heads/initrd/bin/uefi-init

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#!/bin/bash
set -e -o pipefail
. /etc/functions
# Update initrd with CBFS files
if [ -z "$CONFIG_PCR" ]; then
CONFIG_PCR=7
fi
CONFIG_GUID="74696e69-6472-632e-7069-6f2f75736572"
# copy EFI file named $CONFIG_GUID to /tmp, measure and extract
GUID=`uefi -l | grep "^$CONFIG_GUID"`
if [ -n "GUID" ]; then
echo "Loading $GUID from ROM"
TMPFILE=/tmp/uefi.$$
uefi -r $GUID | gunzip -c > $TMPFILE \
|| die "Failed to read config GUID from ROM"
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" -o "$CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS" = "y" ]; then
tpmr extend -ix "$CONFIG_PCR" -if $TMPFILE \
|| die "$filename: tpm extend failed"
fi
( cd / ; cpio -iud < $TMPFILE 2>/dev/null ) \
|| die "Failed to extract config GUID"
fi