heads/initrd/bin/unseal-totp

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#!/bin/bash
# Retrieve the sealed file from the NVRAM, unseal it and compute the totp
. /etc/functions
TOTP_SEALED="/tmp/secret/totp.sealed"
TOTP_SECRET="/tmp/secret/totp.key"
TRACE "Under /bin/unseal-totp"
if [ "$CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS" = "y" ]; then
tpmr unseal 0x81004d47 sha256:0,1,2,3,4,7 > "$TOTP_SECRET" \
|| die "Unable to unseal totp secret"
elif [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
tpm nv_readvalue \
-in 4d47 \
-sz 312 \
-of "$TOTP_SEALED" \
|| die "Unable to retrieve sealed file from TPM NV"
tpm unsealfile \
-hk 40000000 \
-if "$TOTP_SEALED" \
-of "$TOTP_SECRET" \
|| die "Unable to unseal totp secret"
fi
shred -n 10 -z -u "$TOTP_SEALED" 2> /dev/null
if ! totp -q < "$TOTP_SECRET"; then
shred -n 10 -z -u "$TOTP_SECRET" 2> /dev/null
die 'Unable to compute TOTP hash?'
fi
shred -n 10 -z -u "$TOTP_SECRET" 2> /dev/null
exit 0