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416 lines
20 KiB
Plaintext
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=======================================
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Genode on seL4 - IPC and virtual memory
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=======================================
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Norman Feske
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This is the second part of a series of hands-on articles about bringing Genode
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to the seL4 kernel.
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[http://genode.org/documentation/articles/sel4_part_1 - Read the previous part here...]
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After having created a minimalistic root task consisting of two threads, we
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can move forward with exercising the functionality provided by the kernel,
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namely inter-process communication and the handling of virtual memory.
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Once we have tested those functionalities in our minimalistic root task
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environment, we will be able to apply the gained knowledge to the actual
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porting effort of Genode's core component.
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Inter-process communication
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###########################
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In the L4 universe, the term IPC (inter-process communication) usually stands
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for synchronous communication between two threads. In seL4, IPC has two uses.
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First, it enables threads of different protection domains (or the same
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protection domain) to exchange messages. So information can be transferred
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across protection-domain boundaries. Second, IPC is the mechanism used to
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delegate access rights throughout the system. This is accomplished by sending
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capabilities as message payload. When a capability is part of a message, the
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kernel translates the local name of the capability in the sender's protection
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domain to a local name in the receiver's protection domain.
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In Genode, IPC is realized via two thin abstractions that build upon each
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other:
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# At the low level, the IPC library _src/base/ipc/ipc.cc_ is responsible
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for sending and receiving messages using the kernel mechanism. It has a
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generic interface _base/include/base/ipc.h_, which supports the marshalling
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and un-marshalling of message arguments and capabilities using C++
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insertion and extraction
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operators. Genode users never directly interact with the IPC library.
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# Built on top the IPC library, the so-called RPC framework adds the notion
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of RPC functions and RPC objects. RPC interfaces are declared using
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abstract C++ base classes with a few annotations. Under the hood, the
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RPC framework uses C++ meta-programming techniques to turn RPC definitions
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into code that transfers messages via the IPC library. In contrast to
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the IPC library, the RPC library is platform-agnostic.
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To enable Genode's RPC mechanism on seL4, we merely have to provide a
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seL4-specific IPC library implementation. To warm up with seL4's IPC
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mechanism, however, we first modify our existing test program (see
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[http://genode.org/documentation/articles/sel4_part_1 - the first part])
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to let the main thread perform an IPC call to the second thread.
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To let the second thread receive IPC messages, we first need to create a
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synchronous IPC endpoint using the 'seL4_Untyped_RetypeAtOffset' function
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with 'seL4_EndpointObject' as type, an offset that skips the already allocated
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TCB (the TCB object has a known size of 1024 bytes), and the designated
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capability number (EP_CAP).
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As a first test, we want the second thread to receive an incoming message.
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So we change the entry function as follows:
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! PDBG("call seL4_Wait");
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! seL4_MessageInfo_t msg_info = seL4_Wait(EP_CAP, nullptr);
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! PDBG("returned from seL4_Wait, call seL4_Reply");
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! seL4_Reply(msg_info);
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! PDBG("returned from seL4_Reply");
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At the end of the main function (the context of the first thread), we try to
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call the second thread via 'seL4_Call':
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! PDBG("call seL4_Call");
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! seL4_MessageInfo_t msg_info = seL4_MessageInfo_new(0, 0, 0, 0);
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! seL4_Call(EP_CAP, msg_info);
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! PDBG("returned from seL4_Call");
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When executing the code, we get an error as follows:
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! int main(): call seL4_Call
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! void second_thread_entry(): call seL4_Wait
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! Caught cap fault in send phase at address 0x0
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! while trying to handle:
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! vm fault on data at address 0x4 with status 0x6
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! in thread 0xe0100080 at address 0x10002e1
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By looking at the output of 'objdump -lSd', we see that fault happens at the
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instruction
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! mov %edi,%gs:0x4(,%ebx,4)
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The issue is the same as the one we experienced before for the main thread - we
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haven't initialized the GS register with a proper segment, yet. This can be
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easily fixed by adding a call to our 'init_ipc_buffer' function right at the
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start of the second thread's entry function. Still, the program does not work
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yet:
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! vm fault on data at address 0x4 with status 0x6
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! in thread 0xe0100080 at address 0x10002e8
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Looking at the objdump output, we see that the fault still happens at the same
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instruction. So what is missing? The answer is that we haven't equipped the
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second thread with a proper IPC buffer. The attempt to call 'seL4_Wait',
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however, tries to access the IPC buffer of the calling thread. The IPC buffer
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can be configured for a thread using the 'seL4_TCB_SetIPCBuffer' function. But
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wait - what arguments do we need to pass? In addition to the TCB capability,
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there are two arguments: a pointer to the IPC buffer and a page capability,
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which contains the IPC buffer. Well, I had hoped to get away without dealing
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with the memory management at this point. I figure that setting up the IPC
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buffer for the second thread would require me to create a seL4_IA32_4K frame
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object via 'seL4_Untyped_RetypeAtOffset' and insert a mapping of the page frame
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within the roottask's address space, and possibly also create and install a
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page-table object.
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To avoid becoming side-tracked by those memory-management issues, I decide
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to assign the IPC buffer of the second thread right at the same page as
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the one for the initial thread. Both the local address and the page
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capability for the initial thread's IPC buffer are conveniently provided by
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seL4's boot info structure. So let's give this a try:
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! /* assign IPC buffer to second thread */
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! {
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! static_assert(sizeof(seL4_IPCBuffer) % 512 == 0,
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! "unexpected seL4_IPCBuffer size");
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!
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! int const ret = seL4_TCB_SetIPCBuffer(SECOND_THREAD_CAP,
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! (seL4_Word)(bi->ipcBuffer + 1),
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! seL4_CapInitThreadIPCBuffer);
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!
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! PDBG("seL4_TCB_SetIPCBuffer returned %d", ret);
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! }
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With the initialization of the IPC buffer in place, we finally get our
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desired output:
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! int main(): call seL4_Call
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! void second_thread_entry(): call seL4_Wait
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! void second_thread_entry(): returned from seL4_Wait, call seL4_Reply
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! int main(): returned from seL4_Call
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! void second_thread_entry(): returned from seL4_Reply
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Delegation of capabilities via IPC
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==================================
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The seL4 kernel supports the delegation of capabilities across address-space
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boundaries by the means of synchronous IPC. As Genode fundamentally relies
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on such a mechanism, I decide to give it a try by extending the simple IPC
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test. Instead of letting the main thread call the second thread without any
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arguments, the main thread will pass the thread capability of the second
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thread as argument. Upon reception of the call, the second thread will find
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a capability in its IPC buffer. To validate that the received capability
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corresponds to the thread cap, the second thread issues a 'seL4_TCB_Suspend'
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operation on the received cap. It is supposed to stop its execution right
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there. This experiment requires the following steps:
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# At the caller side, we need to supply a capability as argument to the
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'seL4_Call' operation by specifying the number of capabilities to transfer
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at the 'extraCaps' field of the 'seL4_MessageInfo', and marshalling the
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index of the capability via the 'seL4_SetCap' function (specifying
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SECOND_THREAD_CAP as argument).
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# At the callee side, we need to define where to receive an incoming
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capability. First, we have to reserve a CNode slot designated for the
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new capability. For the test, a known-free index will do:
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! enum { RECV_CAP = 0x102 };
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Second, we have to configure the IPC buffer of the second thread to
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point to the RECV_CAP:
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! seL4_SetCapReceivePath(seL4_CapInitThreadCNode, RECV_CAP, 32);
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We specify 32 as receive depth because the CNode of the initial thread has a
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size of 2^12 and a guard of 20.
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At this point, I am wondering that there is apparently no way to specify a
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receive window rather than an individual CNode for receiving capabilities.
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After revisiting Section 4.2.2 of the manual, I came to the realization that
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that *seL4 does not support delegating more than one capability in a single IPC*.
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From Genode's perspective, this could become an issue because Genode's RPC
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framework generally allows for the delegation of multiple capabilities via a
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single RPC call.
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That said, the simple capability-delegation test works as expected.
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When repeatedly performing an IPC call with a delegated capability, the
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RECV_CAP index will be populated by the first call. Subsequent attempts to
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override the RECV_CAP capability do not work (the 'extraCaps' field of the
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received message info remains 0). The receiver has to make sure that the
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specified 'CapReceivePath' is an empty capability slot. I.e., by calling
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'seL4_CNode_Delete' prior 'seL4_Wait'.
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Translation of capabilities aka "unwrapping"
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============================================
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In addition to receiving delegated capabilities under a new name, seL4's IPC
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mechanism allows the recipient of a capability that originated from the
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recipient to obtain a custom defined value instead of receiving a new name.
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In seL4 terminology, this mechanism is called "unwrapping".
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Capability unwrapping is supposed to happen if the transferred capability is
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a minted endpoint capability and the recipient is the original creator of
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the capability. For testing the mechanism, we replace the 'SECOND_THREAD_CAP'
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argument of the 'seL4_Call' by a minted endpoint capability derived from
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the endpoint used by the second thread.
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For creating a minted endpoint capability, we allocate a new index for the
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minted capability (EP_MINTED_CAP) and use the 'seL4_CNode_Mint' operation
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as follows:
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! seL4_CNode const service = seL4_CapInitThreadCNode;
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! seL4_Word const dest_index = EP_MINTED_CAP;
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! uint8_t const dest_depth = 32;
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! seL4_CNode const src_root = seL4_CapInitThreadCNode;
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! seL4_Word const src_index = EP_CAP;
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! uint8_t const src_depth = 32;
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! seL4_CapRights const rights = seL4_Transfer_Mint;
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! seL4_CapData_t const badge = seL4_CapData_Badge_new(111);
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!
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! int const ret = seL4_CNode_Mint(service,
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! dest_index,
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! dest_depth,
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! src_root,
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! src_index,
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! src_depth,
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! rights,
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! badge);
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The badge is set to the magic value 111.
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When specifying the resulting EP_MINTED_CAP as IPC argument for a 'seL4_Call',
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the kernel will translate the capability to the badge value. The callee
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observes the reception of such an "unwrapped" capability via the
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'capsUnwrapped' field of the 'seL4_MessageInfo' structure returned by the
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'seL4_Wait' operation. The badge value can be obtained from the IPC buffer via
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'seL4_GetBadge(0)'. This simple experiment shows that the mechanism works
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as expected.
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Management of virtual memory
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############################
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Besides synchronous IPC, Genode relies on two other forms of inter-process
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communication, namely asynchronous notifications and shared memory. I will
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save the investigation of the former mechanism for later but focus on seL4's
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mechanisms for managing virtual memory for now.
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Virtual-memory management in traditional L4 kernels
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===================================================
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Traditional L4 kernels rely on an in-kernel mapping database to track memory
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mappings. If a protection domain has access to a range of memory pages, it can
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transfer a "mapping" of those memory pages to other protection domains as IPC
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payload. As a side effect of the IPC operation, the kernel populates the page
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tables of the receiver of the mapping accordingly. In reverse, the originator
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of a mapping can revoke the mapping by using a system call. This system call
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takes a virtual-address range of the calling protection domain as argument and
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flushes all mappings that originated from this range. Because mappings could
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be established transitively, the kernel has to maintain a tree structure
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(mapping database) that records how each memory mapping got established. This
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approach has several problems:
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First, it intertwines two concerns, namely the delegation of the authority
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over memory pages and making memory pages accessible. In order to have the
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authorization over memory pages, i.e., the right to hand them out to other
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protection domains or to revoke them from other protection domains, a
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protection domain has to make the pages accessible within its own virtual
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address space. For Genode's core component, which needs to have the authority
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over the entirety of physical memory, this raises two problems: First, even
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though core is not supposed to ever touch memory pages that are in use by
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other components, it still has to make those memory pages accessible within
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its virtual address space. This complicates the assessment of the isolation
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properties of core with respect to the components on top. For example, a
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dangling pointer bug in core could leak or corrupt information that should be
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local to an individual component. Second, the virtual address space of core
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limits the amount of physical memory that can be handed out to other
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components. On a 32-bit machine with 4 GiB of memory, core can hand out a
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maximum of 3 GiB to other components because the upper 1 GiB of its virtual
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address space is owned by the kernel.
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Second, the mapping database keeps records about how mappings got established.
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Thereby, the memory required for storing this information in the kernel
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depends on the behaviour of the user land. As a consequence, a malicious
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user-level program is able to provoke a high consumption of kernel memory
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by establishing mappings. Eventually, this represents an attack vector
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for denial-of-service attacks onto the kernel.
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Virtual-memory management in seL4
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=================================
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Fortunately, the seL4 kernel breaks with this traditional approach.
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Authority over memory pages is represented by capabilities. In fact, in
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order to use a memory page, a capability for the memory page must exist.
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This capability can be delegated. But the possession of the authority
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over a memory page does not imply that the memory page is accessible.
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Very good! Second, seL4 dropped the traditional mapping data base.
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It does not record _how_ memory mappings were established. But it provides
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an thin abstraction of page tables that define _who_ has access to which
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memory page. The backing store for those page tables is managed outside
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the kernel. This effectively alleviates the denial-of-service attack vector
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present in traditional L4 kernels.
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To test the virtual-memory management facilities of seL4, I decide to
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conduct a simple experiment: I want to attach a page of physical memory into
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the virtual address space of the root task twice. I will write a
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string at the first virtual address and expect to read the same string
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from the second virtual address. Compared to other kernels, this simple
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scenario is quote elaborative on seL4 because the kernel barely abstracts
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from the MMU hardware. I have to perform the following steps:
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# Creating a page table and a page frame. I want to attach the page somewhere
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at 0x40000000, which is an address range not yet in use but the root task.
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So I have to create an 'seL4_IA32_PageTableObject' first. This is done by
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the 'seL4_Untyped_RetypeAtOffset' operation as for all other kernel objects.
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In order to be able to use a portion of physical memory as actual memory, we
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also have to convert untyped memory to a 'seL4_IA32_4K' kernel object,
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also using the 'Untyped_Retype' operation.
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# With the page table created, we can tell seL4 to insert the page table
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into the page directory of the root task:
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! seL4_IA32_PageTable const service = PAGE_TABLE_CAP;
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! seL4_IA32_PageDirectory const pd = seL4_CapInitThreadPD;
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! seL4_Word const vaddr = 0x40000000;
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! seL4_IA32_VMAttributes const attr = seL4_IA32_Default_VMAttributes;
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!
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! int const ret = seL4_IA32_PageTable_Map(service, pd, vaddr, attr);
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# Now that the virtual memory range at 0x40000000 is backed by a page table,
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we can finally insert our page frame at the designated virtual address:
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! seL4_IA32_Page const service = PAGE_CAP;
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! seL4_IA32_PageDirectory const pd = seL4_CapInitThreadPD;
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! seL4_Word const vaddr = 0x40001000;
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! seL4_CapRights const rights = seL4_AllRights;
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! seL4_IA32_VMAttributes const attr = seL4_IA32_Default_VMAttributes;
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!
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! int const ret = seL4_IA32_Page_Map(service, pd, vaddr, rights, attr);
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After these steps, root task is able to touch the memory at 0x40001000
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without crashing, which is just expected.
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However, the attempt to attach the same page at a second virtual address
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fails:
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! <<seL4 [decodeIA32FrameInvocation/1630 Te3ffd880 @100025f]:
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! IA32Frame: Frame already mapped.>>
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This is the point where the similarity of seL4's kernel interface to real
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page tables ends. With real page tables, one physical page frame can be
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present in any number of page tables by simply writing the frame number into
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the corresponding page-table entry. In principle, a frame number corresponds
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to an IA32_4K capability. But in contrast to a frame number, which can be
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reused for any number of page-table entries, on seL4, each insertion of a
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page frame into a page table requires a distinct IA32_4K capability. For a
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given IA32_4K capability, the creation of a second capability that refers to
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the same frame is easy enough:
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! seL4_CNode const service = seL4_CapInitThreadCNode;
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! seL4_Word const dest_index = PAGE_CAP_2;
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! uint8_t const dest_depth = 32;
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! seL4_CNode const src_root = seL4_CapInitThreadCNode;
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! seL4_Word const src_index = PAGE_CAP;
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! uint8_t const src_depth = 32;
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! seL4_CapRights const rights = seL4_AllRights;
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!
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! int const ret = seL4_CNode_Copy(service, dest_index, dest_depth,
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! src_root, src_index, src_depth, rights);
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Inserting the page mapping using the copy of the original IA32_4K capability
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works:
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! seL4_IA32_Page const service = PAGE_CAP_2;
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! seL4_IA32_PageDirectory const pd = seL4_CapInitThreadPD;
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! seL4_Word const vaddr = 0x40002000;
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! seL4_CapRights const rights = seL4_AllRights;
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! seL4_IA32_VMAttributes const attr = seL4_IA32_Default_VMAttributes;
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!
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! int const ret = seL4_IA32_Page_Map(service, pd, vaddr, rights, attr);
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The subsequent test of writing a string to 0x40001000 and reading it from
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0x40002000 produces the desired result.
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*Sentiments*
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Compared to traditional L4 kernels, the virtual memory management of seL4
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is much more advanced. It solves pressing problems that plagued L4 kernels
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since an eternity. This is extremely valuable!
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On the other hand, it does so by putting the burden of kernel-resource
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management onto the user land while further complicating the problem
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compared to the underlying mechanism provided by the MMU hardware.
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I understand that the copies of the page-frame capabilities are needed to
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enable to kernel to find and flush all page-table entries when a page frame is
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destroyed. This is a fundamental security property of the kernel.
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In Genode, each range of physical memory is represented as a dataspace that
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can be attached to different or the same virtual address spaces any number of
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times. The seemingly small detail that the population of each page-table entry
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requires a dedicated kernel object raises quite a challenge.
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We do not only need to perform the book keeping of the physical page
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frames and their corresponding capability numbers, but additionally need to
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create and keep track of an additional kernel object (a copy of the page-frame
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capability) each time a physical page is mapped to a virtual address space.
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It goes without saying that all the book-keeping meta data must be allocated
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somewhere and accounted properly.
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Fortunately, I see how Genode's resource-trading mechanisms could come to
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the rescue here.
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