// Copyright 2019 Google Inc. // // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may not // use this file except in compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of // the License at // // http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 // // Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT // WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the // License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations under // the License. package attest import ( "bytes" "crypto" "crypto/rsa" "crypto/sha1" "crypto/sha256" "encoding/binary" "errors" "fmt" "io" "sort" "strings" // Ensure hashes are available. _ "crypto/sha256" "github.com/google/go-tpm/tpm2" "github.com/google/go-tpm/tpmutil" ) // ReplayError describes the parsed events that failed to verify against // a particular PCR. type ReplayError struct { Events []Event // InvalidPCRs reports the set of PCRs where the event log replay failed. InvalidPCRs []int } func (e ReplayError) affected(pcr int) bool { for _, p := range e.InvalidPCRs { if p == pcr { return true } } return false } // Error returns a human-friendly description of replay failures. func (e ReplayError) Error() string { return fmt.Sprintf("event log failed to verify: the following registers failed to replay: %v", e.InvalidPCRs) } // TPM algorithms. See the TPM 2.0 specification section 6.3. // // https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf#page=42 const ( algSHA1 uint16 = 0x0004 algSHA256 uint16 = 0x000B ) // EventType indicates what kind of data an event is reporting. // // https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_PCClientSpecPlat_TPM_2p0_1p04_pub.pdf#page=103 type EventType uint32 var eventTypeStrings = map[uint32]string{ 0x00000000: "EV_PREBOOT_CERT", 0x00000001: "EV_POST_CODE", 0x00000002: "EV_UNUSED", 0x00000003: "EV_NO_ACTION", 0x00000004: "EV_SEPARATOR", 0x00000005: "EV_ACTION", 0x00000006: "EV_EVENT_TAG", 0x00000007: "EV_S_CRTM_CONTENTS", 0x00000008: "EV_S_CRTM_VERSION", 0x00000009: "EV_CPU_MICROCODE", 0x0000000A: "EV_PLATFORM_CONFIG_FLAGS", 0x0000000B: "EV_TABLE_OF_DEVICES", 0x0000000C: "EV_COMPACT_HASH", 0x0000000D: "EV_IPL", 0x0000000E: "EV_IPL_PARTITION_DATA", 0x0000000F: "EV_NONHOST_CODE", 0x00000010: "EV_NONHOST_CONFIG", 0x00000011: "EV_NONHOST_INFO", 0x00000012: "EV_OMIT_BOOT_DEVICE_EVENTS", 0x80000000: "EV_EFI_EVENT_BASE", 0x80000001: "EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG", 0x80000002: "EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT", 0x80000003: "EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION", 0x80000004: "EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER", 0x80000005: "EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER", 0x80000006: "EV_EFI_GPT_EVENT", 0x80000007: "EV_EFI_ACTION", 0x80000008: "EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB", 0x80000009: "EV_EFI_HANDOFF_TABLES", 0x80000010: "EV_EFI_HCRTM_EVENT", 0x800000E0: "EV_EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHORITY", } // String returns the Spec name of the EventType, for example "EV_ACTION". If // unknown, it returns a formatted string of the EventType value. func (e EventType) String() string { if s, ok := eventTypeStrings[uint32(e)]; ok { return s } // NOTE: 0x00000013-0x0000FFFF are reserverd. Should we include that // information in the formatting? return fmt.Sprintf("EventType(0x%08x)", uint32(e)) } // Event is a single event from a TCG event log. This reports descrete items such // as BIOS measurements or EFI states. // // There are many pitfalls for using event log events correctly to determine the // state of a machine[1]. In general it's much safer to only rely on the raw PCR // values and use the event log for debugging. // // [1] https://github.com/google/go-attestation/blob/master/docs/event-log-disclosure.md type Event struct { // order of the event in the event log. sequence int // Index of the PCR that this event was replayed against. Index int // Untrusted type of the event. This value is not verified by event log replays // and can be tampered with. It should NOT be used without additional context, // and unrecognized event types should result in errors. Type EventType // Data of the event. For certain kinds of events, this must match the event // digest to be valid. Data []byte // Digest is the verified digest of the event data. While an event can have // multiple for different hash values, this is the one that was matched to the // PCR value. Digest []byte // TODO(ericchiang): Provide examples or links for which event types must // match their data to their digest. } func (e *Event) digestEquals(b []byte) error { if len(e.Digest) == 0 { return errors.New("no digests present") } switch len(e.Digest) { case crypto.SHA256.Size(): s := sha256.Sum256(b) if bytes.Equal(s[:], e.Digest) { return nil } case crypto.SHA1.Size(): s := sha1.Sum(b) if bytes.Equal(s[:], e.Digest) { return nil } default: return fmt.Errorf("cannot compare hash of length %d", len(e.Digest)) } return fmt.Errorf("digest (len %d) does not match", len(e.Digest)) } // EventLog is a parsed measurement log. This contains unverified data representing // boot events that must be replayed against PCR values to determine authenticity. type EventLog struct { // Algs holds the set of algorithms that the event log uses. Algs []HashAlg rawEvents []rawEvent specIDEvent *specIDEvent } func (e *EventLog) clone() *EventLog { out := EventLog{ Algs: make([]HashAlg, len(e.Algs)), rawEvents: make([]rawEvent, len(e.rawEvents)), } copy(out.Algs, e.Algs) copy(out.rawEvents, e.rawEvents) if e.specIDEvent != nil { dupe := *e.specIDEvent out.specIDEvent = &dupe } return &out } // Events returns events that have not been replayed against the PCR values and // are therefore unverified. The returned events contain the digest that matches // the provided hash algorithm, or are empty if that event didn't contain a // digest for that hash. // // This method is insecure and should only be used for debugging. func (e *EventLog) Events(hash HashAlg) []Event { var events []Event for _, re := range e.rawEvents { ev := Event{ Index: re.index, Type: re.typ, Data: re.data, } for _, digest := range re.digests { if hash.cryptoHash() != digest.hash { continue } ev.Digest = digest.data break } events = append(events, ev) } return events } // Verify replays the event log against a TPM's PCR values, returning the // events which could be matched to a provided PCR value. // // PCRs provide no security guarantees unless they're attested to have been // generated by a TPM. Verify does not perform these checks. // // An error is returned if the replayed digest for events with a given PCR // index do not match any provided value for that PCR index. func (e *EventLog) Verify(pcrs []PCR) ([]Event, error) { events, err := e.verify(pcrs) // If there were any issues replaying the PCRs, try each of the workarounds // in turn. // TODO(jsonp): Allow workarounds to be combined. if rErr, isReplayErr := err.(ReplayError); isReplayErr { for _, wkrd := range eventlogWorkarounds { if !rErr.affected(wkrd.affectedPCR) { continue } el := e.clone() if err := wkrd.apply(el); err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed applying workaround %q: %v", wkrd.id, err) } if events, err := el.verify(pcrs); err == nil { return events, nil } } } return events, err } func (e *EventLog) verify(pcrs []PCR) ([]Event, error) { events, err := replayEvents(e.rawEvents, pcrs) if err != nil { if _, isReplayErr := err.(ReplayError); isReplayErr { return nil, err } return nil, fmt.Errorf("pcrs failed to replay: %v", err) } return events, nil } type rawAttestationData struct { Version [4]byte // This MUST be 1.1.0.0 Fixed [4]byte // This SHALL always be the string ‘QUOT’ Digest [20]byte // PCR Composite Hash Nonce [20]byte // Nonce Hash } var ( fixedQuote = [4]byte{'Q', 'U', 'O', 'T'} ) type rawPCRComposite struct { Size uint16 // always 3 PCRMask [3]byte Values tpmutil.U32Bytes } func (a *AKPublic) validate12Quote(quote Quote, pcrs []PCR, nonce []byte) error { pub, ok := a.Public.(*rsa.PublicKey) if !ok { return fmt.Errorf("unsupported public key type: %T", a.Public) } qHash := sha1.Sum(quote.Quote) if err := rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pub, crypto.SHA1, qHash[:], quote.Signature); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("invalid quote signature: %v", err) } var att rawAttestationData if _, err := tpmutil.Unpack(quote.Quote, &att); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("parsing quote: %v", err) } // TODO(ericchiang): validate Version field. if att.Nonce != sha1.Sum(nonce) { return fmt.Errorf("invalid nonce") } if att.Fixed != fixedQuote { return fmt.Errorf("quote wasn't a QUOT object: %x", att.Fixed) } // See 5.4.1 Creating a PCR composite hash sort.Slice(pcrs, func(i, j int) bool { return pcrs[i].Index < pcrs[j].Index }) var ( pcrMask [3]byte // bitmap indicating which PCRs are active values []byte // appended values of all PCRs ) for _, pcr := range pcrs { if pcr.Index < 0 || pcr.Index >= 24 { return fmt.Errorf("invalid PCR index: %d", pcr.Index) } pcrMask[pcr.Index/8] |= 1 << uint(pcr.Index%8) values = append(values, pcr.Digest...) } composite, err := tpmutil.Pack(rawPCRComposite{3, pcrMask, values}) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("marshaling PCRs: %v", err) } if att.Digest != sha1.Sum(composite) { return fmt.Errorf("PCRs passed didn't match quote: %v", err) } // All provided PCRs are used to construct the composite hash which // is verified against the quote (for TPM 1.2), so if we got this far, // all PCR values are verified. for i := range pcrs { pcrs[i].quoteVerified = true } return nil } func (a *AKPublic) validate20Quote(quote Quote, pcrs []PCR, nonce []byte) error { sig, err := tpm2.DecodeSignature(bytes.NewBuffer(quote.Signature)) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("parse quote signature: %v", err) } sigHash := a.Hash.New() sigHash.Write(quote.Quote) switch pub := a.Public.(type) { case *rsa.PublicKey: if sig.RSA == nil { return fmt.Errorf("rsa public key provided for ec signature") } sigBytes := []byte(sig.RSA.Signature) if err := rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pub, a.Hash, sigHash.Sum(nil), sigBytes); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("invalid quote signature: %v", err) } default: // TODO(ericchiang): support ecdsa return fmt.Errorf("unsupported public key type %T", pub) } att, err := tpm2.DecodeAttestationData(quote.Quote) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("parsing quote signature: %v", err) } if att.Type != tpm2.TagAttestQuote { return fmt.Errorf("attestation isn't a quote, tag of type 0x%x", att.Type) } if !bytes.Equal([]byte(att.ExtraData), nonce) { return fmt.Errorf("nonce = %#v, want %#v", []byte(att.ExtraData), nonce) } pcrByIndex := map[int][]byte{} pcrDigestAlg := HashAlg(att.AttestedQuoteInfo.PCRSelection.Hash).cryptoHash() for _, pcr := range pcrs { if pcr.DigestAlg == pcrDigestAlg { pcrByIndex[pcr.Index] = pcr.Digest } } sigHash.Reset() quotePCRs := make(map[int]struct{}, len(att.AttestedQuoteInfo.PCRSelection.PCRs)) for _, index := range att.AttestedQuoteInfo.PCRSelection.PCRs { digest, ok := pcrByIndex[index] if !ok { return fmt.Errorf("quote was over PCR %d which wasn't provided", index) } quotePCRs[index] = struct{}{} sigHash.Write(digest) } for index, _ := range pcrByIndex { if _, exists := quotePCRs[index]; !exists { return fmt.Errorf("provided PCR %d was not included in quote", index) } } if !bytes.Equal(sigHash.Sum(nil), att.AttestedQuoteInfo.PCRDigest) { return fmt.Errorf("quote digest didn't match pcrs provided") } // If we got this far, all included PCRs with a digest algorithm matching that // of the quote are verified. As such, we set their quoteVerified bit. for i, pcr := range pcrs { if _, exists := quotePCRs[pcr.Index]; exists && pcr.DigestAlg == pcrDigestAlg { pcrs[i].quoteVerified = true } } return nil } func extend(pcr PCR, replay []byte, e rawEvent, locality byte) (pcrDigest []byte, eventDigest []byte, err error) { h := pcr.DigestAlg for _, digest := range e.digests { if digest.hash != pcr.DigestAlg { continue } if len(digest.data) != len(pcr.Digest) { return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("digest data length (%d) doesn't match PCR digest length (%d)", len(digest.data), len(pcr.Digest)) } hash := h.New() if len(replay) != 0 { hash.Write(replay) } else { b := make([]byte, h.Size()) b[h.Size()-1] = locality hash.Write(b) } hash.Write(digest.data) return hash.Sum(nil), digest.data, nil } return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("no event digest matches pcr algorithm: %v", pcr.DigestAlg) } // replayPCR replays the event log for a specific PCR, using pcr and // event digests with the algorithm in pcr. An error is returned if the // replayed values do not match the final PCR digest, or any event tagged // with that PCR does not possess an event digest with the specified algorithm. func replayPCR(rawEvents []rawEvent, pcr PCR) ([]Event, bool) { var ( replay []byte outEvents []Event locality byte ) for _, e := range rawEvents { if e.index != pcr.Index { continue } // If TXT is enabled then the first event for PCR0 // should be a StartupLocality event. The final byte // of this event indicates the locality from which // TPM2_Startup() was issued. The initial value of // PCR0 is equal to the locality. if e.typ == eventTypeNoAction { if pcr.Index == 0 && len(e.data) == 17 && strings.HasPrefix(string(e.data), "StartupLocality") { locality = e.data[len(e.data)-1] } continue } replayValue, digest, err := extend(pcr, replay, e, locality) if err != nil { return nil, false } replay = replayValue outEvents = append(outEvents, Event{sequence: e.sequence, Data: e.data, Digest: digest, Index: pcr.Index, Type: e.typ}) } if len(outEvents) > 0 && !bytes.Equal(replay, pcr.Digest) { return nil, false } return outEvents, true } type pcrReplayResult struct { events []Event successful bool } func replayEvents(rawEvents []rawEvent, pcrs []PCR) ([]Event, error) { var ( invalidReplays []int verifiedEvents []Event allPCRReplays = map[int][]pcrReplayResult{} ) // Replay the event log for every PCR and digest algorithm combination. for _, pcr := range pcrs { events, ok := replayPCR(rawEvents, pcr) allPCRReplays[pcr.Index] = append(allPCRReplays[pcr.Index], pcrReplayResult{events, ok}) } // Record PCR indices which do not have any successful replay. Record the // events for a successful replay. pcrLoop: for i, replaysForPCR := range allPCRReplays { for _, replay := range replaysForPCR { if replay.successful { // We consider the PCR verified at this stage: The replay of values with // one digest algorithm matched a provided value. // As such, we save the PCR's events, and proceed to the next PCR. verifiedEvents = append(verifiedEvents, replay.events...) continue pcrLoop } } invalidReplays = append(invalidReplays, i) } if len(invalidReplays) > 0 { events := make([]Event, 0, len(rawEvents)) for _, e := range rawEvents { events = append(events, Event{e.sequence, e.index, e.typ, e.data, nil}) } return nil, ReplayError{ Events: events, InvalidPCRs: invalidReplays, } } sort.Slice(verifiedEvents, func(i int, j int) bool { return verifiedEvents[i].sequence < verifiedEvents[j].sequence }) return verifiedEvents, nil } // EV_NO_ACTION is a special event type that indicates information to the parser // instead of holding a measurement. For TPM 2.0, this event type is used to signal // switching from SHA1 format to a variable length digest. // // https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_PCClientSpecPlat_TPM_2p0_1p04_pub.pdf#page=110 const eventTypeNoAction = 0x03 // ParseEventLog parses an unverified measurement log. func ParseEventLog(measurementLog []byte) (*EventLog, error) { var specID *specIDEvent r := bytes.NewBuffer(measurementLog) parseFn := parseRawEvent var el EventLog e, err := parseFn(r, specID) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse first event: %v", err) } if e.typ == eventTypeNoAction && len(e.data) >= binary.Size(specIDEventHeader{}) { specID, err = parseSpecIDEvent(e.data) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse spec ID event: %v", err) } for _, alg := range specID.algs { switch tpm2.Algorithm(alg.ID) { case tpm2.AlgSHA1: el.Algs = append(el.Algs, HashSHA1) case tpm2.AlgSHA256: el.Algs = append(el.Algs, HashSHA256) } } if len(el.Algs) == 0 { return nil, fmt.Errorf("measurement log didn't use sha1 or sha256 digests") } // Switch to parsing crypto agile events. Don't include this in the // replayed events since it intentionally doesn't extend the PCRs. // // Note that this doesn't actually guarantee that events have SHA256 // digests. parseFn = parseRawEvent2 el.specIDEvent = specID } else { el.Algs = []HashAlg{HashSHA1} el.rawEvents = append(el.rawEvents, e) } sequence := 1 for r.Len() != 0 { e, err := parseFn(r, specID) if err != nil { return nil, err } e.sequence = sequence sequence++ el.rawEvents = append(el.rawEvents, e) } return &el, nil } type specIDEvent struct { algs []specAlgSize } type specAlgSize struct { ID uint16 Size uint16 } // Expected values for various Spec ID Event fields. // https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/EFI-Protocol-Specification-rev13-160330final.pdf#page=19 var wantSignature = [16]byte{0x53, 0x70, 0x65, 0x63, 0x20, 0x49, 0x44, 0x20, 0x45, 0x76, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x30, 0x33, 0x00} // "Spec ID Event03\0" const ( wantMajor = 2 wantMinor = 0 wantErrata = 0 ) type specIDEventHeader struct { Signature [16]byte PlatformClass uint32 VersionMinor uint8 VersionMajor uint8 Errata uint8 UintnSize uint8 NumAlgs uint32 } // parseSpecIDEvent parses a TCG_EfiSpecIDEventStruct structure from the reader. // // https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/EFI-Protocol-Specification-rev13-160330final.pdf#page=18 func parseSpecIDEvent(b []byte) (*specIDEvent, error) { r := bytes.NewReader(b) var header specIDEventHeader if err := binary.Read(r, binary.LittleEndian, &header); err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("reading event header: %w: %X", err, b) } if header.Signature != wantSignature { return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid spec id signature: %x", header.Signature) } if header.VersionMajor != wantMajor { return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid spec major version, got %02x, wanted %02x", header.VersionMajor, wantMajor) } if header.VersionMinor != wantMinor { return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid spec minor version, got %02x, wanted %02x", header.VersionMajor, wantMinor) } // TODO(ericchiang): Check errata? Or do we expect that to change in ways // we're okay with? specAlg := specAlgSize{} e := specIDEvent{} for i := 0; i < int(header.NumAlgs); i++ { if err := binary.Read(r, binary.LittleEndian, &specAlg); err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("reading algorithm: %v", err) } e.algs = append(e.algs, specAlg) } var vendorInfoSize uint8 if err := binary.Read(r, binary.LittleEndian, &vendorInfoSize); err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("reading vender info size: %v", err) } if r.Len() != int(vendorInfoSize) { return nil, fmt.Errorf("reading vendor info, expected %d remaining bytes, got %d", vendorInfoSize, r.Len()) } return &e, nil } type digest struct { hash crypto.Hash data []byte } type rawEvent struct { sequence int index int typ EventType data []byte digests []digest } // TPM 1.2 event log format. See "5.1 SHA1 Event Log Entry Format" // https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/EFI-Protocol-Specification-rev13-160330final.pdf#page=15 type rawEventHeader struct { PCRIndex uint32 Type uint32 Digest [20]byte EventSize uint32 } type eventSizeErr struct { eventSize uint32 logSize int } func (e *eventSizeErr) Error() string { return fmt.Sprintf("event data size (%d bytes) is greater than remaining measurement log (%d bytes)", e.eventSize, e.logSize) } func parseRawEvent(r *bytes.Buffer, specID *specIDEvent) (event rawEvent, err error) { var h rawEventHeader if err = binary.Read(r, binary.LittleEndian, &h); err != nil { return event, fmt.Errorf("header deserialization error: %w", err) } if h.EventSize > uint32(r.Len()) { return event, &eventSizeErr{h.EventSize, r.Len()} } data := make([]byte, int(h.EventSize)) if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, data); err != nil { return event, fmt.Errorf("reading data error: %w", err) } digests := []digest{{hash: crypto.SHA1, data: h.Digest[:]}} return rawEvent{ typ: EventType(h.Type), data: data, index: int(h.PCRIndex), digests: digests, }, nil } // TPM 2.0 event log format. See "5.2 Crypto Agile Log Entry Format" // https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/EFI-Protocol-Specification-rev13-160330final.pdf#page=15 type rawEvent2Header struct { PCRIndex uint32 Type uint32 } func parseRawEvent2(r *bytes.Buffer, specID *specIDEvent) (event rawEvent, err error) { var h rawEvent2Header if err = binary.Read(r, binary.LittleEndian, &h); err != nil { return event, err } event.typ = EventType(h.Type) event.index = int(h.PCRIndex) // parse the event digests var numDigests uint32 if err := binary.Read(r, binary.LittleEndian, &numDigests); err != nil { return event, err } for i := 0; i < int(numDigests); i++ { var algID uint16 if err := binary.Read(r, binary.LittleEndian, &algID); err != nil { return event, err } var digest digest for _, alg := range specID.algs { if alg.ID != algID { continue } if r.Len() < int(alg.Size) { return event, fmt.Errorf("reading digest: %v", io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) } digest.data = make([]byte, alg.Size) digest.hash = HashAlg(alg.ID).cryptoHash() } if len(digest.data) == 0 { return event, fmt.Errorf("unknown algorithm ID %x", algID) } if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, digest.data); err != nil { return event, err } event.digests = append(event.digests, digest) } // parse event data var eventSize uint32 if err = binary.Read(r, binary.LittleEndian, &eventSize); err != nil { return event, err } if eventSize == 0 { return event, errors.New("event data size is 0") } if eventSize > uint32(r.Len()) { return event, &eventSizeErr{eventSize, r.Len()} } event.data = make([]byte, int(eventSize)) if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, event.data); err != nil { return event, err } return event, err } // AppendEvents takes a series of TPM 2.0 event logs and combines // them into a single sequence of events with a single header. // // Additional logs must not use a digest algorithm which was not // present in the original log. func AppendEvents(base []byte, additional ...[]byte) ([]byte, error) { baseLog, err := ParseEventLog(base) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("base: %v", err) } if baseLog.specIDEvent == nil { return nil, errors.New("tpm 1.2 event logs cannot be combined") } outBuff := make([]byte, len(base)) copy(outBuff, base) out := bytes.NewBuffer(outBuff) for i, l := range additional { log, err := ParseEventLog(l) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("log %d: %v", i, err) } if log.specIDEvent == nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("log %d: cannot use tpm 1.2 event log as a source", i) } algCheck: for _, alg := range log.specIDEvent.algs { for _, baseAlg := range baseLog.specIDEvent.algs { if baseAlg == alg { continue algCheck } } return nil, fmt.Errorf("log %d: cannot use digest (%+v) not present in base log", i, alg) } for x, e := range log.rawEvents { // Serialize header (PCR index, event type, number of digests) binary.Write(out, binary.LittleEndian, rawEvent2Header{ PCRIndex: uint32(e.index), Type: uint32(e.typ), }) binary.Write(out, binary.LittleEndian, uint32(len(e.digests))) // Serialize digests for _, d := range e.digests { var algID uint16 switch d.hash { case crypto.SHA256: algID = uint16(HashSHA256) case crypto.SHA1: algID = uint16(HashSHA1) default: return nil, fmt.Errorf("log %d: event %d: unhandled hash function %v", i, x, d.hash) } binary.Write(out, binary.LittleEndian, algID) out.Write(d.data) } // Serialize event data binary.Write(out, binary.LittleEndian, uint32(len(e.data))) out.Write(e.data) } } return out.Bytes(), nil }