// Package verifier implements high-level logic to check information
// provided by TPMs in client devices.
package verifier

import (
	"bytes"
	"crypto/rsa"
	"fmt"

	tpb "github.com/google/go-attestation/proto"
	pb "github.com/google/go-attestation/verifier/proto"

	tpm1 "github.com/google/go-tpm/tpm"
	"github.com/google/go-tpm/tpm2"
)

const (
	tpmGeneratedMagic = 0xff544347
)

// VerifyAIK examines properties of an AIK and a creation attestation, to determine
// if it is suitable for use as an attestation key.
func VerifyAIK(tpmVersion tpb.TpmVersion, aik *tpb.AikInfo) (*pb.AikVerificationResults, error) {
	switch tpmVersion {
	case tpb.TpmVersion_TPM_12:
		aik12 := aik.GetTpm12()
		return verifyAIK12(aik12.GetPublicBlob())

	case tpb.TpmVersion_TPM_20:
		aik20 := aik.GetTpm20()
		return verifyAIK20(aik20.GetPublicBlob(), aik20.GetCreationData(), aik20.GetAttestationData(), aik20.GetSignatureData())

	default:
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("TPM version %d not supported", tpmVersion)
	}
}

func verifyAIK12(public []byte) (*pb.AikVerificationResults, error) {
	pub, err := tpm1.UnmarshalPubRSAPublicKey(public)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}

	var out pb.AikVerificationResults
	out.RocaVulnerableKey = ROCAVulnerableKey(pub)
	out.Succeeded = !out.RocaVulnerableKey
	return &out, nil
}

func verifyAIK20(public, creationData, attestationData, signature []byte) (*pb.AikVerificationResults, error) {
	if len(signature) < 8 {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("signature is too short to be valid: only %d bytes", len(signature))
	}

	pub, err := tpm2.DecodePublic(public)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	_, err = tpm2.DecodeCreationData(creationData)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	att, err := tpm2.DecodeAttestationData(attestationData)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	if att.Type != tpm2.TagAttestCreation {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("attestation does apply to creation data, got tag %x", att.Type)
	}
	var out pb.AikVerificationResults

	switch pub.Type {
	case tpm2.AlgRSA:
		if pub.RSAParameters.KeyBits < 2048 {
			out.KeyTooSmall = true
		}
		out.RocaVulnerableKey = ROCAVulnerableKey(&rsa.PublicKey{N: pub.RSAParameters.Modulus()})
	default:
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("public key of alg 0x%x not supported", pub.Type)
	}

	// Compute & verify that the creation data matches the digest in the
	// attestation structure.
	nameHashConstructor, err := pub.NameAlg.HashConstructor()
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	h := nameHashConstructor()
	h.Write(creationData)
	out.CreationAttestationMismatch = !bytes.Equal(att.AttestedCreationInfo.OpaqueDigest, h.Sum(nil))

	// Make sure the AIK has sane key parameters (Attestation can be faked if an AIK
	// can be used for arbitrary signatures).
	// We verify the following:
	// - Key is TPM backed.
	// - Key is TPM generated.
	// - Key is a restricted key (means it cannot do arbitrary signing/decrypt ops).
	// - Key cannot be duplicated.
	// - Key was generated by a call to TPM_Create*.
	out.KeyNotTpmBound = (att.Magic != tpmGeneratedMagic) || ((pub.Attributes & tpm2.FlagFixedTPM) == 0)
	out.KeyUsageOverlyBroad = ((pub.Attributes & tpm2.FlagRestricted) == 0) || ((pub.Attributes & tpm2.FlagFixedParent) == 0) || ((pub.Attributes & tpm2.FlagSensitiveDataOrigin) == 0)

	// Verify the attested creation name matches what is computed from
	// the public key.
	match, err := att.AttestedCreationInfo.Name.MatchesPublic(pub)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	out.NameAttestationMismatch = !match

	// Check the signature over the attestation data verifies correctly.
	p := rsa.PublicKey{E: int(pub.RSAParameters.Exponent()), N: pub.RSAParameters.Modulus()}
	signHashConstructor, err := pub.RSAParameters.Sign.Hash.HashConstructor()
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	hsh := signHashConstructor()
	hsh.Write(attestationData)

	verifyHash, err := cryptoHash(pub.RSAParameters.Sign.Hash)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}

	//TODO(jsonp): Decode to tpm2.Signature & use that, once PR to expose DecodeSignature() is in.
	out.SignatureMismatch = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(&p, verifyHash, hsh.Sum(nil), signature[6:]) != nil

	out.Succeeded = !(out.CreationAttestationMismatch || out.KeyTooSmall || out.KeyNotTpmBound || out.KeyUsageOverlyBroad || out.NameAttestationMismatch || out.SignatureMismatch)
	return &out, nil
}