heads/initrd/bin/seal-totp

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#!/bin/bash
# Generate a random secret, seal it with the PCRs
# and write it to the TPM NVRAM.
#
# Pass in a hostname if you want to change it from the default string
#
. /etc/functions
TRACE "Under /bin/seal-totp"
TPM_NVRAM_SPACE=4d47
HOST="$1"
if [ -z "$HOST" ]; then
HOST="TPMTOTP"
fi
TPM_PASSWORD="$2"
TOTP_SECRET="/tmp/secret/totp.key"
TOTP_SEALED="/tmp/secret/totp.sealed"
dd \
if=/dev/urandom \
of="$TOTP_SECRET" \
count=1 \
bs=20 \
2>/dev/null \
|| die "Unable to generate 20 random bytes"
secret="`base32 < $TOTP_SECRET`"
pcrf="/tmp/secret/pcrf.bin"
DEBUG "Sealing TOTP with actual state of PCR0-4)"
tpmr pcrread 0 "$pcrf"
tpmr pcrread -a 1 "$pcrf"
tpmr pcrread -a 2 "$pcrf"
tpmr pcrread -a 3 "$pcrf"
DEBUG "Sealing TOTP with actual state of PCR4 (Going to recovery shell extends PCR4)"
# pcr 4 is expected to either:
# zero on bare coreboot+linuxboot on x86 (boot mode: init)
# already extended on ppc64 per BOOTKERNEL (skiboot) which boots heads.
#We expect the PCR4 to be in the right state at unattended unseal operation
tpmr pcrread -a 4 "$pcrf"
# pcr 5 (kernel modules loaded) is not measured at sealing/unsealing of totp
DEBUG "Sealing TOTP neglecting PCR5 involvement (Dynamically loaded kernel modules are not firmware integrity attestation related)"
# pcr 6 (drive luks header) is not measured at sealing/unsealing of totp
DEBUG "Sealing TOTP without PCR6 involvement (LUKS header consistency is not firmware integrity attestation related)"
# pcr 7 is containing measurements of user injected stuff in cbfs
tpmr pcrread -a 7 "$pcrf"
tpmr seal "$TOTP_SECRET" "$TPM_NVRAM_SPACE" 0,1,2,3,4,7 "$pcrf" 312 "" "$TPM_PASSWORD" \
|| die "Unable to write sealed secret to NVRAM"
shred -n 10 -z -u "$TOTP_SEALED" 2> /dev/null
url="otpauth://totp/$HOST?secret=$secret"
secret=""
qrenc "$url"
echo "$url"