TPM Disk Unlock Key sealing/renewal cleanup (Triggered automatically when resealing TOTP)

Changes:
- As per master: when TOTP cannot unseal TOTP, user is prompted to either reset or regenerate TOTP
- Now, when either is done and a previous TPM Disk Unlock Key was setuped, the user is guided into:
  - Regenerating checksums and signing them
  - Regenerating TPM disk Unlock Key and resealing TPM disk Unlock Key with passphrase into TPM
  - LUKS header being modified, user is asked to resign kexec.sig one last time prior of being able to default boot
- When no previous Disk Unlock Key was setuped, the user is guided into:
  - The above, plus
    - Detection of LUKS containers,suggesting only relevant partitions

- Addition of TRACE and DEBUG statements to troubleshoot actual vs expected behavior while coding
  - Were missing under TPM Disk Unlock Key setup codepaths

- Fixes for #645 : We now check if only one slots exists and we do not use it if its slot1.
  - Also shows in DEBUG traces now

Unrelated staged changes
- ash_functions: warn and die now contains proper spacing and eye attaction
- all warn and die calls modified if containing warnings and too much punctuation
- unify usage of term TPM Disk Unlock Key and Disk Recovery Key

FAQ.md

@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ to deceive you and steal your login password?  Maybe!  It wouldn't get
 your disk password, which is perhaps an improvement.
 
 
-Disk key in TPM or user passphrase?
+Disk key in TPM (TPM Disk Unlock Key) or user passphrase?
 ---
 Depends on your threat model.  With the disk key in the TPM an attacker
 would need to have the entire machine (or a backdoor in the TPM)

initrd/bin/flashrom-kgpe-d16-openbmc.sh

@@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ sha256sum /tmp/kgpe-d16-openbmc.rom
 flashrom --programmer="ast1100:spibus=2,cpu=reset" -c "S25FL128P......0" -w /tmp/kgpe-d16-openbmc.rom \
 || die "$ROM: Flash failed"
 
-warn "Reboot and hopefully it works..."
+warn "Reboot and hopefully it works"
 exit 0

initrd/bin/gui-init

@@ -173,7 +173,8 @@ generate_totp_hotp()
     # clear screen
     printf "\033c"
   else
-    warn "Unsealing TOTP/HOTP secret from previous sealed measurements failed. Try "Generate new HOTP/TOTP secret" option if you updated firmware content."
+    warn "Unsealing TOTP/HOTP secret from previous sealed measurements failed"
+    warn "Try "Generate new HOTP/TOTP secret" option if you updated firmware content"
   fi
 }
 
@@ -229,6 +230,7 @@ update_totp()
           if (whiptail $BG_COLOR_WARNING --title 'Generate new TOTP/HOTP secret' \
               --yesno "This will erase your old secret and replace it with a new one!\n\nDo you want to proceed?" 0 80) then
             generate_totp_hotp && update_totp && BG_COLOR_MAIN_MENU=""
+            reseal_tpm_disk_decryption_key
           fi
           ;;
         i )
@@ -237,6 +239,7 @@ update_totp()
           ;;
         p )
           reset_tpm && update_totp && BG_COLOR_MAIN_MENU=""
+          reseal_tpm_disk_decryption_key
           ;;
         x )
           recovery "User requested recovery shell"
@@ -298,6 +301,7 @@ update_hotp()
         if (whiptail $BG_COLOR_WARNING --title 'Generate new TOTP/HOTP secret' \
             --yesno "This will erase your old secret and replace it with a new one!\n\nDo you want to proceed?" 0 80) then
           generate_totp_hotp && BG_COLOR_MAIN_MENU=""
+          reseal_tpm_disk_decryption_key
         fi
         ;;
       i )
@@ -523,9 +527,11 @@ show_tpm_totp_hotp_options_menu()
   case "$option" in 
     g )
       generate_totp_hotp
+      reseal_tpm_disk_decryption_key
       ;;
     r )
       reset_tpm
+      reseal_tpm_disk_decryption_key
       ;;
     t )
       prompt_totp_mismatch
@@ -571,8 +577,10 @@ reset_tpm()
       # now that the TPM is reset, remove invalid TPM counter files
       mount_boot
       mount -o rw,remount /boot
+      warn "Removing rollback and primary handle hash under /boot"
       rm -f /boot/kexec_rollback.txt
       rm -f /boot/kexec_primhdl_hash.txt
+      #TODO: When primhdl_hash is gone but not recreated and signed: fail at TPM Disk Unlock Key for TPM2....
 
       # create Heads TPM counter before any others
       check_tpm_counter /boot/kexec_rollback.txt "" "$key_password" \

initrd/bin/kexec-boot

@@ -158,7 +158,9 @@ if [ "$CONFIG_DEBUG_OUTPUT" = "y" ];then
 	#Repeat kexec command that will be executed since in debug
 	DEBUG "kexeccmd= $kexeccmd"
 
-	read -n 1 -p "[DEBUG] Continue booting? [Y/n]: " debug_boot_confirm
+	#Ask user if they want to continue booting without echoing back the input (-s)
+	read -s -n 1 -p "[DEBUG] Continue booting? [Y/n]: " debug_boot_confirm
+	echo
 	if [ "${debug_boot_confirm^^}" = N ]; then
 		# abort
 		die "Boot aborted"

initrd/bin/kexec-save-default

@@ -8,10 +8,10 @@ TRACE "Under /bin/kexec-save-default"
 
 while getopts "b:d:p:i:" arg; do
 	case $arg in
-		b) bootdir="$OPTARG" ;;
+	b) bootdir="$OPTARG" ;;
-		d) paramsdev="$OPTARG" ;;
+	d) paramsdev="$OPTARG" ;;
-		p) paramsdir="$OPTARG" ;;
+	p) paramsdir="$OPTARG" ;;
-		i) index="$OPTARG" ;;
+	i) index="$OPTARG" ;;
 	esac
 done
 
@@ -35,21 +35,53 @@ TMP_MENU_FILE="/tmp/kexec/kexec_menu.txt"
 ENTRY_FILE="$paramsdir/kexec_default.$index.txt"
 HASH_FILE="$paramsdir/kexec_default_hashes.txt"
 PRIMHASH_FILE="$paramsdir/kexec_primhdl_hash.txt"
+KEY_DEVICES="$paramsdir/kexec_key_devices.txt"
+KEY_LVM="$paramsdir/kexec_key_lvm.txt"
+
+
+lvm_suggest=$(lvm vgscan | awk -F '"' {'print $1'} | tail -n +2)
+num_lvm=$(echo "$lvm_suggest" | wc -l)
+if [ "$num_lvm" -eq 1 ] && [ -n "$lvm_suggest" ]; then
+	lvm_volume_group="$lvm_suggest"
+elif [ -z "$lvm_suggest" ]; then
+	num_lvm=0
+fi
+DEBUG "LVM num_lvm: $num_lvm, lvm_suggest: $lvm_suggest"
+
+# get all LUKS container devices
+devices_suggest=$(blkid | cut -d ':' -f 1 | while read device; do
+	cryptsetup isLuks "$device"
+	if [ $(echo $?) == 0 ]; then echo "$device"; fi
+done | sort)
+num_devices=$(echo "$devices_suggest" | wc -l)
+
+if [ "$num_devices" -eq 1 ] && [ -s "$devices_suggest" ]; then
+	key_devices=$devices_suggest
+else
+	devices_suggest=$(echo $devices_suggest)
+fi
+DEBUG "LUKS num_devices: $num_devices, devices_suggest: $devices_suggest"
+
+if [ "$num_lvm" -eq 0 ] && [ "$num_devices" -eq 0 ]; then
+	#No encrypted partition found.
+	no_encrypted_partition=1
+fi
 
 if [ ! -r "$TMP_MENU_FILE" ]; then
 	die "No menu options available, please run kexec-select-boot"
 fi
 
-entry=`head -n $index $TMP_MENU_FILE | tail -1`
+entry=$(head -n $index $TMP_MENU_FILE | tail -1)
 if [ -z "$entry" ]; then
 	die "Invalid menu index $index"
 fi
 
-KEY_DEVICES="$paramsdir/kexec_key_devices.txt"
-KEY_LVM="$paramsdir/kexec_key_lvm.txt"
 save_key="n"
 if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ] && [ "$CONFIG_TPM_NO_LUKS_DISK_UNLOCK" != "y" ] && [ "$CONFIG_BASIC" != y ]; then
+	DEBUG "TPM is enabled and TPM_NO_LUKS_DISK_UNLOCK is not set"
+	DEBUG "Checking if a a TPM Disk Unlock Key was previously setuped from $KEY_DEVICES"
 	if [ ! -r "$KEY_DEVICES" ]; then
+		DEBUG "No previous TPM Disk Unlock Key was setuped for LUKS devices, confirming to add a disk encryption to the TPM"
 		read \
 			-n 1 \
 			-p "Do you wish to add a disk encryption to the TPM [y/N]: " \
@@ -58,11 +90,11 @@ if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ] && [ "$CONFIG_TPM_NO_LUKS_DISK_UNLOCK" != "y" ] && [
 
 		if [ "$add_key_confirm" = "y" \
 			-o "$add_key_confirm" = "Y" ]; then
-			lvm_suggest="e.g. qubes_dom0 or blank"
+			DEBUG "User confirmed to add a disk encryption to the TPM"
-			devices_suggest="e.g. /dev/sda2 or blank"
 			save_key="y"
 		fi
 	else
+		DEBUG "Previous TPM Disk Unlock Key was setuped for LUKS devices"
 		read \
 			-n 1 \
 			-p "Do you want to reseal a disk key to the TPM [y/N]: " \
@@ -73,36 +105,85 @@ if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ] && [ "$CONFIG_TPM_NO_LUKS_DISK_UNLOCK" != "y" ] && [
 			-o "$change_key_confirm" = "Y" ]; then
 			old_lvm_volume_group=""
 			if [ -r "$KEY_LVM" ]; then
-				old_lvm_volume_group=`cat $KEY_LVM` || true
+				old_lvm_volume_group=$(cat $KEY_LVM) || true
-				old_key_devices=`cat $KEY_DEVICES \
+				old_key_devices=$(cat $KEY_DEVICES |
-				| cut -d\  -f1 \
+					cut -d\  -f1 |
-				| grep -v "$old_lvm_volume_group" \
+					grep -v "$old_lvm_volume_group" |
-				| xargs` || true
+					xargs) || true
 			else
-				old_key_devices=`cat $KEY_DEVICES \
+				old_key_devices=$(cat $KEY_DEVICES |
-				| cut -d\  -f1 | xargs` || true
+					cut -d\  -f1 | xargs) || true
 			fi
 
-			lvm_suggest="was '$old_lvm_volume_group'"
+			lvm_suggest="$old_lvm_volume_group"
-			devices_suggest="was '$old_key_devices'"
+			devices_suggest="$old_key_devices"
 			save_key="y"
 		fi
 	fi
 
 	if [ "$save_key" = "y" ]; then
-		echo "+++ LVM volume groups (lvm vgscan): "
+		if [ -n "$old_key_devices" ] || [ -n "$old_lvm_volume_group" ]; then
-		lvm vgscan || true
+			DEBUG "Previous TPM Disk Unlock Key was setuped for LUKS devices $old_key_devices $old_lvm_volume_group"
+			read \
+				-n 1 \
+				-p "Do you want to reuse configured Encrypted LVM groups/Block devices? (Y/n):" \
+				reuse_past_devices
+			echo
+			if [ "$reuse_past_devices" = "y" ] || [ "$reuse_past_devices" = "Y" ] || [ -z "$reuse_past_devices" ]; then
+				if [ -z "$key_devices" ] && [ -n "$old_key_devices" ]; then
+					key_devices="$old_key_devices"
+				fi
+				if [ -z "$lvm_volume_group" ] && [ -n "$old_lvm_volume_group" ]; then
+					lvm_volume_group="$old_lvm_volume_group"
+				fi
+			fi
+		else
+			DEBUG "No previous TPM Disk Unlock Key was setuped for LUKS devices, setting up new ones"
+			if [ "$num_lvm" -gt 1 ]; then
+				DEBUG "Multiple LVM groups found"
+				//untested
+				selected_lvmdev_not_existing=1
+				while [ $selected_lvmdev_not_existing -ne 0 ]; do
+					{
+						read \
+							-p "Encrypted LVM group? choose between: '$lvm_suggest': " \
+							lvm_volume_group
 
-		read \
+						result=$(echo "$lvm_suggest" | grep -q "$lvm_volume_group") || selected_lvmdev_not_existing=1
-			-p "LVM group containing Encrypted LVs (retype to keep)? ($lvm_suggest): " \
+						if [ $? == 0 ]; then
-			lvm_volume_group
+							selected_lvmdev_not_existing=0
+						fi
+					}
+				done
+			elif [ "$num_lvm" -eq 1 ] && [ -s $lvm_suggest ]; then
+				echo "Single Encrypted LVM group found at $lvm_suggest."
+				lvm_volume_group=$lvm_suggest
+			else
+				echo "No encrypted LVM Group found."
+			fi
 
-		echo "+++ Block devices (blkid): "
+			if [ "$num_devices" -gt 1 ]; then
-		blkid || true
+				DEBUG "Multiple LUKS devices found"
+				selected_luksdev_not_existing=1
+				while [ $selected_luksdev_not_existing -ne 0 ]; do
+					{
+						read \
+							-p "Encrypted devices? (choose between: '$devices_suggest'): " \
+							key_devices
 
-		read \
+						result=$(echo "$devices_suggest" | grep -q "$key_devices") || selected_luksdev_not_existing=1
-			-p "Encrypted devices (retype to keep)? ($devices_suggest): " \
+						if [ $? == 0 ]; then
-			key_devices
+							selected_luksdev_not_existing=0
+						fi
+					}
+				done
+			elif [ "$num_devices" -eq 1 ]; then
+				echo "Single Encrypted Disk found at $devices_suggest."
+				key_devices=$devices_suggest
+			else
+				echo "No encrypted devices found."
+			fi
+		fi
 
 		save_key_params="-s -p $paramsdev"
 		if [ -n "$lvm_volume_group" ]; then
@@ -110,9 +191,8 @@ if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ] && [ "$CONFIG_TPM_NO_LUKS_DISK_UNLOCK" != "y" ] && [
 		else
 			save_key_params="$save_key_params $key_devices"
 		fi
-		echo "Running kexec-save-key with params: $save_key_params"
+		kexec-save-key $save_key_params ||
-		kexec-save-key $save_key_params \
+			die "Failed to save the disk key"
-			|| die "Failed to save the disk key"
 	fi
 fi
 
@@ -120,19 +200,20 @@ fi
 mount -o rw,remount $paramsdev
 
 if [ ! -d $paramsdir ]; then
-	mkdir -p $paramsdir \
+	mkdir -p $paramsdir ||
-	|| die "Failed to create params directory"
+		die "Failed to create params directory"
 fi
 
 if [ "$CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS" = "y" ]; then
-	sha256sum /tmp/primary.handle > "$PRIMHASH_FILE" \
+	sha256sum /tmp/primary.handle >"$PRIMHASH_FILE" ||
-		|| die "ERROR: Failed to Hash TPM2 primary key handle!"
+		die "ERROR: Failed to Hash TPM2 primary key handle!"
 fi
 
 rm $paramsdir/kexec_default.*.txt 2>/dev/null || true
-echo "$entry" > $ENTRY_FILE
+echo "$entry" >$ENTRY_FILE
-( cd $bootdir && kexec-boot -b "$bootdir" -e "$entry" -f| \
+(
-	xargs sha256sum > $HASH_FILE \
+	cd $bootdir && kexec-boot -b "$bootdir" -e "$entry" -f |
+		xargs sha256sum >$HASH_FILE
 ) || die "Failed to create hashes of boot files"
 if [ ! -r $ENTRY_FILE -o ! -r $HASH_FILE ]; then
 	die "Failed to write default config"
@@ -144,19 +225,19 @@ if [ "$save_key" = "y" ]; then
 	cd /tmp/initrd_extract
 	# Get initrd filename selected to be default initrd that OS could be using to configure LUKS on boot by deploying crypttab files
 	current_default_initrd=$(cat /boot/kexec_default_hashes.txt | grep initr | awk -F " " {'print $NF'} | sed 's/\.\//\/boot\//g')
-	
+
 	# Get crypttab files paths from initrd
 	echo "+++ Checking current selected default boot's $current_default_initrd for existing crypttab files..."
 	# First either decompress or use the original if it's not compressed
 	initrd_decompressed="/tmp/initrd_extract/initrd_decompressed.cpio"
-	zcat < "$current_default_initrd" > "$initrd_decompressed" 2> /dev/null || initrd_decompressed="$current_default_initrd"
+	zcat <"$current_default_initrd" >"$initrd_decompressed" 2>/dev/null || initrd_decompressed="$current_default_initrd"
-	crypttab_files=$(cpio --list --quiet < "$initrd_decompressed" | grep crypttab 2> /dev/null) || true
+	crypttab_files=$(cpio --list --quiet <"$initrd_decompressed" | grep crypttab 2>/dev/null) || true
-	
+
 	if [ ! -z "$crypttab_files" ]; then
 		echo "+++ Extracting current selected default boot's $current_default_initrd for found crypttab files analysis..."
-		cpio -id --quiet < $initrd_decompressed $crypttab_files 2> /dev/null
+		cpio -id --quiet $crypttab_files <$initrd_decompressed 2>/dev/null
 		rm -f $bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt || true
-		
+
 		#Parsing each crypttab file found
 		echo "$crypttab_files" | while read filepath; do
 			# Keep only non-commented lines
@@ -165,7 +246,7 @@ if [ "$save_key" = "y" ]; then
 			modified_filepath_entries=$(echo "$current_filepath_entries" | sed 's/none/\/secret.key/g')
 			echo "$modified_filepath_entries" | while read single_modified_filepath_entry; do
 				# Append each found filepath:entry into additional kexec_ file that will be part of detached signed digest
-				echo "$filepath:$single_modified_filepath_entry" >> $bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt
+				echo "$filepath:$single_modified_filepath_entry" >>$bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt
 			done
 		done
 
@@ -189,14 +270,14 @@ fi
 
 # sign and auto-roll config counter
 extparam=
-if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ];then
+if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
 	if [ "$CONFIG_IGNORE_ROLLBACK" != "y" ]; then
 		extparam=-r
 	fi
 fi
 if [ "$CONFIG_BASIC" != "y" ]; then
-	kexec-sign-config -p $paramsdir $extparam \
+	kexec-sign-config -p $paramsdir $extparam ||
-		|| die "Failed to sign default config"
+		die "Failed to sign default config"
 fi
 # switch back to ro mode
 mount -o ro,remount $paramsdev

initrd/bin/kexec-save-key

@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
 #!/bin/bash
 # Generate a TPM key used to unlock LUKS disks
+
+. /etc/functions
+
+TRACE "kexec-save-key: start"
 set -e -o pipefail
 . /etc/functions
 
@@ -13,20 +17,28 @@ while getopts "sp:d:l:" arg; do
 		l) lvm_volume_group="$OPTARG" ;;
 	esac
 done
+
+DEBUG "kexec-save-key prior of parsing: paramsdir: $paramsdir, paramsdev: $paramsdev, lvm_volume_group: $lvm_volume_group"
+
 shift `expr $OPTIND - 1`
 key_devices="$@"
 
+DEBUG "kexec-save-key: key_devices: $key_devices"
+
 if [ -z "$paramsdir" ]; then
 	die "Usage: $0 [-s] -p /boot [-l qubes_dom0] [/dev/sda2 /dev/sda5 ...] "
 fi
 
 if [ -z "$paramsdev" ]; then
 	paramsdev="$paramsdir"
+	DEBUG "kexec-save-key: paramsdev modified to : $paramsdev"
 fi
 
 paramsdev="${paramsdev%%/}"
 paramsdir="${paramsdir%%/}"
 
+DEBUG "kexec-save-key prior of last override: paramsdir: $paramsdir, paramsdev: $paramsdev, lvm_volume_group: $lvm_volume_group"
+
 if [ -n "$lvm_volume_group" ]; then
 	lvm vgchange -a y $lvm_volume_group \
 	|| die "Failed to activate the LVM group"
@@ -45,14 +57,17 @@ mount -o rw,remount $paramsdev
 
 rm -f $paramsdir/kexec_key_lvm.txt || true
 if [ -n "$lvm_volume_group" ]; then
+	DEBUG "kexec-save-key saving under $paramsdir/kexec_key_lvm.txt : lvm_volume_group: $lvm_volume_group"
 	echo "$lvm_volume_group" > $paramsdir/kexec_key_lvm.txt \
 	|| die "Failed to write lvm group to key config "
 fi
 
 rm -f $paramsdir/kexec_key_devices.txt || true
 for dev in $key_devices; do
+	DEBUG "gettinmg uuid for $dev"
 	uuid=`cryptsetup luksUUID "$dev" 2>/dev/null` \
 	|| die "Failed to get UUID for device $dev"
+	DEBUG "saving under $paramsdir/kexec_key_devices.txt : dev: $dev, uuid: $uuid"
 	echo "$dev $uuid" >> $paramsdir/kexec_key_devices.txt \
 	|| die "Failed to add $dev:$uuid to key devices config"
 done
@@ -71,4 +86,4 @@ if [ "$skip_sign" != "y" ]; then
 fi
 
 # switch back to ro mode
-mount -o ro,remount $paramsdev
+mount -o ro,remount $paramsdev

initrd/bin/kexec-seal-key

@@ -26,16 +26,20 @@ KEY_LVM="$paramsdir/kexec_key_lvm.txt"
 
 if [ ! -r "$KEY_DEVICES" ]; then
 	die "No devices defined for disk encryption"
+else
+	DEBUG "Devices defined for disk encryption: $(cat "$KEY_DEVICES" | cut -d\  -f1)"
 fi
 
 if [ -r "$KEY_LVM" ]; then
 	# Activate the LVM volume group
-	VOLUME_GROUP=`cat $KEY_LVM`
+	VOLUME_GROUP=$(cat $KEY_LVM)
 	if [ -z "$VOLUME_GROUP" ]; then
 		die "No LVM volume group defined for activation"
 	fi
-	lvm vgchange -a y $VOLUME_GROUP \
+	lvm vgchange -a y $VOLUME_GROUP ||
-		|| die "$VOLUME_GROUP: unable to activate volume group"
+		die "$VOLUME_GROUP: unable to activate volume group"
+else
+	DEBUG "No LVM volume group defined for activation"
 fi
 
 DEBUG "$(pcrs)"
@@ -43,50 +47,69 @@ DEBUG "$(pcrs)"
 # LUKS Key slot 0 is the manual recovery pass phrase
 # that they user entered when they installed OS,
 # key slot 1 is the one that we've generated.
-read -s -p "Enter disk recovery key: " disk_password
+read -s -p "Enter disk recovery key/passphrase: " disk_password
-echo -n "$disk_password" > "$RECOVERY_KEY"
+echo -n "$disk_password" >"$RECOVERY_KEY"
 echo
 
-read -s -p "New disk unlock password for booting: " key_password
+read -s -p "New TPM Disk Unlock Key passphrase for booting: " key_password
 echo
-read -s -p "Repeat unlock code: " key_password2
+read -s -p "Repeat TPM Disk Unlock key passphrase: " key_password2
 echo
 
 if [ "$key_password" != "$key_password2" ]; then
-	die "Key passwords do not match"
+	die "Key passphrases do not match"
 fi
 
 # Generate key file
+echo "++++++ Generating new randomized 128 bytes key file that will be unsealed by TPM Disk Unlock Key passphrase"
 dd \
 	if=/dev/urandom \
 	of="$KEY_FILE" \
 	bs=1 \
 	count=128 \
-	2>/dev/null \
+	2>/dev/null ||
-|| die "Unable to generate 128 random bytes"
+	die "Unable to generate 128 random bytes"
+
+# Count the number of slots used on each device
+for dev in $(cat "$KEY_DEVICES" | cut -d\  -f1); do
+	DEBUG "Checking number of slots used on $dev"
+	#check if the device is a LUKS device with luks[1,2]
+	slots_used=$(cryptsetup luksDump $dev | grep -c 'luks[0-9]*' || die "Unable to get number of slots used on $dev")
+	DEBUG "Number of slots used on $dev: $slots_used"
+	# If slot1 is the only one used, warn and die with proper messages
+	if [ $slots_used -eq 1 ]; then
+		# Check if slot 1 is the only one existing
+		if cryptsetup luksDump $dev | grep -q "Slot 1: ENABLED"; then
+			warn "Slot 1 is the only one existing on $dev. Heads cannot use it to store TPM sealed LUKS Disk Unlock Key"
+			die "Slot 1 should not be the only one existing on $dev. Fix your custom setup"
+		fi
+	else
+		DEBUG "Slot 1 is not the only one existing on $dev. It is safe to use it to store TPM sealed LUKS Disk Unlock Key"
+	fi
+done
 
 # Remove all the old keys from slot 1
-for dev in `cat "$KEY_DEVICES" | cut -d\  -f1`; do
+for dev in $(cat "$KEY_DEVICES" | cut -d\  -f1); do
-	echo "++++++ $dev: Removing old key slot"
+	echo "++++++ $dev: Removing old key slot 1"
 	cryptsetup luksKillSlot \
 		--key-file "$RECOVERY_KEY" \
-		$dev 1 \
+		$dev 1 ||
-	|| warn "$dev: ignoring problem"
+		warn "$dev: removal of key in slot 1 failed: might not exist. Continuing"
 
-	echo "++++++ $dev: Adding key"
+	echo "++++++ $dev: Adding key to slot 1"
 	cryptsetup luksAddKey \
 		--key-file "$RECOVERY_KEY" \
 		--key-slot 1 \
-		$dev "$KEY_FILE" \
+		$dev "$KEY_FILE" ||
-	|| die "$dev: Unable to add key"
+		die "$dev: Unable to add key to slot 1"
 done
 
 # Now that we have setup the new keys, measure the PCRs
 # We don't care what ends up in PCR 6; we just want
 # to get the /tmp/luksDump.txt file.  We use PCR16
 # since it should still be zero
-cat "$KEY_DEVICES" | cut -d\  -f1 | xargs /bin/qubes-measure-luks \
+cat "$KEY_DEVICES" | cut -d\  -f1 | xargs /bin/qubes-measure-luks ||
-	|| die "Unable to measure the LUKS headers"
+	die "Unable to measure the LUKS headers"
 
 pcrf="/tmp/secret/pcrf.bin"
 tpmr pcrread 0 "$pcrf"
@@ -94,19 +117,19 @@ tpmr pcrread -a 1 "$pcrf"
 tpmr pcrread -a 2 "$pcrf"
 tpmr pcrread -a 3 "$pcrf"
 # Note that PCR 4 needs to be set with the "normal-boot" path value, read it from event log.
-tpmr calcfuturepcr 4 >> "$pcrf"
+tpmr calcfuturepcr 4 >>"$pcrf"
 if [ "$CONFIG_USB_KEYBOARD" = "y" -o -r /lib/modules/libata.ko -o -x /bin/hotp_verification ]; then
-	DEBUG "Sealing TPM disk unlock key with PCR5 involvement (additional kernel modules are loaded per board config)..."
+	DEBUG "Sealing TPM Disk Unlock key with PCR5 involvement (additional kernel modules are loaded per board config)..."
 	# Here, we take pcr 5 into consideration if modules are expected to be measured+loaded
 	tpmr pcrread -a 5 "$pcrf"
 else
-	DEBUG "Sealing TPM disk unlock key with PCR5=0 (NO additional kernel modules are loaded per board config)..."
+	DEBUG "Sealing TPM Disk Unlock Key with PCR5=0 (NO additional kernel modules are loaded per board config)..."
 	#no kernel modules are expected to be measured+loaded
-	tpmr calcfuturepcr 5 >> "$pcrf"
+	tpmr calcfuturepcr 5 >>"$pcrf"
 fi
 # Precompute the value for pcr 6
-DEBUG "Precomputing TPM future value for PCR6 sealing/unsealing of TPM disk unlock key..."
+DEBUG "Precomputing TPM future value for PCR6 sealing/unsealing of TPM Disk Unlock Key..."
-tpmr calcfuturepcr 6 "/tmp/luksDump.txt" >> "$pcrf"
+tpmr calcfuturepcr 6 "/tmp/luksDump.txt" >>"$pcrf"
 # We take into consideration user files in cbfs
 tpmr pcrread -a 7 "$pcrf"
 
@@ -115,9 +138,12 @@ DO_WITH_DEBUG --mask-position 7 \
 	"$TPM_SIZE" "$key_password"
 
 # should be okay if this fails
-shred -n 10 -z -u "$pcrf".* 2> /dev/null || true
+shred -n 10 -z -u "$pcrf" 2>/dev/null ||
-shred -n 10 -z -u "$KEY_FILE" 2> /dev/null \
+	warn "Failed to delete pcrf file - continuing"
-|| warn "Failed to delete key file - continuing"
+shred -n 10 -z -u "$KEY_FILE" 2>/dev/null ||
+	warn "Failed to delete key file - continuing"
 
-cp /tmp/luksDump.txt "$paramsdir/kexec_lukshdr_hash.txt" \
+mount -o rw,remount $paramsdir || die "Failed to remount $paramsdir in RW - continuing"
-|| warn "Failed to have hashes of LUKS header - continuing"
+cp -f /tmp/luksDump.txt "$paramsdir/kexec_lukshdr_hash.txt" ||
+	die "Failed to copy LUKS header hashes to /boot - continuing"
+mount -o ro,remount $paramsdir || die "Failed to remount $paramsdir in RO - continuing"

initrd/bin/kexec-select-boot

@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ if [ "$CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS" = "y" ]; then
 			|| {
 			echo "FATAL: Hash of TPM2 primary key handle mismatch!";
 			echo "If you have not intentionally regenerated TPM2 primary key,";
-			warn "your system may have been compromised!";
+			warn "your system may have been compromised";
 		}
 	else
 		echo "WARNING: Hash of TPM2 primary key handle does not exist!"
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ default_select() {
 			whiptail $BG_COLOR_ERROR --title 'ERROR: Boot Entry Has Changed' \
 				--msgbox "The list of boot entries has changed\n\nPlease set a new default" 0 80
 		fi
-		warn "!!! Boot entry has changed - please set a new default"
+		warn "Boot entry has changed - please set a new default"
 		return
 	fi
 	parse_option

initrd/bin/kexec-unseal-key

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ DEBUG "Show PCRs"
 DEBUG "$(pcrs)"
 
 for tries in 1 2 3; do
-	read -s -p "Enter unlock password (blank to abort): " tpm_password
+	read -s -p "Enter LUKS Disk Unlock Key passphrase (blank to abort): " tpm_password
 	echo
 	if [ -z "$tpm_password" ]; then
 		die "Aborting unseal disk encryption key"

initrd/bin/seal-hotpkey

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ HOTP_KEY="/boot/kexec_hotp_key"
 
 mount_boot()
 {
-  TRACE "Under /bin/seal-htopkey:mount_boot"
+  TRACE "Under /bin/seal-hotpkey:mount_boot"
   # Mount local disk if it is not already mounted
   if ! grep -q /boot /proc/mounts ; then
     mount -o ro /boot \

initrd/bin/tpmr

@@ -495,13 +495,13 @@ tpm1_seal() {
 		# The permissions are 0 since there is nothing special
 		# about the sealed file
 		tpm physicalpresence -s \
-			|| warn "Warning: Unable to assert physical presence"
+			|| warn "Unable to assert physical presence"
 
 		prompt_tpm_password
 
 		tpm nv_definespace -in "$index" -sz "$sealed_size" \
 			-pwdo "$tpm_password" -per 0 \
-			|| warn "Warning: Unable to define NVRAM space; trying anyway"
+			|| warn "Unable to define NVRAM space; trying anyway"
 
 
 		tpm nv_writevalue -in "$index" -if "$sealed_file" \
@@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ tpm2_reset() {
 	TRACE "Under /bin/tpmr:tpm2_reset"
 	key_password="$1"
 	mkdir -p "$SECRET_DIR"
-	tpm2 clear -c platform || warn "Unable to clear TPM on platform hierarchy!"
+	tpm2 clear -c platform || warn "Unable to clear TPM on platform hierarchy"
 	tpm2 changeauth -c owner "$(tpm2_password_hex "$key_password")"
 	tpm2 changeauth -c endorsement "$(tpm2_password_hex "$key_password")"
 	tpm2 createprimary -C owner -g sha256 -G "${CONFIG_PRIMARY_KEY_TYPE:-rsa}" \
@@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ tpm2_kexec_finalize() {
 	echo "Locking TPM2 platform hierarchy..."
 	randpass=$(dd if=/dev/urandom bs=4 count=1 status=none | xxd -p)
 	tpm2 changeauth -c platform "$randpass" \
-		|| warn "Failed to lock platform hierarchy of TPM2!"
+		|| warn "Failed to lock platform hierarchy of TPM2"
 }
 
 tpm2_shutdown() {

initrd/etc/ash_functions

@@ -4,13 +4,13 @@
 # busybox ash on legacy-flash boards, and with bash on all other boards.
 
 die() {
-	echo >&2 "$*";
+	echo >&2 " !!! ERROR: $* !!!";
 	sleep 2;
 	exit 1;
 }
 
 warn() {
-	echo >&2 "$*";
+	echo >&2 " *** WARNING: $* ***";
 	sleep 1;
 }
 

initrd/etc/functions

@@ -81,6 +81,36 @@ confirm_totp()
 	echo
 }
 
+reseal_tpm_disk_decryption_key()
+{
+	TRACE "Under /etc/functions:reseal_tpm_disk_decryption_key"
+	#Can be called only on resealing, not on tpm reset:
+	#otherise primary handle and rollback would change.
+	if ! grep -q /boot /proc/mounts ; then
+		mount -o ro /boot \
+		|| recovery "Unable to mount /boot"
+	fi
+
+	if [ -s /boot/kexec_key_devices.txt ] || [ -s /boot/kexec_key_lvm.txt ]; then
+		warn "A TPM disk decryption key previoulsy sealed is now invalid since firmware measurements cannot be unsealed" 
+		warn "Renewing LUKS Disk Unlock Key to be unsealed by TPM Disk Unlock Key passphrase"
+		while ! kexec-seal-key /boot; do
+			warn "Recovery disk encryption key passphrase invalid. Try again!"
+		done
+		warn "LUKS header hash changed under of /boot/kexec_luks_hdr_hash.txt" 
+		warn "Updating checksums and signing all files under /boot/kexec.sig"
+		while ! update_checksums; do
+		warn "Checksums were not signed. Bad GPG PIN provided?" 
+		warn "Please update checksums and provide a valid GPG PIN"
+		done
+		warn "Rebooting in 3 seconds to enable booting default boot option"
+		sleep 3
+		reboot
+	else
+		DEBUG "No TPM disk decryption key to reseal"
+	fi
+}
+
 # Enable USB storage (if not already enabled), and wait for storage devices to
 # be detected.  If USB storage was already enabled, no wait occurs, this would
 # have happened already when USB storage was enabled.

initrd/etc/luks-functions

@@ -246,7 +246,6 @@ select_luks_container()
 				mount -o remount,ro /boot
 			fi
 		else
-		
 			warn "No encrypted device found."
 			return 1
 		fi