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#!/bin/bash
# Shell functions for most initialization scripts
. /etc/ash_functions
# Print <hidden> or <empty> depending on whether $1 is empty. Useful to mask an
# optional password parameter.
mask_param() {
if [ -z "$1" ]; then
echo "<empty>"
else
echo "<hidden>"
fi
}
# Pipe input to this to sink it to the debug log, with a name prefix.
# If the input is empty, no output is produced, so actual output is
# readily visible in logs.
#
# For example:
# ls /boot/vmlinux* | SINK_DEBUG "/boot kernels"
SINK_DEBUG() {
local name="$1"
local line haveblank
# If the input doesn't end with a line break, read won't give us the
# last (unterminated) line. Add a line break with echo to ensure we
# don't lose any input. Buffer up to one blank line so we can avoid
# emitting a final (or only) blank line.
(cat; echo) | while IFS= read -r line; do
[[ -n "$haveblank" ]] && DEBUG "$name: " # Emit buffered blank line
if [[ -z "$line" ]]; then
haveblank=y
else
haveblank=
DEBUG "$name: $line"
fi
done
}
# Trace a command with DEBUG, then execute it. Trace failed exit status, stdout
# and stderr, etc.
#
# DO_WITH_DEBUG is designed so it can be dropped in to most command invocations
# without side effects - it adds visibility without actually affecting the
# execution of the script. Exit statuses, stdout, and stderr are traced, but
# they are still returned/written to the caller.
#
# A password parameter can be masked by passing --mask-position N before the
# command to execute, the debug trace will just indicate whether the password
# was empty or nonempty (which is important when use of a password is optional).
# N=0 is the name of the command to be executed, N=1 is its first parameter,
# etc.
#
# DO_WITH_DEBUG() can be added in most places where a command is executed to
# add visibility in the debug log. For example:
#
# [DO_WITH_DEBUG] mount "$BLOCK" "$MOUNTPOINT"
# ^-- adding DO_WITH_DEBUG will show the block device, mountpoint, and whether
# the mount fails
#
# [DO_WITH_DEBUG --mask-position 7] tpmr seal "$KEY" "$IDX" "$pcrs" "$pcrf" "$size" "$PASSWORD"
# ^-- trace the resulting invocation, but mask the password in the log
#
# if ! [DO_WITH_DEBUG] umount "$MOUNTPOINT"; then [...]
# ^-- it can be used when the exit status is checked, like the condition of `if`
#
# hotp_token_info="$([DO_WITH_DEBUG] hotp_verification info)"
# ^-- output of hotp_verification info becomes visible in debug log while
# still being captured by script
#
# [DO_WITH_DEBUG] umount "$MOUNTPOINT" &>/dev/null || true
# ^-- if the command's stdout/stderr/failure are ignored, this still works the
# same way with DO_WITH_DEBUG
DO_WITH_DEBUG() {
local exit_status=0
local cmd_output
if [[ "$1" == "--mask-position" ]]; then
local mask_position="$2"
shift
shift
local show_args=("$@")
show_args[$mask_position]="$(mask_param "${show_args[$mask_position]}")"
DEBUG "${show_args[@]}"
else
DEBUG "$@"
fi
# Execute the command and capture the exit status. Tee stdout/stderr to
# debug sinks, so they're visible but still can be used by the caller
#
# This is tricky when set -e / set -o pipefail may or may not be in
# effect.
# - Putting the command in an `if` ensures set -e won't terminate us,
# and also does not overwrite $? (like `|| true` would).
# - We capture PIPESTATUS[0] whether the command succeeds or fails,
# since we don't know whether the pipeline status will be that of the
# command or 'tee' (depends on set -o pipefail).
if ! "$@" 2> >(tee /dev/stderr | SINK_DEBUG "$1 stderr") | tee >(SINK_DEBUG "$1 stdout"); then
exit_status="${PIPESTATUS[0]}"
else
exit_status="${PIPESTATUS[0]}"
fi
if [[ "$exit_status" -ne 0 ]]; then
# Trace unsuccessful exit status, but only at DEBUG because this
# may be expected. Include the command name in case the command
# also invoked a DO_WITH_DEBUG (it could be a script).
DEBUG "$1: exited with status $exit_status"
fi
# If the command was (probably) not found, trace PATH in case it
# prevented the command from being found
if [[ "$exit_status" -eq 127 ]]; then
DEBUG "$1: PATH=$PATH"
fi
return "$exit_status"
}
# Trace the current script and function.
TRACE_FUNC() {
# Index [1] for BASH_SOURCE and FUNCNAME give us the caller location.
# FUNCNAME is 'main' if called from a script outside any function.
# BASH_LINENO is offset by 1, it provides the line that the
# corresponding FUNCNAME was _called from_, so BASH_LINENO[0] is the
# location of the caller.
TRACE "${BASH_SOURCE[1]}(${BASH_LINENO[0]}): ${FUNCNAME[1]}"
}
# Show the entire current call stack in debug output - useful if a catastrophic
# error or something very unexpected occurs, like totally invalid parameters.
DEBUG_STACK() {
local FRAMES
FRAMES="${#FUNCNAME[@]}"
DEBUG "call stack: ($((FRAMES-1)) frames)"
# Don't print DEBUG_STACK itself, start from 1
for i in $(seq 1 "$((FRAMES-1))"); do
DEBUG "- $((i-1)) - ${BASH_SOURCE[$i]}(${BASH_LINENO[$((i-1))]}): ${FUNCNAME[$i]}"
done
}
pcrs() {
if [ "$CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS" = "y" ]; then
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
tpm2 pcrread sha256
elif [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
head -8 /sys/class/tpm/tpm0/pcrs
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
fi
}
confirm_totp() {
TRACE_FUNC
prompt="$1"
last_half=X
unset totp_confirm
while true; do
# update the TOTP code every thirty seconds
date=$(date "+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
seconds=$(date "+%s")
half=$(expr \( $seconds % 60 \) / 30)
if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" != "y" ]; then
TOTP="NO TPM"
elif [ "$half" != "$last_half" ]; then
last_half=$half
TOTP=$(unseal-totp) ||
recovery "TOTP code generation failed"
fi
echo -n "$date $TOTP: "
# read the first character, non-blocking
read \
-t 1 \
-n 1 \
-s \
-p "$prompt" \
totp_confirm &&
break
# nothing typed, redraw the line
echo -ne '\r'
done
# clean up with a newline
echo
}
reseal_tpm_disk_decryption_key() {
TRACE_FUNC
Uniformize vocabulary: LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key & LUKS Disk Recovery Key When playing with long fbwhiptail/whiptail messages, this commit played around the long string using fold. ''' echo -e "This will replace the encrypted container content and its LUKS Disk Recovery Key.\n\nThe passphrase associated with this key will be asked from the user under the following conditions:\n 1-Every boot if no Disk Unlock Key was added to the TPM\n 2-If the TPM fails (hardware failure)\n 3-If the firmware has been tampered with/modified by the user\n\nThis process requires you to type the current LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase and will delete the LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key slot, if set up, by setting a default boot LUKS key slot (1) if present.\n\nAt the next prompt, you may be asked to select which file corresponds to the LUKS device container.\n\nHit Enter to continue." | fold -w 70 -s ''' Which gave the exact output of what will be inside of the fbwhiptail prompt, fixed to 70 chars width: ''' This will replace the encrypted container content and its LUKS Disk Recovery Key. The passphrase associated with this key will be asked from the user under the following conditions: 1-Every boot if no Disk Unlock Key was added to the TPM 2-If the TPM fails (hardware failure) 3-If the firmware has been tampered with/modified by the user This process requires you to type the current LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase and will delete the LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key slot, if set up, by setting a default boot LUKS key slot (1) if present. At the next prompt, you may be asked to select which file corresponds to the LUKS device container. Hit Enter to continue. ''' Therefore, for long prompts in the future, one can just deal with "\n 1-" alignments to be respected in prompts and have fold deal with cutting the length of strings properly. Signed-off-by: Thierry Laurion <insurgo@riseup.net>
2024-01-19 17:32:04 +00:00
#For robustness, exit early if LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key is prohibited in board configs
if [ "$CONFIG_TPM_DISK_UNLOCK_KEY" == "n" ]; then
Uniformize vocabulary: LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key & LUKS Disk Recovery Key When playing with long fbwhiptail/whiptail messages, this commit played around the long string using fold. ''' echo -e "This will replace the encrypted container content and its LUKS Disk Recovery Key.\n\nThe passphrase associated with this key will be asked from the user under the following conditions:\n 1-Every boot if no Disk Unlock Key was added to the TPM\n 2-If the TPM fails (hardware failure)\n 3-If the firmware has been tampered with/modified by the user\n\nThis process requires you to type the current LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase and will delete the LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key slot, if set up, by setting a default boot LUKS key slot (1) if present.\n\nAt the next prompt, you may be asked to select which file corresponds to the LUKS device container.\n\nHit Enter to continue." | fold -w 70 -s ''' Which gave the exact output of what will be inside of the fbwhiptail prompt, fixed to 70 chars width: ''' This will replace the encrypted container content and its LUKS Disk Recovery Key. The passphrase associated with this key will be asked from the user under the following conditions: 1-Every boot if no Disk Unlock Key was added to the TPM 2-If the TPM fails (hardware failure) 3-If the firmware has been tampered with/modified by the user This process requires you to type the current LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase and will delete the LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key slot, if set up, by setting a default boot LUKS key slot (1) if present. At the next prompt, you may be asked to select which file corresponds to the LUKS device container. Hit Enter to continue. ''' Therefore, for long prompts in the future, one can just deal with "\n 1-" alignments to be respected in prompts and have fold deal with cutting the length of strings properly. Signed-off-by: Thierry Laurion <insurgo@riseup.net>
2024-01-19 17:32:04 +00:00
DEBUG "LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key is prohibited in board configs"
return
else
Uniformize vocabulary: LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key & LUKS Disk Recovery Key When playing with long fbwhiptail/whiptail messages, this commit played around the long string using fold. ''' echo -e "This will replace the encrypted container content and its LUKS Disk Recovery Key.\n\nThe passphrase associated with this key will be asked from the user under the following conditions:\n 1-Every boot if no Disk Unlock Key was added to the TPM\n 2-If the TPM fails (hardware failure)\n 3-If the firmware has been tampered with/modified by the user\n\nThis process requires you to type the current LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase and will delete the LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key slot, if set up, by setting a default boot LUKS key slot (1) if present.\n\nAt the next prompt, you may be asked to select which file corresponds to the LUKS device container.\n\nHit Enter to continue." | fold -w 70 -s ''' Which gave the exact output of what will be inside of the fbwhiptail prompt, fixed to 70 chars width: ''' This will replace the encrypted container content and its LUKS Disk Recovery Key. The passphrase associated with this key will be asked from the user under the following conditions: 1-Every boot if no Disk Unlock Key was added to the TPM 2-If the TPM fails (hardware failure) 3-If the firmware has been tampered with/modified by the user This process requires you to type the current LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase and will delete the LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key slot, if set up, by setting a default boot LUKS key slot (1) if present. At the next prompt, you may be asked to select which file corresponds to the LUKS device container. Hit Enter to continue. ''' Therefore, for long prompts in the future, one can just deal with "\n 1-" alignments to be respected in prompts and have fold deal with cutting the length of strings properly. Signed-off-by: Thierry Laurion <insurgo@riseup.net>
2024-01-19 17:32:04 +00:00
DEBUG "LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key is allowed in board configs. Continuing"
fi
if ! grep -q /boot /proc/mounts; then
mount -o ro /boot ||
recovery "Unable to mount /boot"
fi
if [ -s /boot/kexec_key_devices.txt ] || [ -s /boot/kexec_key_lvm.txt ]; then
Uniformize vocabulary: LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key & LUKS Disk Recovery Key When playing with long fbwhiptail/whiptail messages, this commit played around the long string using fold. ''' echo -e "This will replace the encrypted container content and its LUKS Disk Recovery Key.\n\nThe passphrase associated with this key will be asked from the user under the following conditions:\n 1-Every boot if no Disk Unlock Key was added to the TPM\n 2-If the TPM fails (hardware failure)\n 3-If the firmware has been tampered with/modified by the user\n\nThis process requires you to type the current LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase and will delete the LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key slot, if set up, by setting a default boot LUKS key slot (1) if present.\n\nAt the next prompt, you may be asked to select which file corresponds to the LUKS device container.\n\nHit Enter to continue." | fold -w 70 -s ''' Which gave the exact output of what will be inside of the fbwhiptail prompt, fixed to 70 chars width: ''' This will replace the encrypted container content and its LUKS Disk Recovery Key. The passphrase associated with this key will be asked from the user under the following conditions: 1-Every boot if no Disk Unlock Key was added to the TPM 2-If the TPM fails (hardware failure) 3-If the firmware has been tampered with/modified by the user This process requires you to type the current LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase and will delete the LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key slot, if set up, by setting a default boot LUKS key slot (1) if present. At the next prompt, you may be asked to select which file corresponds to the LUKS device container. Hit Enter to continue. ''' Therefore, for long prompts in the future, one can just deal with "\n 1-" alignments to be respected in prompts and have fold deal with cutting the length of strings properly. Signed-off-by: Thierry Laurion <insurgo@riseup.net>
2024-01-19 17:32:04 +00:00
warn "LUKS TPM sealed Disk Unlock Key secret needs to be resealed alongside TOTP/HOTP secret"
echo "Resealing LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key to be unsealed by LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key passphrase"
while ! kexec-seal-key /boot; do
warn "Recovery Disk Encryption key passphrase/TPM Owner Password may be invalid. Please try again"
done
warn "LUKS header hash changed under /boot/kexec_luks_hdr_hash.txt"
echo "Updating checksums and signing all files under /boot/kexec.sig"
while ! update_checksums; do
warn "Checksums were not signed. Preceding errors should explain possible causes"
done
warn "Rebooting in 3 seconds to enable booting default boot option"
sleep 3
reboot
else
DEBUG "No TPM disk decryption key to reseal"
fi
}
# Enable USB storage (if not already enabled), and wait for storage devices to
# be detected. If USB storage was already enabled, no wait occurs, this would
# have happened already when USB storage was enabled.
enable_usb_storage() {
TRACE_FUNC
if ! lsmod | grep -q usb_storage; then
timeout=0
echo "Scanning for USB storage devices..."
insmod /lib/modules/usb-storage.ko >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
die "usb_storage: module load failed"
while [[ $(list_usb_storage | wc -l) -eq 0 ]]; do
[[ $timeout -ge 8 ]] && break
sleep 1
timeout=$(($timeout + 1))
done
fi
}
device_has_partitions() {
local DEVICE="$1"
# fdisk normally says "doesn't contain a valid partition table" for
# devices that lack a partition table - except for FAT32.
#
# FAT32 devices have a volume boot record that looks enough like an MBR
# to satisfy fdisk. In that case, fdisk prints a partition table header
# but no partitions.
#
# This check covers that: [ $(fdisk -l "$b" | wc -l) -eq 5 ]
# In both cases the output is 5 lines: 3 about device info, 1 empty line
# and the 5th will be the table header or the invalid message.
local DISK_DATA=$(fdisk -l "$DEVICE")
if echo "$DISK_DATA" | grep -q "doesn't contain a valid partition table" || \
[ "$(echo "$DISK_DATA" | wc -l)" -eq 5 ]; then
# No partition table
return 1
fi
# There is a partition table
return 0
}
list_usb_storage() {
TRACE_FUNC
# List all USB storage devices, including partitions unless we received argument stating we want drives only
# The output is a list of device names, one per line.
if [ "$1" = "disks" ]; then
DEBUG "Listing USB storage devices (disks only) since list_usb_storage was called with 'disks' argument"
else
DEBUG "Listing USB storage devices (including partitions)"
fi
stat -c %N /sys/block/sd* 2>/dev/null | grep usb |
cut -f1 -d ' ' |
sed "s/[']//g" |
while read b; do
# Ignore devices of size 0, such as empty SD card
# readers on laptops attached via USB.
if [ "$(cat "$b/size")" -gt 0 ]; then
DEBUG "USB storage device of size greater then 0: $b"
echo "$b"
fi
done |
sed "s|/sys/block|/dev|" |
while read b; do
# If the device has a partition table, ignore it and
# include the partitions instead - even if the kernel
# hasn't detected the partitions yet. Such a device is
# never usable directly, and this allows the "wait for
# disks" loop in mount-usb to correctly wait for the
# partitions.
if ! device_has_partitions "$b"; then
# No partition table, include this device
DEBUG "USB storage device without partition table: $b"
echo "$b"
#Bypass the check for partitions if we want only disks
elif [ "$1" = "disks" ]; then
# disks only were requested, so we don't list partitions
DEBUG "USB storage device with partition table: $b"
DEBUG "We asked for disks only, so we don't want to list partitions"
echo "$b"
else
# Has a partition table, include partitions
DEBUG "USB storage device with partition table: $b"
ls -1 "$b"* | awk 'NR!=1 {print $0}'
fi
done
}
# Prompt for a TPM Owner Password if it is not already cached in /tmp/secret/tpm_owner_password.
# Sets tpm_owner_password variable reused in flow, and cache file used until recovery shell is accessed.
# Tools should optionally accept a TPM password on the command line, since some flows need
# it multiple times and only one prompt is ideal.
prompt_tpm_owner_password() {
TRACE_FUNC
if [ -s /tmp/secret/tpm_owner_password ]; then
DEBUG "/tmp/secret/tpm_owner_password already cached in file. Reusing"
tpm_owner_password=$(cat /tmp/secret/tpm_owner_password)
return 0
fi
read -s -p "TPM Owner Password: " tpm_owner_password
echo # new line after password prompt
# Cache the password externally to be reused by who needs it
DEBUG "Caching TPM Owner Password to /tmp/secret/tpm_owner_password"
mkdir -p /tmp/secret || die "Unable to create /tmp/secret"
echo -n "$tpm_owner_password" >/tmp/secret/tpm_owner_password || die "Unable to cache TPM owner_password under /tmp/secret/tpm_owner_password"
}
# Prompt for a new TPM Owner Password when resetting the TPM.
# Returned in tpm_owner_passpword and cached under /tpm/secret/tpm_owner_password
# The password must be 1-32 characters and must be entered twice,
# the script will loop until this is met.
prompt_new_owner_password() {
TRACE_FUNC
local tpm_owner_password2
tpm_owner_password=1
tpm_owner_password2=2
while [ "$tpm_owner_password" != "$tpm_owner_password2" ] || [ "${#tpm_owner_password}" -gt 32 ] || [ -z "$tpm_owner_password" ]; do
read -s -p "New TPM Owner Password (2 words suggested, 1-32 characters max): " tpm_owner_password
echo
read -s -p "Repeat chosen TPM Owner Password: " tpm_owner_password2
echo
if [ "$tpm_owner_password" != "$tpm_owner_password2" ]; then
echo "Passphrases entered do not match. Try again!"
echo
fi
done
# Cache the password externally to be reused by who needs it
DEBUG "Caching TPM Owner Password to /tmp/secret/tpm_owner_password"
mkdir -p /tmp/secret || die "Unable to create /tmp/secret"
echo -n "$tpm_owner_password" >/tmp/secret/tpm_owner_password || die "Unable to cache TPM password under /tmp/secret"
}
check_tpm_counter() {
TRACE_FUNC
LABEL=${2:-3135106223}
tpm_password="$3"
# if the /boot.hashes file already exists, read the TPM counter ID
# from it.
if [ -r "$1" ]; then
TPM_COUNTER=$(grep counter- "$1" | cut -d- -f2)
else
warn "$1 does not exist; creating new TPM counter"
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
tpmr counter_create \
-pwdc '' \
-la $LABEL |
tee /tmp/counter ||
die "Unable to create TPM counter"
TPM_COUNTER=$(cut -d: -f1 </tmp/counter)
fi
if [ -z "$TPM_COUNTER" ]; then
die "$1: TPM Counter not found?"
fi
}
read_tpm_counter() {
TRACE_FUNC
tpmr counter_read -ix "$1" | tee "/tmp/counter-$1" ||
die "Counter read failed"
}
increment_tpm_counter() {
TRACE_FUNC
tpmr counter_increment -ix "$1" -pwdc '' |
tee /tmp/counter-$1 ||
die "TPM counter increment failed for rollback prevention. Please reset the TPM"
}
check_config() {
TRACE_FUNC
if [ ! -d /tmp/kexec ]; then
mkdir /tmp/kexec ||
die 'Failed to make kexec tmp dir'
else
rm -rf /tmp/kexec/* ||
die 'Failed to empty kexec tmp dir'
fi
if [ ! -r $1/kexec.sig -a "$CONFIG_BASIC" != "y" ]; then
return
fi
if [ $(find $1/kexec*.txt | wc -l) -eq 0 ]; then
return
fi
if [ "$2" != "force" ]; then
if ! sha256sum $(find $1/kexec*.txt) | gpgv $1/kexec.sig -; then
die 'Invalid signature on kexec boot params'
fi
fi
echo "+++ Found verified kexec boot params"
cp $1/kexec*.txt /tmp/kexec ||
die "Failed to copy kexec boot params to tmp"
}
# Replace a file in a ROM (add it if the file does not exist)
replace_rom_file() {
ROM="$1"
ROM_FILE="$2"
NEW_FILE="$3"
if (cbfs.sh -o "$ROM" -l | grep -q "$ROM_FILE"); then
cbfs.sh -o "$ROM" -d "$ROM_FILE"
fi
cbfs.sh -o "$ROM" -a "$ROM_FILE" -f "$NEW_FILE"
}
replace_config() {
TRACE_FUNC
CONFIG_FILE=$1
CONFIG_OPTION=$2
NEW_SETTING=$3
touch $CONFIG_FILE
# first pull out the existing option from the global config and place in a tmp file
awk "gsub(\"^export ${CONFIG_OPTION}=.*\",\"export ${CONFIG_OPTION}=\\\"${NEW_SETTING}\\\"\")" /tmp/config >${CONFIG_FILE}.tmp
awk "gsub(\"^${CONFIG_OPTION}=.*\",\"${CONFIG_OPTION}=\\\"${NEW_SETTING}\\\"\")" /tmp/config >>${CONFIG_FILE}.tmp
# then copy any remaining settings from the existing config file, minus the option you changed
grep -v "^export ${CONFIG_OPTION}=" ${CONFIG_FILE} | grep -v "^${CONFIG_OPTION}=" >>${CONFIG_FILE}.tmp || true
sort ${CONFIG_FILE}.tmp | uniq >${CONFIG_FILE}
rm -f ${CONFIG_FILE}.tmp
}
# Generate a secret for TPM-less HOTP by reading the ROM. Output is the
# sha256sum of the ROM (binary, not printable), which can be truncated to the
# supported secret length.
secret_from_rom_hash() {
local ROM_IMAGE="/tmp/coreboot-notpm.rom"
echo -e "\nTPM not detected; measuring ROM directly\n" 1>&2
# Read the ROM if we haven't read it yet
if [ ! -f "${ROM_IMAGE}" ]; then
flash.sh -r "${ROM_IMAGE}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 1
fi
sha256sum "${ROM_IMAGE}" | cut -f1 -d ' ' | fromhex_plain
}
update_checksums() {
TRACE_FUNC
# ensure /boot mounted
if ! grep -q /boot /proc/mounts; then
mount -o ro /boot ||
recovery "Unable to mount /boot"
fi
# remount RW
mount -o rw,remount /boot
# sign and auto-roll config counter
extparam=
if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
if [ "$CONFIG_IGNORE_ROLLBACK" != "y" ]; then
extparam=-r
fi
fi
if ! kexec-sign-config -p /boot -u $extparam; then
rv=1
else
rv=0
fi
# switch back to ro mode
mount -o ro,remount /boot
return $rv
}
print_tree() {
TRACE_FUNC
find ./ ! -path './kexec*' -print0 | sort -z
}
# Escape zero-delimited standard input to safely display it to the user in e.g.
# `whiptail`, `less`, `echo`, `cat`. Doesn't produce shell-escaped output.
# Most printable characters are passed verbatim (exception: \).
# These escapes are used to replace their corresponding characters: #n#r#t#v#b
# Other characters are rendered as hexadecimal escapes.
# escape_zero [prefix] [escape character]
# prefix: \0 in the input will result in \n[prefix]
# escape character: character to use for escapes (default: #); \ may be interpreted by `whiptail`
escape_zero() {
local prefix="$1"
local echar="${2:-#}"
local todo=""
local echar_hex="$(echo -n "$echar" | xxd -p -c1)"
[ ${#echar_hex} -eq 2 ] || die "Invalid escape character $echar passed to escape_zero(). Programming error?!"
echo -e -n "$prefix"
xxd -p -c1 | tr -d '\n' |
{
while IFS= read -r -n2 -d ''; do
if [ -n "$todo" ]; then
#REPLY == " " is EOF
[[ "$REPLY" == " " ]] && echo '' || echo -e -n "$todo"
todo=""
fi
case "$REPLY" in
00)
todo="\n$prefix"
;;
08)
echo -n "${echar}b"
;;
09)
echo -n "${echar}t"
;;
0a)
echo -n "${echar}n"
;;
0b)
echo -n "${echar}v"
;;
0d)
echo -n "${echar}r"
;;
"$echar_hex")
echo -n "$echar$echar"
;;
#interpreted characters:
2[0-9a-f] | 3[0-9a-f] | 4[0-9a-f] | 5[0-9abd-f] | 6[0-9a-f] | 7[0-9a-e])
echo -e -n '\x'"$REPLY"
;;
# All others are escaped
*)
echo -n "${echar}x$REPLY"
;;
esac
done
}
}
# Currently heads doesn't support signing file names with certain characters
# due to https://bugs.busybox.net/show_bug.cgi?id=14226. Also, certain characters
# may be intepreted by `whiptail`, `less` et al (e.g. \n, \b, ...).
assert_signable() {
TRACE_FUNC
# ensure /boot mounted
if ! grep -q /boot /proc/mounts; then
mount -o ro /boot || die "Unable to mount /boot"
fi
find /boot -print0 >/tmp/signable.ref
local del='\001-\037\134\177-\377'
LC_ALL=C tr -d "$del" </tmp/signable.ref >/tmp/signable.del || die "Failed to execute tr."
if ! cmp -s "/tmp/signable.ref" "/tmp/signable.del" &>/dev/null; then
local user_out="/tmp/hash_output_mismatches"
local add="Please investigate!"
[ -f "$user_out" ] && add="Please investigate the following relative paths to /boot (where # are sanitized invalid characters):"$'\n'"$(cat "$user_out")"
recovery "Some /boot file names contain characters that are currently not supported by heads: $del"$'\n'"$add"
fi
rm -f /tmp/signable.*
}
verify_checksums() {
TRACE_FUNC
local boot_dir="$1"
local gui="${2:-y}"
(
set +e -o pipefail
local ret=0
cd "$boot_dir" || ret=1
sha256sum -c "$TMP_HASH_FILE" >/tmp/hash_output || ret=1
# also make sure that the file & directory structure didn't change
# (sha256sum won't detect added files)
print_tree >/tmp/tree_output || ret=1
if ! cmp -s "$TMP_TREE_FILE" /tmp/tree_output &>/dev/null; then
ret=1
[[ "$gui" != "y" ]] && exit "$ret"
# produce a diff that can safely be presented to the user
# this is relatively hard as file names may e.g. contain backslashes etc.,
# which are interpreted by whiptail, less, ...
escape_zero "(new) " <"$TMP_TREE_FILE" >"${TMP_TREE_FILE}.user"
escape_zero "(new) " </tmp/tree_output >/tmp/tree_output.user
diff "${TMP_TREE_FILE}.user" /tmp/tree_output.user | grep -E '^\+\(new\).*$' | sed -r 's/^\+\(new\)/(new)/g' >>/tmp/hash_output
rm -f "${TMP_TREE_FILE}.user"
rm -f /tmp/tree_output.user
fi
exit $ret
)
return $?
}
# Check if a device is an LVM2 PV, and if so print the VG name
find_lvm_vg_name() {
TRACE_FUNC
local DEVICE VG
DEVICE="$1"
mkdir -p /tmp/root-hashes-gui
if ! lvm pvs "$DEVICE" >/tmp/root-hashes-gui/lvm_vg 2>/dev/null; then
# It's not an LVM PV
return 1
fi
VG="$(tail -n +2 /tmp/root-hashes-gui/lvm_vg | awk '{print $2}')"
if [ -z "$VG" ]; then
DEBUG "Could not find LVM2 VG from lvm pvs output:"
DEBUG "$(cat /tmp/root-hashes-gui/lvm_vg)"
return 1
fi
echo "$VG"
}
# If a block device is a partition, check if it is a bios-grub partition on a
# GPT-partitioned disk.
is_gpt_bios_grub() {
TRACE_FUNC
local PART_DEV="$1" DEVICE NUMBER
# Figure out the partitioned device containing this device (if there is
# one) from /sys/class/block.
local DEVICE_MATCHES=("/sys/class/block/"*"/$(basename "$PART_DEV")")
DEVICE="$(echo "${DEVICE_MATCHES[0]}" | cut -d/ -f5)"
if [ "${#DEVICE_MATCHES[@]}" -ne 1 ] || [ "$DEVICE" = "*" ]; then
return 0
fi
# Extract the partition number
if ! [[ $(basename "$PART_DEV") =~ ([0-9]+)$ ]]; then
return 0 # Can't figure out the partition number
fi
NUMBER="${BASH_REMATCH[1]}"
# Now we know the device and partition number, get the type. This is
# specific to GPT disks, MBR disks are shown differently by fdisk.
TRACE "$PART_DEV is partition $NUMBER of $DEVICE"
if [ "$(fdisk -l "/dev/$DEVICE" | awk '$1 == '"$NUMBER"' {print $5}')" == grub ]; then
return 0
fi
return 1
}
# Test if a block device could be used as /boot - we can mount it and it
# contains /boot/grub* files. (Here, the block device could be a partition or
# an unpartitioned device.)
#
# If the device is a partition, its type is also checked. Some common types
# that we definitely can't mount this way are excluded to silence spurious exFAT
# errors.
#
# Any existing /boot is unmounted. If the device is a reasonable boot device,
# it's left mounted on /boot.
mount_possible_boot_device() {
TRACE_FUNC
local BOOT_DEV="$1"
local PARTITION_TYPE
# Unmount anything on /boot. Ignore failure since there might not be
# anything. If there is something mounted and we cannot unmount it for
# some reason, mount will fail, which is handled.
umount /boot 2>/dev/null || true
# Skip bios-grub partitions on GPT disks, LUKS partitions, and LVM PVs,
# we can't mount these as /boot.
if is_gpt_bios_grub "$BOOT_DEV" || cryptsetup isLuks "$BOOT_DEV" ||
find_lvm_vg_name "$BOOT_DEV" >/dev/null; then
TRACE "$BOOT_DEV is not a mountable partition for /boot"
return 1
fi
TRACE "Try mounting $BOOT_DEV as /boot"
if mount -o ro "$BOOT_DEV" /boot >/dev/null 2>&1; then
if ls -d /boot/grub* >/dev/null 2>&1; then
# This device is a reasonable boot device
return 0
fi
umount /boot || true
fi
return 1
}
# detect and set /boot device
# mount /boot if successful
detect_boot_device() {
TRACE_FUNC
local devname
# unmount /boot to be safe
cd / && umount /boot 2>/dev/null
# check $CONFIG_BOOT_DEV if set/valid
if [ -e "$CONFIG_BOOT_DEV" ] && mount_possible_boot_device "$CONFIG_BOOT_DEV"; then
# CONFIG_BOOT_DEV is valid device and contains an installed OS
return 0
fi
# generate list of possible boot devices
fdisk -l | grep "Disk /dev/" | cut -f2 -d " " | cut -f1 -d ":" >/tmp/disklist
# Check each possible boot device
for i in $(cat /tmp/disklist); do
# If the device has partitions, check the partitions instead
if device_has_partitions "$i"; then
devname="$(basename "$i")"
partitions=("/sys/class/block/$devname/$devname"?*)
else
partitions=("$i") # Use the device itself
fi
for partition in "${partitions[@]}"; do
partition_dev=/dev/"$(basename "$partition")"
# No sense trying something we already tried above
if [ "$partition_dev" = "$CONFIG_BOOT_DEV" ]; then
continue
fi
# If this is a reasonable boot device, select it and finish
if mount_possible_boot_device "$partition_dev"; then
CONFIG_BOOT_DEV="$partition_dev"
return 0
fi
done
done
# no valid boot device found
echo "Unable to locate /boot files on any mounted disk"
return 1
}
scan_boot_options() {
TRACE_FUNC
local bootdir config option_file
bootdir="$1"
config="$2"
option_file="$3"
if [ -r $option_file ]; then rm $option_file; fi
for i in $(find $bootdir -name "$config"); do
DO_WITH_DEBUG kexec-parse-boot "$bootdir" "$i" >>$option_file
done
# FC29/30+ may use BLS format grub config files
# https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/BootLoaderSpecByDefault
# only parse these if $option_file is still empty
if [ ! -s $option_file ] && [ -d "$bootdir/loader/entries" ]; then
for i in $(find $bootdir -name "$config"); do
kexec-parse-bls "$bootdir" "$i" "$bootdir/loader/entries" >>$option_file
done
fi
}
calc() {
awk "BEGIN { print "$*" }"
}
# truncate a file to a size only if it is longer (busybox truncate lacks '<' and
# always sets the file size)
truncate_max_bytes() {
local bytes="$1"
local file="$2"
if [ "$(stat -c %s "$file")" -gt "$bytes" ]; then
truncate -s "$bytes" "$file"
fi
}
# Busybox xxd -p pads the last line with spaces to 60 columns, which not only
# trips up many scripts, it's very difficult to diagnose by looking at the
# output. Delete line breaks and spaces to really get plain hex output.
tohex_plain() {
xxd -p | tr -d '\n '
}
# Busybox xxd -p -r silently truncates lines longer than 60 hex chars.
# Shorter lines are OK, spaces are OK, and even splitting a byte across lines is
# allowed, so just fold the text to maximum 60 column lines.
# Note that also unlike GNU xxd, non-hex chars in input corrupt the output (GNU
# xxd ignores them).
fromhex_plain() {
fold -w 60 | xxd -p -r
}
print_battery_health() {
if [ -d /sys/class/power_supply/BAT* ]; then
battery_health=$(calc $(cat /sys/class/power_supply/BAT*/charge_full)/$(cat /sys/class/power_supply/BAT*/charge_full_design)*100 | awk -F "." {'print $1'})
echo "$battery_health"
fi
}
print_battery_charge() {
if [ -d /sys/class/power_supply/BAT* ]; then
battery_charge=$(calc $(cat /sys/class/power_supply/BAT*/charge_now)/$(cat /sys/class/power_supply/BAT*/charge_full)*100 | awk -F "." {'print $1'})
echo "$battery_charge"
fi
}
generate_random_mac_address() {
#Borrowed from https://stackoverflow.com/questions/42660218/bash-generate-random-mac-address-unicast
hexdump -n 6 -ve '1/1 "%.2x "' /dev/urandom | awk -v a="2,6,a,e" -v r="$RANDOM" 'BEGIN{srand(r);}NR==1{split(a,b,",");r=int(rand()*4+1);printf "%s%s:%s:%s:%s:%s:%s\n",substr($1,0,1),b[r],$2,$3,$4,$5,$6}'
}
# Add a command to be invoked at exit. (Note that trap EXIT replaces any
# existing handler.) Commands are invoked in reverse order, so they can be used
# to clean up resources, etc.
# The parameters are all executed as-is and do _not_ require additional quoting
# (unlike trap). E.g.:
# at_exit shred "$file" #<-- file is expanded when calling at_exit, no extra quoting needed
at_exit() {
AT_EXIT_HANDLERS+=("$@") # Command and args
AT_EXIT_HANDLERS+=("$#") # Number of elements in this command
}
# Array of all exit handler command arguments with lengths of each command at
# the end. For example:
# at_exit echo hello
# at_exit echo a b c
# results in:
# AT_EXIT_HANDLERS=(echo hello 2 echo a b c 4)
AT_EXIT_HANDLERS=()
# Each handler is an array AT_EXIT_HANDLER_{i}
run_at_exit_handlers() {
local cmd_pos cmd_len
cmd_pos="${#AT_EXIT_HANDLERS[@]}"
# Silence trace if there are no handlers, this is common and occurs a lot
[ "$cmd_pos" -gt 0 ] && DEBUG "Running at_exit handlers"
while [ "$cmd_pos" -gt 0 ]; do
cmd_pos="$((cmd_pos - 1))"
cmd_len="${AT_EXIT_HANDLERS[$cmd_pos]}"
cmd_pos="$((cmd_pos - cmd_len))"
"${AT_EXIT_HANDLERS[@]:$cmd_pos:$cmd_len}"
done
}
trap run_at_exit_handlers EXIT