2020-06-02 00:35:23 +00:00
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// Copyright 2020 Google Inc.
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//
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may not
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// use this file except in compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of
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// the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
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// WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the
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// License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations under
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// the License.
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package attest
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import (
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"bytes"
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"encoding/binary"
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"encoding/hex"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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2020-06-18 20:59:51 +00:00
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"strings"
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"unicode/utf16"
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2020-06-02 00:35:23 +00:00
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"github.com/google/go-attestation/attest/internal"
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)
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type windowsEvent uint32
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// SIPA event types
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const (
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sipaTypeMask windowsEvent = 0x000f0000
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sipaContainer windowsEvent = 0x00010000
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sipaInformation windowsEvent = 0x00020000
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sipaError windowsEvent = 0x00030000
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sipaPreOsParameter windowsEvent = 0x00040000
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sipaOSParameter windowsEvent = 0x00050000
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sipaAuthority windowsEvent = 0x00060000
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sipaLoadedModule windowsEvent = 0x00070000
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sipaTrustPoint windowsEvent = 0x00080000
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sipaELAM windowsEvent = 0x00090000
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sipaVBS windowsEvent = 0x000a0000
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trustBoundary windowsEvent = 0x40010001
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elamAggregation windowsEvent = 0x40010002
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loadedModuleAggregation windowsEvent = 0x40010003
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trustpointAggregation windowsEvent = 0xC0010004
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ksrAggregation windowsEvent = 0x40010005
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ksrSignedMeasurementAggregation windowsEvent = 0x40010006
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information windowsEvent = 0x00020001
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bootCounter windowsEvent = 0x00020002
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transferControl windowsEvent = 0x00020003
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applicationReturn windowsEvent = 0x00020004
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bitlockerUnlock windowsEvent = 0x00020005
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eventCounter windowsEvent = 0x00020006
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counterID windowsEvent = 0x00020007
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morBitNotCancelable windowsEvent = 0x00020008
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applicationSVN windowsEvent = 0x00020009
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svnChainStatus windowsEvent = 0x0002000A
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morBitAPIStatus windowsEvent = 0x0002000B
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bootDebugging windowsEvent = 0x00040001
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bootRevocationList windowsEvent = 0x00040002
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osKernelDebug windowsEvent = 0x00050001
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codeIntegrity windowsEvent = 0x00050002
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testSigning windowsEvent = 0x00050003
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dataExecutionPrevention windowsEvent = 0x00050004
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safeMode windowsEvent = 0x00050005
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winPE windowsEvent = 0x00050006
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physicalAddressExtension windowsEvent = 0x00050007
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osDevice windowsEvent = 0x00050008
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systemRoot windowsEvent = 0x00050009
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hypervisorLaunchType windowsEvent = 0x0005000A
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hypervisorPath windowsEvent = 0x0005000B
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hypervisorIOMMUPolicy windowsEvent = 0x0005000C
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hypervisorDebug windowsEvent = 0x0005000D
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driverLoadPolicy windowsEvent = 0x0005000E
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siPolicy windowsEvent = 0x0005000F
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hypervisorMMIONXPolicy windowsEvent = 0x00050010
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hypervisorMSRFilterPolicy windowsEvent = 0x00050011
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vsmLaunchType windowsEvent = 0x00050012
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osRevocationList windowsEvent = 0x00050013
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vsmIDKInfo windowsEvent = 0x00050020
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flightSigning windowsEvent = 0x00050021
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pagefileEncryptionEnabled windowsEvent = 0x00050022
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vsmIDKSInfo windowsEvent = 0x00050023
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hibernationDisabled windowsEvent = 0x00050024
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dumpsDisabled windowsEvent = 0x00050025
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dumpEncryptionEnabled windowsEvent = 0x00050026
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dumpEncryptionKeyDigest windowsEvent = 0x00050027
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lsaISOConfig windowsEvent = 0x00050028
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noAuthority windowsEvent = 0x00060001
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authorityPubKey windowsEvent = 0x00060002
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filePath windowsEvent = 0x00070001
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imageSize windowsEvent = 0x00070002
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hashAlgorithmID windowsEvent = 0x00070003
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authenticodeHash windowsEvent = 0x00070004
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authorityIssuer windowsEvent = 0x00070005
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authoritySerial windowsEvent = 0x00070006
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imageBase windowsEvent = 0x00070007
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authorityPublisher windowsEvent = 0x00070008
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authoritySHA1Thumbprint windowsEvent = 0x00070009
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imageValidated windowsEvent = 0x0007000A
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moduleSVN windowsEvent = 0x0007000B
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quote windowsEvent = 0x80080001
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quoteSignature windowsEvent = 0x80080002
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aikID windowsEvent = 0x80080003
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aikPubDigest windowsEvent = 0x80080004
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elamKeyname windowsEvent = 0x00090001
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elamConfiguration windowsEvent = 0x00090002
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elamPolicy windowsEvent = 0x00090003
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elamMeasured windowsEvent = 0x00090004
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vbsVSMRequired windowsEvent = 0x000A0001
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vbsSecurebootRequired windowsEvent = 0x000A0002
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vbsIOMMURequired windowsEvent = 0x000A0003
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vbsNXRequired windowsEvent = 0x000A0004
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vbsMSRFilteringRequired windowsEvent = 0x000A0005
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vbsMandatoryEnforcement windowsEvent = 0x000A0006
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vbsHVCIPolicy windowsEvent = 0x000A0007
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vbsMicrosoftBootChainRequired windowsEvent = 0x000A0008
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ksrSignature windowsEvent = 0x000B0001
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)
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type WinCSPAlg uint32
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// Valid CSP Algorithm IDs.
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const (
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WinAlgMD4 WinCSPAlg = 0x02
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WinAlgMD5 WinCSPAlg = 0x03
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WinAlgSHA1 WinCSPAlg = 0x04
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WinAlgSHA256 WinCSPAlg = 0x0c
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WinAlgSHA384 WinCSPAlg = 0x0d
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WinAlgSHA512 WinCSPAlg = 0x0e
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)
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// BitlockerStatus describes the status of BitLocker on a Windows system.
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type BitlockerStatus uint8
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// Valid BitlockerStatus values.
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const (
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BitlockerStatusCached = 0x01
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BitlockerStatusMedia = 0x02
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BitlockerStatusTPM = 0x04
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BitlockerStatusPin = 0x10
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BitlockerStatusExternal = 0x20
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BitlockerStatusRecovery = 0x40
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)
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// WinEvents describes information from the event log recorded during
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// bootup of Microsoft Windows.
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type WinEvents struct {
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// BootCount contains the value of the monotonic boot counter. This
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// value is not set for TPM 1.2 devices and some TPMs with buggy
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// implementations of monotonic counters.
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BootCount int
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// LoadedModules contains authenticode hashes for binaries which
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// were loaded during boot.
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LoadedModules map[string]WinModuleLoad
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// ELAM describes the configuration of each Early Launch AntiMalware driver,
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// for each AV Vendor key.
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ELAM map[string]WinELAM
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// BootDebuggingEnabled is true if boot debugging was ever reported
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// as enabled.
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BootDebuggingEnabled bool
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// KernelDebugEnabled is true if kernel debugging was recorded as
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// enabled at any point during boot.
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KernelDebugEnabled bool
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// DEPEnabled is true if NX (Data Execution Prevention) was consistently
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// reported as enabled.
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DEPEnabled bool
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// CodeIntegrityEnabled is true if code integrity was consistently
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// reported as enabled.
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CodeIntegrityEnabled bool
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// TestSigningEnabled is true if test-mode signature verification was
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// ever reported as enabled.
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TestSigningEnabled bool
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// BitlockerUnlocks reports the bitlocker status for every instance of
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// a disk unlock, where bitlocker was used to secure the disk.
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BitlockerUnlocks []BitlockerStatus
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seenDep bool
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seenCodeIntegrity bool
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}
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// WinModuleLoad describes a module which was loaded while
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// Windows booted.
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type WinModuleLoad struct {
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// FilePath represents the path from which the module was loaded. This
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// information is not always present.
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FilePath string
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// AuthenticodeHash contains the authenticode hash of the binary
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// blob which was loaded.
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AuthenticodeHash []byte
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// ImageBase describes all the addresses to which the the blob was loaded.
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ImageBase []uint64
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// ImageSize describes the size of the image in bytes. This information
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// is not always present.
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ImageSize uint64
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// HashAlgorithm describes the hash algorithm used.
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HashAlgorithm WinCSPAlg
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// ImageValidated is set if the post-boot loader validated the image.
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ImageValidated bool
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// AuthorityIssuer identifies the issuer of the certificate which certifies
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// the signature on this module.
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AuthorityIssuer string
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// AuthorityPublisher identifies the publisher of the certificate which
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// certifies the signature on this module.
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AuthorityPublisher string
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// AuthoritySerial contains the serial of the certificate certifying this
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// module.
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AuthoritySerial []byte
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// AuthoritySHA1 is the SHA1 hash of the certificate thumbprint.
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AuthoritySHA1 []byte
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}
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// WinELAM describes the configuration of an Early Launch AntiMalware driver.
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// These values represent the 3 measured registry values stored in the ELAM
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// hive for the driver.
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type WinELAM struct {
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Measured []byte
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Config []byte
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Policy []byte
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}
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// ParseWinEvents parses a series of events to extract information about
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// the bringup of Microsoft Windows. This information is not trustworthy
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// unless the integrity of platform & bootloader events has already been
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// established.
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func ParseWinEvents(events []Event) (*WinEvents, error) {
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var (
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out = WinEvents{
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LoadedModules: map[string]WinModuleLoad{},
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ELAM: map[string]WinELAM{},
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}
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seenSeparator struct {
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PCR12 bool
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PCR13 bool
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}
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)
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for _, e := range events {
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if e.Index != 12 && e.Index != 13 {
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continue
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}
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et, err := internal.UntrustedParseEventType(uint32(e.Type))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("unrecognised event type: %v", err)
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}
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digestVerify := e.digestEquals(e.Data)
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switch e.Index {
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case 12: // 'early boot' events
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switch et {
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case internal.EventTag:
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if seenSeparator.PCR12 {
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continue
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}
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s, err := internal.ParseTaggedEventData(e.Data)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid tagged event structure at event %d: %w", e.sequence, err)
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}
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if digestVerify != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid digest for tagged event %d: %w", e.sequence, err)
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}
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if err := out.readWinEventBlock(s, e.Index); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid SIPA events in event %d: %w", e.sequence, err)
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}
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case internal.Separator:
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if seenSeparator.PCR12 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("duplicate WBCL separator at event %d", e.sequence)
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}
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seenSeparator.PCR12 = true
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if !bytes.Equal(e.Data, []byte("WBCL")) {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid WBCL separator data at event %d: %v", e.sequence, e.Data)
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}
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if digestVerify != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid separator digest at event %d: %v", e.sequence, digestVerify)
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}
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default:
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected (PCR12) event type: %v", et)
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}
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case 13: // Post 'early boot' events
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switch et {
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case internal.EventTag:
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if seenSeparator.PCR13 {
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continue
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}
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s, err := internal.ParseTaggedEventData(e.Data)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid tagged event structure at event %d: %w", e.sequence, err)
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}
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if digestVerify != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid digest for tagged event %d: %w", e.sequence, err)
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}
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if err := out.readWinEventBlock(s, e.Index); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid SIPA events in event %d: %w", e.sequence, err)
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}
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case internal.Separator:
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if seenSeparator.PCR13 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("duplicate WBCL separator at event %d", e.sequence)
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}
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seenSeparator.PCR13 = true
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if !bytes.Equal(e.Data, []byte("WBCL")) {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid WBCL separator data at event %d: %v", e.sequence, e.Data)
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}
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if digestVerify != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid separator digest at event %d: %v", e.sequence, digestVerify)
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}
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default:
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected (PCR13) event type: %v", et)
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}
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}
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}
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return &out, nil
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}
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type microsoftEventHeader struct {
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Type windowsEvent
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Size uint32
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}
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// unknownSIPAEvent is returned by parseSIPAEvent if the event type is
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// not handled. Unlike other events in the TCG log, it is safe to skip
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// unhandled SIPA events, as they are embedded within EventTag structures,
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// and these structures should match the event digest.
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var unknownSIPAEvent = errors.New("unknown event")
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func (w *WinEvents) readBooleanInt64Event(header microsoftEventHeader, r *bytes.Reader) error {
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if header.Size != 8 {
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return fmt.Errorf("payload was %d bytes, want 8", header.Size)
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}
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var num uint64
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if err := binary.Read(r, binary.LittleEndian, &num); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("reading u64: %w", err)
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}
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isSet := num != 0
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switch header.Type {
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// Boolean signals that latch off if the are ever false (ie: attributes
|
|
|
|
// that represent a stronger security state when set).
|
|
|
|
case dataExecutionPrevention:
|
|
|
|
w.DEPEnabled = isSet && !(w.DEPEnabled != isSet && w.seenDep)
|
|
|
|
w.seenDep = true
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func (w *WinEvents) readBooleanByteEvent(header microsoftEventHeader, r *bytes.Reader) error {
|
|
|
|
if header.Size != 1 {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("payload was %d bytes, want 1", header.Size)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var b byte
|
|
|
|
if err := binary.Read(r, binary.LittleEndian, &b); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("reading byte: %w", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
isSet := b != 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch header.Type {
|
|
|
|
// Boolean signals that latch on if they are ever true (ie: attributes
|
|
|
|
// that represent a weaker security state when set).
|
|
|
|
case osKernelDebug:
|
|
|
|
w.KernelDebugEnabled = w.KernelDebugEnabled || isSet
|
|
|
|
case bootDebugging:
|
|
|
|
w.BootDebuggingEnabled = w.BootDebuggingEnabled || isSet
|
|
|
|
case testSigning:
|
|
|
|
w.TestSigningEnabled = w.TestSigningEnabled || isSet
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Boolean signals that latch off if the are ever false (ie: attributes
|
|
|
|
// that represent a stronger security state when set).
|
|
|
|
case codeIntegrity:
|
|
|
|
w.CodeIntegrityEnabled = isSet && !(w.CodeIntegrityEnabled != isSet && w.seenCodeIntegrity)
|
|
|
|
w.seenCodeIntegrity = true
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-14 23:44:10 +00:00
|
|
|
func (w *WinEvents) readUint(header microsoftEventHeader, r io.Reader) (uint64, error) {
|
2020-06-02 00:35:23 +00:00
|
|
|
if header.Size > 8 {
|
2020-09-14 23:44:10 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0, fmt.Errorf("integer too large (%d bytes)", header.Size)
|
2020-06-02 00:35:23 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-09-14 23:44:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-06-02 00:35:23 +00:00
|
|
|
data := make([]uint8, header.Size)
|
|
|
|
if err := binary.Read(r, binary.LittleEndian, &data); err != nil {
|
2020-09-14 23:44:10 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0, fmt.Errorf("reading u%d: %w", header.Size<<8, err)
|
2020-06-02 00:35:23 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
i, n := binary.Uvarint(data)
|
|
|
|
if n <= 0 {
|
2020-09-14 23:44:10 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0, fmt.Errorf("reading u%d: invalid varint", header.Size<<8)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return i, nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func (w *WinEvents) readBootCounter(header microsoftEventHeader, r *bytes.Reader) error {
|
|
|
|
i, err := w.readUint(header, r)
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("boot counter: %v", err)
|
2020-06-02 00:35:23 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if w.BootCount > 0 && w.BootCount != int(i) {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("conflicting values for boot counter: %d != %d", i, w.BootCount)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
w.BootCount = int(i)
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-14 23:44:10 +00:00
|
|
|
func (w *WinEvents) readBitlockerUnlock(header microsoftEventHeader, r *bytes.Reader, pcr int) error {
|
2020-06-02 00:35:23 +00:00
|
|
|
if header.Size > 8 {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("bitlocker data too large (%d bytes)", header.Size)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data := make([]uint8, header.Size)
|
|
|
|
if err := binary.Read(r, binary.LittleEndian, &data); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("reading u%d: %w", header.Size<<8, err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
i, n := binary.Uvarint(data)
|
|
|
|
if n <= 0 {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("reading u%d: invalid varint", header.Size<<8)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-14 23:44:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if pcr == 13 {
|
|
|
|
// The bitlocker status is duplicated across both PCRs. As such,
|
|
|
|
// we prefer the earlier one, and bail here to prevent duplicate
|
|
|
|
// records.
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-06-11 00:10:15 +00:00
|
|
|
w.BitlockerUnlocks = append(w.BitlockerUnlocks, BitlockerStatus(i))
|
2020-06-02 00:35:23 +00:00
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-14 23:44:10 +00:00
|
|
|
func (w *WinEvents) parseImageValidated(header microsoftEventHeader, r io.Reader) (bool, error) {
|
|
|
|
if header.Size != 1 {
|
|
|
|
return false, fmt.Errorf("payload was %d bytes, want 1", header.Size)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var num byte
|
|
|
|
if err := binary.Read(r, binary.LittleEndian, &num); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return false, fmt.Errorf("reading u8: %w", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return num == 1, nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func (w *WinEvents) parseHashAlgID(header microsoftEventHeader, r io.Reader) (WinCSPAlg, error) {
|
|
|
|
i, err := w.readUint(header, r)
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return 0, fmt.Errorf("hash algorithm ID: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch alg := WinCSPAlg(i & 0xff); alg {
|
|
|
|
case WinAlgMD4, WinAlgMD5, WinAlgSHA1, WinAlgSHA256, WinAlgSHA384, WinAlgSHA512:
|
|
|
|
return alg, nil
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return 0, fmt.Errorf("unknown algorithm ID: %x", i)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func (w *WinEvents) parseAuthoritySerial(header microsoftEventHeader, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
|
|
if header.Size > 128 {
|
|
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("authority serial is too long (%d bytes)", header.Size)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data := make([]byte, header.Size)
|
|
|
|
if err := binary.Read(r, binary.LittleEndian, &data); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("reading bytes: %w", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return data, nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func (w *WinEvents) parseAuthoritySHA1(header microsoftEventHeader, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
|
|
if header.Size > 20 {
|
|
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("authority thumbprint is too long (%d bytes)", header.Size)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data := make([]byte, header.Size)
|
|
|
|
if err := binary.Read(r, binary.LittleEndian, &data); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("reading bytes: %w", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return data, nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-06-02 00:35:23 +00:00
|
|
|
func (w *WinEvents) parseImageBase(header microsoftEventHeader, r io.Reader) (uint64, error) {
|
|
|
|
if header.Size != 8 {
|
|
|
|
return 0, fmt.Errorf("payload was %d bytes, want 8", header.Size)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var num uint64
|
|
|
|
if err := binary.Read(r, binary.LittleEndian, &num); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return 0, fmt.Errorf("reading u64: %w", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return num, nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func (w *WinEvents) parseAuthenticodeHash(header microsoftEventHeader, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
|
|
if header.Size > 32 {
|
|
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("authenticode hash data exceeds the size of any valid hash (%d bytes)", header.Size)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data := make([]byte, header.Size)
|
|
|
|
if err := binary.Read(r, binary.LittleEndian, &data); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("reading bytes: %w", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return data, nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func (w *WinEvents) readLoadedModuleAggregation(rdr *bytes.Reader, header microsoftEventHeader) error {
|
|
|
|
var (
|
2020-09-14 23:44:10 +00:00
|
|
|
r = &io.LimitedReader{R: rdr, N: int64(header.Size)}
|
|
|
|
codeHash []byte
|
|
|
|
imgBase, imgSize uint64
|
|
|
|
fPath string
|
|
|
|
algID WinCSPAlg
|
|
|
|
imgValidated bool
|
|
|
|
aIssuer, aPublisher string
|
|
|
|
aSerial, aSHA1 []byte
|
2020-06-02 00:35:23 +00:00
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
2020-06-18 20:59:51 +00:00
|
|
|
for r.N > 0 {
|
|
|
|
var h microsoftEventHeader
|
|
|
|
if err := binary.Read(r, binary.LittleEndian, &h); err != nil {
|
2020-06-02 00:35:23 +00:00
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("parsing LMA sub-event: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-06-18 20:59:51 +00:00
|
|
|
if int64(h.Size) > r.N {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("LMA sub-event is larger than available data: %d > %d", h.Size, r.N)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-06-02 00:35:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
var err error
|
2020-06-18 20:59:51 +00:00
|
|
|
switch h.Type {
|
2020-06-02 00:35:23 +00:00
|
|
|
case imageBase:
|
|
|
|
if imgBase != 0 {
|
|
|
|
return errors.New("duplicate image base data in LMA event")
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-06-18 20:59:51 +00:00
|
|
|
if imgBase, err = w.parseImageBase(h, r); err != nil {
|
2020-06-02 00:35:23 +00:00
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case authenticodeHash:
|
|
|
|
if codeHash != nil {
|
|
|
|
return errors.New("duplicate authenticode hash structure in LMA event")
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-06-18 20:59:51 +00:00
|
|
|
if codeHash, err = w.parseAuthenticodeHash(h, r); err != nil {
|
2020-06-02 00:35:23 +00:00
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-09-14 23:44:10 +00:00
|
|
|
case filePath:
|
|
|
|
if fPath != "" {
|
|
|
|
return errors.New("duplicate file path in LMA event")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if fPath, err = w.parseUTF16(h, r); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case imageSize:
|
|
|
|
if imgSize != 0 {
|
|
|
|
return errors.New("duplicate image size in LMA event")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if imgSize, err = w.readUint(h, r); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case hashAlgorithmID:
|
|
|
|
if algID != 0 {
|
|
|
|
return errors.New("duplicate hash algorithm ID in LMA event")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if algID, err = w.parseHashAlgID(h, r); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case imageValidated:
|
|
|
|
if imgValidated == true {
|
|
|
|
return errors.New("duplicate image validated field in LMA event")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if imgValidated, err = w.parseImageValidated(h, r); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case authorityIssuer:
|
|
|
|
if aIssuer != "" {
|
|
|
|
return errors.New("duplicate authority issuer in LMA event")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if aIssuer, err = w.parseUTF16(h, r); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case authorityPublisher:
|
|
|
|
if aPublisher != "" {
|
|
|
|
return errors.New("duplicate authority publisher in LMA event")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if aPublisher, err = w.parseUTF16(h, r); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case authoritySerial:
|
|
|
|
if aSerial != nil {
|
|
|
|
return errors.New("duplicate authority serial in LMA event")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if aSerial, err = w.parseAuthoritySerial(h, r); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case authoritySHA1Thumbprint:
|
|
|
|
if aSHA1 != nil {
|
|
|
|
return errors.New("duplicate authority SHA1 thumbprint in LMA event")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if aSHA1, err = w.parseAuthoritySHA1(h, r); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case moduleSVN:
|
|
|
|
// Ignore - consume value.
|
|
|
|
b := make([]byte, h.Size)
|
|
|
|
if err := binary.Read(r, binary.LittleEndian, &b); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-06-02 00:35:23 +00:00
|
|
|
default:
|
2020-06-18 20:59:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("unknown event in LMA aggregation: %v", h.Type)
|
2020-06-02 00:35:23 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-14 23:44:10 +00:00
|
|
|
var iBase []uint64
|
|
|
|
if imgBase != 0 {
|
|
|
|
iBase = []uint64{imgBase}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-06-02 00:35:23 +00:00
|
|
|
l := WinModuleLoad{
|
2020-09-14 23:44:10 +00:00
|
|
|
FilePath: fPath,
|
|
|
|
AuthenticodeHash: codeHash,
|
|
|
|
ImageBase: iBase,
|
|
|
|
ImageSize: imgSize,
|
|
|
|
ImageValidated: imgValidated,
|
|
|
|
HashAlgorithm: algID,
|
|
|
|
AuthorityIssuer: aIssuer,
|
|
|
|
AuthorityPublisher: aPublisher,
|
|
|
|
AuthoritySerial: aSerial,
|
|
|
|
AuthoritySHA1: aSHA1,
|
2020-06-02 00:35:23 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hashHex := hex.EncodeToString(l.AuthenticodeHash)
|
|
|
|
l.ImageBase = append(l.ImageBase, w.LoadedModules[hashHex].ImageBase...)
|
|
|
|
w.LoadedModules[hashHex] = l
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-06-18 20:59:51 +00:00
|
|
|
// parseUTF16 decodes data representing a UTF16 string. It is assumed the
|
|
|
|
// caller has validated that the data size is within allowable bounds.
|
|
|
|
func (w *WinEvents) parseUTF16(header microsoftEventHeader, r io.Reader) (string, error) {
|
|
|
|
data := make([]uint16, header.Size/2)
|
|
|
|
if err := binary.Read(r, binary.LittleEndian, &data); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return "", err
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-11-19 06:25:44 +00:00
|
|
|
return strings.TrimSuffix(string(utf16.Decode(data)), "\x00"), nil
|
2020-06-18 20:59:51 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func (w *WinEvents) readELAMAggregation(rdr *bytes.Reader, header microsoftEventHeader) error {
|
|
|
|
var (
|
|
|
|
r = &io.LimitedReader{R: rdr, N: int64(header.Size)}
|
|
|
|
driverName string
|
|
|
|
measured []byte
|
|
|
|
policy []byte
|
|
|
|
config []byte
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for r.N > 0 {
|
|
|
|
var h microsoftEventHeader
|
|
|
|
if err := binary.Read(r, binary.LittleEndian, &h); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("parsing ELAM aggregation sub-event: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if int64(h.Size) > r.N {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("ELAM aggregation sub-event is larger than available data: %d > %d", h.Size, r.N)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
var err error
|
|
|
|
switch h.Type {
|
|
|
|
case elamKeyname:
|
|
|
|
if driverName != "" {
|
|
|
|
return errors.New("duplicate driver name in ELAM aggregation event")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if driverName, err = w.parseUTF16(h, r); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("parsing ELAM driver name: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case elamMeasured:
|
|
|
|
if measured != nil {
|
|
|
|
return errors.New("duplicate measured data in ELAM aggregation event")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
measured = make([]byte, h.Size)
|
|
|
|
if err := binary.Read(r, binary.LittleEndian, &measured); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("reading ELAM measured value: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case elamPolicy:
|
|
|
|
if policy != nil {
|
|
|
|
return errors.New("duplicate policy data in ELAM aggregation event")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
policy = make([]byte, h.Size)
|
|
|
|
if err := binary.Read(r, binary.LittleEndian, &policy); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("reading ELAM policy value: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case elamConfiguration:
|
|
|
|
if config != nil {
|
|
|
|
return errors.New("duplicate config data in ELAM aggregation event")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
config = make([]byte, h.Size)
|
|
|
|
if err := binary.Read(r, binary.LittleEndian, &config); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("reading ELAM config value: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("unknown event in LMA aggregation: %v", h.Type)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if driverName == "" {
|
|
|
|
return errors.New("ELAM driver name not specified")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
w.ELAM[driverName] = WinELAM{
|
|
|
|
Measured: measured,
|
|
|
|
Config: config,
|
|
|
|
Policy: policy,
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-09-14 23:44:10 +00:00
|
|
|
func (w *WinEvents) readSIPAEvent(r *bytes.Reader, pcr int) error {
|
2020-06-02 00:35:23 +00:00
|
|
|
var header microsoftEventHeader
|
|
|
|
if err := binary.Read(r, binary.LittleEndian, &header); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch header.Type {
|
2020-06-18 20:59:51 +00:00
|
|
|
case elamAggregation:
|
|
|
|
return w.readELAMAggregation(r, header)
|
2020-06-02 00:35:23 +00:00
|
|
|
case loadedModuleAggregation:
|
|
|
|
return w.readLoadedModuleAggregation(r, header)
|
|
|
|
case bootCounter:
|
|
|
|
return w.readBootCounter(header, r)
|
|
|
|
case bitlockerUnlock:
|
2020-09-14 23:44:10 +00:00
|
|
|
return w.readBitlockerUnlock(header, r, pcr)
|
2020-06-02 00:35:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case osKernelDebug, codeIntegrity, bootDebugging, testSigning: // Parse boolean values.
|
|
|
|
return w.readBooleanByteEvent(header, r)
|
|
|
|
case dataExecutionPrevention: // Parse booleans represented as uint64's.
|
|
|
|
return w.readBooleanInt64Event(header, r)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
// Event type was not handled, consume the data.
|
|
|
|
if int(header.Size) > r.Len() {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("event data len (%d bytes) larger than event length (%d bytes)", header.Size, r.Len())
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tmp := make([]byte, header.Size)
|
|
|
|
if err := binary.Read(r, binary.LittleEndian, &tmp); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("reading unknown data section of length %d: %w", header.Size, err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return unknownSIPAEvent
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// readWinEventBlock extracts boot configuration from SIPA events contained in
|
|
|
|
// the given tagged event.
|
2020-09-14 23:44:10 +00:00
|
|
|
func (w *WinEvents) readWinEventBlock(evt *internal.TaggedEventData, pcr int) error {
|
2020-06-02 00:35:23 +00:00
|
|
|
r := bytes.NewReader(evt.Data)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// All windows information should be sub events in an enclosing SIPA
|
|
|
|
// container event.
|
|
|
|
if (windowsEvent(evt.ID) & sipaTypeMask) != sipaContainer {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("expected container event, got %v", windowsEvent(evt.ID))
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for r.Len() > 0 {
|
2020-09-14 23:44:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if err := w.readSIPAEvent(r, pcr); err != nil {
|
2020-06-02 00:35:23 +00:00
|
|
|
if errors.Is(err, unknownSIPAEvent) {
|
|
|
|
// Unknown SIPA events are okay as all TCG events are verifiable.
|
|
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|