heads/initrd/bin/unseal-hotp

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#!/bin/bash
# Retrieve the sealed file and counter from the NVRAM, unseal it and compute the hotp
. /etc/functions
HOTP_SECRET="/tmp/secret/hotp.key"
HOTP_COUNTER="/boot/kexec_hotp_counter"
mount_boot_or_die()
{
TRACE "Under /bin/unseal-hotp:mount_boot_or_die"
# Mount local disk if it is not already mounted
if ! grep -q /boot /proc/mounts ; then
mount -o ro /boot \
|| die "Unable to mount /boot"
fi
}
TRACE "Under /bin/unseal-hotp"
# Store counter in file instead of TPM for now, as it conflicts with Heads
# config TPM counter as TPM 1.2 can only increment one counter between reboots
# get current value of HOTP counter in TPM, create if absent
mount_boot_or_die
#check_tpm_counter $HOTP_COUNTER hotp \
#|| die "Unable to find/create TPM counter"
#counter="$TPM_COUNTER"
#
#counter_value=$(read_tpm_counter $counter | cut -f2 -d ' ' | awk 'gsub("^000e","")')
#
counter_value=$(cat $HOTP_COUNTER)
if [ "$counter_value" == "" ]; then
die "Unable to read HOTP counter"
fi
#counter_value=$(printf "%d" 0x${counter_value})
if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
DEBUG "Unsealing HOTP secret reuses TOTP sealed secret..."
tpmr unseal 4d47 0,1,2,3,4,7 312 "$HOTP_SECRET"
else
# without a TPM, generate a secret based on the SHA-256 of the ROM
secret_from_rom_hash > "$HOTP_SECRET" || die "Reading ROM failed"
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
fi
# Truncate the secret if it is longer than the maximum HOTP secret
truncate_max_bytes 20 "$HOTP_SECRET"
if ! hotp $counter_value < "$HOTP_SECRET"; then
shred -n 10 -z -u "$HOTP_SECRET" 2> /dev/null
die 'Unable to compute HOTP hash?'
fi
shred -n 10 -z -u "$HOTP_SECRET" 2> /dev/null
#increment_tpm_counter $counter > /dev/null \
#|| die "Unable to increment tpm counter"
mount -o remount,rw /boot
counter_value=`expr $counter_value + 1`
echo $counter_value > $HOTP_COUNTER \
|| die "Unable to create hotp counter file"
#sha256sum /tmp/counter-$counter > $HOTP_COUNTER \
#|| die "Unable to create hotp counter file"
mount -o remount,ro /boot
exit 0