2023-02-08 21:01:48 +00:00
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#!/bin/bash
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2017-07-12 04:17:45 +00:00
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# This will generate a disk encryption key and seal / ecncrypt
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# with the current PCRs and then store it in the TPM NVRAM.
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# It will then need to be bundled into initrd that is booted.
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set -e -o pipefail
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2023-02-18 17:58:43 +00:00
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. /etc/functions
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2017-07-12 04:17:45 +00:00
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TPM_INDEX=3
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TPM_SIZE=312
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KEY_FILE="/tmp/secret/secret.key"
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TPM_SEALED="/tmp/secret/secret.sealed"
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RECOVERY_KEY="/tmp/secret/recovery.key"
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. /etc/functions
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2018-12-06 23:24:28 +00:00
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. /tmp/config
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2017-07-12 04:17:45 +00:00
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2023-02-23 22:05:15 +00:00
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TRACE "Under kexec-seal-key"
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2017-07-12 04:17:45 +00:00
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paramsdir=$1
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if [ -z "$paramsdir" ]; then
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2017-07-17 16:43:14 +00:00
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die "Usage $0 /boot"
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2017-07-12 04:17:45 +00:00
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fi
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KEY_DEVICES="$paramsdir/kexec_key_devices.txt"
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KEY_LVM="$paramsdir/kexec_key_lvm.txt"
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if [ ! -r "$KEY_DEVICES" ]; then
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die "No devices defined for disk encryption"
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2023-08-22 18:34:29 +00:00
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else
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DEBUG "Devices defined for disk encryption: $(cat "$KEY_DEVICES" | cut -d\ -f1)"
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2017-07-12 04:17:45 +00:00
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fi
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if [ -r "$KEY_LVM" ]; then
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# Activate the LVM volume group
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2023-08-22 18:34:29 +00:00
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VOLUME_GROUP=$(cat $KEY_LVM)
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2017-07-12 04:17:45 +00:00
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if [ -z "$VOLUME_GROUP" ]; then
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die "No LVM volume group defined for activation"
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fi
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2023-08-22 18:34:29 +00:00
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lvm vgchange -a y $VOLUME_GROUP ||
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die "$VOLUME_GROUP: unable to activate volume group"
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else
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DEBUG "No LVM volume group defined for activation"
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2017-07-12 04:17:45 +00:00
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fi
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2023-02-23 22:05:15 +00:00
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DEBUG "$(pcrs)"
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2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
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# LUKS Key slot 0 is the manual recovery pass phrase
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# that they user entered when they installed OS,
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2017-07-12 04:17:45 +00:00
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# key slot 1 is the one that we've generated.
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2023-08-30 20:49:39 +00:00
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read -s -p "Enter Disk Recovery Key/passphrase: " disk_password
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2023-08-22 18:34:29 +00:00
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echo -n "$disk_password" >"$RECOVERY_KEY"
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2017-07-12 04:17:45 +00:00
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echo
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2023-08-22 18:34:29 +00:00
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read -s -p "New TPM Disk Unlock Key passphrase for booting: " key_password
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2023-02-23 14:15:00 +00:00
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echo
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2023-08-31 16:07:39 +00:00
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read -s -p "Repeat TPM Disk Unlock Key passphrase for booting: " key_password2
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2023-02-23 14:15:00 +00:00
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echo
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if [ "$key_password" != "$key_password2" ]; then
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2023-08-22 18:34:29 +00:00
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die "Key passphrases do not match"
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2017-07-12 04:17:45 +00:00
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fi
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# Generate key file
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2023-08-22 18:34:29 +00:00
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echo "++++++ Generating new randomized 128 bytes key file that will be unsealed by TPM Disk Unlock Key passphrase"
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2017-07-12 04:17:45 +00:00
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dd \
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if=/dev/urandom \
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of="$KEY_FILE" \
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bs=1 \
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count=128 \
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2023-08-22 18:34:29 +00:00
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2>/dev/null ||
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die "Unable to generate 128 random bytes"
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# Count the number of slots used on each device
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for dev in $(cat "$KEY_DEVICES" | cut -d\ -f1); do
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DEBUG "Checking number of slots used on $dev"
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#check if the device is a LUKS device with luks[1,2]
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slots_used=$(cryptsetup luksDump $dev | grep -c 'luks[0-9]*' || die "Unable to get number of slots used on $dev")
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DEBUG "Number of slots used on $dev: $slots_used"
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# If slot1 is the only one used, warn and die with proper messages
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if [ $slots_used -eq 1 ]; then
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# Check if slot 1 is the only one existing
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if cryptsetup luksDump $dev | grep -q "Slot 1: ENABLED"; then
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warn "Slot 1 is the only one existing on $dev. Heads cannot use it to store TPM sealed LUKS Disk Unlock Key"
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die "Slot 1 should not be the only one existing on $dev. Fix your custom setup"
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fi
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else
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2023-08-30 20:49:39 +00:00
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DEBUG "Slot 1 is not the only one existing on $dev"
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DEBUG "$dev Slot 1 will be used to store LUKS Disk Unlock Key that will be sealed into TPM next"
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2023-08-22 18:34:29 +00:00
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fi
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done
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2017-07-12 04:17:45 +00:00
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# Remove all the old keys from slot 1
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2023-08-22 18:34:29 +00:00
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for dev in $(cat "$KEY_DEVICES" | cut -d\ -f1); do
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echo "++++++ $dev: Removing old key slot 1"
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2017-07-12 04:17:45 +00:00
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cryptsetup luksKillSlot \
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--key-file "$RECOVERY_KEY" \
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2023-08-22 18:34:29 +00:00
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$dev 1 ||
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warn "$dev: removal of key in slot 1 failed: might not exist. Continuing"
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2017-07-12 04:17:45 +00:00
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2023-08-22 18:34:29 +00:00
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echo "++++++ $dev: Adding key to slot 1"
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2017-07-12 04:17:45 +00:00
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cryptsetup luksAddKey \
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--key-file "$RECOVERY_KEY" \
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--key-slot 1 \
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2023-08-22 18:34:29 +00:00
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$dev "$KEY_FILE" ||
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die "$dev: Unable to add key to slot 1"
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2017-07-12 04:17:45 +00:00
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done
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# Now that we have setup the new keys, measure the PCRs
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# We don't care what ends up in PCR 6; we just want
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# to get the /tmp/luksDump.txt file. We use PCR16
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# since it should still be zero
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2023-08-22 18:34:29 +00:00
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cat "$KEY_DEVICES" | cut -d\ -f1 | xargs /bin/qubes-measure-luks ||
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die "Unable to measure the LUKS headers"
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2018-11-07 21:27:52 +00:00
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2023-03-08 17:39:06 +00:00
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pcrf="/tmp/secret/pcrf.bin"
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tpmr pcrread 0 "$pcrf"
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tpmr pcrread -a 1 "$pcrf"
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tpmr pcrread -a 2 "$pcrf"
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tpmr pcrread -a 3 "$pcrf"
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2023-06-30 16:33:09 +00:00
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# Note that PCR 4 needs to be set with the "normal-boot" path value, read it from event log.
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2023-08-22 18:34:29 +00:00
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tpmr calcfuturepcr 4 >>"$pcrf"
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2023-03-08 17:39:06 +00:00
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if [ "$CONFIG_USB_KEYBOARD" = "y" -o -r /lib/modules/libata.ko -o -x /bin/hotp_verification ]; then
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2023-08-22 18:34:29 +00:00
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DEBUG "Sealing TPM Disk Unlock key with PCR5 involvement (additional kernel modules are loaded per board config)..."
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2023-03-08 17:39:06 +00:00
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# Here, we take pcr 5 into consideration if modules are expected to be measured+loaded
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tpmr pcrread -a 5 "$pcrf"
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else
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2023-08-22 18:34:29 +00:00
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DEBUG "Sealing TPM Disk Unlock Key with PCR5=0 (NO additional kernel modules are loaded per board config)..."
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2023-03-08 17:39:06 +00:00
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#no kernel modules are expected to be measured+loaded
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2023-08-22 18:34:29 +00:00
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tpmr calcfuturepcr 5 >>"$pcrf"
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2017-07-12 04:17:45 +00:00
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fi
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2023-03-08 17:39:06 +00:00
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# Precompute the value for pcr 6
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2023-08-22 18:34:29 +00:00
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DEBUG "Precomputing TPM future value for PCR6 sealing/unsealing of TPM Disk Unlock Key..."
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tpmr calcfuturepcr 6 "/tmp/luksDump.txt" >>"$pcrf"
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2023-03-08 17:39:06 +00:00
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# We take into consideration user files in cbfs
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tpmr pcrread -a 7 "$pcrf"
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2023-03-08 21:19:37 +00:00
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DO_WITH_DEBUG --mask-position 7 \
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2023-03-08 17:39:06 +00:00
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tpmr seal "$KEY_FILE" "$TPM_INDEX" 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7 "$pcrf" \
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"$TPM_SIZE" "$key_password"
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# should be okay if this fails
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2023-08-22 18:34:29 +00:00
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shred -n 10 -z -u "$pcrf" 2>/dev/null ||
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warn "Failed to delete pcrf file - continuing"
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shred -n 10 -z -u "$KEY_FILE" 2>/dev/null ||
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warn "Failed to delete key file - continuing"
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mount -o rw,remount $paramsdir || die "Failed to remount $paramsdir in RW - continuing"
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cp -f /tmp/luksDump.txt "$paramsdir/kexec_lukshdr_hash.txt" ||
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die "Failed to copy LUKS header hashes to /boot - continuing"
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mount -o ro,remount $paramsdir || die "Failed to remount $paramsdir in RO - continuing"
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