3,4,7 312 "$HOTP_SECRET"
+fi

 if ! hotp $counter_value < "$HOTP_SECRET"; then
 	shred -n 10 -z -u "$HOTP_SECRET" 2> /dev/null
--- a/initrd/bin/unseal-totp
+++ b/initrd/bin/unseal-totp
@ -1,26 +1,16 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 # Retrieve the sealed file from the NVRAM, unseal it and compute the totp

 . /etc/functions

-TOTP_SEALED="/tmp/secret/totp.sealed"
 TOTP_SECRET="/tmp/secret/totp.key"

 TRACE "Under /bin/unseal-totp"

-tpm nv_readvalue \
-	-in 4d47 \
-	-sz 312 \
-	-of "$TOTP_SEALED" \
-|| die "Unable to retrieve sealed file from TPM NV"
-
-tpm unsealfile  \
-	-hk 40000000 \
-	-if "$TOTP_SEALED" \
-	-of "$TOTP_SECRET" \
-|| die "Unable to unseal totp secret"
-
-shred -n 10 -z -u "$TOTP_SEALED" 2> /dev/null
+if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
+	tpmr unseal 4d47 0,1,2,3,4,7 312 "$TOTP_SECRET" \
+		|| die "Unable to unseal totp secret"
+fi

 if ! totp -q < "$TOTP_SECRET"; then
 	shred -n 10 -z -u "$TOTP_SECRET" 2> /dev/null
--- a/initrd/bin/usb-init
+++ b/initrd/bin/usb-init
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 # Boot a USB installation

 . /etc/functions
@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ TRACE "Under /bin/usb-init"

 if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
 	# Extend PCR4 as soon as possible
-	tpm extend -ix 4 -ic usb
+	tpmr extend -ix 4 -ic usb
 fi

 media-scan usb
--- a/initrd/bin/wget-measure.sh
+++ b/initrd/bin/wget-measure.sh
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 # get a file and extend a TPM PCR
 . /etc/functions

@ -19,6 +19,6 @@ fi
 wget "$URL" || die "$URL: failed"

 FILE="`basename "$URL"`"
-tpm extend -ix "$INDEX" -if "$FILE" || die "$FILE: tpm extend failed"
+tpmr extend -ix "$INDEX" -if "$FILE" || die "$FILE: tpm extend failed"


--- a/initrd/bin/x230-flash.init
+++ b/initrd/bin/x230-flash.init
@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-# Initialize the USB and network device drivers,
-# invoke a recovery shell and prompt the user for how to proceed
-
-. /etc/functions
-. /tmp/config
-
-TRACE "Under /bin/x230-flash.init"
-
-insmod /lib/modules/ehci-hcd.ko
-insmod /lib/modules/ehci-pci.ko
-insmod /lib/modules/xhci-hcd.ko
-insmod /lib/modules/xhci-pci.ko
-insmod /lib/modules/e1000e.ko
-insmod /lib/modules/usb-storage.ko
-
-tpm extend -ix 4 -ic recovery
-sleep 2
-
-echo '***** Starting recovery shell'
-echo ''
-echo 'To install from flash drive:'
-echo ''
-echo '  mount -o ro /dev/sdb1 /media'
-echo '  flash.sh /media/x230.rom'
-echo ''
-
-exec /bin/ash
--- a/initrd/bin/xx30-flash.init
+++ b/initrd/bin/xx30-flash.init
@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+#!/bin/ash
+# Initialize the USB and network device drivers,
+# invoke a recovery shell and prompt the user for how to proceed
+
+. /etc/ash_functions
+. /tmp/config
+
+TRACE "Under /bin/xx30-flash.init"
+
+busybox insmod /lib/modules/ehci-hcd.ko
+busybox insmod /lib/modules/ehci-pci.ko
+busybox insmod /lib/modules/xhci-hcd.ko
+busybox insmod /lib/modules/xhci-pci.ko
+busybox insmod /lib/modules/e1000e.ko
+busybox insmod /lib/modules/usb-storage.ko
+
+sleep 2
+
+echo '***** Starting recovery shell'
+echo ''
+echo 'To install from flash drive:'
+echo ''
+echo '  mount -o ro /dev/sdb1 /media'
+echo '  flash.sh /media/xx30-legacy.rom'
+echo ''
+
+exec /bin/sh
--- a/initrd/etc/ash_functions
+++ b/initrd/etc/ash_functions
@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#
+# Core shell functions that do not require bash.  These functions are used with
+# busybox ash on legacy-flash boards, and with bash on all other boards.
+
+die() {
+	echo >&2 "$*";
+	sleep 2;
+	exit 1;
+}
+
+warn() {
+	echo >&2 "$*";
+	sleep 1;
+}
+
+DEBUG() {
+	if [ "$CONFIG_DEBUG_OUTPUT" = "y" ];then
+		echo "DEBUG: $*" | tee -a /tmp/debug.log >&2;
+	fi
+}
+
+TRACE() {
+        if [ "$CONFIG_ENABLE_FUNCTION_TRACING_OUTPUT" = "y" ];then
+                echo "TRACE: $*" | tee -a /tmp/debug.log >&2;
+        fi
+}
+
+preserve_rom() {
+	TRACE "Under /etc/functions:preserve_rom"
+	new_rom="$1"
+	old_files=`cbfs -t 50 -l 2>/dev/null | grep "^heads/"`
+
+	for old_file in `echo $old_files`; do
+		new_file=`cbfs.sh -o $1 -l | grep -x $old_file`
+		if [ -z "$new_file" ]; then
+			echo "+++ Adding $old_file to $1"
+			cbfs -t 50 -r $old_file >/tmp/rom.$$ \
+			|| die "Failed to read cbfs file from ROM"
+			cbfs.sh -o $1 -a $old_file -f /tmp/rom.$$ \
+			|| die "Failed to write cbfs file to new ROM file"
+		fi
+	done
+}
+
+recovery() {
+	TRACE "Under /etc/functions:recovery"
+	echo >&2 "!!!!! $*"
+
+	# Remove any temporary secret files that might be hanging around
+	# but recreate the directory so that new tools can use it.
+
+	#safe to always be true. Otherwise "set -e" would make it exit here
+	shred -n 10 -z -u /tmp/secret/* 2> /dev/null || true
+	rm -rf /tmp/secret
+	mkdir -p /tmp/secret
+
+	# ensure /tmp/config exists for recovery scripts that depend on it
+	touch /tmp/config
+
+	if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
+		tpmr extend -ix 4 -ic recovery
+	fi
+
+	while [ true ]
+	do
+		echo >&2 "!!!!! Starting recovery shell"
+		sleep 1
+
+		if [ -x /bin/setsid ]; then
+			/bin/setsid -c /bin/sh
+		else
+			/bin/sh
+		fi
+	done
+}
+
+pause_recovery() {
+	TRACE "Under /etc/functions:pause_recovery"
+	read -p $'!!! Hit enter to proceed to recovery shell !!!\n'
+	recovery $*
+}
+
+combine_configs() {
+	TRACE "Under /etc/functions:combine_configs"
+	cat /etc/config* > /tmp/config
+}
--- a/initrd/etc/functions
+++ b/initrd/etc/functions
@ -1,71 +1,44 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 # Shell functions for most initialization scripts
+. /etc/ash_functions

-die() {
-	echo >&2 "$*";
-	sleep 2;
-	exit 1;
-}
-
-warn() {
-	echo >&2 "$*";
-	sleep 1;
-}
-
-DEBUG() {
-	if [ "$CONFIG_DEBUG_OUTPUT" = "y" ];then
-		echo >&2 "DEBUG: $*";
+# Print <hidden> or <empty> depending on whether $1 is empty.  Useful to mask an
+# optional password parameter.
+mask_param() {
+	if [ -z "$1" ]; then
+		echo "<empty>"
+	else
+		echo "<hidden>"
 	fi
 }

-TRACE() {
-        if [ "$CONFIG_ENABLE_FUNCTION_TRACING_OUTPUT" = "y" ];then
-                echo >&2 "TRACE: $*";
-        fi
-}
+# Trace a command with DEBUG, then execute it.
+# A password parameter can be masked by passing --mask-position N before the
+# command to execute, the debug trace will just indicate whether the password
+# was empty or nonempty (which is important when use of a password is optional).
+# N=0 is the name of the command to be executed, N=1 is its first parameter,
+# etc.
+DO_WITH_DEBUG() {
+	if [ "$1" == "--mask-position" ]; then
+		mask_position="$2"
+		shift
+		shift
+		DEBUG_ARGS=("$@")

-
-
-recovery() {
-	TRACE "Under /etc/functions:recovery"
-	echo >&2 "!!!!! $*"
-
-	# Remove any temporary secret files that might be hanging around
-	# but recreate the directory so that new tools can use it.
-
-	#safe to always be true. Otherwise "set -e" would make it exit here
-	shred -n 10 -z -u /tmp/secret/* 2> /dev/null || true
-	rm -rf /tmp/secret
-	mkdir -p /tmp/secret
-
-	# ensure /tmp/config exists for recovery scripts that depend on it
-	touch /tmp/config
-
-	if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = y ]; then
-		tpm extend -ix 4 -ic recovery
+		DEBUG_ARGS[$mask_position]="$(mask_param "${DEBUG_ARGS[$mask_position]}")"
+		DEBUG "${DEBUG_ARGS[@]}"
+	else
+		DEBUG "$@"
 	fi
-
-	while [ true ]
-	do
-		echo >&2 "!!!!! Starting recovery shell"
-		sleep 1
-
-		if [ -x /bin/setsid ]; then
-			/bin/setsid -c /bin/ash
-		else
-			/bin/ash
-		fi
-	done
-}
-
-pause_recovery() {
-	TRACE "Under /etc/functions:pause_recovery"
-	read -p 'Hit enter to proceed to recovery shell:'
-	recovery $*
+	"$@"
 }

 pcrs() {
-	head -8 /sys/class/tpm/tpm0/pcrs
+	if [ "$CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS" = "y" ]; then
+		tpm2 pcrread sha256
+	elif [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
+		head -8 /sys/class/tpm/tpm0/pcrs
+	fi
 }

 confirm_totp()
@ -81,7 +54,7 @@ confirm_totp()
 		date=`date "+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"`
 		seconds=`date "+%s"`
 		half=`expr \( $seconds % 60 \) / 30`
-		if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" != y ]; then
+		if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" != "y" ]; then
 			TOTP="NO TPM"
 		elif [ "$half" != "$last_half" ]; then
 			last_half=$half;
@ -236,20 +209,52 @@ confirm_gpg_card()
 	fi
 }

+# Prompt for an owner password if it is not already set in tpm_password.  Sets
+# tpm_password.  Tools should optionally accept a TPM password on the command
+# line, since some flows need it multiple times and only one prompt is ideal.
+prompt_tpm_password() {
+	if [ -n "$tpm_password" ]; then
+		return 0;
+	fi
+
+	read -s -p "TPM Owner password: " tpm_password
+	echo # new line after password prompt
+}
+
+# Prompt for a new owner password when resetting the TPM.  Returned in
+# key_password.  The password must be 1-32 characters and must be entered twice,
+# the script will loop until this is met.
+prompt_new_owner_password() {
+	local key_password2
+	key_password=1
+	key_password2=2
+	while [ "$key_password" != "$key_password2" ] || [ "${#key_password}" -gt 32 ] || [ -z "$key_password" ]; do
+		read -s -p "New TPM owner passphrase (2 words suggested, 1-32 characters max): " key_password
+		echo
+
+		read -s -p "Repeat chosen TPM owner passphrase: " key_password2
+		echo
+
+		if [ "$key_password" != "$key_password2" ]; then
+			echo "Passphrases entered do not match. Try again!"
+			echo
+		fi
+	done
+}

 check_tpm_counter()
 {
  TRACE "Under /etc/functions:check_tpm_counter"
  LABEL=${2:-3135106223}
+  tpm_password="$3"
 	# if the /boot.hashes file already exists, read the TPM counter ID
 	# from it.
 	if [ -r "$1" ]; then
 		TPM_COUNTER=`grep counter- "$1" | cut -d- -f2`
 	else
 		warn "$1 does not exist; creating new TPM counter"
-		read -s -p "TPM Owner password: " tpm_password
-		echo
-		tpm counter_create \
+		prompt_tpm_password
+		tpmr counter_create \
 			-pwdo "$tpm_password" \
 			-pwdc '' \
 			-la $LABEL \
@ -266,14 +271,14 @@ check_tpm_counter()
 read_tpm_counter()
 {
 	TRACE "Under /etc/functions:read_tpm_counter"
-	tpm counter_read -ix "$1" | tee "/tmp/counter-$1" \
+	tpmr counter_read -ix "$1" | tee "/tmp/counter-$1" \
 	|| die "Counter read failed"
 }

 increment_tpm_counter()
 {
 	TRACE "Under /etc/functions:increment_tpm_counter"
-	tpm counter_increment -ix "$1" -pwdc '' \
+	tpmr counter_increment -ix "$1" -pwdc '' \
 		| tee /tmp/counter-$1 \
 	|| die "Counter increment failed"
 }
@ -307,22 +312,6 @@ check_config() {
 	|| die "Failed to copy kexec boot params to tmp"
 }

-preserve_rom() {
-	TRACE "Under /etc/functions:preserve_rom"
-	new_rom="$1"
-	old_files=`cbfs -t 50 -l 2>/dev/null | grep "^heads/"`
-
-	for old_file in `echo $old_files`; do
-		new_file=`cbfs.sh -o $1 -l | grep -x $old_file`
-		if [ -z "$new_file" ]; then
-			echo "+++ Adding $old_file to $1"
-			cbfs -t 50 -r $old_file >/tmp/rom.$$ \
-			|| die "Failed to read cbfs file from ROM"
-			cbfs.sh -o $1 -a $old_file -f /tmp/rom.$$ \
-			|| die "Failed to write cbfs file to new ROM file"
-		fi
-	done
-}
 replace_config() {
 	TRACE "Under /etc/functions:replace_config"
 	CONFIG_FILE=$1
@ -339,10 +328,6 @@ replace_config() {
  sort ${CONFIG_FILE}.tmp | uniq > ${CONFIG_FILE}
 	rm -f ${CONFIG_FILE}.tmp
 }
-combine_configs() {
-	TRACE "Under /etc/functions:combine_configs"
-	cat /etc/config* > /tmp/config
-}

 update_checksums()
 {
@ -358,8 +343,10 @@ update_checksums()

 	# sign and auto-roll config counter
 	extparam=
-	if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
-		extparam=-r
+	if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ];then
+		if [ "$CONFIG_IGNORE_ROLLBACK" != "y" ]; then
+			extparam=-r
+		fi
 	fi
 	if ! kexec-sign-config -p /boot -u $extparam ; then
 		rv=1
@ -568,3 +555,37 @@ generate_random_mac_address()
 	#Borrowed from https://stackoverflow.com/questions/42660218/bash-generate-random-mac-address-unicast
 	hexdump -n 6 -ve '1/1 "%.2x "' /dev/urandom | awk -v a="2,6,a,e" -v r="$RANDOM" 'BEGIN{srand(r);}NR==1{split(a,b,",");r=int(rand()*4+1);printf "%s%s:%s:%s:%s:%s:%s\n",substr($1,0,1),b[r],$2,$3,$4,$5,$6}'
 }
+
+# Add a command to be invoked at exit.  (Note that trap EXIT replaces any
+# existing handler.)  Commands are invoked in reverse order, so they can be used
+# to clean up resources, etc.
+# The parameters are all executed as-is and do _not_ require additional quoting
+# (unlike trap).  E.g.:
+# at_exit shred "$file" #<-- file is expanded when calling at_exit, no extra quoting needed
+at_exit() {
+	AT_EXIT_HANDLERS+=("$@") # Command and args
+	AT_EXIT_HANDLERS+=("$#") # Number of elements in this command
+}
+
+# Array of all exit handler command arguments with lengths of each command at
+# the end.  For example:
+#   at_exit echo hello
+#   at_exit echo a b c
+# results in:
+# AT_EXIT_HANDLERS=(echo hello 2 echo a b c 4)
+
+AT_EXIT_HANDLERS=()
+# Each handler is an array AT_EXIT_HANDLER_{i}
+run_at_exit_handlers() {
+	local cmd_pos cmd_len
+	cmd_pos="${#AT_EXIT_HANDLERS[@]}"
+	# Silence trace if there are no handlers, this is common and occurs a lot
+	[ "$cmd_pos" -gt 0 ] && DEBUG "Running at_exit handlers"
+	while [ "$cmd_pos" -gt 0 ]; do
+		cmd_pos="$((cmd_pos-1))"
+		cmd_len="${AT_EXIT_HANDLERS[$cmd_pos]}"
+		cmd_pos="$((cmd_pos-cmd_len))"
+		"${AT_EXIT_HANDLERS[@]:$cmd_pos:$cmd_len}"
+	done
+}
+trap run_at_exit_handlers EXIT
--- a/initrd/etc/gui_functions
+++ b/initrd/etc/gui_functions
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 # Shell functions for common operations using fbwhiptail
 . /etc/functions

--- a/initrd/etc/luks-functions
+++ b/initrd/etc/luks-functions
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 # Reencrypt LUKS container and change Disk Recovery Key associated passphrase (Slot 0: main slot)

 . /etc/functions
--- a/initrd/etc/passwd
+++ b/initrd/etc/passwd
@ -1 +1 @@
-root:x:0:0:root:/:/bin/ash
+root:x:0:0:root:/:/bin/sh
--- a/initrd/init
+++ b/initrd/init
@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
-#!/bin/ash
+#! /bin/ash
+# Note this is used on legacy-flash boards that lack bash, it runs with busybox
+# ash.  Calls to bash scripts must be guarded by checking config.
+
 mknod /dev/ttyprintk c 5 3
 echo "hello world" > /dev/ttyprintk

@ -16,6 +19,7 @@ mkdir /proc /sys /dev /tmp /boot /media 2>&- 1>&-
 mount /dev 2>/dev/ttyprintk
 mount /proc 2>/dev/ttyprintk
 mount /sys 2>/dev/ttyprintk
+
 if [ "$CONFIG_LINUXBOOT" = "y" ]; then
 	mount /sys/firmware/efi/efivars
 fi
@ -28,6 +32,12 @@ if [ ! -r /dev/ptmx ]; then
 	ln -s /dev/pts/ptmx /dev/ptmx
 fi

+# Needed by bash
+[ -e /dev/stdin ] || ln -s /proc/self/fd/0 /dev/stdin
+[ -e /dev/stdout ] || ln -s /proc/self/fd/1 /dev/stdout
+[ -e /dev/stderr ] || ln -s /proc/self/fd/2 /dev/stderr
+[ -e /dev/fd ] || ln -s /proc/self/fd /dev/fd
+
 # Recovery shells will erase anything from here
 mkdir -p /tmp/secret

@ -40,16 +50,16 @@ fi
 hwclock -l -s

 # Read the system configuration parameters
-. /etc/functions
+. /etc/ash_functions
 . /etc/config

 TRACE "Under init"

 # set CONFIG_TPM dynamically before init
-if [ -e /dev/tpm0 ]; then
-	CONFIG_TPM='y'
-else
+if [ ! -e /dev/tpm0 ]; then
 	CONFIG_TPM='n'
+	CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS='n'
+	warn 'No TPM found...'
 fi

 #Specify whiptail background colors cues under FBWhiptail only
@ -61,8 +71,13 @@ else
 	export BG_COLOR_ERROR="${CONFIG_ERROR_BG_COLOR:-""}"
 fi

+if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
+	# Initialize tpm2 encrypted sessions here
+	tpmr startsession
+fi
+
 if [ "$CONFIG_COREBOOT" = "y" ]; then
-	/bin/cbfs-init
+	[ -x /bin/bash ] && /bin/cbfs-init
 fi
 if [ "$CONFIG_LINUXBOOT" = "y" ]; then
 	/bin/uefi-init
@ -71,7 +86,7 @@ fi
 # Set GPG_TTY before calling gpg in key-init
 export GPG_TTY=/dev/console

-/bin/key-init
+[ -x /bin/bash ] && /bin/key-init

 # Setup recovery serial shell
 if [ ! -z "$CONFIG_BOOT_RECOVERY_SERIAL" ]; then
@ -100,17 +115,19 @@ if [ "$boot_option" = "r" ]; then
 	recovery 'User requested recovery shell'
 	# just in case...
 	if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
-		tpm extend -ix 4 -ic recovery
+		tpmr extend -ix 4 -ic recovery
 	fi
-	exec /bin/ash
+	exec /bin/sh
 	exit
 fi

-# Override CONFIG_TPM from /etc/config with runtime value determined above.
+# Override CONFIG_TPM and CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS from /etc/config with runtime value
+# determined above.
 #
 # Values in user config have higher priority during combining thus effectively
 # changing the value for the rest of the scripts which source /tmp/config.
 echo "export CONFIG_TPM=\"$CONFIG_TPM\"" >> /etc/config.user
+echo "export CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS=\"$CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS\"" >> /etc/config.user

 combine_configs
 . /tmp/config
@ -157,6 +174,6 @@ fi

 # belts and suspenders, just in case...
 if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
-	tpm extend -ix 4 -ic recovery
+	tpmr extend -ix 4 -ic recovery
 fi
-exec /bin/ash
+exec /bin/sh
--- a/initrd/mount-boot
+++ b/initrd/mount-boot
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 # Extract the GPG signed dmsetup configuration from
 # the header of the file system, validate it against
 # the trusted key database, and execute it to mount
--- a/initrd/sbin/config-dhcp.sh
+++ b/initrd/sbin/config-dhcp.sh
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash

 # udhcpc script

--- a/initrd/sbin/insmod
+++ b/initrd/sbin/insmod
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/bin/sh
+#!/bin/bash
 # extend a TPM PCR with a module and then load it
 # any arguments will also be measured.
 # The default PCR to be extended is 5, but can be
@ -25,18 +25,20 @@ if [ ! -r "$MODULE" ]; then
 fi

 if [ ! -r /sys/class/tpm/tpm0/pcrs -o ! -x /bin/tpm ]; then
-	tpm_missing=1
+   if [ ! -c /dev/tpmrm0 -o ! -x /bin/tpm2 ]; then
+	   tpm_missing=1
+   fi
 fi

 if [ -z "$tpm_missing" ]; then
-	tpm extend -ix "$MODULE_PCR" -if "$MODULE" \
+	tpmr extend -ix "$MODULE_PCR" -if "$MODULE" \
 	|| die "$MODULE: tpm extend failed"
 fi

 if [ ! -z "$*" -a -z "$tpm_missing" ]; then
 	TMPFILE=/tmp/insmod.$$
 	echo "$@" > $TMPFILE
-	tpm extend -ix "$MODULE_PCR" -if $TMPFILE \
+	tpmr extend -ix "$MODULE_PCR" -if $TMPFILE \
 	|| die "$MODULE: tpm extend on arguments failed"
 fi

--- a/modules/bash
+++ b/modules/bash
@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# GNU bash
+modules-$(CONFIG_BASH) += bash
+
+bash_version := 5.1.16
+bash_dir := bash-$(bash_version)
+bash_tar := bash-$(bash_version).tar.gz
+bash_url := https://ftpmirror.gnu.org/bash/$(bash_tar)
+bash_hash := 5bac17218d3911834520dad13cd1f85ab944e1c09ae1aba55906be1f8192f558
+
+bash_configure := CFLAGS=-Os ./configure \
+	$(CROSS_TOOLS) \
+	--host $(target) \
+	--prefix="/usr" \
+        --enable-largefile \
+        --infodir=/usr/share/info \
+        --mandir=/usr/share/man \
+        --without-bash-malloc \
+	--disable-coprocesses \
+	--disable-debugger \
+	--disable-net-redirections \
+	--enable-single-help-strings \
+	--disable-nls \
+	--disable-readline \
+
+bash_target := $(MAKE_JOBS) \
+	&& $(MAKE) -C $(build)/$(bash_dir) \
+	DESTDIR="$(INSTALL)" \
+	install \
+
+bash_output := bash
+
+bash_depends := $(musl_dep)
--- a/modules/linux
+++ b/modules/linux
@ -131,6 +131,10 @@ linux_modules-$(CONFIG_LINUX_MEI)	+= drivers/misc/mei/mei-me.ko

 EXTRA_FLAGS := -fdebug-prefix-map=$(pwd)=heads -gno-record-gcc-switches

+ifeq "$(CONFIG_LINUX_VERSION)" "4.14.62"
+EXTRA_FLAGS += -Wno-cast-function-type
+endif
+
 linux_target := \
 	O="$(build)/$(linux_dir)" \
 	ARCH="$(LINUX_ARCH)" \
--- a/modules/openssl
+++ b/modules/openssl
@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+# OpenSSL library
+modules-$(CONFIG_OPENSSL) += openssl
+
+openssl_version := 3.0.8
+openssl_dir := openssl-$(openssl_version)
+openssl_tar := openssl-$(openssl_version).tar.gz
+openssl_url := https://www.openssl.org/source/$(openssl_tar)
+openssl_hash := 6c13d2bf38fdf31eac3ce2a347073673f5d63263398f1f69d0df4a41253e4b3e
+
+# hack to provide path to libgcc
+LIBGCC_DIR := $(dir $(shell $(heads_cc) -print-libgcc-file-name))
+
+# The only optional algorithm that's enabled is SM3.  tpm2-tss uses SHA, AES,
+# and SM3.
+openssl_configure := \
+	$(CROSS_TOOLS) \
+	CFLAGS="-Os" \
+	LDFLAGS="-L$(LIBGCC_DIR)" \
+	./Configure \
+		--prefix="/" \
+		no-tests \
+		linux-$(strip $(arch)) \
+		no-aria \
+		no-bf \
+		no-blake2 \
+		no-camellia \
+		no-cast \
+		no-chacha \
+		no-cmac \
+		no-des \
+		no-dh \
+		no-dsa \
+		no-ecdh \
+		no-ecdsa \
+		no-idea \
+		no-md4 \
+		no-mdc2 \
+		no-ocb \
+		no-poly1305 \
+		no-rc2 \
+		no-rc4 \
+		no-rmd160 \
+		no-scrypt \
+		no-seed \
+		no-siphash \
+		no-siv \
+		no-sm2 \
+		no-sm4 \
+		no-whirlpool \
+
+openssl_target := $(MAKE_JOBS) \
+	build_programs \
+	&& \
+	$(MAKE) \
+		-C "$(build)/$(openssl_dir)" \
+		DESTDIR="$(INSTALL)" \
+		LIBDIR="lib" \
+		install_sw \
+
+# Only libcrypto is needed currently, libssl is not included in initrd
+openssl_libraries := \
+	libcrypto.so.3 \
+
+openssl_depends := $(musl_dep)
--- a/modules/tpm2-tools
+++ b/modules/tpm2-tools
@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# TPM2 tools program
+modules-$(CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS) += tpm2-tools
+
+# CONFIG_TPM means any TPM version.  (CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS differentiates them when
+# they must be handled differently, which should be localized.)  Boards setting
+# CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS=y imply CONFIG_TPM=y.
+ifeq "$(CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS)" "y"
+	export CONFIG_TPM=y
+endif
+
+tpm2-tools_version := 5.2
+#tpm2-tools_version := 78a7681
+#tpm2-tools_repo := https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tools.git
+
+tpm2-tools_dir := tpm2-tools-$(tpm2-tools_version)
+tpm2-tools_tar := tpm2-tools-$(tpm2-tools_version).tar.gz
+tpm2-tools_url := https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tools/releases/download/$(tpm2-tools_version)/$(tpm2-tools_tar)
+tpm2-tools_hash := c0b402f6a7b3456e8eb2445211e2d41c46c7e769e05fe4d8909ff64119f7a630
+
+# we have ESYS 3.0, but it doesn't figure that out on its own
+tpm2-tools_configure := ./bootstrap && ./configure \
+	$(CROSS_TOOLS) \
+	--host $(MUSL_ARCH)-elf-linux \
+	--prefix "/" \
+	--disable-fapi \
+	TSS2_ESYS_3_0_CFLAGS="-I$(INSTALL)/include" \
+	TSS2_ESYS_3_0_LIBS="-ltss2-esys" \
+
+tpm2-tools_target := $(MAKE_JOBS) \
+	DESTDIR="$(INSTALL)" \
+	$(CROSS_TOOLS) \
+	install \
+
+tpm2-tools_output := tools/tpm2
+
+tpm2-tools_depends := openssl tpm2-tss $(musl_dep)
--- a/modules/tpm2-tss
+++ b/modules/tpm2-tss
@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+# TPM2 TSS library
+modules-$(CONFIG_TPM2_TSS) += tpm2-tss
+
+tpm2-tss_version := 3.2.0
+tpm2-tss_dir := tpm2-tss-$(tpm2-tss_version)
+tpm2-tss_tar := tpm2-tss-$(tpm2-tss_version).tar.gz
+tpm2-tss_url := https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss/releases/download/$(tpm2-tss_version)/$(tpm2-tss_tar)
+tpm2-tss_hash := 48305e4144dcf6d10f3b25b7bccf0189fd2d1186feafd8cd68c6b17ecf0d7912
+
+tpm2-tss_configure := aclocal && automake --add-missing && autoreconf -fi \
+	&& ./configure \
+	$(CROSS_TOOLS) \
+	--host $(MUSL_ARCH)-elf-linux \
+	--prefix "/" \
+	--disable-doxygen-doc \
+	--disable-doxygen-man \
+	--disable-doxygen-rtf \
+	--disable-doxygen-html \
+	--disable-fapi \
+
+# Run one build to generate the executables with the pre-defined
+# exec_prefix and datarootdir, then a second make to install the binaries
+# into our actual target location
+
+tpm2-tss_target := $(MAKE_JOBS) \
+	DESTDIR="$(INSTALL)" \
+	$(CROSS_TOOLS) \
+	install \
+
+# tpm2 binary wants to dlopen some libraries, so be sure that
+# they are available.  It would be nice to statically link these.
+tpm2-tss_libraries := \
+	src/tss2-rc/.libs/libtss2-rc.so.0 \
+	src/tss2-mu/.libs/libtss2-mu.so.0 \
+	src/tss2-sys/.libs/libtss2-sys.so.1 \
+	src/tss2-esys/.libs/libtss2-esys.so.0 \
+	src/tss2-tcti/.libs/libtss2-tctildr.so.0 \
+	src/tss2-tcti/.libs/libtss2-tcti-device.so.0 \
+
+# The pcap TCTI driver is only included if enabled in the board config.
+ifeq "$(CONFIG_TPM2_CAPTURE_PCAP)" "y"
+tpm2-tss_libraries += src/tss2-tcti/.libs/libtss2-tcti-pcap.so.0
+endif
+
+tpm2-tss_depends := openssl $(musl_dep)
--- a/modules/tpmtotp
+++ b/modules/tpmtotp
@ -2,14 +2,11 @@ modules-$(CONFIG_TPMTOTP) += tpmtotp

 tpmtotp_depends := mbedtls qrencode $(musl_dep)

-#tpmtotp_version := git
-#tpmtotp_repo := https://github.com/osresearch/tpmtotp
-
-tpmtotp_version := 18b860fdcf5a55537c8395b891f2b2a5c24fc00a
+tpmtotp_version := 4d63d21c8b7db2e92ddb393057f168aead147f47
 tpmtotp_dir := tpmtotp-$(tpmtotp_version)
 tpmtotp_tar := tpmtotp-$(tpmtotp_version).tar.gz
 tpmtotp_url := https://github.com/osresearch/tpmtotp/archive/$(tpmtotp_version).tar.gz
-tpmtotp_hash := 1082f2b0e4af833e04220dddedcc21a39eb39ee4dc5668bb010e7bcc795c606c
+tpmtotp_hash := eaac1e8f652f1da7f5a1ed6a8cfefb6511f1e5e1dabf93b44db3b29c18c5ae53

 tpmtotp_target := \
 	$(CROSS_TOOLS) \
--- a/patches/tpm2-tools-5.2.patch
+++ b/patches/tpm2-tools-5.2.patch
@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am
+index 7132215..32e2193 100644
+--- a/Makefile.am
+++ b/Makefile.am
+@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ tss2_tools = \
+ 
+ # Bundle all the tools into a single program similar to busybox
+ bin_PROGRAMS += tools/tpm2
+-tools_tpm2_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(CURL_LIBS)
+tools_tpm2_LDADD = $(LDADD)
+ tools_tpm2_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) -DTPM2_TOOLS_MAX="$(words $(tpm2_tools))"
+ tools_tpm2_SOURCES = \
+ 	tools/tpm2_tool.c \
+@@ -127,7 +127,6 @@ tpm2_tools = \
+     tools/tpm2_encryptdecrypt.c \
+     tools/tpm2_evictcontrol.c \
+     tools/tpm2_flushcontext.c \
+-    tools/tpm2_getekcertificate.c \
+     tools/tpm2_getrandom.c \
+     tools/tpm2_gettime.c \
+     tools/tpm2_hash.c \
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index f1c1711..7279baa 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -59,7 +59,6 @@ PKG_CHECK_MODULES([TSS2_MU], [tss2-mu])
+ PKG_CHECK_MODULES([TSS2_RC], [tss2-rc])
+ PKG_CHECK_MODULES([TSS2_SYS], [tss2-sys])
+ PKG_CHECK_MODULES([CRYPTO], [libcrypto >= 1.1.0])
+-PKG_CHECK_MODULES([CURL], [libcurl])
+ 
+ # pretty print of devicepath if efivar library is present
+ PKG_CHECK_MODULES([EFIVAR], [efivar],,[true])
--- a/patches/tpm2-tss-3.2.0.patch
+++ b/patches/tpm2-tss-3.2.0.patch
@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+--- a/configure.ac	2022-05-21 14:40:59.686470575 +0800
+++ b/configure.ac	2022-05-21 14:41:21.406671435 +0800
+@@ -488,17 +488,6 @@ AM_CONDITIONAL(SYSD_SYSUSERS, test "x$sy
+ AC_CHECK_PROG(systemd_tmpfiles, systemd-tmpfiles, yes)
+ AM_CONDITIONAL(SYSD_TMPFILES, test "x$systemd_tmpfiles" = "xyes")
+ 
+-# Check all tools used by make install
+-AS_IF([test "$HOSTOS" = "Linux"],
+-    [ AC_CHECK_PROG(useradd, useradd, yes)
+-      AC_CHECK_PROG(groupadd, groupadd, yes)
+-      AC_CHECK_PROG(adduser, adduser, yes)
+-      AC_CHECK_PROG(addgroup, addgroup, yes)
+-      AS_IF([test "x$addgroup" != "xyes" && test "x$groupadd" != "xyes" ],
+-         [AC_MSG_ERROR([addgroup or groupadd are needed.])])
+-      AS_IF([test "x$adduser" != "xyes" && test "x$useradd" != "xyes" ],
+-         [AC_MSG_ERROR([adduser or useradd are needed.])])])
+-
+ AC_SUBST([PATH])
+ 
+ dnl --------- Doxy Gen -----------------------
				`@ -0,0 +1 @@`
				`../qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1-hotp/qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1-hotp.md`