mirror of
https://github.com/linuxboot/heads.git
synced 2024-12-20 05:28:08 +00:00
This adds support for seamless booting of Qubes with a TPM disk key, as well as signing of qubes files in /boot with a Yubikey. The signed hashes also includes a TPM counter, which is incremented when new hashes are signed. This prevents rollback attacks against the /boot filesystem. The TPMTOTP value is presented to the user at the time of entering the disk encryption keys. Hitting enter will generate a new code. The LUKS headers are included in the TPM sealing of the disk encryption keys.
This commit is contained in:
Trammell Hudson
parent
8464227aa1
commit
353a0efe6f
38
initrd/bin/qubes-boot
Executable file
38
initrd/bin/qubes-boot
Executable file
@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
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#!/bin/sh
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# Final stage to start qubes given a Xen, dom0 kernel and initrd
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# get the UUID of the root file system
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# busybox blkid doesn't have a "just the UUID" option
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. /etc/functions
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. /etc/config
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XEN="$1"
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KERNEL="$2"
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INITRD="$3"
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if [ -z "$XEN" -o -z "$KERNEL" -o -z "$INITRD" ]; then
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die "Usage: $0 /boot/xen... /boot/vmlinuz... /boot/initramfs..."
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fi
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# Activate the dom0 group, if it isn't already active
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lvm vgchange -a y "$CONFIG_QUBES_VG" \
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|| die "$CONFIG_QUBES_VG: LVM volume group activate failed"
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ROOT_UUID=`blkid /dev/$CONFIG_QUBES_VG/00 | cut -d\" -f2`
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if [ -z "$ROOT_UUID" ]; then
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die "$CONFIG_QUBES_VG/00: No UUID for /"
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fi
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echo "$CONFIG_QUBES_VG/00: UUID=$ROOT_UUID"
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# command line arguments are include in the signature on this script,
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echo '+++ Loading kernel and initrd'
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kexec \
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-l \
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--module "$KERNEL root=/dev/mapper/luks-$ROOT_UUID ro rd.qubes.hide_all_usb" \
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--module "$INITRD" \
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--command-line "no-real-mode reboot=no" \
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"${XEN}" \
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|| die "kexec load failed"
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echo "+++ Starting Qubes..."
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exec kexec -e
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@ -5,85 +5,79 @@
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# which is only set if the top level /init script has started
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# without user intervention or dropping into a recovery shell.
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recovery() {
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echo >&2 "!!!!! $@"
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rm -f /tmp/secret.key
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tpm extend -ix 4 -ic recovery
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. /etc/functions
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. /etc/config
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echo >&2 "!!!!! Starting recovery shell"
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exec /bin/ash
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}
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. /config
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# TODO: Allow /boot to be encrypted?
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# This would require a different TPM key or a user
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# passphrase to decrypt it.
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mount -o ro "$CONFIG_QUBES_BOOT_DEV" /boot \
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|| recovery '$CONFIG_BOOT_DEV: Unable to mount /boot'
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BOOT_SCRIPT=/boot/boot.sh
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if [ ! -x /boot/boot.sh ]; then
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recovery "$BOOT_SCRIPT does not exist"
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if [ "$1" = "recovery" ]; then
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warn "Recovery mode boot; ignoring key failures"
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RECOVERY=1
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fi
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# Hand control over to the user boot script
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echo "+++ Checking $BOOT_SCRIPT"
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gpgv "$BOOT_SCRIPT.asc" "$BOOT_SCRIPT" \
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|| recovery 'boot script signature failed'
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# TODO: Allow /boot to be encrypted?
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# This would require a different TPM key, a user passphrase to decrypt it,
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# or loading the USB modules to talk to a Yubikey to get the thing.
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if ! grep -q /boot /proc/mounts ; then
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mount -o ro "$CONFIG_QUBES_BOOT_DEV" /boot \
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|| recovery '$CONFIG_BOOT_DEV: Unable to mount /boot'
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fi
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exec "$BOOT_SCRIPT"
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BOOT_HASHES=/boot/boot.hashes
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if [ ! -r "$BOOT_HASHES" ]; then
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recovery "$BOOT_HASHES does not exist; re-run qubes-update"
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fi
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recovery 'Boot script exec failed?'
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# Verify the signature on the hashes
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gpgv "$BOOT_HASHES.asc" "$BOOT_HASHES" \
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|| recovery 'boot hashes signature failed'
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############################
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# For historical reference
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# Retrieve the TPM counter ID and generate its current value
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TPM_COUNTER=`grep counter $BOOT_HASHES | cut -d- -f2`
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if [ -z "$TPM_COUNTER" ]; then
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recovery "$BOOT_HASHES: TPM counter not found?"
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fi
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# TODO: Allow these to be specified on the /boot device
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XEN=/boot/xen-4.6.3.heads
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INITRD=/boot/initramfs-4.4.31-11.pvops.qubes.x86_64.img
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KERNEL=/boot/vmlinuz-4.4.31-11.pvops.qubes.x86_64
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tpm counter_read -ix "$TPM_COUNTER" | tee "/tmp/counter-$TPM_COUNTER"
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echo "+++ Checking $XEN"
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gpgv "${XEN}.asc" "${XEN}" \
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|| recovery 'Xen signature failed'
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# Check the hashes of all the files
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sha256sum -c "$BOOT_HASHES" \
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|| recovery "$BOOT_HASHES: hash mismatch"
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echo "+++ Checking $INITRD"
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gpgv "${INITRD}.asc" "${INITRD}" \
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|| recovery 'Initrd signature failed'
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XEN=`grep /boot/xen $BOOT_HASHES | cut -d\ -f3 | tail -1`
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KERNEL=`grep /boot/vmlin $BOOT_HASHES | cut -d\ -f3 | tail -1`
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INITRD=`grep /boot/initram $BOOT_HASHES | cut -d\ -f3 | tail -1`
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echo "+++ Checking $KERNEL"
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gpgv "${KERNEL}.asc" "${KERNEL}" \
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|| recovery 'Kernel signature failed'
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# Activate the dom0 group
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lvm vgchange -a y "$CONFIG_QUBES_VG" \
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|| recovery "$CONFIG_QUBES_VG: LVM volume group activate failed"
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# Measure the LUKS headers before we unseal the disk key
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/bin/qubes-measure-luks $CONFIG_QUBES_DEVS \
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qubes-measure-luks /dev/$CONFIG_QUBES_VG/* \
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|| recovery "LUKS measure failed"
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# Unpack the initrd and fixup the /etc/crypttab
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# this is a hack to split it into two parts since
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# we know that the first 0x3400 bytes are the microcode
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INITRD_DIR=/tmp/secret/initrd
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SECRET_CPIO=/tmp/secret/initrd.cpio
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mkdir -p "$INITRD_DIR/etc"
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# Attempt to unseal the disk key from the TPM
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# should we give this some number of tries?
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unseal-key \
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|| recovery 'Unseal disk key failed. Starting recovery shell'
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if ! unseal-key "$INITRD_DIR/secret.key" ; then
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warn 'Unseal disk key failed'
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if [ -z "$RECOVERY" ]; then
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recovery 'Starting recovery shell'
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fi
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fi
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# command line arguments are in the hash, so they are "correct".
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kexec \
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-l \
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--module "${KERNEL} root=LABEL=root ro rd.qubes.hide_all_usb rhgb" \
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--module "${INITRD}" \
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--command-line "no-real-mode reboot=no"
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"${XEN}" \
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|| recovery "kexec load failed"
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kexec -l \
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--module "${KERNEL} root=UUID=257b593f-d4ae-46ee-b499-14bc9ffd37d4 ro rd.qubes.hide_all_usb" \
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--module "/boot/initramfs-4.4.31-11.pvops.qubes.x86_64.img" \
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--command-line "no-real-mode reboot=no" \
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/boot/xen-4.6.3.heads
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# Last step is to override PCR 6 so that user can't read the key
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# Override PCR 4 so that user can't read the key
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tpm extend -ix 4 -ic qubes \
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|| recovery 'Unable to scramble PCR'
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echo "+++ Starting Qubes..."
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exec kexec -e
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echo '+++ Building initrd'
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( cd "$INITRD_DIR" ; find . | cpio -H newc -o ) > "$SECRET_CPIO"
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cat "$INITRD" >> "$SECRET_CPIO"
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/bin/qubes-boot "$XEN" "$KERNEL" "$SECRET_CPIO"
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recovery "Something failed..."
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81
initrd/bin/qubes-update
Executable file
81
initrd/bin/qubes-update
Executable file
@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
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#!/bin/sh
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# Update the /boot partition signatures
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set -o pipefail
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. /etc/functions
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XEN="$1"
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KERNEL="$2"
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INITRD="$3"
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BOOT_HASHES="/boot/boot.hashes"
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if [ -z "$XEN" -o -z "$KERNEL" -o -z "$INITRD" ]; then
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die "Usage: $0 /boot/xen... /boot/vmlinuz... /boot/initramfs..."
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fi
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# setup the USB so we can reach the GPG card
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if ! lsmod | grep -q ehci_hcd; then
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insmod /lib/modules/ehci-hcd.ko \
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|| die "ehci_hcd: module load failed"
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fi
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if ! lsmod | grep -q ehci_pci; then
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insmod /lib/modules/ehci-pci.ko \
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|| die "ehci_pci: module load failed"
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fi
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if ! lsmod | grep -q xhci_hcd; then
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insmod /lib/modules/xhci-hcd.ko \
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|| die "ehci_hcd: module load failed"
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fi
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if ! lsmod | grep -q xhci_pci; then
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insmod /lib/modules/xhci-pci.ko \
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|| die "ehci_pci: module load failed"
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sleep 2
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fi
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gpg --card-status \
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|| die "gpg card read failed"
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# if the /boot.hashes file already exists, read the TPM counter ID
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# from it.
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if [ -r "$BOOT_HASHES" ]; then
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TPM_COUNTER=`grep counter- "$BOOT_HASHES" | cut -d- -f2`
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else
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warn "$BOOT_HASHES does not exist; creating new TPM counter"
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read -s -p "TPM Owner password: " tpm_password
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echo
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tpm counter_create \
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-pwdo "$tpm_password" \
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-pwdc '' \
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-la 3135106223 \
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| tee /tmp/counter \
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|| die "Unable to create TPM counter"
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TPM_COUNTER=`cut -d: -f1 < /tmp/counter`
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fi
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if [ -z "$TPM_COUNTER" ]; then
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die "$BOOT_HASHES: TPM Counter not found?"
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fi
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mount -o rw,remount /boot \
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|| die "Could not remount /boot"
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tpm counter_increment -ix "$TPM_COUNTER" -pwdc '' \
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| tee /tmp/counter-$TPM_COUNTER \
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|| die "Counter increment failed"
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sha256sum \
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"$XEN" \
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"$KERNEL" \
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"$INITRD" \
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"/tmp/counter-$TPM_COUNTER" \
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| tee "$BOOT_HASHES"
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for tries in 1 2 3; do
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if gpg --detach-sign -a "$BOOT_HASHES"; then
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mount -o ro,remount /boot
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exit 0
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fi
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done
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warn "$BOOT_HASHES: Unable to sign boot hashes"
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mount -o ro,remount /boot
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exit 1
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@ -1,34 +1,48 @@
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#!/bin/sh
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# This will unseal and unecncrypt the drive encryption key from the TPM
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# The TOTP secret will be shown to the user on each encryption attempt.
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# It will then need to be bundled into initrd that is booted with Qubes.
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TPM_INDEX=3
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TPM_SIZE=312
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die() { echo >&2 "$@"; exit 1; }
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warn() { echo >&2 "$@"; }
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. /etc/functions
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mkdir -p /tmp/secret
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sealed_file="/tmp/secret/sealed.key"
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key_file="$1"
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if [ -z "$key_file" ]; then
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key_file=/tmp/secret.key
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fi
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read -s -p "Disk encryption password: " tpm_password
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echo
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if [ -z "$key_file" ]; then
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key_file="/tmp/secret/secret.key"
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fi
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tpm nv_readvalue \
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-in "$TPM_INDEX" \
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-sz "$TPM_SIZE" \
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-of /tmp/sealed \
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-of "$sealed_file" \
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|| die "Unable to read key from TPM NVRAM"
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tpm unsealfile \
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-if /tmp/sealed \
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for tries in 1 2 3; do
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tpm_password=
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while [ -z "$tpm_password" ]; do
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unseal-totp || die "TOTP code generation failed"
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read -s -p "Disk unlock password: " tpm_password
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echo
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done
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if tpm unsealfile \
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-if "$sealed_file" \
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-of "$key_file" \
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-pwdd "$tpm_password" \
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-hk 40000000 \
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|| die "Unable to unseal disk encryption key"
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rm -f /tmp/sealed
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; then
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rm -f /tmp/secret/sealed
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exit 0
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fi
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pcrs
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warn "Unable to unseal disk encryption key"
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done
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die "Retry count exceeded..."
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60
initrd/init
60
initrd/init
@ -1,10 +1,19 @@
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#!/bin/ash
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# This is the very first script invoked by the Linux kernel and is
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# running out of the ram disk. There are no fileysstems mounted.
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# It is important to have a way to invoke a recovery shell in case
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# the boot scripts are messed up, but also important to modify the
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# PCRs if this happens to prevent the TPM disk keys from being revealed.
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# First thing it is vital to mount the /dev and other system directories
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mkdir /proc /sys /dev /tmp /boot /media 2>&- 1>&-
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mount /dev
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mount /proc
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mount /sys
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# Recovery shells will erase anything from here
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mkdir -p /tmp/secret
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# Setup our path
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export PATH=/sbin:/bin
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@ -17,50 +26,37 @@ fi
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hwclock -l -s
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# Read the system configuration parameters
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. /config
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. /etc/functions
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. /etc/config
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if [ -z "$CONFIG_TIMEOUT" ]; then
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CONFIG_TIMEOUT=10
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fi
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while true; do
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boot_option=
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# Verify the user's TPM secret
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echo "TPM TOTP:"
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if ! unsealtotp.sh ; then
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echo '!!!!!'
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echo '!!!!! TPM TOTP secret not found.'
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echo '!!!!! This firmware can not be trusted.'
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echo '!!!!! Entering recovery shell'
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echo '!!!!!'
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tpm extend -ix 4 -ic "tpm-failure"
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if [ ! -x "$CONFIG_BOOTSCRIPT" ]; then
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recovery 'Boot script missing? Entering recovery shell'
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# just in case...
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tpm extend -ix 4 recovery
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exec /bin/ash
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fi
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# Secret decrypted ok, so prompt for a next step
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# Give the user a second to enter a recovery shell
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read \
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-t "$CONFIG_TIMEOUT" \
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-p "Enter for normal boot or 'r' for recovery shell: " \
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-t "1" \
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-p "Press 'r' for recovery shell: " \
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-n 1 \
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boot_option
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echo
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if [ "$boot_option" = "r" ]; then
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# Start an interactive shell
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echo '***** Starting recovery shell'
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tpm extend -ix 4 -ic "recovery"
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exec /bin/ash
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fi
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if [ "$boot_option" = "" ]; then
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if [ ! -x "$CONFIG_BOOTSCRIPT" ]; then
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echo '!!!!! Boot script missing? Entering recovery shell'
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tpm extend -ix 4 -ic "boot-failure"
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recovery 'User requested recovery shell'
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# just in case...
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tpm extend -ix 4 recovery
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exec /bin/ash
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fi
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echo '***** Normal boot'
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tpm extend -ix 4 -ic "normal-boot"
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exec "$CONFIG_BOOTSCRIPT"
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fi
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done
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# We should never reach here, but just in case...
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recovery 'Boot script failure? Entering recovery shell'
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# belts and suspenders, just in case...
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tpm extend -ix 4 recovery
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exec /bin/ash
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107
qubes/boot.sh
107
qubes/boot.sh
@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
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#!/bin/sh
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# /boot/boot.sh -- Startup Qubes
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#
|
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# The signature on this script will be verified by the ROM,
|
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# and this script lives on the /boot partition to allow
|
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# the system owner to change the specific Qubes boot parameters
|
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#
|
||||
# This depends on the PCR 4 being "normal-boot":
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||||
# f8fa3b6e32e7c6fe04c366e74636e505b28f3b0d
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# which is only set if the top level /init script has started
|
||||
# without user intervention or dropping into a recovery shell.
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||||
#
|
||||
# To sign this script and the other bootable components:
|
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#
|
||||
# gpg -a --sign --detach-sign boot.sh
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#
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||||
|
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XEN=/boot/xen-4.6.4.heads
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INITRD=/boot/initramfs-4.4.14-11.pvops.qubes.x86_64.img
|
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KERNEL=/boot/vmlinuz-4.4.14-11.pvops.qubes.x86_64
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||||
|
||||
|
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recovery() {
|
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echo >&2 "!!!!! $@"
|
||||
rm -f /tmp/secret.key /initrd.gz
|
||||
tpm extend -ix 4 -ic recovery
|
||||
|
||||
echo >&2 "!!!!! Starting recovery shell"
|
||||
exec /bin/ash
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
. /config
|
||||
|
||||
echo "+++ Checking $XEN"
|
||||
gpgv "${XEN}.asc" "${XEN}" \
|
||||
|| recovery 'Xen signature failed'
|
||||
|
||||
echo "+++ Checking $INITRD"
|
||||
gpgv "${INITRD}.asc" "${INITRD}" \
|
||||
|| recovery 'Initrd signature failed'
|
||||
|
||||
echo "+++ Checking $KERNEL"
|
||||
gpgv "${KERNEL}.asc" "${KERNEL}" \
|
||||
|| recovery 'Kernel signature failed'
|
||||
|
||||
# Activate the dom0 group
|
||||
lvm vgchange -a y "$CONFIG_QUBES_VG" \
|
||||
|| recovery "$CONFIG_QUBES_VG: LVM volume group activate failed"
|
||||
|
||||
# Measure the LUKS headers before we unseal the disk key
|
||||
qubes-measure-luks /dev/$CONFIG_QUBES_VG/* \
|
||||
|| recovery "LUKS measure failed"
|
||||
|
||||
# get the UUID of the root file system
|
||||
# busybox blkid doesn't have a "just the UUID" option
|
||||
ROOT_UUID=`blkid /dev/$CONFIG_QUBES_VG/00 | cut -d\" -f2`
|
||||
if [ -z "$ROOT_UUID" ]; then
|
||||
recovery "$CONFIG_QUBES_VG/00: No UUID for /"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
echo "$CONFIG_QUBES_VG/00: UUID=$ROOT_UUID"
|
||||
|
||||
# Attempt to unseal the disk key from the TPM
|
||||
# should we give this some number of tries?
|
||||
unseal-key \
|
||||
|| recovery 'Unseal disk key failed. Starting recovery shell'
|
||||
|
||||
# Unpack the initrd and fixup the /etc/crypttab
|
||||
# this is a hack to split it into two parts since
|
||||
# we know that the first 0x3400 bytes are the microcode
|
||||
INITRD_DIR=/tmp/initrd
|
||||
echo '+++ Unpacking initrd'
|
||||
mkdir -p $INITRD_DIR/etc
|
||||
#dd if="$INITRD" bs=256 count=52 | ( cd $INITRD_DIR ; cpio -i )
|
||||
#dd if="$INITRD" bs=256 skip=52 | zcat | ( cd $INITRD_DIR ; cpio -i )
|
||||
|
||||
mv /tmp/secret.key $INITRD_DIR/
|
||||
|
||||
## Update the /etc/crypttab in the initrd and install our key
|
||||
## This is no longer required, now that dom0 /etc/crypttab has
|
||||
## the /secret.key specified.
|
||||
#for dev in /dev/$CONFIG_QUBES_VG/*; do
|
||||
# uuid=`blkid $dev | cut -d\" -f2`
|
||||
# echo luks-$uuid /dev/disk/by-uuid/$uuid /secret.key
|
||||
#done > $INITRD_DIR/etc/crypttab
|
||||
|
||||
echo '+++ Repacking initrd'
|
||||
( cd $INITRD_DIR ; find . | cpio -H newc -o ) > /initrd.cpio
|
||||
cat "$INITRD" >> /initrd.cpio
|
||||
|
||||
# command line arguments are include in the signature on this script,
|
||||
echo '+++ Loading kernel and initrd'
|
||||
kexec \
|
||||
-l \
|
||||
--module "${KERNEL} root=/dev/mapper/luks-$ROOT_UUID ro rd.qubes.hide_all_usb" \
|
||||
--module /initrd.cpio \
|
||||
--command-line "no-real-mode reboot=no" \
|
||||
"${XEN}" \
|
||||
|| recovery "kexec load failed"
|
||||
|
||||
# Last step is to override PCR 4 so that user can't read the key
|
||||
tpm extend -ix 4 -ic qubes \
|
||||
|| recovery 'Unable to scramble PCR'
|
||||
|
||||
echo "+++ Starting Qubes..."
|
||||
sleep 2
|
||||
exec kexec -e
|
||||
@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
|
||||
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|
||||
|
||||
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|
||||
Kt/2Usabu7lzdYNpBp9h+jmGDj1Jg+5wvKBXgYQXiPG0TuPNXqeih+X1NJbeXO3S
|
||||
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||||
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||||
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|
||||
=0kHU
|
||||
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user