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Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
# TPM2 TSS library
modules-$(CONFIG_TPM2_TSS) += tpm2-tss
tpm2-tss_version := 3.2.2
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
tpm2-tss_dir := tpm2-tss-$(tpm2-tss_version)
tpm2-tss_tar := tpm2-tss-$(tpm2-tss_version).tar.gz
tpm2-tss_url := https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss/releases/download/$(tpm2-tss_version)/$(tpm2-tss_tar)
tpm2-tss_hash := ba9e52117f254f357ff502e7d60fce652b3bfb26327d236bbf5ab634235e40f1
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
#Repro checks:
# find build/x86/tpm2-tss-3.2.2/src/*/.libs/libtss2-*so* | while read file; do echo "library $file:"; strings $file|grep heads; done
# Should not return any result
#NEEDED otherwise output on previous command
#sed -i 's/hardcode_into_libs=yes/hardcode_into_libs=no/g' configure
# needed otherwise library build/x86/tpm2-tss-3.2.2/src/tss2-tcti/.libs/libtss2-tcti-pcap.so.0.0.0:
# contains: /home/user/heads/build/x86/tpm2-tss-3.2.2/src/tss2-tcti/.libs:/home/user/heads/build/x86/tpm2-tss-3.2.2/src/tss2-mu/.libs://lib
tpm2-tss_configure := aclocal && automake --add-missing && autoreconf -fi \
&& sed -i 's/hardcode_into_libs=yes/hardcode_into_libs=no/g' configure \
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
&& ./configure \
$(CROSS_TOOLS) \
--host $(MUSL_ARCH)-elf-linux \
--prefix "/" \
WiP modules/tpm2* : removed Makefile build instructions too quick /nix/store/5lr5n3qa4day8l1ivbwlcby2nknczqkq-bash-5.2p26/bin/bash ./libtool --tag=CC --mode=link /home/user/heads/crossgcc/x86/bin/x86_64-linux-musl-gcc -fdebug-prefix-map=/home/user/heads=heads -gno-record-gcc-switches -D__MUSL__ --sysroot /home/user/heads/install/x86 -isystem /home/user/heads/install/x86/include -L/home/user/heads/install/x86/lib -I./tools -I./lib -Wall -Wextra -Wformat -Wformat-security -Wstack-protector -fstack-protector-all -Wstrict-overflow=5 -O2 -fPIC -fPIE -D_GNU_SOURCE -std=gnu99 -Wstringop-overflow=4 -Wstringop-truncation -Wduplicated-branches -Wduplicated-cond -Wbool-compare -fdata-sections -ffunction-sections -I/home/user/heads/install/x86/include -I/home/user/heads/install/x86//include -I/home/user/heads/install/x86//include/tss2 -I/home/user/heads/install/x86/nix/store/yg75achq89wgqn2fi3gglgsd77kjpi03-openssl-3.0.13-dev/include -I/home/user/heads/install/x86//include -I/home/user/heads/install/x86//include/tss2 -I/home/user/heads/install/x86//include -I/home/user/heads/install/x86//include/tss2 -I/home/user/heads/install/x86//include -I/home/user/heads/install/x86//include/tss2 -DTPM2_TOOLS_MAX="101" -fdebug-prefix-map=/home/user/heads/install/x86=. -shared -pie -Wl,-z,relro -Wl,-z,now -Wl,--gc-sections -o tools/tpm2 tools/tpm2-tpm2_tool.o tools/misc/tpm2-tpm2_certifyX509certutil.o tools/misc/tpm2-tpm2_checkquote.o tools/misc/tpm2-tpm2_encodeobject.o tools/misc/tpm2-tpm2_eventlog.o tools/misc/tpm2-tpm2_print.o tools/misc/tpm2-tpm2_rc_decode.o tools/misc/tpm2-tpm2_tr_encode.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_activatecredential.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_certify.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_changeauth.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_changeeps.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_changepps.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_clear.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_clearcontrol.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_clockrateadjust.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_create.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_createak.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_createek.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_createpolicy.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_setprimarypolicy.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_createprimary.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_dictionarylockout.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_duplicate.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_getcap.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_gettestresult.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_encryptdecrypt.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_evictcontrol.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_flushcontext.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_getrandom.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_gettime.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_hash.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_hierarchycontrol.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_hmac.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_import.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_incrementalselftest.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_load.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_loadexternal.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_makecredential.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_nvdefine.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_nvextend.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_nvincrement.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_nvreadpublic.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_nvread.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_nvreadlock.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_nvundefine.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_nvwrite.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_nvwritelock.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_nvsetbits.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_pcrallocate.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_pcrevent.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_pcrextend.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_pcrread.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_pcrreset.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_policypcr.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_policyauthorize.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_policyauthorizenv.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_policynv.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_policycountertimer.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_policyor.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_policynamehash.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_policytemplate.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_policycphash.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_policypassword.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_policysigned.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_policyticket.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_policyauthvalue.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_policysecret.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_policyrestart.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_policycommandcode.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_policynvwritten.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_policyduplicationselect.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_policylocality.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_quote.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_readclock.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_readpublic.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_rsadecrypt.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_rsaencrypt.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_send.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_selftest.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_setclock.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_shutdown.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_sign.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_certifycreation.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_nvcertify.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_startauthsession.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_startup.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_stirrandom.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_testparms.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_unseal.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_verifysignature.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_setcommandauditstatus.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_getcommandauditdigest.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_getsessionauditdigest.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_geteccparameters.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_ecephemeral.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_commit.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_ecdhkeygen.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_ecdhzgen.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_zgen2phase.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_sessionconfig.o tools/tpm2-tpm2_getpolicydigest.o lib/libcommon.a -ltss2-esys -L/home/user/heads/install/x86/lib -L/home/user/heads/install/x86//lib -ltss2-mu -L/home/user/heads/install/x86/nix/store/7nmrrad8skxr47f9hfl3xc0pfqmwq51b-openssl-3.0.13/lib -lcrypto -L/home/user/heads/install/x86//lib -ltss2-tctildr -L/home/user/heads/install/x86//lib -ltss2-rc -L/home/user/heads/install/x86//lib -ltss2-sys libtool: error: cannot find the library '//lib/libtss2-sys.la' or unhandled argument '//lib/libtss2-sys.la' make[1]: *** [Makefile:2478: tools/tpm2] Error 1 make[1]: Leaving directory '/home/user/heads/build/x86/tpm2-tools-5.6' make: *** [Makefile:521: /home/user/heads/build/x86/tpm2-tools-5.6/.build] Error 1 Signed-off-by: Thierry Laurion <insurgo@riseup.net>
2024-04-23 17:37:17 +00:00
--with-sysroot=$(INSTALL) \
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
--disable-doxygen-doc \
--disable-doxygen-html \
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
--disable-doxygen-man \
--disable-doxygen-rtf \
--disable-fapi \
--disable-static \
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
# Run one build to generate the executables with the pre-defined
# exec_prefix and datarootdir, then a second make to install the binaries
# into our actual target location
tpm2-tss_target := $(MAKE_JOBS) \
DESTDIR="$(INSTALL)" \
$(CROSS_TOOLS) \
install \
# tpm2 binary wants to dlopen some libraries, so be sure that
# they are available. It would be nice to statically link these.
tpm2-tss_libraries := \
src/tss2-rc/.libs/libtss2-rc.so.0 \
src/tss2-mu/.libs/libtss2-mu.so.0 \
src/tss2-sys/.libs/libtss2-sys.so.1 \
src/tss2-esys/.libs/libtss2-esys.so.0 \
src/tss2-tcti/.libs/libtss2-tctildr.so.0 \
src/tss2-tcti/.libs/libtss2-tcti-device.so.0 \
# The pcap TCTI driver is only included if enabled in the board config.
ifeq "$(CONFIG_TPM2_CAPTURE_PCAP)" "y"
tpm2-tss_libraries += src/tss2-tcti/.libs/libtss2-tcti-pcap.so.0
endif
Addition of qemu-(fb)whiptail-tpm2(-hotp) boards -coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations) -swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config -Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized) This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads ------------- WiP TODO: - libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built - Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing - init tries to bind fd and fails currently - Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output - When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail) - seal-hotpkey is not working properly - setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM) - We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase. - primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup - would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only - tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help. - Implementing them would be better - REVIEW TODOS IN CODE - READD CIRCLECI CONFIG Current state: - TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid) - TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without. - TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails. - Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens) - Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
2022-08-25 18:43:31 +00:00
tpm2-tss_depends := openssl $(musl_dep)