heads/initrd/etc/fstab

devtmpfs	/dev		devtmpfs	defaults	0 0
devpts		/dev/pts	devpts		defaults	0 0
sysfs		/sys		sysfs		defaults	0 0
proc		/proc		proc		defaults	0 0
efivarfs	/sys/firmware/efi/efivars efivarfs defaults	0 0
securityfs	/sys/kernel/security securityfs defaults        0 0
remember to add /dev to /etc/fstab 2017-04-10 21:48:20 +00:00			`devtmpfs /dev devtmpfs defaults 0 0`
Build the Heads/NERF firmware for the Dell R630 server. This development branch builds a NERF firmware for the Dell R630 server. It does not use coreboot; instead it branches directly from the vendor's PEI core into Linux and the Heads runtime that is setup to be run as an EFI executable. 2017-09-20 14:29:14 +00:00			`devpts /dev/pts devpts defaults 0 0`
remember to add /dev to /etc/fstab 2017-04-10 21:48:20 +00:00			`sysfs /sys sysfs defaults 0 0`
			`proc /proc proc defaults 0 0`
fix typos in efivarfs 2018-02-08 22:25:32 +00:00			`efivarfs /sys/firmware/efi/efivars efivarfs defaults 0 0`
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities 2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00			`securityfs /sys/kernel/security securityfs defaults 0 0`