heads/initrd/bin/kexec-save-default

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#!/bin/bash
# Save these options to be the persistent default
set -e -o pipefail
. /tmp/config
. /etc/functions
TRACE_FUNC
while getopts "b:d:p:i:" arg; do
case $arg in
b) bootdir="$OPTARG" ;;
d) paramsdev="$OPTARG" ;;
p) paramsdir="$OPTARG" ;;
i) index="$OPTARG" ;;
esac
done
if [ -z "$bootdir" -o -z "$index" ]; then
die "Usage: $0 -b /boot -i menu_option "
fi
if [ -z "$paramsdev" ]; then
paramsdev="$bootdir"
fi
if [ -z "$paramsdir" ]; then
paramsdir="$bootdir"
fi
bootdir="${bootdir%%/}"
paramsdev="${paramsdev%%/}"
paramsdir="${paramsdir%%/}"
TMP_MENU_FILE="/tmp/kexec/kexec_menu.txt"
ENTRY_FILE="$paramsdir/kexec_default.$index.txt"
HASH_FILE="$paramsdir/kexec_default_hashes.txt"
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
PRIMHASH_FILE="$paramsdir/kexec_primhdl_hash.txt"
KEY_DEVICES="$paramsdir/kexec_key_devices.txt"
KEY_LVM="$paramsdir/kexec_key_lvm.txt"
lvm_suggest=$(lvm vgscan | awk -F '"' {'print $1'} | tail -n +2)
num_lvm=$(echo "$lvm_suggest" | wc -l)
if [ "$num_lvm" -eq 1 ] && [ -n "$lvm_suggest" ]; then
lvm_volume_group="$lvm_suggest"
elif [ -z "$lvm_suggest" ]; then
num_lvm=0
fi
# $lvm_suggest is a multiline string, we need to convert it to a space separated string
lvm_suggest=$(echo $lvm_suggest | tr '\n' ' ')
DEBUG "LVM num_lvm: $num_lvm, lvm_suggest: $lvm_suggest"
# get all LUKS container devices
devices_suggest=$(blkid | cut -d ':' -f 1 | while read device; do
if cryptsetup isLuks "$device"; then echo "$device"; fi
done | sort)
num_devices=$(echo "$devices_suggest" | wc -l)
if [ "$num_devices" -eq 1 ] && [ -s "$devices_suggest" ]; then
key_devices=$devices_suggest
elif [ -z "$devices_suggest" ]; then
num_devices=0
fi
# $devices_suggest is a multiline string, we need to convert it to a space separated string
devices_suggest=$(echo $devices_suggest | tr '\n' ' ')
DEBUG "LUKS num_devices: $num_devices, devices_suggest: $devices_suggest"
if [ "$num_lvm" -eq 0 ] && [ "$num_devices" -eq 0 ]; then
#No encrypted partition found.
no_encrypted_partition=1
fi
#Reusable function when user wants to define new TPM DUK for lvms/disks
prompt_for_existing_encrypted_lvms_or_disks() {
TRACE_FUNC
DEBUG "num_lvm: $num_lvm, lvm_suggest: $lvm_suggest, num_devices: $num_devices, devices_suggest: $devices_suggest"
# Create an associative array to store the suggested LVMs and their paths
declare -A lvms_array
# Loop through the suggested LVMs and add them to the array
for lvm in $lvm_suggest; do
lvms_array[$lvm]=$lvm
done
# Get the number of suggested LVMs
num_lvms=${#lvms_array[@]}
if [ "$num_lvms" -gt 1 ]; then
DEBUG "Multiple LVMs found: $lvm_suggest"
selected_lvms_not_existing=1
# Create an array to store the selected LVMs
declare -a key_lvms_array
while [ $selected_lvms_not_existing -ne 0 ]; do
{
# Read the user input and store it in a variable
read \
-p "Encrypted LVMs? (choose between/all: $lvm_suggest): " \
key_lvms
# Split the user input by spaces and add each element to the array
IFS=' ' read -r -a key_lvms_array <<<"$key_lvms"
# Loop through the array and check if each element is in the lvms_array
valid=1
for lvm in "${key_lvms_array[@]}"; do
if [[ ! ${lvms_array[$lvm]+_} ]]; then
# If not found, set the flag to indicate invalid input
valid=0
break
fi
done
# If valid, set the flag to indicate valid input
if [[ $valid -eq 1 ]]; then
selected_lvms_not_existing=0
fi
}
done
elif [ "$num_lvms" -eq 1 ]; then
echo "Single Encrypted LVM found at $lvm_suggest."
key_lvms=$lvm_suggest
else
echo "No encrypted LVMs found."
fi
# Create an associative array to store the suggested devices and their paths
declare -A devices_array
# Loop through the suggested devices and add them to the array
for device in $devices_suggest; do
devices_array[$device]=$device
done
# Get the number of suggested devices
num_devices=${#devices_array[@]}
if [ "$num_devices" -gt 1 ]; then
DEBUG "Multiple LUKS devices found: $devices_suggest"
selected_luksdevs_not_existing=1
# Create an array to store the selected devices
declare -a key_devices_array
while [ $selected_luksdevs_not_existing -ne 0 ]; do
{
# Read the user input and store it in a variable
read \
-p "Encrypted devices? (choose between/all: $devices_suggest): " \
key_devices
# Split the user input by spaces and add each element to the array
IFS=' ' read -r -a key_devices_array <<<"$key_devices"
# Loop through the array and check if each element is in the devices_array
valid=1
for device in "${key_devices_array[@]}"; do
if [[ ! ${devices_array[$device]+_} ]]; then
# If not found, set the flag to indicate invalid input
valid=0
break
fi
done
# If valid, set the flag to indicate valid input
if [[ $valid -eq 1 ]]; then
selected_luksdevs_not_existing=0
fi
}
done
elif [ "$num_devices" -eq 1 ]; then
echo "Single Encrypted Disk found at $devices_suggest."
key_devices=$devices_suggest
else
echo "No encrypted devices found."
fi
DEBUG "Multiple LUKS devices selected: $key_devices"
}
if [ ! -r "$TMP_MENU_FILE" ]; then
die "No menu options available, please run kexec-select-boot"
fi
entry=$(head -n $index $TMP_MENU_FILE | tail -1)
if [ -z "$entry" ]; then
die "Invalid menu index $index"
fi
save_key="n"
if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ] && [ "$CONFIG_TPM_NO_LUKS_DISK_UNLOCK" != "y" ] && [ "$CONFIG_BASIC" != y ]; then
DEBUG "TPM is enabled and TPM_NO_LUKS_DISK_UNLOCK is not set"
Uniformize vocabulary: LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key & LUKS Disk Recovery Key When playing with long fbwhiptail/whiptail messages, this commit played around the long string using fold. ''' echo -e "This will replace the encrypted container content and its LUKS Disk Recovery Key.\n\nThe passphrase associated with this key will be asked from the user under the following conditions:\n 1-Every boot if no Disk Unlock Key was added to the TPM\n 2-If the TPM fails (hardware failure)\n 3-If the firmware has been tampered with/modified by the user\n\nThis process requires you to type the current LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase and will delete the LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key slot, if set up, by setting a default boot LUKS key slot (1) if present.\n\nAt the next prompt, you may be asked to select which file corresponds to the LUKS device container.\n\nHit Enter to continue." | fold -w 70 -s ''' Which gave the exact output of what will be inside of the fbwhiptail prompt, fixed to 70 chars width: ''' This will replace the encrypted container content and its LUKS Disk Recovery Key. The passphrase associated with this key will be asked from the user under the following conditions: 1-Every boot if no Disk Unlock Key was added to the TPM 2-If the TPM fails (hardware failure) 3-If the firmware has been tampered with/modified by the user This process requires you to type the current LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase and will delete the LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key slot, if set up, by setting a default boot LUKS key slot (1) if present. At the next prompt, you may be asked to select which file corresponds to the LUKS device container. Hit Enter to continue. ''' Therefore, for long prompts in the future, one can just deal with "\n 1-" alignments to be respected in prompts and have fold deal with cutting the length of strings properly. Signed-off-by: Thierry Laurion <insurgo@riseup.net>
2024-01-19 17:32:04 +00:00
DEBUG "Checking if a a LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key was previously set up from $KEY_DEVICES"
#check if $KEY_DEVICES file exists and is not empty
if [ -r "$KEY_DEVICES" ] && [ -s "$KEY_DEVICES" ]; then
Uniformize vocabulary: LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key & LUKS Disk Recovery Key When playing with long fbwhiptail/whiptail messages, this commit played around the long string using fold. ''' echo -e "This will replace the encrypted container content and its LUKS Disk Recovery Key.\n\nThe passphrase associated with this key will be asked from the user under the following conditions:\n 1-Every boot if no Disk Unlock Key was added to the TPM\n 2-If the TPM fails (hardware failure)\n 3-If the firmware has been tampered with/modified by the user\n\nThis process requires you to type the current LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase and will delete the LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key slot, if set up, by setting a default boot LUKS key slot (1) if present.\n\nAt the next prompt, you may be asked to select which file corresponds to the LUKS device container.\n\nHit Enter to continue." | fold -w 70 -s ''' Which gave the exact output of what will be inside of the fbwhiptail prompt, fixed to 70 chars width: ''' This will replace the encrypted container content and its LUKS Disk Recovery Key. The passphrase associated with this key will be asked from the user under the following conditions: 1-Every boot if no Disk Unlock Key was added to the TPM 2-If the TPM fails (hardware failure) 3-If the firmware has been tampered with/modified by the user This process requires you to type the current LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase and will delete the LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key slot, if set up, by setting a default boot LUKS key slot (1) if present. At the next prompt, you may be asked to select which file corresponds to the LUKS device container. Hit Enter to continue. ''' Therefore, for long prompts in the future, one can just deal with "\n 1-" alignments to be respected in prompts and have fold deal with cutting the length of strings properly. Signed-off-by: Thierry Laurion <insurgo@riseup.net>
2024-01-19 17:32:04 +00:00
DEBUG "LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key was previously set up from $KEY_DEVICES"
read \
-n 1 \
-p "Do you want to reseal a disk key to the TPM [y/N]: " \
change_key_confirm
echo
if [ "$change_key_confirm" = "y" \
-o "$change_key_confirm" = "Y" ]; then
old_lvm_volume_group=""
if [ -r "$KEY_LVM" ]; then
old_lvm_volume_group=$(cat $KEY_LVM) || true
old_key_devices=$(cat $KEY_DEVICES |
cut -d\ -f1 |
grep -v "$old_lvm_volume_group" |
xargs) || true
else
old_key_devices=$(cat $KEY_DEVICES |
cut -d\ -f1 | xargs) || true
fi
lvm_suggest="$old_lvm_volume_group"
devices_suggest="$old_key_devices"
save_key="y"
fi
else
Uniformize vocabulary: LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key & LUKS Disk Recovery Key When playing with long fbwhiptail/whiptail messages, this commit played around the long string using fold. ''' echo -e "This will replace the encrypted container content and its LUKS Disk Recovery Key.\n\nThe passphrase associated with this key will be asked from the user under the following conditions:\n 1-Every boot if no Disk Unlock Key was added to the TPM\n 2-If the TPM fails (hardware failure)\n 3-If the firmware has been tampered with/modified by the user\n\nThis process requires you to type the current LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase and will delete the LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key slot, if set up, by setting a default boot LUKS key slot (1) if present.\n\nAt the next prompt, you may be asked to select which file corresponds to the LUKS device container.\n\nHit Enter to continue." | fold -w 70 -s ''' Which gave the exact output of what will be inside of the fbwhiptail prompt, fixed to 70 chars width: ''' This will replace the encrypted container content and its LUKS Disk Recovery Key. The passphrase associated with this key will be asked from the user under the following conditions: 1-Every boot if no Disk Unlock Key was added to the TPM 2-If the TPM fails (hardware failure) 3-If the firmware has been tampered with/modified by the user This process requires you to type the current LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase and will delete the LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key slot, if set up, by setting a default boot LUKS key slot (1) if present. At the next prompt, you may be asked to select which file corresponds to the LUKS device container. Hit Enter to continue. ''' Therefore, for long prompts in the future, one can just deal with "\n 1-" alignments to be respected in prompts and have fold deal with cutting the length of strings properly. Signed-off-by: Thierry Laurion <insurgo@riseup.net>
2024-01-19 17:32:04 +00:00
DEBUG "No previous LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key was set up, confirming to add a Disk Encryption Key to the TPM"
read \
-n 1 \
-p "Do you wish to add a disk encryption to the TPM [y/N]: " \
add_key_confirm
echo
if [ "$add_key_confirm" = "y" \
-o "$add_key_confirm" = "Y" ]; then
DEBUG "User confirmed desire to add a Disk Encryption Key to the TPM"
save_key="y"
fi
fi
if [ "$save_key" = "y" ]; then
if [ -n "$old_key_devices" ] || [ -n "$old_lvm_volume_group" ]; then
Uniformize vocabulary: LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key & LUKS Disk Recovery Key When playing with long fbwhiptail/whiptail messages, this commit played around the long string using fold. ''' echo -e "This will replace the encrypted container content and its LUKS Disk Recovery Key.\n\nThe passphrase associated with this key will be asked from the user under the following conditions:\n 1-Every boot if no Disk Unlock Key was added to the TPM\n 2-If the TPM fails (hardware failure)\n 3-If the firmware has been tampered with/modified by the user\n\nThis process requires you to type the current LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase and will delete the LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key slot, if set up, by setting a default boot LUKS key slot (1) if present.\n\nAt the next prompt, you may be asked to select which file corresponds to the LUKS device container.\n\nHit Enter to continue." | fold -w 70 -s ''' Which gave the exact output of what will be inside of the fbwhiptail prompt, fixed to 70 chars width: ''' This will replace the encrypted container content and its LUKS Disk Recovery Key. The passphrase associated with this key will be asked from the user under the following conditions: 1-Every boot if no Disk Unlock Key was added to the TPM 2-If the TPM fails (hardware failure) 3-If the firmware has been tampered with/modified by the user This process requires you to type the current LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase and will delete the LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key slot, if set up, by setting a default boot LUKS key slot (1) if present. At the next prompt, you may be asked to select which file corresponds to the LUKS device container. Hit Enter to continue. ''' Therefore, for long prompts in the future, one can just deal with "\n 1-" alignments to be respected in prompts and have fold deal with cutting the length of strings properly. Signed-off-by: Thierry Laurion <insurgo@riseup.net>
2024-01-19 17:32:04 +00:00
DEBUG "Previous LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key was set up for $old_key_devices $old_lvm_volume_group"
read \
-n 1 \
-p "Do you want to reuse configured Encrypted LVM groups/Block devices? (Y/n):" \
reuse_past_devices
echo
if [ "$reuse_past_devices" = "y" ] || [ "$reuse_past_devices" = "Y" ] || [ -z "$reuse_past_devices" ]; then
if [ -z "$key_devices" ] && [ -n "$old_key_devices" ]; then
key_devices="$old_key_devices"
fi
if [ -z "$lvm_volume_group" ] && [ -n "$old_lvm_volume_group" ]; then
lvm_volume_group="$old_lvm_volume_group"
fi
#User doesn't want to reuse past devices, so we need to prompt him from devices_suggest and lvm_suggest
else
prompt_for_existing_encrypted_lvms_or_disks
fi
else
Uniformize vocabulary: LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key & LUKS Disk Recovery Key When playing with long fbwhiptail/whiptail messages, this commit played around the long string using fold. ''' echo -e "This will replace the encrypted container content and its LUKS Disk Recovery Key.\n\nThe passphrase associated with this key will be asked from the user under the following conditions:\n 1-Every boot if no Disk Unlock Key was added to the TPM\n 2-If the TPM fails (hardware failure)\n 3-If the firmware has been tampered with/modified by the user\n\nThis process requires you to type the current LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase and will delete the LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key slot, if set up, by setting a default boot LUKS key slot (1) if present.\n\nAt the next prompt, you may be asked to select which file corresponds to the LUKS device container.\n\nHit Enter to continue." | fold -w 70 -s ''' Which gave the exact output of what will be inside of the fbwhiptail prompt, fixed to 70 chars width: ''' This will replace the encrypted container content and its LUKS Disk Recovery Key. The passphrase associated with this key will be asked from the user under the following conditions: 1-Every boot if no Disk Unlock Key was added to the TPM 2-If the TPM fails (hardware failure) 3-If the firmware has been tampered with/modified by the user This process requires you to type the current LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase and will delete the LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key slot, if set up, by setting a default boot LUKS key slot (1) if present. At the next prompt, you may be asked to select which file corresponds to the LUKS device container. Hit Enter to continue. ''' Therefore, for long prompts in the future, one can just deal with "\n 1-" alignments to be respected in prompts and have fold deal with cutting the length of strings properly. Signed-off-by: Thierry Laurion <insurgo@riseup.net>
2024-01-19 17:32:04 +00:00
DEBUG "No previous LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key was set up, setting up"
prompt_for_existing_encrypted_lvms_or_disks
fi
save_key_params="-s -p $paramsdev"
if [ -n "$lvm_volume_group" ]; then
save_key_params="$save_key_params -l $lvm_volume_group $key_devices"
else
save_key_params="$save_key_params $key_devices"
fi
kexec-save-key $save_key_params ||
Uniformize vocabulary: LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key & LUKS Disk Recovery Key When playing with long fbwhiptail/whiptail messages, this commit played around the long string using fold. ''' echo -e "This will replace the encrypted container content and its LUKS Disk Recovery Key.\n\nThe passphrase associated with this key will be asked from the user under the following conditions:\n 1-Every boot if no Disk Unlock Key was added to the TPM\n 2-If the TPM fails (hardware failure)\n 3-If the firmware has been tampered with/modified by the user\n\nThis process requires you to type the current LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase and will delete the LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key slot, if set up, by setting a default boot LUKS key slot (1) if present.\n\nAt the next prompt, you may be asked to select which file corresponds to the LUKS device container.\n\nHit Enter to continue." | fold -w 70 -s ''' Which gave the exact output of what will be inside of the fbwhiptail prompt, fixed to 70 chars width: ''' This will replace the encrypted container content and its LUKS Disk Recovery Key. The passphrase associated with this key will be asked from the user under the following conditions: 1-Every boot if no Disk Unlock Key was added to the TPM 2-If the TPM fails (hardware failure) 3-If the firmware has been tampered with/modified by the user This process requires you to type the current LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase and will delete the LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key slot, if set up, by setting a default boot LUKS key slot (1) if present. At the next prompt, you may be asked to select which file corresponds to the LUKS device container. Hit Enter to continue. ''' Therefore, for long prompts in the future, one can just deal with "\n 1-" alignments to be respected in prompts and have fold deal with cutting the length of strings properly. Signed-off-by: Thierry Laurion <insurgo@riseup.net>
2024-01-19 17:32:04 +00:00
die "Failed to save the LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key"
fi
fi
# try to switch to rw mode
mount -o rw,remount $paramsdev
if [ ! -d $paramsdir ]; then
mkdir -p $paramsdir ||
die "Failed to create params directory"
fi
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
if [ "$CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS" = "y" ]; then
sha256sum /tmp/secret/primary.handle >"$PRIMHASH_FILE" ||
die "ERROR: Failed to Hash TPM2 primary key handle!"
DEBUG "TPM2 primary key handle hash saved to $PRIMHASH_FILE"
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
fi
rm $paramsdir/kexec_default.*.txt 2>/dev/null || true
echo "$entry" >$ENTRY_FILE
(
cd $bootdir && kexec-boot -b "$bootdir" -e "$entry" -f |
xargs sha256sum >$HASH_FILE
) || die "Failed to create hashes of boot files"
if [ ! -r $ENTRY_FILE -o ! -r $HASH_FILE ]; then
die "Failed to write default config"
fi
if [ "$save_key" = "y" ]; then
# logic to parse OS initrd to extract crypttab, its filepaths and its OS defined options
initrd_decompressed="/tmp/initrd_extract"
mkdir -p "$initrd_decompressed"
# Get initrd filename selected to be default initrd that OS could be using to configure LUKS on boot by deploying crypttab files
current_default_initrd=$(cat /boot/kexec_default_hashes.txt | grep initr | awk -F " " {'print $NF'} | sed 's/\.\//\/boot\//g')
echo "+++ Extracting current selected default boot's $current_default_initrd to find crypttab files..."
unpack_initramfs.sh "$current_default_initrd" "$initrd_decompressed"
crypttab_files=$(find "$initrd_decompressed" | grep crypttab 2>/dev/null) || true
if [ ! -z "$crypttab_files" ]; then
DEBUG "Found crypttab files in $current_default_initrd"
rm -f $bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt || true
#Parsing each crypttab file found
echo "$crypttab_files" | while read crypttab_file; do
# Change crypttab file path to be relative to initrd for string manipulation
final_initrd_filepath=${crypttab_file#/tmp/initrd_extract}
DEBUG "Final initramfs crypttab path:$final_initrd_filepath"
# Keep only non-commented lines for crypttab entries
current_crypttab_entries=$(cat "$crypttab_file" | grep -v "^#")
DEBUG "Found initrd crypttab entries $final_initrd_filepath:$current_crypttab_entries"
# Modify each retained crypttab line for /secret.key under intramfs to be considered as a keyfile
modified_crypttab_entries=$(echo "$current_crypttab_entries" | sed 's/none/\/secret.key/g')
DEBUG "Modified crypttab entries $final_initrd_filepath:$modified_crypttab_entries"
echo "$modified_crypttab_entries" | while read modified_crypttab_entry; do
echo "$final_initrd_filepath:$modified_crypttab_entry" >>$bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt
done
done
#insert current default boot's initrd crypttab locations into tracking file to be overwritten into initramfs at kexec-inject-key
echo "+++ The following OS crypttab file:entry were modified from default boot's initrd:"
cat $bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt
echo "+++ Heads added /secret.key in those entries and saved them under $bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt"
echo "+++ Those overrides will be part of detached signed digests and used to prepare cpio injected at kexec of selected default boot entry."
else
echo "+++ No crypttab file found in extracted initrd. A generic crypttab will be generated"
if [ -e "$bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt" ]; then
echo "+++ Removing $bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt"
rm -f "$bootdir/kexec_initrd_crypttab_overrides.txt"
fi
fi
# Cleanup
cd /
rm -rf /tmp/initrd_extract || true
fi
# sign and auto-roll config counter
extparam=
if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
if [ "$CONFIG_IGNORE_ROLLBACK" != "y" ]; then
extparam=-r
fi
fi
if [ "$CONFIG_BASIC" != "y" ]; then
kexec-sign-config -p $paramsdir $extparam ||
die "Failed to sign default config"
fi
# switch back to ro mode
mount -o ro,remount $paramsdev