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42 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
42 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
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# T480 Blobs
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The following blobs are needed:
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* `ifd.bin`
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* `gbe.bin`
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* `me.bin`
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## me.bin: automatically extract, neuter and deguard
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download_clean_me.sh : Download vulnerable ME from Dell, verify checksum, extract ME, neuter ME and trim it, then apply the deguard patch and place it into me.bin
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The ME blob dumped in this directory comes from the following link: https://dl.dell.com/FOLDER04573471M/1/Inspiron_5468_1.3.0.exe
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This provides ME version 11.6.0.1126. In this version CVE-2017-5705 has not yet been fixed.
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See https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00086.html
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Therefore, Bootguard can be disabled by deguard with a patched ME.
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As specified in the first link, this ME can be deployed to:
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* T480
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* T480s
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## ifd.bin and gbe.bin
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Both blobs were taken from libreboot: https://codeberg.org/libreboot/lbmk/src/commit/68ebde2f033ce662813dbf8f5ab21f160014029f/config/ifd/t480
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The GBE MAC address was forged to: `00:DE:AD:C0:FF:EE MAC`
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## Integrity
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Sha256sums: `blobs/xx80/hashes.txt`
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# CAVEATS for the board:
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See the board configs `boards/t480-[hotp-]maximized/t480-[hotp-]maximized.config`:
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> This board is vulnerable to a TPM reset attack, i.e. the PCRs are reset while the system is running.
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> This attack can be used to bypass measured boot when an attacker succeeds at modifying the SPI flash.
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> Also it can be used to extract FDE keys from a TPM.
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> The related coreboot issue contains more information: https://ticket.coreboot.org/issues/576
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> Make sure you understand the implications of the attack for your threat model before using this board.
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