go-attestation/attest/certification.go

260 lines
9.1 KiB
Go
Raw Normal View History

// Copyright 2021 Google Inc.
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may not
// use this file except in compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of
// the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
// WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the
// License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations under
// the License.
package attest
import (
"bytes"
"crypto"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
2023-06-13 14:43:38 +00:00
"github.com/google/go-tpm/legacy/tpm2"
"github.com/google/go-tpm/legacy/tpm2/credactivation"
"github.com/google/go-tpm/tpmutil"
)
// secureCurves represents a set of secure elliptic curves. For now,
// the selection is based on the key size only.
var secureCurves = map[tpm2.EllipticCurve]bool{
tpm2.CurveNISTP256: true,
tpm2.CurveNISTP384: true,
tpm2.CurveNISTP521: true,
tpm2.CurveBNP256: true,
tpm2.CurveBNP638: true,
}
// CertificationParameters encapsulates the inputs for certifying an application key.
// Only TPM 2.0 is supported at this point.
type CertificationParameters struct {
// Public represents the key's canonical encoding (a TPMT_PUBLIC structure).
// It includes the public key and signing parameters.
Public []byte
// CreateData represents the properties of a TPM 2.0 key. It is encoded
// as a TPMS_CREATION_DATA structure.
CreateData []byte
// CreateAttestation represents an assertion as to the details of the key.
// It is encoded as a TPMS_ATTEST structure.
CreateAttestation []byte
// CreateSignature represents a signature of the CreateAttestation structure.
// It is encoded as a TPMT_SIGNATURE structure.
CreateSignature []byte
}
// VerifyOpts specifies options for the key certification's verification.
type VerifyOpts struct {
// Public is the public key used to verify key ceritification.
Public crypto.PublicKey
// Hash is the hash function used for signature verification. It can be
// extracted from the properties of the certifying key.
Hash crypto.Hash
}
// ActivateOpts specifies options for the key certification's challenge generation.
type ActivateOpts struct {
// EK, the endorsement key, describes an asymmetric key whose
// private key is permanently bound to the TPM.
//
// Activation will verify that the provided EK is held on the same
// TPM as the key we're certifying. However, it is the caller's responsibility to
// ensure the EK they provide corresponds to the the device which
// they are trying to associate the certified key with.
EK crypto.PublicKey
// VerifierKeyNameDigest is the name digest of the public key we're using to
// verify the certification of the tpm-generated key being activated.
// The verifier key (usually the AK) that owns this digest should be the same
// key used in VerifyOpts.Public.
// Use tpm2.Public.Name() to produce the digest for a provided key.
VerifierKeyNameDigest *tpm2.HashValue
}
// NewActivateOpts creates options for use in generating an activation challenge for a certified key.
// The computed hash is the name digest of the public key used to verify the certification of our key.
func NewActivateOpts(verifierPubKey tpm2.Public, ek crypto.PublicKey) (*ActivateOpts, error) {
pubName, err := verifierPubKey.Name()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to resolve a tpm2.Public Name struct from the given public key struct: %v", err)
}
return &ActivateOpts{
EK: ek,
VerifierKeyNameDigest: pubName.Digest,
}, nil
}
// Verify verifies the TPM2-produced certification parameters checking whether:
// - the key length is secure
// - the attestation parameters matched the attested key
// - the key was TPM-generated and resides within TPM
// - the key can sign/decrypt outside-TPM objects
// - the signature is successfuly verified against the passed public key
// For now, it accepts only RSA verification keys.
func (p *CertificationParameters) Verify(opts VerifyOpts) error {
pub, err := tpm2.DecodePublic(p.Public)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("DecodePublic() failed: %v", err)
}
att, err := tpm2.DecodeAttestationData(p.CreateAttestation)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("DecodeAttestationData() failed: %v", err)
}
if att.Type != tpm2.TagAttestCertify {
return fmt.Errorf("attestation does not apply to certification data, got tag %x", att.Type)
}
switch pub.Type {
case tpm2.AlgRSA:
if pub.RSAParameters.KeyBits < minRSABits {
return fmt.Errorf("attested key too small: must be at least %d bits but was %d bits", minRSABits, pub.RSAParameters.KeyBits)
}
case tpm2.AlgECC:
if !secureCurves[pub.ECCParameters.CurveID] {
return fmt.Errorf("attested key uses insecure curve")
}
default:
return fmt.Errorf("public key of alg 0x%x not supported", pub.Type)
}
// Make sure the key has sane parameters (e.g., attestation can be faked if an AK
// can be used for arbitrary signatures).
// We verify the following:
// - Key is TPM backed.
// - Key is TPM generated.
// - Key is not restricted (means it can do arbitrary signing/decrypt ops).
// - Key cannot be duplicated.
// - Key was generated by a call to TPM_Create*.
if att.Magic != tpm20GeneratedMagic {
return errors.New("creation attestation was not produced by a TPM")
}
if (pub.Attributes & tpm2.FlagFixedTPM) == 0 {
return errors.New("provided key is exportable")
}
if (pub.Attributes & tpm2.FlagRestricted) != 0 {
return errors.New("provided key is restricted")
}
if (pub.Attributes & tpm2.FlagFixedParent) == 0 {
return errors.New("provided key can be duplicated to a different parent")
}
if (pub.Attributes & tpm2.FlagSensitiveDataOrigin) == 0 {
return errors.New("provided key is not created by TPM")
}
// Verify the attested creation name matches what is computed from
// the public key.
match, err := att.AttestedCertifyInfo.Name.MatchesPublic(pub)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !match {
return errors.New("certification refers to a different key")
}
// Check the signature over the attestation data verifies correctly.
// TODO: Support ECC certifying keys
pk, ok := opts.Public.(*rsa.PublicKey)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("only RSA verification keys are supported")
}
if !opts.Hash.Available() {
return fmt.Errorf("hash function is unavailable")
}
hsh := opts.Hash.New()
hsh.Write(p.CreateAttestation)
if len(p.CreateSignature) < 8 {
return fmt.Errorf("signature invalid: length of %d is shorter than 8", len(p.CreateSignature))
}
sig, err := tpm2.DecodeSignature(bytes.NewBuffer(p.CreateSignature))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("DecodeSignature() failed: %v", err)
}
if err := rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pk, opts.Hash, hsh.Sum(nil), sig.RSA.Signature); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not verify attestation: %v", err)
}
return nil
}
// Generate returns a credential activation challenge, which can be provided
// to the TPM to verify the AK parameters given are authentic & the AK
// is present on the same TPM as the EK.
//
// The caller is expected to verify the secret returned from the TPM as
// as result of calling ActivateCredential() matches the secret returned here.
// The caller should use subtle.ConstantTimeCompare to avoid potential
// timing attack vectors.
func (p *CertificationParameters) Generate(rnd io.Reader, verifyOpts VerifyOpts, activateOpts ActivateOpts) (secret []byte, ec *EncryptedCredential, err error) {
if err := p.Verify(verifyOpts); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
if activateOpts.EK == nil {
return nil, nil, errors.New("no EK provided")
}
secret = make([]byte, activationSecretLen)
if rnd == nil {
rnd = rand.Reader
}
if _, err = io.ReadFull(rnd, secret); err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("error generating activation secret: %v", err)
}
att, err := tpm2.DecodeAttestationData(p.CreateAttestation)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("DecodeAttestationData() failed: %v", err)
}
if att.Type != tpm2.TagAttestCertify {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("attestation does not apply to certify data, got %x", att.Type)
}
cred, encSecret, err := credactivation.Generate(activateOpts.VerifierKeyNameDigest, activateOpts.EK, symBlockSize, secret)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("credactivation.Generate() failed: %v", err)
}
return secret, &EncryptedCredential{
Credential: cred,
Secret: encSecret,
}, nil
}
// certify uses AK's handle and the passed signature scheme to certify the key
// with the `hnd` handle.
func certify(tpm io.ReadWriteCloser, hnd, akHnd tpmutil.Handle, scheme tpm2.SigScheme) (*CertificationParameters, error) {
pub, _, _, err := tpm2.ReadPublic(tpm, hnd)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tpm2.ReadPublic() failed: %v", err)
}
public, err := pub.Encode()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not encode public key: %v", err)
}
att, sig, err := tpm2.CertifyEx(tpm, "", "", hnd, akHnd, nil, scheme)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tpm2.Certify() failed: %v", err)
}
return &CertificationParameters{
Public: public,
CreateAttestation: att,
CreateSignature: sig,
}, nil
}