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#! /bin/ash
# Note this is used on legacy-flash boards that lack bash, it runs with busybox
# ash. Calls to bash scripts must be guarded by checking config.
mknod /dev/ttyprintk c 5 3
echo "hello world" > /dev/ttyprintk
# Setup our path
export PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin
# This is the very first script invoked by the Linux kernel and is
# running out of the ram disk. There are no fileysstems mounted.
# It is important to have a way to invoke a recovery shell in case
# the boot scripts are messed up, but also important to modify the
# PCRs if this happens to prevent the TPM Disk Unlock Keys from being revealed.
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# First thing it is vital to mount the /dev and other system directories
mkdir /proc /sys /dev /tmp /boot /media 2>&- 1>&-
mount /dev 2>/dev/ttyprintk
mount /proc 2>/dev/ttyprintk
mount /sys 2>/dev/ttyprintk
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
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if [ "$CONFIG_LINUXBOOT" = "y" ]; then
mount /sys/firmware/efi/efivars
fi
# Setup the pty pseudo filesystem
mkdir /dev/pts
mount /dev/pts 2>/dev/ttyprintk
if [ ! -r /dev/ptmx ]; then
ln -s /dev/pts/ptmx /dev/ptmx
fi
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
# Needed by bash
[ -e /dev/stdin ] || ln -s /proc/self/fd/0 /dev/stdin
[ -e /dev/stdout ] || ln -s /proc/self/fd/1 /dev/stdout
[ -e /dev/stderr ] || ln -s /proc/self/fd/2 /dev/stderr
[ -e /dev/fd ] || ln -s /proc/self/fd /dev/fd
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
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# Recovery shells will erase anything from here
mkdir -p /tmp/secret
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# Now it is safe to print a banner
if [ -r /etc/motd ]; then
cat /etc/motd > /dev/tty0
fi
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# Load the date from the hardware clock, setting it in local time
hwclock -l -s
# When mounting a filesystem, try exFAT last, since it logs errors if the
# filesystem is not exFAT, and the errors go to the console. Those errors are
# spurious when the medium is iso9660. By default in our config, the only
# filesystem after exFAT is iso9660, move exFAT last.
(grep -v '^\texfat$' /proc/filesystems && echo -e '\texfat') >/etc/filesystems
# Read the system configuration parameters
. /etc/ash_functions
. /etc/config
# Board config had CONFIG_DEBUG_OUTPUT=y defined.
# Note that boards's coreboot config kernel command line "debug" option only will have all kernel messages output on console prior of this point
if [ "$CONFIG_DEBUG_OUTPUT" = "y" ]; then
#Maximize printk messages to output all to console (8=debug)
#DEBUG and TRACE calls will output to /dev/kmsg, outputting both on dmesg and on console
dmesg -n 8 || true
DEBUG "Debug output enabled from board CONFIG_DEBUG_OUTPUT=y option (/etc/config)"
else
# Board config did't have CONFIG_DEBUG_OUTPUT=y defined
# config.user extracted and combined from CBFS had CONFIG_DEBUG_OUTPUT=y
# Output only print messages with a priority of 4 (warnings) or lower (errors and critical) kernel messages to console
# This way, "debug" kernel command line option will have all kernel messages output on console prior of this point
# This is useful to debug boot issues but permits qemu board to boot without flooding console with kernel messages by disabling CONFIG_DEBUG_OUTPUT=y in qemu board config
dmesg -n 4 || true
DEBUG "Debug output enabled from /etc/config.user's CONFIG_DEBUG_OUTPUT=y after combine_configs (Config menu enabled Debug)"
fi
TRACE "Under init"
# make sure we have sysctl requirements
if [ ! -d /proc/sys ]; then
warn "BUG!!! The following requirements to apply runtime kernel tweaks are missing:"
warn "CONFIG_SYSCTL=y"
warn "CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL=y"
warn "Please open an issue"
fi
if [ ! -e /proc/sys/vm/panic_on_oom ]; then
warn "BUG!!! Requirements to setup Panic when under Out Of Memory situation through PROC_SYSCTL are missing (panic_on_oom was not enabled)"
warn "Please open an issue"
else
DEBUG "Applying panic_on_oom setting to sysctl"
echo 1 > /proc/sys/vm/panic_on_oom
fi
# set CONFIG_TPM dynamically before init
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
if [ ! -e /dev/tpm0 ]; then
CONFIG_TPM='n'
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS='n'
fi
#Specify whiptail background colors cues under FBWhiptail only
if [ -x /bin/fbwhiptail ]; then
export BG_COLOR_WARNING="${CONFIG_WARNING_BG_COLOR:-"--background-gradient 0 0 0 150 125 0"}"
export BG_COLOR_ERROR="${CONFIG_ERROR_BG_COLOR:-"--background-gradient 0 0 0 150 0 0"}"
export BG_COLOR_MAIN_MENU="normal"
else
export TEXT_BG_COLOR_WARNING="${CONFIG_WARNING_TEXT_BG_COLOR:-"yellow"}"
export TEXT_BG_COLOR_ERROR="${CONFIG_ERROR_TEXT_BG_COLOR:-"red"}"
export BG_COLOR_MAIN_MENU="normal"
fi
if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
# Initialize tpm2 encrypted sessions here
tpmr startsession
fi
if [ "$CONFIG_COREBOOT" = "y" ]; then
[ -x /bin/bash ] && /bin/cbfs-init
fi
if [ "$CONFIG_LINUXBOOT" = "y" ]; then
/bin/uefi-init
fi
# Set GPG_TTY before calling gpg in key-init
export GPG_TTY=/dev/console
# Initialize gpnupg with distro/user keys and setup the keyrings
[ -x /bin/bash ] && /bin/key-init
# Override CONFIG_USE_BLOB_JAIL if needed and persist via user config
if lspci -n | grep -E -q "8086:(2723|4df0)"; then
if ! cat /etc/config.user 2>/dev/null | grep -q "USE_BLOB_JAIL"; then
echo "CONFIG_USE_BLOB_JAIL=y" >> /etc/config.user
fi
fi
# Override CONFIG_TPM and CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS from /etc/config with runtime value
# determined above.
#
# Values in user config have higher priority during combining thus effectively
# changing the value for the rest of the scripts which source /tmp/config.
#Only set CONFIG_TPM and CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS if they are not already set in /etc/config.user
if ! grep -q 'CONFIG_TPM=' /etc/config.user; then
echo "export CONFIG_TPM=\"$CONFIG_TPM\"" >> /etc/config.user
fi
if ! grep -q 'CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS=' /etc/config.user; then
echo "export CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS=\"$CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS\"" >> /etc/config.user
fi
# CONFIG_BASIC was previously CONFIG_PUREBOOT_BASIC in the PureBoot distribution.
# Substitute it in config.user if present for backward compatibility.
sed -i -e 's/^export CONFIG_PUREBOOT_BASIC=/export CONFIG_BASIC=/g' /etc/config.user
combine_configs
. /tmp/config
# Enable maximum debug info from here if config.user extracted and combined from CBFS had CONFIG_DEBUG_OUTPUT=y
if [ "$CONFIG_DEBUG_OUTPUT" = "y" ]; then
#Output all kernel messages to console (8=debug)
#DEBUG and TRACE calls will be in dmesg and on console
if ! grep -q 'CONFIG_DEBUG_OUTPUT="y"' /etc/config;then
# Board config did't have CONFIG_DEBUG_OUTPUT=y defined
# config.user extracted and combined from CBFS had CONFIG_DEBUG_OUTPUT=y
dmesg -n 8
DEBUG "Debug output enabled from /etc/config.user's CONFIG_DEBUG_OUTPUT=y after combine_configs (Config menu enabled Debug)"
TRACE "Under init:after combine_configs"
fi
fi
# Setup recovery serial shell
if [ ! -z "$CONFIG_BOOT_RECOVERY_SERIAL" ]; then
stty -F "$CONFIG_BOOT_RECOVERY_SERIAL" 115200
pause_recovery 'Console recovery shell' \
< "$CONFIG_BOOT_RECOVERY_SERIAL" \
> "$CONFIG_BOOT_RECOVERY_SERIAL" 2>&1 &
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fi
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# load USB modules for boards using a USB keyboard
if [ "$CONFIG_USB_KEYBOARD_REQUIRED" = y ] || [ "$CONFIG_USER_USB_KEYBOARD" = "y" ]; then
enable_usb
fi
# If the user has been holding down r, enter a recovery shell
# otherwise immediately start the configured boot script.
# We don't print a prompt, since this is a near instant timeout.
read \
-t 0.1 \
-n 1 \
boot_option
echo
if [ "$boot_option" = "r" ]; then
# Start an interactive shell
recovery 'User requested recovery shell'
# just in case...
exit
elif [ "$boot_option" = "o" ]; then
# Launch OEM Factory Reset/Re-Ownership
oem-factory-reset
# just in case...
exit
fi
if [ "$CONFIG_BASIC" = "y" ]; then
echo -e "***** BASIC mode: tamper detection disabled\n" > /dev/tty0
fi
# export firmware version
export FW_VER=$(fw_version)
# Add our boot devices into the /etc/fstab, if they are defined
# in the configuration file.
if [ ! -z "$CONFIG_BOOT_DEV" ]; then
echo >> /etc/fstab "$CONFIG_BOOT_DEV /boot auto defaults,ro 0 0"
fi
# Set the console font if needed
[ -x /bin/bash ] && setconsolefont.sh
if [ "$CONFIG_BASIC" = "y" ]; then
CONFIG_BOOTSCRIPT=/bin/gui-init-basic
export CONFIG_HOTPKEY=n
fi
# Perform board-specific init if present
if [ -x /bin/board-init.sh ]; then
/bin/board-init.sh
fi
if [ ! -x "$CONFIG_BOOTSCRIPT" -a ! -x "$CONFIG_BOOTSCRIPT_NETWORK" ]; then
recovery 'Boot script missing? Entering recovery shell'
else
if [ -x "$CONFIG_BOOTSCRIPT_NETWORK" ]; then
echo '***** Network Boot:' $CONFIG_BOOTSCRIPT_NETWORK
$CONFIG_BOOTSCRIPT_NETWORK
echo '***** Network Boot Completed:' $CONFIG_BOOTSCRIPT_NETWORK
# not blocking
fi
if [ -x "$CONFIG_BOOTSCRIPT" ]; then
echo '***** Normal boot:' $CONFIG_BOOTSCRIPT
if [ -x /bin/setsid ] && [ -x /bin/agetty ]; then
for console in $CONFIG_BOOT_EXTRA_TTYS; do
setsid agetty -aroot -l"$CONFIG_BOOTSCRIPT" "$console" linux &
done
fi
#Setup a control tty so that all terminals outputs correct tty when tty is called
exec cttyhack "$CONFIG_BOOTSCRIPT"
else
# wait for boot via network to occur
pause_recovery 'Override network boot. Entering recovery shell'
fi
fi
# We should never reach here, but just in case...
recovery 'Boot script failure? Entering recovery shell'