add some warning to the t480 board config about the TPM GPIO reset attack

https://mkukri.xyz/2024/06/01/tpm-gpio-fail.html
Signed-off-by: gaspar-ilom <gasparilom@riseup.net>
This commit is contained in:
gaspar-ilom 2025-02-18 21:30:47 +01:00
parent f02ab497a1
commit 9978aa6134
No known key found for this signature in database
2 changed files with 14 additions and 0 deletions

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@ -1,5 +1,12 @@
# Configuration for a T480 running Qubes 4.2.3 and other Linux Based OSes (through kexec)
#
# CAVEATS:
# This board is vulnerable to a TPM reset attack, i.e. the PCRs are reset while the system is running.
# This attack can be used to bypass measured boot when an attacker succeeds at modifying the SPI flash.
# Also it can be used to extract FDE keys from a TPM.
# The related coreboot issue contains more information: https://ticket.coreboot.org/issues/576
# Make sure you understand the implications of the attack for your threat model before using this board.
#
# Includes
# - Deactivated+neutered+deguarded ME and expanded consequent IFD BIOS regions
# - Forged GBE MAC address to 00:DE:AD:C0:FF:EE MAC address (if not extracting gbe.bin from backup with blobs/xx80/extract.sh)

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@ -1,5 +1,12 @@
# Configuration for a T480 running Qubes 4.2.3 and other Linux Based OSes (through kexec)
#
# CAVEATS:
# This board is vulnerable to a TPM reset attack, i.e. the PCRs are reset while the system is running.
# This attack can be used to bypass measured boot when an attacker succeeds at modifying the SPI flash.
# Also it can be used to extract FDE keys from a TPM.
# The related coreboot issue contains more information: https://ticket.coreboot.org/issues/576
# Make sure you understand the implications of the attack for your threat model before using this board.
#
# Includes
# - Deactivated+neutered+deguarded ME and expanded consequent IFD BIOS regions
# - Forged GBE MAC address to 00:DE:AD:C0:FF:EE MAC address (if not extracting gbe.bin from backup with blobs/xx80/extract.sh)