2021-03-08 20:27:00 +00:00
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// Copyright 2021 Google Inc.
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//
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may not
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// use this file except in compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of
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// the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
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// WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the
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// License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations under
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// the License.
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package attest
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import (
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"bytes"
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"crypto"
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Add support for generating TPM2.0 challenges using AttestedCertifyInfo
Fixes: issues/320.
Adds support for generating an activation challenge using
CertificationParameters.
Achieves symmetry with challenge-generation in
AttestationParameters, in order to provide a challenge to a
TPM to activate a TPM-certified key.
`attest.Activation` currently supports verifying and
generating a challenge given attestationData, an EK, an AK,
and a signature. In the attestationData, the CreationInfo
field is used to further validate and create the resulting
challenge.
In this change, `attest.Certification` will now support
generating a challenge given attestationData, an EK, a
TPM-certified public key, and a signature, in addition to
an AK used to verify the certification of the provided
public key we are generating an activation challenge for.
2023-05-31 01:00:02 +00:00
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"crypto/rand"
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2021-03-08 20:27:00 +00:00
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"crypto/rsa"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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2021-04-23 21:41:30 +00:00
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"io"
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2021-03-08 20:27:00 +00:00
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"github.com/google/go-tpm/tpm2"
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Add support for generating TPM2.0 challenges using AttestedCertifyInfo
Fixes: issues/320.
Adds support for generating an activation challenge using
CertificationParameters.
Achieves symmetry with challenge-generation in
AttestationParameters, in order to provide a challenge to a
TPM to activate a TPM-certified key.
`attest.Activation` currently supports verifying and
generating a challenge given attestationData, an EK, an AK,
and a signature. In the attestationData, the CreationInfo
field is used to further validate and create the resulting
challenge.
In this change, `attest.Certification` will now support
generating a challenge given attestationData, an EK, a
TPM-certified public key, and a signature, in addition to
an AK used to verify the certification of the provided
public key we are generating an activation challenge for.
2023-05-31 01:00:02 +00:00
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"github.com/google/go-tpm/tpm2/credactivation"
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"github.com/google/go-tpm/tpmutil"
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2021-03-08 20:27:00 +00:00
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)
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// secureCurves represents a set of secure elliptic curves. For now,
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// the selection is based on the key size only.
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var secureCurves = map[tpm2.EllipticCurve]bool{
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tpm2.CurveNISTP256: true,
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tpm2.CurveNISTP384: true,
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tpm2.CurveNISTP521: true,
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tpm2.CurveBNP256: true,
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tpm2.CurveBNP638: true,
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}
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// CertificationParameters encapsulates the inputs for certifying an application key.
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// Only TPM 2.0 is supported at this point.
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type CertificationParameters struct {
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// Public represents the key's canonical encoding (a TPMT_PUBLIC structure).
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// It includes the public key and signing parameters.
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Public []byte
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// CreateData represents the properties of a TPM 2.0 key. It is encoded
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// as a TPMS_CREATION_DATA structure.
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CreateData []byte
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// CreateAttestation represents an assertion as to the details of the key.
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// It is encoded as a TPMS_ATTEST structure.
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CreateAttestation []byte
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// CreateSignature represents a signature of the CreateAttestation structure.
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// It is encoded as a TPMT_SIGNATURE structure.
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CreateSignature []byte
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}
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// VerifyOpts specifies options for the key certification's verification.
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type VerifyOpts struct {
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// Public is the public key used to verify key ceritification.
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Public crypto.PublicKey
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// Hash is the hash function used for signature verification. It can be
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// extracted from the properties of the certifying key.
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Hash crypto.Hash
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}
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Add support for generating TPM2.0 challenges using AttestedCertifyInfo
Fixes: issues/320.
Adds support for generating an activation challenge using
CertificationParameters.
Achieves symmetry with challenge-generation in
AttestationParameters, in order to provide a challenge to a
TPM to activate a TPM-certified key.
`attest.Activation` currently supports verifying and
generating a challenge given attestationData, an EK, an AK,
and a signature. In the attestationData, the CreationInfo
field is used to further validate and create the resulting
challenge.
In this change, `attest.Certification` will now support
generating a challenge given attestationData, an EK, a
TPM-certified public key, and a signature, in addition to
an AK used to verify the certification of the provided
public key we are generating an activation challenge for.
2023-05-31 01:00:02 +00:00
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// ActivateOpts specifies options for the key certification's challenge generation.
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type ActivateOpts struct {
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// EK, the endorsement key, describes an asymmetric key whose
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// private key is permanently bound to the TPM.
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//
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// Activation will verify that the provided EK is held on the same
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// TPM as the key we're certifying. However, it is the caller's responsibility to
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// ensure the EK they provide corresponds to the the device which
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// they are trying to associate the certified key with.
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EK crypto.PublicKey
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// VerifierKeyNameDigest is the name digest of the public key we're using to
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// verify the certification of the tpm-generated key being activated.
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// The verifier key (usually the AK) that owns this digest should be the same
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// key used in VerifyOpts.Public.
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// Use tpm2.Public.Name() to produce the digest for a provided key.
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VerifierKeyNameDigest *tpm2.HashValue
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}
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// NewActivateOpts creates options for use in generating an activation challenge for a certified key.
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// The computed hash is the name digest of the public key used to verify the certification of our key.
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func NewActivateOpts(verifierPubKey tpm2.Public, ek crypto.PublicKey) (*ActivateOpts, error) {
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pubName, err := verifierPubKey.Name()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to resolve a tpm2.Public Name struct from the given public key struct: %v", err)
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}
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return &ActivateOpts{
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EK: ek,
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VerifierKeyNameDigest: pubName.Digest,
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}, nil
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}
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// Verify verifies the TPM2-produced certification parameters checking whether:
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// - the key length is secure
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// - the attestation parameters matched the attested key
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// - the key was TPM-generated and resides within TPM
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// - the key can sign/decrypt outside-TPM objects
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// - the signature is successfuly verified against the passed public key
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// For now, it accepts only RSA verification keys.
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func (p *CertificationParameters) Verify(opts VerifyOpts) error {
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pub, err := tpm2.DecodePublic(p.Public)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("DecodePublic() failed: %v", err)
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}
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att, err := tpm2.DecodeAttestationData(p.CreateAttestation)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("DecodeAttestationData() failed: %v", err)
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}
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if att.Type != tpm2.TagAttestCertify {
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return fmt.Errorf("attestation does not apply to certification data, got tag %x", att.Type)
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}
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switch pub.Type {
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case tpm2.AlgRSA:
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if pub.RSAParameters.KeyBits < minRSABits {
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return fmt.Errorf("attested key too small: must be at least %d bits but was %d bits", minRSABits, pub.RSAParameters.KeyBits)
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}
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case tpm2.AlgECC:
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if !secureCurves[pub.ECCParameters.CurveID] {
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return fmt.Errorf("attested key uses insecure curve")
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}
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default:
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return fmt.Errorf("public key of alg 0x%x not supported", pub.Type)
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}
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// Make sure the key has sane parameters (e.g., attestation can be faked if an AK
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// can be used for arbitrary signatures).
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// We verify the following:
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// - Key is TPM backed.
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// - Key is TPM generated.
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// - Key is not restricted (means it can do arbitrary signing/decrypt ops).
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// - Key cannot be duplicated.
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// - Key was generated by a call to TPM_Create*.
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if att.Magic != tpm20GeneratedMagic {
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return errors.New("creation attestation was not produced by a TPM")
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}
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if (pub.Attributes & tpm2.FlagFixedTPM) == 0 {
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return errors.New("provided key is exportable")
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}
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if (pub.Attributes & tpm2.FlagRestricted) != 0 {
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return errors.New("provided key is restricted")
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}
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if (pub.Attributes & tpm2.FlagFixedParent) == 0 {
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return errors.New("provided key can be duplicated to a different parent")
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}
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if (pub.Attributes & tpm2.FlagSensitiveDataOrigin) == 0 {
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return errors.New("provided key is not created by TPM")
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}
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// Verify the attested creation name matches what is computed from
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// the public key.
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match, err := att.AttestedCertifyInfo.Name.MatchesPublic(pub)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if !match {
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return errors.New("certification refers to a different key")
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}
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// Check the signature over the attestation data verifies correctly.
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// TODO: Support ECC certifying keys
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pk, ok := opts.Public.(*rsa.PublicKey)
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if !ok {
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return fmt.Errorf("only RSA verification keys are supported")
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}
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if !opts.Hash.Available() {
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return fmt.Errorf("hash function is unavailable")
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}
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hsh := opts.Hash.New()
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hsh.Write(p.CreateAttestation)
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if len(p.CreateSignature) < 8 {
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return fmt.Errorf("signature invalid: length of %d is shorter than 8", len(p.CreateSignature))
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}
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sig, err := tpm2.DecodeSignature(bytes.NewBuffer(p.CreateSignature))
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("DecodeSignature() failed: %v", err)
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}
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if err := rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pk, opts.Hash, hsh.Sum(nil), sig.RSA.Signature); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("could not verify attestation: %v", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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2021-04-23 21:41:30 +00:00
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Add support for generating TPM2.0 challenges using AttestedCertifyInfo
Fixes: issues/320.
Adds support for generating an activation challenge using
CertificationParameters.
Achieves symmetry with challenge-generation in
AttestationParameters, in order to provide a challenge to a
TPM to activate a TPM-certified key.
`attest.Activation` currently supports verifying and
generating a challenge given attestationData, an EK, an AK,
and a signature. In the attestationData, the CreationInfo
field is used to further validate and create the resulting
challenge.
In this change, `attest.Certification` will now support
generating a challenge given attestationData, an EK, a
TPM-certified public key, and a signature, in addition to
an AK used to verify the certification of the provided
public key we are generating an activation challenge for.
2023-05-31 01:00:02 +00:00
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// Generate returns a credential activation challenge, which can be provided
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// to the TPM to verify the AK parameters given are authentic & the AK
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// is present on the same TPM as the EK.
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//
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// The caller is expected to verify the secret returned from the TPM as
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// as result of calling ActivateCredential() matches the secret returned here.
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// The caller should use subtle.ConstantTimeCompare to avoid potential
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// timing attack vectors.
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func (p *CertificationParameters) Generate(rnd io.Reader, verifyOpts VerifyOpts, activateOpts ActivateOpts) (secret []byte, ec *EncryptedCredential, err error) {
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if err := p.Verify(verifyOpts); err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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if activateOpts.EK == nil {
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return nil, nil, errors.New("no EK provided")
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}
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secret = make([]byte, activationSecretLen)
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if rnd == nil {
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rnd = rand.Reader
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}
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if _, err = io.ReadFull(rnd, secret); err != nil {
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return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("error generating activation secret: %v", err)
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}
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att, err := tpm2.DecodeAttestationData(p.CreateAttestation)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("DecodeAttestationData() failed: %v", err)
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}
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if att.Type != tpm2.TagAttestCertify {
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return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("attestation does not apply to certify data, got %x", att.Type)
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}
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cred, encSecret, err := credactivation.Generate(activateOpts.VerifierKeyNameDigest, activateOpts.EK, symBlockSize, secret)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("credactivation.Generate() failed: %v", err)
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}
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return secret, &EncryptedCredential{
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Credential: cred,
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Secret: encSecret,
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}, nil
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}
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// certify uses AK's handle and the passed signature scheme to certify the key
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// with the `hnd` handle.
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func certify(tpm io.ReadWriteCloser, hnd, akHnd tpmutil.Handle, scheme tpm2.SigScheme) (*CertificationParameters, error) {
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pub, _, _, err := tpm2.ReadPublic(tpm, hnd)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("tpm2.ReadPublic() failed: %v", err)
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}
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public, err := pub.Encode()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not encode public key: %v", err)
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}
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att, sig, err := tpm2.CertifyEx(tpm, "", "", hnd, akHnd, nil, scheme)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("tpm2.Certify() failed: %v", err)
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}
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return &CertificationParameters{
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Public: public,
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CreateAttestation: att,
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CreateSignature: sig,
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}, nil
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}
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