heads/initrd/bin/kexec-save-default

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#!/bin/bash
# Save these options to be the persistent default
set -e -o pipefail
. /tmp/config
. /etc/functions
TRACE "Under /bin/kexec-save-default"
while getopts "b:d:p:i:" arg; do
case $arg in
b) bootdir="$OPTARG" ;;
d) paramsdev="$OPTARG" ;;
p) paramsdir="$OPTARG" ;;
i) index="$OPTARG" ;;
esac
done
if [ -z "$bootdir" -o -z "$index" ]; then
die "Usage: $0 -b /boot -i menu_option "
fi
if [ -z "$paramsdev" ]; then
paramsdev="$bootdir"
fi
if [ -z "$paramsdir" ]; then
paramsdir="$bootdir"
fi
bootdir="${bootdir%%/}"
paramsdev="${paramsdev%%/}"
paramsdir="${paramsdir%%/}"
TMP_MENU_FILE="/tmp/kexec/kexec_menu.txt"
ENTRY_FILE="$paramsdir/kexec_default.$index.txt"
HASH_FILE="$paramsdir/kexec_default_hashes.txt"
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
PRIMHASH_FILE="$paramsdir/kexec_primhdl_hash.txt"
if [ ! -r "$TMP_MENU_FILE" ]; then
die "No menu options available, please run kexec-select-boot"
fi
entry=`head -n $index $TMP_MENU_FILE | tail -1`
if [ -z "$entry" ]; then
die "Invalid menu index $index"
fi
KEY_DEVICES="$paramsdir/kexec_key_devices.txt"
KEY_LVM="$paramsdir/kexec_key_lvm.txt"
save_key="n"
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" -o "$CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS" = "y" ] && [ "$CONFIG_TPM_NO_LUKS_DISK_UNLOCK" != "y" ]; then
if [ ! -r "$KEY_DEVICES" ]; then
read \
-n 1 \
-p "Do you wish to add a disk encryption to the TPM [y/N]: " \
add_key_confirm
echo
if [ "$add_key_confirm" = "y" \
-o "$add_key_confirm" = "Y" ]; then
lvm_suggest="e.g. qubes_dom0 or blank"
devices_suggest="e.g. /dev/sda2 or blank"
save_key="y"
fi
else
read \
-n 1 \
-p "Do you want to reseal a disk key to the TPM [y/N]: " \
change_key_confirm
echo
if [ "$change_key_confirm" = "y" \
-o "$change_key_confirm" = "Y" ]; then
old_lvm_volume_group=""
if [ -r "$KEY_LVM" ]; then
old_lvm_volume_group=`cat $KEY_LVM` || true
old_key_devices=`cat $KEY_DEVICES \
| cut -d\ -f1 \
| grep -v "$old_lvm_volume_group" \
| xargs` || true
else
old_key_devices=`cat $KEY_DEVICES \
| cut -d\ -f1 | xargs` || true
fi
lvm_suggest="was '$old_lvm_volume_group'"
devices_suggest="was '$old_key_devices'"
save_key="y"
fi
fi
if [ "$save_key" = "y" ]; then
echo "+++ LVM volume groups (lvm vgscan): "
lvm vgscan || true
read \
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
-p "LVM group containing Encrypted LVs (retype to keep)? ($lvm_suggest): " \
lvm_volume_group
echo "+++ Block devices (blkid): "
blkid || true
read \
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
-p "Encrypted devices (retype to keep)? ($devices_suggest): " \
key_devices
save_key_params="-s -p $paramsdev"
if [ -n "$lvm_volume_group" ]; then
save_key_params="$save_key_params -l $lvm_volume_group $key_devices"
else
save_key_params="$save_key_params $key_devices"
fi
echo "Running kexec-save-key with params: $save_key_params"
kexec-save-key $save_key_params \
|| die "Failed to save the disk key"
fi
fi
# try to switch to rw mode
mount -o rw,remount $paramsdev
if [ ! -d $paramsdir ]; then
mkdir -p $paramsdir \
|| die "Failed to create params directory"
fi
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
if [ "$CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS" = "y" ]; then
if [ ! -r "$PRIMHASH_FILE" ]; then
sha256sum /tmp/primary.handle > "$PRIMHASH_FILE" \
|| die "ERROR: Failed to Hash TPM2 primary key handle!"
fi
fi
rm $paramsdir/kexec_default.*.txt 2>/dev/null || true
echo "$entry" > $ENTRY_FILE
( cd $bootdir && kexec-boot -b "$bootdir" -e "$entry" -f| \
xargs sha256sum > $HASH_FILE \
) || die "Failed to create hashes of boot files"
if [ ! -r $ENTRY_FILE -o ! -r $HASH_FILE ]; then
die "Failed to write default config"
fi
if [ "$save_key" = "y" ]; then
# logic to parse OS initrd to extract crypttab, its filepaths and its OS defined options
mkdir -p /tmp/initrd_extract
cd /tmp/initrd_extract
# Get initrd filename selected to be default initrd that OS could be using to configure LUKS on boot by deploying crypttab files
current_default_initrd=$(cat /boot/kexec_default_hashes.txt | grep initr | awk -F " " {'print $NF'} | sed 's/\.\//\/boot\//g')
# Get crypttab files paths from initrd
echo "Checking current selected default boot's $current_default_initrd for existing crypttab files..."
# First either decompress or use the original if it's not compressed
initrd_decompressed="/tmp/initrd_extract/initrd_decompressed.cpio"
zcat < "$current_default_initrd" > "$initrd_decompressed" 2> /dev/null || initrd_decompressed="$current_default_initrd"
crypttab_files=$(cpio --list --quiet < "$initrd_decompressed" | grep crypttab 2> /dev/null) || true
if [ ! -z "$crypttab_files" ]; then
echo "Extracting current selected default boot's $current_default_initrd for found crypttab files analysis..."
cpio -id --quiet < $initrd_decompressed $crypttab_files 2> /dev/null
rm -f $bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt || true
#Parsing each crypttab file found
echo "$crypttab_files" | while read filepath; do
# Keep only non-commented lines
current_filepath_entries=$(cat "$filepath" | grep -v "^#")
# Modify each retained crypttab line to contain to be injected /secret.key at next default boots
modified_filepath_entries=$(echo "$current_filepath_entries" | sed 's/none/\/secret.key/g')
echo "$modified_filepath_entries" | while read single_modified_filepath_entry; do
# Append each found filepath:entry into additional kexec_ file that will be part of detached signed digest
echo "$filepath:$single_modified_filepath_entry" >> $bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt
done
done
cd - > /dev/null
#insert current default boot's initrd crypttab locations into tracking file to be overwritten into initramfs at kexec-inject-key
echo "The following OS crypttab file:entry were modified from default boot's initrd:"
cat $bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt
echo "Heads added /secret.key in those entries and saved them under $bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt"
echo "Those overrides will be part of detached signed digests and used to prepare cpio injected at kexec of selected default boot entry."
else
echo "No crypttab file found in extracted initrd. Removing $bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt"
rm -f "$bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt" || true
fi
# Cleanup
rm -rf /tmp/initrd_extract || true
fi
# sign and auto-roll config counter
extparam=
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" -o "$CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS" = "y" ];then
if [ "$CONFIG_IGNORE_ROLLBACK" != "y" ]; then
extparam=-r
fi
fi
kexec-sign-config -p $paramsdir $extparam \
|| die "Failed to sign default config"
# switch back to ro mode
mount -o ro,remount $paramsdev