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#!/bin/bash
# Shell functions for most initialization scripts
. /etc/ash_functions
# Print <hidden> or <empty> depending on whether $1 is empty. Useful to mask an
# optional password parameter.
mask_param() {
if [ -z "$1" ]; then
echo "<empty>"
else
echo "<hidden>"
fi
}
# Trace a command with DEBUG, then execute it.
# A password parameter can be masked by passing --mask-position N before the
# command to execute, the debug trace will just indicate whether the password
# was empty or nonempty (which is important when use of a password is optional).
# N=0 is the name of the command to be executed, N=1 is its first parameter,
# etc.
DO_WITH_DEBUG() {
if [ "$1" == "--mask-position" ]; then
mask_position="$2"
shift
shift
DEBUG_ARGS=("$@")
DEBUG_ARGS[$mask_position]="$(mask_param "${DEBUG_ARGS[$mask_position]}")"
DEBUG "${DEBUG_ARGS[@]}"
else
DEBUG "$@"
fi
"$@"
}
pcrs() {
if [ "$CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS" = "y" ]; then
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
tpm2 pcrread sha256
elif [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
head -8 /sys/class/tpm/tpm0/pcrs
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
fi
}
confirm_totp() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:confirm_totp"
prompt="$1"
last_half=X
unset totp_confirm
while true; do
# update the TOTP code every thirty seconds
date=$(date "+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
seconds=$(date "+%s")
half=$(expr \( $seconds % 60 \) / 30)
if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" != "y" ]; then
TOTP="NO TPM"
elif [ "$half" != "$last_half" ]; then
last_half=$half
TOTP=$(unseal-totp) ||
recovery "TOTP code generation failed"
fi
echo -n "$date $TOTP: "
# read the first character, non-blocking
read \
-t 1 \
-n 1 \
-s \
-p "$prompt" \
totp_confirm &&
break
# nothing typed, redraw the line
echo -ne '\r'
done
# clean up with a newline
echo
}
reseal_tpm_disk_decryption_key() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:reseal_tpm_disk_decryption_key"
#For robustness, exit early if TPM Disk Unlock Key is prohibited in board configs
if [ "$CONFIG_TPM_DISK_UNLOCK_KEY" == "n" ]; then
DEBUG "TPM Disk Unlock Key is prohibited in board configs"
return
else
DEBUG "TPM Disk Unlock Key is allowed in board configs. Continuing"
fi
if ! grep -q /boot /proc/mounts; then
mount -o ro /boot ||
recovery "Unable to mount /boot"
fi
if [ -s /boot/kexec_key_devices.txt ] || [ -s /boot/kexec_key_lvm.txt ]; then
warn "A TPM Disk Unlock Key previously sealed is now invalid since firmware measurements could not unseal TOTP"
echo "Renewing LUKS Disk Unlock Key to be unsealed by TPM Disk Unlock Key passphrase"
while ! kexec-seal-key /boot; do
warn "Recovery Disk Encryption key passphrase invalid. Try again!"
done
warn "LUKS header hash changed under /boot/kexec_luks_hdr_hash.txt"
echo "Updating checksums and signing all files under /boot/kexec.sig"
while ! update_checksums; do
warn "Checksums were not signed. Bad GPG PIN provided?"
warn "Please update checksums and provide a valid GPG PIN"
done
warn "Rebooting in 3 seconds to enable booting default boot option"
sleep 3
reboot
else
DEBUG "No TPM disk decryption key to reseal"
fi
}
# Enable USB storage (if not already enabled), and wait for storage devices to
# be detected. If USB storage was already enabled, no wait occurs, this would
# have happened already when USB storage was enabled.
enable_usb_storage() {
if ! lsmod | grep -q usb_storage; then
timeout=0
echo "Scanning for USB storage devices..."
insmod /lib/modules/usb-storage.ko >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
die "usb_storage: module load failed"
while [[ $(list_usb_storage | wc -l) -eq 0 ]]; do
[[ $timeout -ge 8 ]] && break
sleep 1
timeout=$(($timeout + 1))
done
fi
}
list_usb_storage() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:list_usb_storage"
# List all USB storage devices, including partitions unless we received argument stating we want drives only
# The output is a list of device names, one per line.
if [ "$1" = "disks" ]; then
DEBUG "Listing USB storage devices (disks only) since list_usb_storage was called with 'disks' argument"
else
DEBUG "Listing USB storage devices (including partitions)"
fi
stat -c %N /sys/block/sd* 2>/dev/null | grep usb |
cut -f1 -d ' ' |
sed "s/[']//g" |
while read b; do
# Ignore devices of size 0, such as empty SD card
# readers on laptops attached via USB.
if [ "$(cat "$b/size")" -gt 0 ]; then
DEBUG "USB storage device of size greater then 0: $b"
echo "$b"
fi
done |
sed "s|/sys/block|/dev|" |
while read b; do
# If the device has a partition table, ignore it and
# include the partitions instead - even if the kernel
# hasn't detected the partitions yet. Such a device is
# never usable directly, and this allows the "wait for
# disks" loop in mount-usb to correctly wait for the
# partitions.
# This check: [ $(fdisk -l "$b" | wc -l) -eq 5 ]
# covers the case of a device without partition table but
# formatted as fat32, which contains a sortof partition table.
# this causes fdisk to not print the invalid partition table
# message and instead it'll print an empty table with header.
# In both cases the output is 5 lines: 3 about device info,
# 1 empty line and the 5th will be the table header or the
# unvalid message.
DISK_DATA=$(fdisk -l "$b")
if echo "$DISK_DATA" | grep -q "doesn't contain a valid partition table" || [ $(echo "$DISK_DATA" | wc -l) -eq 5 ]; then
# No partition table, include this device
DEBUG "USB storage device without partition table: $b"
echo "$b"
#Bypass the check for partitions if we want only disks
elif [ "$1" = "disks" ]; then
# disks only were requested, so we don't list partitions
DEBUG "USB storage device with partition table: $b"
DEBUG "We asked for disks only, so we don't want to list partitions"
echo "$b"
else
# Has a partition table, include partitions
DEBUG "USB storage device with partition table: $b"
ls -1 "$b"* | awk 'NR!=1 {print $0}'
fi
done
}
confirm_gpg_card() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:confirm_gpg_card"
read \
-n 1 \
-p "Please confirm that your GPG card is inserted [Y/n]: " \
card_confirm
echo
if [ "$card_confirm" != "y" \
-a "$card_confirm" != "Y" \
-a -n "$card_confirm" ] \
; then
die "gpg card not confirmed"
fi
# setup the USB so we can reach the GPG card
enable_usb
echo -e "\nVerifying presence of GPG card...\n"
# ensure we don't exit without retrying
errexit=$(set -o | grep errexit | awk '{print $2}')
set +e
gpg --card-status >/dev/null
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
# prompt for reinsertion and try a second time
read -n1 -r -p \
"Can't access GPG key; remove and reinsert, then press Enter to retry. " \
ignored
# restore prev errexit state
if [ "$errexit" = "on" ]; then
set -e
fi
# retry card status
gpg --card-status >/dev/null ||
die "gpg card read failed"
fi
# restore prev errexit state
if [ "$errexit" = "on" ]; then
set -e
fi
}
# Prompt for an owner password if it is not already set in tpm_password. Sets
# tpm_password. Tools should optionally accept a TPM password on the command
# line, since some flows need it multiple times and only one prompt is ideal.
prompt_tpm_password() {
if [ -n "$tpm_password" ]; then
return 0
fi
read -s -p "TPM Owner password: " tpm_password
echo # new line after password prompt
}
# Prompt for a new owner password when resetting the TPM. Returned in
# key_password. The password must be 1-32 characters and must be entered twice,
# the script will loop until this is met.
prompt_new_owner_password() {
local key_password2
key_password=1
key_password2=2
while [ "$key_password" != "$key_password2" ] || [ "${#key_password}" -gt 32 ] || [ -z "$key_password" ]; do
read -s -p "New TPM owner passphrase (2 words suggested, 1-32 characters max): " key_password
echo
read -s -p "Repeat chosen TPM owner passphrase: " key_password2
echo
if [ "$key_password" != "$key_password2" ]; then
echo "Passphrases entered do not match. Try again!"
echo
fi
done
}
check_tpm_counter() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:check_tpm_counter"
LABEL=${2:-3135106223}
tpm_password="$3"
# if the /boot.hashes file already exists, read the TPM counter ID
# from it.
if [ -r "$1" ]; then
TPM_COUNTER=$(grep counter- "$1" | cut -d- -f2)
else
warn "$1 does not exist; creating new TPM counter"
prompt_tpm_password
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
tpmr counter_create \
-pwdo "$tpm_password" \
-pwdc '' \
-la $LABEL |
tee /tmp/counter ||
die "Unable to create TPM counter"
TPM_COUNTER=$(cut -d: -f1 </tmp/counter)
fi
if [ -z "$TPM_COUNTER" ]; then
die "$1: TPM Counter not found?"
fi
}
read_tpm_counter() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:read_tpm_counter"
tpmr counter_read -ix "$1" | tee "/tmp/counter-$1" ||
die "Counter read failed"
}
increment_tpm_counter() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:increment_tpm_counter"
tpmr counter_increment -ix "$1" -pwdc '' |
tee /tmp/counter-$1 ||
die "Counter increment failed"
}
check_config() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:check_config"
if [ ! -d /tmp/kexec ]; then
mkdir /tmp/kexec ||
die 'Failed to make kexec tmp dir'
else
rm -rf /tmp/kexec/* ||
die 'Failed to empty kexec tmp dir'
fi
if [ ! -r $1/kexec.sig -a "$CONFIG_BASIC" != "y" ]; then
return
fi
if [ $(find $1/kexec*.txt | wc -l) -eq 0 ]; then
return
fi
if [ "$2" != "force" ]; then
if ! sha256sum $(find $1/kexec*.txt) | gpgv $1/kexec.sig -; then
die 'Invalid signature on kexec boot params'
fi
fi
echo "+++ Found verified kexec boot params"
cp $1/kexec*.txt /tmp/kexec ||
die "Failed to copy kexec boot params to tmp"
}
# Replace a file in a ROM (add it if the file does not exist)
replace_rom_file() {
ROM="$1"
ROM_FILE="$2"
NEW_FILE="$3"
if (cbfs.sh -o "$ROM" -l | grep -q "$ROM_FILE"); then
cbfs.sh -o "$ROM" -d "$ROM_FILE"
fi
cbfs.sh -o "$ROM" -a "$ROM_FILE" -f "$NEW_FILE"
}
replace_config() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:replace_config"
CONFIG_FILE=$1
CONFIG_OPTION=$2
NEW_SETTING=$3
touch $CONFIG_FILE
# first pull out the existing option from the global config and place in a tmp file
awk "gsub(\"^export ${CONFIG_OPTION}=.*\",\"export ${CONFIG_OPTION}=\\\"${NEW_SETTING}\\\"\")" /tmp/config >${CONFIG_FILE}.tmp
awk "gsub(\"^${CONFIG_OPTION}=.*\",\"${CONFIG_OPTION}=\\\"${NEW_SETTING}\\\"\")" /tmp/config >>${CONFIG_FILE}.tmp
# then copy any remaining settings from the existing config file, minus the option you changed
grep -v "^export ${CONFIG_OPTION}=" ${CONFIG_FILE} | grep -v "^${CONFIG_OPTION}=" >>${CONFIG_FILE}.tmp || true
sort ${CONFIG_FILE}.tmp | uniq >${CONFIG_FILE}
rm -f ${CONFIG_FILE}.tmp
}
# Set a config variable in a specific file to a given value - replace it if it
# exists, or add it. If added, the variable will be exported.
set_config() {
CONFIG_FILE="$1"
CONFIG_OPTION="$2"
NEW_SETTING="$3"
if grep -q "$CONFIG_OPTION" "$CONFIG_FILE"; then
replace_config "$CONFIG_FILE" "$CONFIG_OPTION" "$NEW_SETTING"
else
echo "export $CONFIG_OPTION=\"$NEW_SETTING\"" >>"$CONFIG_FILE"
fi
}
# Set a value in config.user, re-combine configs, and update configs in the
# environment.
set_user_config() {
CONFIG_OPTION="$1"
NEW_SETTING="$2"
set_config /etc/config.user "$CONFIG_OPTION" "$NEW_SETTING"
combine_configs
. /tmp/config
}
# Load a config value to a variable, defaulting to empty. Does not fail if the
# config is not set (since it would expand to empty by default).
load_config_value() {
local config_name="$1"
if grep -q "$config_name=" /tmp/config; then
grep "$config_name=" /tmp/config | tail -n1 | cut -f2 -d '=' | tr -d '"'
fi
}
# Generate a secret for TPM-less HOTP by reading the ROM. Output is the
# sha256sum of the ROM (binary, not printable), which can be truncated to the
# supported secret length.
secret_from_rom_hash() {
local ROM_IMAGE="/tmp/coreboot-notpm.rom"
echo -e "\nTPM not detected; measuring ROM directly\n" 1>&2
# Read the ROM if we haven't read it yet
if [ ! -f "${ROM_IMAGE}" ]; then
flash.sh -r "${ROM_IMAGE}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 1
fi
sha256sum "${ROM_IMAGE}" | cut -f1 -d ' ' | fromhex_plain
}
update_checksums() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:update_checksums"
# ensure /boot mounted
if ! grep -q /boot /proc/mounts; then
mount -o ro /boot ||
recovery "Unable to mount /boot"
fi
# remount RW
mount -o rw,remount /boot
# sign and auto-roll config counter
extparam=
if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
if [ "$CONFIG_IGNORE_ROLLBACK" != "y" ]; then
extparam=-r
fi
fi
if ! kexec-sign-config -p /boot -u $extparam; then
rv=1
else
rv=0
fi
# switch back to ro mode
mount -o ro,remount /boot
return $rv
}
print_tree() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:print_tree"
find ./ ! -path './kexec*' -print0 | sort -z
}
# Escape zero-delimited standard input to safely display it to the user in e.g.
# `whiptail`, `less`, `echo`, `cat`. Doesn't produce shell-escaped output.
# Most printable characters are passed verbatim (exception: \).
# These escapes are used to replace their corresponding characters: #n#r#t#v#b
# Other characters are rendered as hexadecimal escapes.
# escape_zero [prefix] [escape character]
# prefix: \0 in the input will result in \n[prefix]
# escape character: character to use for escapes (default: #); \ may be interpreted by `whiptail`
escape_zero() {
local prefix="$1"
local echar="${2:-#}"
local todo=""
local echar_hex="$(echo -n "$echar" | xxd -p -c1)"
[ ${#echar_hex} -eq 2 ] || die "Invalid escape character $echar passed to escape_zero(). Programming error?!"
echo -e -n "$prefix"
xxd -p -c1 | tr -d '\n' |
{
while IFS= read -r -n2 -d ''; do
if [ -n "$todo" ]; then
#REPLY == " " is EOF
[[ "$REPLY" == " " ]] && echo '' || echo -e -n "$todo"
todo=""
fi
case "$REPLY" in
00)
todo="\n$prefix"
;;
08)
echo -n "${echar}b"
;;
09)
echo -n "${echar}t"
;;
0a)
echo -n "${echar}n"
;;
0b)
echo -n "${echar}v"
;;
0d)
echo -n "${echar}r"
;;
"$echar_hex")
echo -n "$echar$echar"
;;
#interpreted characters:
2[0-9a-f] | 3[0-9a-f] | 4[0-9a-f] | 5[0-9abd-f] | 6[0-9a-f] | 7[0-9a-e])
echo -e -n '\x'"$REPLY"
;;
# All others are escaped
*)
echo -n "${echar}x$REPLY"
;;
esac
done
}
}
# Currently heads doesn't support signing file names with certain characters
# due to https://bugs.busybox.net/show_bug.cgi?id=14226. Also, certain characters
# may be intepreted by `whiptail`, `less` et al (e.g. \n, \b, ...).
assert_signable() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:assert_signable"
# ensure /boot mounted
if ! grep -q /boot /proc/mounts; then
mount -o ro /boot || die "Unable to mount /boot"
fi
find /boot -print0 >/tmp/signable.ref
local del='\001-\037\134\177-\377'
LC_ALL=C tr -d "$del" </tmp/signable.ref >/tmp/signable.del || die "Failed to execute tr."
if ! cmp -s "/tmp/signable.ref" "/tmp/signable.del" &>/dev/null; then
local user_out="/tmp/hash_output_mismatches"
local add="Please investigate!"
[ -f "$user_out" ] && add="Please investigate the following relative paths to /boot (where # are sanitized invalid characters):"$'\n'"$(cat "$user_out")"
recovery "Some /boot file names contain characters that are currently not supported by heads: $del"$'\n'"$add"
fi
rm -f /tmp/signable.*
}
verify_checksums() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:verify_checksums"
local boot_dir="$1"
local gui="${2:-y}"
(
set +e -o pipefail
local ret=0
cd "$boot_dir" || ret=1
sha256sum -c "$TMP_HASH_FILE" >/tmp/hash_output || ret=1
# also make sure that the file & directory structure didn't change
# (sha256sum won't detect added files)
print_tree >/tmp/tree_output || ret=1
if ! cmp -s "$TMP_TREE_FILE" /tmp/tree_output &>/dev/null; then
ret=1
[[ "$gui" != "y" ]] && exit "$ret"
# produce a diff that can safely be presented to the user
# this is relatively hard as file names may e.g. contain backslashes etc.,
# which are interpreted by whiptail, less, ...
escape_zero "(new) " <"$TMP_TREE_FILE" >"${TMP_TREE_FILE}.user"
escape_zero "(new) " </tmp/tree_output >/tmp/tree_output.user
diff "${TMP_TREE_FILE}.user" /tmp/tree_output.user | grep -E '^\+\(new\).*$' | sed -r 's/^\+\(new\)/(new)/g' >>/tmp/hash_output
rm -f "${TMP_TREE_FILE}.user"
rm -f /tmp/tree_output.user
fi
exit $ret
)
return $?
}
# detect and set /boot device
# mount /boot if successful
detect_boot_device() {
TRACE "Under /etc/functions:detect_boot_device"
# unmount /boot to be safe
cd / && umount /boot 2>/dev/null
# check $CONFIG_BOOT_DEV if set/valid
if [ -e "$CONFIG_BOOT_DEV" ]; then
if mount -o ro $CONFIG_BOOT_DEV /boot >/dev/null 2>&1; then
if ls -d /boot/grub* >/dev/null 2>&1; then
# CONFIG_BOOT_DEV is valid device and contains an installed OS
return 0
fi
fi
fi
# generate list of possible boot devices
fdisk -l | grep "Disk /dev/" | cut -f2 -d " " | cut -f1 -d ":" >/tmp/disklist
# filter out extraneous options
>/tmp/boot_device_list
for i in $(cat /tmp/disklist); do
# remove block device from list if numeric partitions exist, since not bootable
DEV_NUM_PARTITIONS=$(($(ls -1 $i* | wc -l) - 1))
if [ ${DEV_NUM_PARTITIONS} -eq 0 ]; then
echo $i >>/tmp/boot_device_list
else
ls $i* | tail -${DEV_NUM_PARTITIONS} >>/tmp/boot_device_list
fi
done
# iterate thru possible options and check for grub dir
for i in $(cat /tmp/boot_device_list); do
umount /boot 2>/dev/null
if mount -o ro $i /boot >/dev/null 2>&1; then
if ls -d /boot/grub* >/dev/null 2>&1; then
CONFIG_BOOT_DEV="$i"
return 0
fi
fi
done
# no valid boot device found
echo "Unable to locate /boot files on any mounted disk"
umount /boot 2>/dev/null
return 1
}
scan_boot_options() {
local bootdir config option_file
bootdir="$1"
config="$2"
option_file="$3"
if [ -r $option_file ]; then rm $option_file; fi
for i in $(find $bootdir -name "$config"); do
DO_WITH_DEBUG kexec-parse-boot "$bootdir" "$i" >>$option_file
done
# FC29/30+ may use BLS format grub config files
# https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/BootLoaderSpecByDefault
# only parse these if $option_file is still empty
if [ ! -s $option_file ] && [ -d "$bootdir/loader/entries" ]; then
for i in $(find $bootdir -name "$config"); do
kexec-parse-bls "$bootdir" "$i" "$bootdir/loader/entries" >>$option_file
done
fi
}
calc() {
awk "BEGIN { print "$*" }"
}
# truncate a file to a size only if it is longer (busybox truncate lacks '<' and
# always sets the file size)
truncate_max_bytes() {
local bytes="$1"
local file="$2"
if [ "$(stat -c %s "$file")" -gt "$bytes" ]; then
truncate -s "$bytes" "$file"
fi
}
# Busybox xxd -p pads the last line with spaces to 60 columns, which not only
# trips up many scripts, it's very difficult to diagnose by looking at the
# output. Delete line breaks and spaces to really get plain hex output.
tohex_plain() {
xxd -p | tr -d '\n '
}
# Busybox xxd -p -r silently truncates lines longer than 60 hex chars.
# Shorter lines are OK, spaces are OK, and even splitting a byte across lines is
# allowed, so just fold the text to maximum 60 column lines.
# Note that also unlike GNU xxd, non-hex chars in input corrupt the output (GNU
# xxd ignores them).
fromhex_plain() {
fold -w 60 | xxd -p -r
}
print_battery_health() {
if [ -d /sys/class/power_supply/BAT* ]; then
battery_health=$(calc $(cat /sys/class/power_supply/BAT*/charge_full)/$(cat /sys/class/power_supply/BAT*/charge_full_design)*100 | awk -F "." {'print $1'})
echo "$battery_health"
fi
}
print_battery_charge() {
if [ -d /sys/class/power_supply/BAT* ]; then
battery_charge=$(calc $(cat /sys/class/power_supply/BAT*/charge_now)/$(cat /sys/class/power_supply/BAT*/charge_full)*100 | awk -F "." {'print $1'})
echo "$battery_charge"
fi
}
generate_random_mac_address() {
#Borrowed from https://stackoverflow.com/questions/42660218/bash-generate-random-mac-address-unicast
hexdump -n 6 -ve '1/1 "%.2x "' /dev/urandom | awk -v a="2,6,a,e" -v r="$RANDOM" 'BEGIN{srand(r);}NR==1{split(a,b,",");r=int(rand()*4+1);printf "%s%s:%s:%s:%s:%s:%s\n",substr($1,0,1),b[r],$2,$3,$4,$5,$6}'
}
# Add a command to be invoked at exit. (Note that trap EXIT replaces any
# existing handler.) Commands are invoked in reverse order, so they can be used
# to clean up resources, etc.
# The parameters are all executed as-is and do _not_ require additional quoting
# (unlike trap). E.g.:
# at_exit shred "$file" #<-- file is expanded when calling at_exit, no extra quoting needed
at_exit() {
AT_EXIT_HANDLERS+=("$@") # Command and args
AT_EXIT_HANDLERS+=("$#") # Number of elements in this command
}
# Array of all exit handler command arguments with lengths of each command at
# the end. For example:
# at_exit echo hello
# at_exit echo a b c
# results in:
# AT_EXIT_HANDLERS=(echo hello 2 echo a b c 4)
AT_EXIT_HANDLERS=()
# Each handler is an array AT_EXIT_HANDLER_{i}
run_at_exit_handlers() {
local cmd_pos cmd_len
cmd_pos="${#AT_EXIT_HANDLERS[@]}"
# Silence trace if there are no handlers, this is common and occurs a lot
[ "$cmd_pos" -gt 0 ] && DEBUG "Running at_exit handlers"
while [ "$cmd_pos" -gt 0 ]; do
cmd_pos="$((cmd_pos - 1))"
cmd_len="${AT_EXIT_HANDLERS[$cmd_pos]}"
cmd_pos="$((cmd_pos - cmd_len))"
"${AT_EXIT_HANDLERS[@]:$cmd_pos:$cmd_len}"
done
}
trap run_at_exit_handlers EXIT