heads/initrd/bin/seal-hotpkey

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#!/bin/bash
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# Retrieve the sealed TOTP secret and initialize a USB Security dongle with it
. /etc/functions
HOTP_SECRET="/tmp/secret/hotp.key"
HOTP_COUNTER="/boot/kexec_hotp_counter"
HOTP_KEY="/boot/kexec_hotp_key"
mount_boot()
{
TRACE "Under /bin/seal-htopkey:mount_boot"
# Mount local disk if it is not already mounted
if ! grep -q /boot /proc/mounts ; then
mount -o ro /boot \
|| recovery "Unable to mount /boot"
fi
}
TRACE "Under /bin/seal-hotpkey"
# Use stored HOTP key branding (this might be useful after OEM reset)
if [ -r /boot/kexec_hotp_key ]; then
HOTPKEY_BRANDING="$(cat /boot/kexec_hotp_key)"
else
HOTPKEY_BRANDING="HOTP USB Security Dongle"
fi
if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ]; then
tpmr unseal 4d47 sha256:0,1,2,3,4,7 312 "$HOTP_SECRET" \
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
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|| die "Unable to unseal HOTP secret"
fi
# Store counter in file instead of TPM for now, as it conflicts with Heads
# config TPM counter as TPM 1.2 can only increment one counter between reboots
# get current value of HOTP counter in TPM, create if absent
mount_boot
#check_tpm_counter $HOTP_COUNTER hotp \
#|| die "Unable to find/create TPM counter"
#counter="$TPM_COUNTER"
#
#counter_value=$(read_tpm_counter $counter | cut -f2 -d ' ' | awk 'gsub("^000e","")')
#if [ "$counter_value" == "" ]; then
# die "Unable to read HOTP counter"
#fi
#counter_value=$(printf "%d" 0x${counter_value})
counter_value=1
enable_usb
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if ! hotp_verification info ; then
echo "Insert your $HOTPKEY_BRANDING and press Enter to configure it"
read
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if ! hotp_verification info ; then
# don't leak key on failure
shred -n 10 -z -u "$HOTP_SECRET" 2> /dev/null
die "Unable to find $HOTPKEY_BRANDING"
fi
fi
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# Set HOTP USB Security Dongle branding based on VID
if lsusb | grep -q "20a0:" ; then
HOTPKEY_BRANDING="Nitrokey"
elif lsusb | grep -q "316d:" ; then
HOTPKEY_BRANDING="Librem Key"
else
HOTPKEY_BRANDING="HOTP USB Security Dongle"
fi
echo -e ""
read -s -p "Enter your $HOTPKEY_BRANDING Admin PIN: " admin_pin
echo -e "\n"
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hotp_initialize "$admin_pin" $HOTP_SECRET $counter_value "$HOTPKEY_BRANDING"
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
echo -e "\n"
read -s -p "Error setting HOTP secret, re-enter Admin PIN and try again: " admin_pin
echo -e "\n"
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if ! hotp_initialize "$admin_pin" $HOTP_SECRET $counter_value "$HOTPKEY_BRANDING" ; then
# don't leak key on failure
shred -n 10 -z -u "$HOTP_SECRET" 2> /dev/null
die "Setting HOTP secret failed"
fi
fi
# HOTP key no longer needed
shred -n 10 -z -u "$HOTP_SECRET" 2> /dev/null
# Make sure our counter is incremented ahead of the next check
#increment_tpm_counter $counter > /dev/null \
#|| die "Unable to increment tpm counter"
#increment_tpm_counter $counter > /dev/null \
#|| die "Unable to increment tpm counter"
mount -o remount,rw /boot
counter_value=`expr $counter_value + 1`
echo $counter_value > $HOTP_COUNTER \
|| die "Unable to create hotp counter file"
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# Store/overwrite HOTP USB Security Dongle branding found out beforehand
echo $HOTPKEY_BRANDING > $HOTP_KEY \
|| die "Unable to store hotp key file"
#sha256sum /tmp/counter-$counter > $HOTP_COUNTER \
#|| die "Unable to create hotp counter file"
mount -o remount,ro /boot
echo -e "\n$HOTPKEY_BRANDING initialized successfully. Press Enter to continue."
read
exit 0