From 88cae5e82e31e29ee36fc995d94211ac3d04d143 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Norman Feske Date: Mon, 26 May 2014 14:37:19 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] Release notes for version 14.05 --- doc/release_notes-14-05.txt | 1124 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 1124 insertions(+) create mode 100644 doc/release_notes-14-05.txt diff --git a/doc/release_notes-14-05.txt b/doc/release_notes-14-05.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bc4829452c --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/release_notes-14-05.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1124 @@ + + + =============================================== + Release notes for the Genode OS Framework 14.05 + =============================================== + + Genode Labs + + + +With Genode version 14.05, we address two problems that are fundamental for +the scalability of the framework. The first problem is the way how Genode +interoperates with existing software. A new concept for integrating 3rd-party +source code with the framework makes the porting and use of software that +is maintained outside the Genode source tree easier and more robust than ever. +The rationale and the new concept are explained in Section +[Management of ported 3rd-party source code]. +The second problem is concerned about how programs that are built atop a C +runtime (as is the case for most 3rd-party software) interact with the Genode +world. Section [Per-process virtual file systems] describes how we +consolidated many special-purpose solutions into one coherent design of using +process-local virtual file systems. + +In line with our road map, we put forward our storage-related agenda by enabling +the use of NetBSD's cryptographic device driver (CGD) on Genode. Thereby, we +continue our engagement with the rump kernel that we started to embrace with +version 14.02. Section [Block-level encryption using CGD] explains the +use of CGD as a Genode component. + +Apart from those infrastructural improvements, the release cycle has focused +on the NOVA and base-hw platforms. On NOVA, we are happy to have enabled +static real-time priorities, which make the kernel much more appealing +for the designated use for a general-purpose OS. Furthermore, we intensified +our work on VirtualBox on NOVA by enabling guest-addition support and +improving stability and performance. The NOVA-related improvements are +covered by Sections [VirtualBox on NOVA] and [NOVA microhypervisor]. + +The development of our custom base-hw kernel platform for the ARM architecture +goes full steam ahead. With the added support for multiple processors, base-hw +can finally leverage the CPU resources of modern ARM platforms. Furthermore, +we largely redesigned the memory management to avoid the need to maintain +identity mappings, which makes the kernel more robust. Section +[Execution on bare hardware (base-hw)] explains those developments in detail. + +Finally, we enhanced the driver support for x86-based platforms by enabling +USB 3.0 in our Linux device-driver environment +Section [USB 3.0 for x86-based platforms] outlines the steps we had to take. + + +Management of ported 3rd-party source code +########################################## + +Without the wealth of existing open-source software, Genode would be of little +use. We regularly combine the work of more than 70 open-source projects with +the framework. The number is steadily growing because each Genode user longs +for different features. + +Since version 11.08, we employed a common way of integrating 3rd-party +software with Genode, which came in the form of a makefile per source-code +repository. Each of those makefiles offered "prepare" and "clean" rules +that automated the downloading and integration of 3rd-party code. +The introduced automatism was a big relief for our work flows. +Since then, the amount of 3rd-party code ported to Genode has been steadily +increasing. It eventually reached a complexity that became hard to manage +using the original mechanism. +In order to make Genode easier to conquer for new users and more +enjoyable for regular developers, we had to reconsider the way of how +3rd-party code is integrated with the framework. + +We identified the following limitations of the existing approach: + +* From the viewpoint of Genode users, the most inconvenient limitation was + the lack of proper error messages when a port was not prepared beforehand. + Instead, the build system produced confusing error messages when unable to + find the source code. According to the trouble-shooting requests on our + mailing list, the missing preparation of 3rd-party code seems to be the + most prominent road block for new users. + +* Still, when having prepared all required 3rd-party ports, the prepared + version may become outdated when using Genode over time. Eventually the + build process will expect a different version of the 3rd-party code than the + one prepared. This happens particularly when switching between branches. In + some cases the version of the 3rd-party code is updated quite often (e.g., + base-nova). The build system could not detect such inconsistencies and + consequently responded with arcane error messages, or even worse, produced + binaries with unexpected runtime behaviour. + +* There are many source-code repositories that deal with downloading and + integrating 3rd-party code in different ways, namely libports, ports, + ports-foc, base-, dde_ipxe, dde_rump, dde_linux, dde_oss, qt4. Even + though all makefiles contained in those repositories used to contain the + "prepare" and "clean" rules, they were not consistent with regard to the + handling of corner cases, to the updating of packages, and with the use of + additional arguments ("PKG="). Moreover, the individual port-description + files (_/ports/*.mk_) files found in the ports and libports + repositories contained a lot of boiler-plate content such as the rules for + downloading files via wget, or the rules for checking signatures. Such + duplicated code tends to degrade in quality and consistence over time, + affecting the user experience and maintenance costs in a negative way. + +* The downloaded archives and the extracted 3rd-party code used to reside + within the respective repositories (in the _download/_ and _contrib/_ + subdirectories). This made the use of search tools like grep very inefficient + when attempting to search in Genode's source code while excluding 3rd-party + sources. For this reason, most regular Genode developers have crafted some + special shell aliases for filtered search operations. But this should not be + the way to go. + +* During the "make prepare" step, most ports of libraries used to create a + bunch of symlinks within _/contrib/_. Effectively, this step touched + Genode's source tree, which was bad in two ways. First, the portions of the + source tree installed by the "make prepare" mechanism had to be blacklisted + in Genode's .gitignore file. And second, executing the port-specific "make + clean" rules was quite dangerous because those rules operated on the source + tree. + + +The way forward +=============== + +The points above made the need for a changed source-tree structure apparent. +Traditionally, all of Genode's source-code repositories alongside the _tool/_ +and _doc/_ directories were located at the root of the tree structure: + +! tool/ +! doc/ +! base/ +! base-okl4/Makefile +! download/ +! include/ +! lib/ +! src/ +! os/ +! ... + +Repositories that incorporated 3rd-party code (e.g., base-okl4 as depicted +above) hosted a makefile for the preparation, a _download/_ directory for the +downloaded 3rd-party source code, and a _contrib/_ directory for the extracted +source code. There was no notion of common tools that would work across +repositories. + +With Genode 14.05, we move all repositories to a _repos/_ directory: + +! tool/ +! doc/ +! repos/ +! base/ +! base-okl4/ +! os/ +! ... +! contrib/ + +Downloaded 3rd-party source code resides outside of the actual repository at +the central 'contrib/' directory. By using this structure, we achieve +the following: + +* Working with grep within the repositories works very efficient because + downloaded and extracted 3rd-party code are no longer in the way. They + reside next to the repositories. + +* In contrast to the original situation where we had no convention about + the location of source-code repositories, tools can rely on a convention + now. Being located at a known position within the tree, the tools for + creating build directories and for managing ports become aware of the + location of the repositories as well as the central _contrib/_ directory. + +* Adding a supplemental repository is pretty intuitive: Just clone a git + repository into _repos/_. + +* Tutorials that describe the use of Genode could benefit from the introduced + convention as they could suggest creating build directories at the top + level, which no longer interferes with the location of the source-code + repositories. This would make those tutorials a bit easier to follow. + +* The create_builddir tool can create build directories at sensible default + locations. E.g., when 'create_builddir' is called with nova_x86_64 as + argument but with no BUILD_DIR argument, the tool will create a build + directory _build/nova_x86_64/_ by default. This way, we reinforce a useful + convention about the naming and location of build directories that will ease + the support of Genode users. + +* Storing all build directories and downloaded 3rd-party source code somewhere + outside the Genode source tree, let's say on different disk partitions, can + be easily accomplished by creating a symbolic link for each of the _build/_ + and _contrib/_ directory. + +Of course, changing the source-tree structure at the top-level was no +light-hearted decision. In particular, it raised the question of how to +deal with topic branches that were branched off a Genode version with the +old layout. During the transition, we observed the following patterns +to deal with that problem: + +* Git can deal well with patches that change existing files, even if the + file location has changed. For simple patches, e.g., small bug fixes, + cherry-picking those individual commits to a current branch works quite + well. + +* If a commit adds new files, the files will naturally end up at the + location specified in the patch, i.e., somewhere outside of the _repos/_ + directory. You will have to manually move them to the correct location using + 'git mv' and squash the resulting rename commit onto the original commit + using 'git rebase -i'. + +* For migrating a series of complex commits to the new layout, we use + 'git format-patch' to obtain a patch series for the topic branch, prefix + the original pathnames with "repos/" using 'sed', and apply the result + using 'git am'. + + +Unification of the ports management +=================================== + +With the new source-tree layout in place, we could pursue a new take on +unifying the management of ported 3rd-party source code. The new solution, +which is very much inspired by the fabulous +[http://nixos.org/nix - Nix package manager] comes in the form of new tools to +be found at 'tool/ports/'. + +Note that even though the port mechanism described herein looks a bit like +"package management", it covers a different problem. The problem covered here +is the integration of existing 3rd-party source code with the Genode source +tree. Packaging, on the other hand, would provide a means to distribute +self-contained portions of the Genode source tree including their respective +3rd-party counterparts as separate packages. Package management is not +addressed yet. + +The new tools capture all ports present in the repositories located under +_repos/_. Using them is as simple as follows: + +:Obtain a list of available ports: + ! tool/ports/list + +:Download and install a port: + ! tool/ports/prepare_port + +The prepare_port tool will scan all repositories for the specified port and +install the port into _contrib/_. Each version of an installed +port resides in a dedicated subdirectory within the _contrib/_ directory. +The port-specific directory is called port directory. It is named +_-_. The __ uniquely identifies +the version of the port (it is a SHA1 hash of the ingredients of the +port). If two versions of the same port are installed, each of them will +have a different fingerprint. So they end up in different directories. + +Within a source-code repository, a port is represented by two files, a +_.port_ and a _.hash_ file. Both files reside at the +_ports/_ subdirectory of the corresponding repository. The +_.port_ file is the port description, which declares the +ingredients of the port, e.g., the archives to download and the patches to apply. +The _.hash_ file contains the fingerprint of the corresponding +port description, thereby uniquely identifying a version of the port +as expected by the checked-out Genode version. + +So how does Genode's build system find the source code for a given port? +If the build system encounters a target that incorporates +ported source code, it looks up the respective _.hash_ file in the +repositories as specified in the build configuration. The fingerprint found in +the hash file is used to construct the path to the port directory under +_contrib/_. If that lookup fails, a meaningful error is printed. Any number of +versions of the same port can be installed at the same time. I.e., when +switching Git branches that use different versions of the same port, the build +system automatically finds the right port version as expected by the currently +active branch. + +For step-by-step instructions of how to add a port using the new mechanism, +please refer to the updated porting guide: + +:Genode Porting Guide: + + [http://genode.org/documentation/developer-resources/porting] + + +:Known limitations: + +* There is no garbage collection of stale ports, yet. Each time when a port + gets updated, a new version will be created within the _contrib/_ directory. + However, the subdirectories can safely be deleted manually to regain + disk space. In the worst case, if you deleted a port that is in use, + the build system will let you know. + +* Even though some port files are equipped with information about + cryptographic signatures, those signatures are not checked yet. However, + each downloaded archive is checked against a known-good hash value declared + in the port description so that the integrity of downloaded files is + checked. But as illustrated by the signature declarations in the + port descriptions, we plan to increase the confidence by enabling + signature checks in addition to the hash-sum checks. + +* Dependencies between ports are not covered by port descriptions, yet. + + +:Transition to the new mechanism: + +We have reworked the majority of the more than 70 existing ports to the new +mechanism. The only ports not covered so far are base-codezero, qt5, gcc, gdb, +and qt4. During the next release cycle, we will keep the original "make +prepare" mechanism as a front end intact. So the "make prepare" instructions +as found in many tutorials will still work. But under the hood, "make prepare" +just invokes the new _tool/ports/prepare_port_ tool. + + +Block-level encryption using CGD +################################ + +The need for protection of personal data is becoming generally +accepted in the information age. Especially, against the background of +ubiquitous storage devices in smart phones, notebooks, and tablet +computers, which may go missing easily. + +There are several different approaches to prevent unauthorized access +to data storage. For example, data could be encrypted on a per file +basis (e.g. EncFS or PEFS). Thereby each file is encrypted using a +cipher but stored on a regular file system besides unencrypted files. +Beyond this approach, it is also common to encrypt data on the lower +block-device layer. With block-level encryption, each block on the +storage device is encrypted respectively decrypted when written to or read +from the device (e.g., TrueCrypt, FreeBSD's geli(8), Linux LUKS). On +top of this cryptographic storage device, a regular file system may be +used. + +Additionally, it is desirable to access the +encrypted data from various operating systems. In our case, we want to +use the data from Genode as well as from our current development +platform Linux. + +In Genode 14.02, we introduced a port of the NetBSD based rumpkernels +to leverage file-system implementations, e.g., ext2. Beside file +systems, NetBSD itself also offers block-level encryption in form of +its cryptographic disk-driver _cgd(4)_. In line with our roadmap, we +enabled the cryptographic-device driver in our rumpkernels port as a +first step to exploring block-level encryption on Genode. + +:[https://www.netbsd.org/docs/guide/en/chap-cgd.html]: + NetBSD cryptographic-device driver (CGD) + +The heart of our CGD port is the _rump_cgd_ server, which encapsulates +the rumpkernels and the cgd device. The server uses a block session to +get access to an existing block device and, in return, provides a +block session to its client. Each block written or read by the client +is transparently encrypted resp. decrypted by the server with a given +key. This enables us to seamlessly integrate CGD into Genode's existing +infrastructure. + +To ease the use, the server interface is modelled after the interface +of _cgdconfig(8)_. This implies that the key must have the same format +as used by _cgdconfig_, which means the key is a base64-encoded +string. The first 4 bytes of the key string denote the actual length +of the key in bits (these 4 bytes are stored in big endian order). For +now, we only support the use of a stored key. However, we plan to add +the use of passphrases in relation with keys later. + +Currently, _rump_cgd_ is only able to _configure_ a _cgd_ device but +can not generate the configuration itself. A configuration or rather a +working key may be generated by using the new _tool/rump_ script. The +used cipher is hard-coded to _aes-cbc_ with a key size of 256 bit at +the moment. Note, the server serves only one client as it +transparently encrypts/decrypts one back-end block session. Though +_rump_cgd_ is currently limited with regard to the used cipher and the +way key input is handled, we plan to extend this +rumpkernel-based component step by step in the future. + +If you want to get some hands on with CGD, the first step is to +prepare a raw encrypted and ext2-formatted partition image by using +the 'tool/rump' script + +! dd if=/dev/urandom of=/path/to/image +! rump -c /path/to/image # key is printed to stdout +! rump -c -k -f -F ext2fs /path/to/image + +To use this disk image, the following config snippet can be used + +! +! +! +! +! +! key +! AAABAJhpB2Y2UvVjkFdlP4m44449Pi3A/uW211mkanSulJo8 +! +! +! +! +! +! +! + +Note, we explicitly route the block-session requests for the +underlying block device to the AHCI driver. + +The block service provided by _rump_cgd_, in turn, is used by a file-system +server. + +! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! + +Currently, the key to access the cryptographically secured device must +be specified before using the device. Implementing a mechanism which +asks for the key on the first attempt is in the works. + +By using the rumpkernels and the cryptographic-device driver, we are +able to use block-level encryption on Genode and on Linux. +In Linux case, we depend on _rumprun_, which can +run unmodified NetBSD userland tools on top of the rumpkernels to +manage the cgd device. To ease this task, we provide the +aforementioned _rump_ wrapper script. + +:[https://github.com/rumpkernel/rumprun]: Rumprun + +Since the rump script covers the most common use cases for the tools, +the script is comparatively extensive, hence giving a short tutorial +is reasonable. + + +:Format a disk image with Ext2: + +First, prepare the actual image file + +! dd if=/dev/zero of=/path/to/image bs=1M count=128 + +Second, use _tool/rump_ to format the disk image: + +! rump -f -F ext2fs /path/to/image + +Afterwards the file system just created may be populated with the +contents of another directory by executing + +! rump -F ext2fs -p /path/to/source /path/to/image + +To list the contents of the image run + +! rump -F ext2fs -l /path/to/image + + +:Create an encrypted disk image: + +Creating a cryptographic-disk image based on cgd(4) is done by +executing the following command + +! rump -c /path/to/image + +This will generate a key that may be used to decrypt the image later +on. Since this command will only generate a key and _not_ initialize +the disk image, it is highly advised to prepare the disk image by +using _/dev/urandom_ instead of _/dev/zero_. In other words, only new +blocks later written to the disk image are encrypted on the fly. In +addition while generating the key, a temporary configuration file will +be created. Although this file has proper permissions, it may leak the +generated key if it is created on persistent storage. To specify a +more secure directory, the '-t' option can be used: + +! rump -c -t /path/to/secure/directory /path/to/image + +It is advised to carefully select an empty directory because the specified +directory is removed at after completion. + +Decrypting the disk image requires the key generated in the previous +step: + +! rump -c -k /path/to/image + +For now this key has to be specified as command line argument. This is +an issue if the shell, which is used, is maintaining a history of +executed commands. + +For the sake of completeness let us put all examples together by creating an +encrypted Ext2 image that will contain all files of Genode's _demo_ +scenario: + +! dd if=/dev/urandom of=/tmp/demo.img bs=1M count=16 +! rump -c /tmp/demo.img # key is printed to stdout +! rump -c -k -f -F ext2fs -d /dev/rcgd0a /tmp/demo.img +! rump -c -k -F ext2fs -p $(BUILD_DIR)/var/run/demo /tmp/demo.img + +To check if the image was populated successfully, execute the +following: + +! rump -c -k -F ext2fs -l /tmp/demo.img + +More detailed information about the options and arguments of +this tool can be obtained by running: + +! rump -h + +Since _tool/rump_ just utilizes the rumpkernels running on the host +system to do its duty, there is a script called _tool/rump_cgdconf_ +that extracts the key from a 'cgdconfig(8)' generated configuration +file and is also able to generate such a file from a given key. +Thereby, we try accommodate the interoperability between the general +rumpkernels-based tools and the _rump_cgd_ server used on Genode. + + +Per-process virtual file systems +################################ + +Our C runtime served us quite well over the years. At its core, it has a +flexible plugin architecture that allows us to combine different back ends +such the lwIP socket API (using libc_lwip_nic_dhcp), using LOG as stdout via +(via libc_log), or using a ROM dataspace as a file (via libc_rom). Recently +however, the original design has started to show its limitations: + +Although there is the libc_fs plugin that allows a program to access files +from a file-system server, there is no way to allow a program to access +two different file-system servers. For example, if a web server wants to +obtain its configuration and the website content from two different file +systems. + +Beside the lack of features of individual libc plugins, there are +problems stemming from combining multiple plugins. +For example, there is the libc_block plugin that makes a block session +accessible as a +pseudo block device named "/dev/blkdev". However, when combined with the +libc_fs plugin, it is not defined which of the two plugins will respond to +requests for a file with this name. +As a quick and dirty work-around, the libc_fs plugin +explicitly black-lists "/dev/blkdev". The need for such a work-around +hints at a deficiency of the overall design. +In general, if multiple plugins are combined, there is no consistent +virtual file-system structure exposed via getdirentries. + +Another inconvenience is a missing concept for handling standard input +and output. Most programs use +libc_log to direct stdout to the LOG service. But what if we want to +direct the output of such a program to a terminal? Granted, there +exists the terminal_log server to translate a LOG session to a +terminal session but it would be much nicer to have this flexibility +at the C-runtime level. + +Finally, when looking at the implementation of the plugins, it becomes +apparent that many of them look similar. We have to admit that there are quite +a few dusty corners where duplicated code has been accumulated over the years. +That said, the semantic details (e.g., the quality of error handling) differ +from plugin to plugin. Seeing the number of file systems (and thereby the +number of added libc plugins) grow, it became clear that our original +design would make the situation even worse. + +On the other hand, we have gathered overly positive experiences with the +virtual file-system implementation of our Noux runtime, which is an +environment for running Unix software on Genode. The VFS as implemented for +Noux supports stacked file systems (similar to union mounts) of various +types. It is stable and complete enough to run our tool chain to build Genode +on Genode. Wouldn't it be a good idea to reuse the Noux VFS for the normal +libc? With the current release cycle, we pursued this line of thoughts. + +The first step was transplanting the VFS code from the Noux runtime to an +free-standing library. The most substantial +change was the decoupling of the VFS interfaces from the types provided by +Noux. All those types had been moved to the VFS library. In the process +of reshaping the Noux VFS into a library, several existing pseudo file systems +received a welcome cleanup, and some new ones were added. In particular, +there is a new "log" file system for writing data to a LOG session, a "rom" +file system for reading ROM modules, and an "inline" file system for +reading data defined within the VFS configuration. + +The second step was the addition of a new libc_vfs plugin to the C runtime. +This plugin makes the VFS library available to libc-using programs via the +original libc plugin interface. It translates the types and functions of the +VFS library to the types and functions of the C library. At this point, it was +an optional plugin. As the VFS was meant to replace the various existing plugins +instead of accompanying them, the next challenge was to revisit all the +users of the various libc plugins and adapting them to use the libc_vfs +plugin instead. This was, by far, the more elaborative step. More than 50 +programs and their respective run scripts had to be adapted and tested. +However, this process was very satisfying because we could see how the +new VFS plugin satisfies all the use cases formerly accommodated by a zoo +of special plugins. + +As the last step, we could retire several libc plugins such as libc_rom, +libc_block, libc_log, and libc_fs and merge the libc_vfs into the libc. +Technically, it is still a plugin, but it is always present. + + +:How has the libc changed?: + +Each libc-using program can be configured with a program-local virtual +file system as illustrated by the following example: + +! +! ... +! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! ... +! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! +! + +Here you see a lighttpd server that serves a website coming from a TAR +archive (which is obtained from a ROM module named "website.tar"). There +are two pseudo devices "/dev/log" and "/dev/null", to which the +"stdin", "stdout", and "stderr" attributes refer. The "log" file system +consists of a single node that represents a LOG session. The web server +configuration is supplied inline as part of the config. (Btw, you can +try out a very similar scenario using the 'ports/genode_org.run' script) + +The VFS implementation resides at 'os/include/vfs/'. This is where you +can see the file-system types that are available (look for +_*_file_system.h_ files). Because the same code is used by Noux, we have +one unified and coherent VFS implementation throughout the framework now. + +There are two things needed to adapt your work to the change. + +* Remove the use of the libc_{rom, block, log, fs} plugins from your + target description files. Those plugins are no more. As of now, + the VFS is still internally a plugin, but it is always included with + the libc. + +* Configure the VFS of your libc-using program in your run script. For + most former users of the sole libc_log plugin, this configuration + looks like this: + + ! + ! + ! + ! + ! + + For former users of other plugins, there are the 'block', 'rom', + and 'fs' file-system types available. + + +:Feature set and limitations: + +As of now, the following file-system types are supported: + +:dir: represents a directory, which, in turn, can host multiple file + systems. + +:block: accesses a block session. The label of the session can be configured + via the "label" attribute. + +:fs: accesses a file-system server via a file-system session. The session + label can be defined via the "label" attribute. + +:inline: provides the content of the configuration node as the content of + a read-only file. + +:log: represents a pseudo device for writing to a LOG session. This type + is useful for redirecting stdout to a LOG service such as the one provided + by core. + +:null and zero: represent pseudo devices similar to _/dev/null_ and + _/dev/zero_ on Unix. + +:rom: makes a ROM module available as a read-only file. If the name of + the ROM module differs from the node name, the module name can be + expressed by the "label" attribute. + +:tar: obtains a TAR archive as ROM module and makes its content available + as a file system. The name of the ROM module corresponds to the + name of the tar node. + +:terminal: is a pseudo device that accesses a terminal session. The + session can be labeled using the "label" attribute. + +There are still two major limitations: First, select is not supported yet. +That means that programs cannot block for I/O (such as reading from a +terminal). Because of this limitation, we still keep the libc_terminal around, +which supports select. As the second limitation, the VFS interface performs +read and write operations as synchronous requests. This is inherited from the +Noux implementation. It goes without saying that we plan to change it to +support non-blocking operations. But this step is not taken yet. + + +Revised session interfaces +========================== + +The session interfaces for framebuffer and file-system access underwent +the following minor changes. + +:Framebuffer session: + + We simplified the framebuffer-session interface by removing the + 'Framebuffer::Session::release()' function. This step makes the mode-change + protocol consistent with the way the ROM-session interface handles + ROM-module changes. That is, the client acknowledges the release of its + current dataspace by requesting a new dataspace via the + 'Framebuffer::Session::dataspace()' function. + + To enable framebuffer clients to synchronize their operations with the + display frequency, the session interface received the new 'sync_sigh' + function. Using this function, a client can register a handler for + receiving display-synchronization events. As of now, no framebuffer + service implements this feature in a useful way. But this will change + in the upcoming release cycle when we overhaul Genode's GUI stack. + +:File-system session: + + Until now, there was no exception type for the condition where a symbolic link was + created on a file system w/o symlink support, e.g., FAT. The + corresponding file-system server (ffat_fs) used to return a negative handle + as a work-around. Hence, we added 'Permission_denied' to the list of + exceptions thrown by 'File_system::Session::symlink' to handle this case in + a clean way. + + +Ported 3rd-party software +######################### + +VirtualBox on NOVA +================== + +With Genode 14.02, we successfully executed more than seven +guest-operating systemsa, including MS Windows 7, on top of Genode/NOVA. Based +on this proof of concept, we invested significant efforts to stabilize +and extend our port of VirtualBox during the last three months. We +also paid attention to user friendliness (i.e., features) by enabling +support for guest-additions. + +Regarding stability, one issue we encountered has been occasional +synchronization problems during the early VMM bootstrap phase. Several +internal threads in the VMM are started concurrently, like the timer +thread, emulation thread (EMT), virtual CPU handler thread, hard-disk +thread, and user-interface frontend thread. Some of these threads are +favoured regarding their execution over others according to their +importance. VirtualBox expresses this by host-specific mechanisms like +priorities and nice levels of the host operating system. For Genode, +we implemented this specific part accordingly by using multiple Genode +CPU sessions. + +The next working field was the emulation code and the code for +handling VM exits, which have been executed by two different threads. +We chose this structure in the original port to satisfy the following +specific characteristics of the underlying NOVA kernel. The emulation +code is provided by VirtualBox and is started as a pthread (EMT +thread). In contrast, the hardware accelerated vCPU thread is running +solely in the context of the VM in guest mode. When a VM exit happens, +the exit is reflected by an IPC message sent through a NOVA portal and +received by a vCPU handler thread running in our port of the +VirtualBox VMM. This thread must be a NOVA _worker_ thread, one which +has no scheduling context (SC) associated. The emulation thread +however is a _global_ thread with an associated SC. + +Using two separate threads and synchronization points between them +enabled us in the first release of the port to quickly make progress, +which led to the successful execution of Windows guests. Now, one goal was +to merge both threads in order to avoid thread-context switching costs +between them. Also, we wanted to get rid of transferring the state +between vCPU handler and emulation thread back and forth including all +that ugly synchronization code. For that purpose, we changed the +startup of the emulation code: We first setup the vCPU handler thread +and then start the vCPU in the VM. Hereafter, the VM exits immediately +via a NOVA specific vCPU startup exception and the vCPU handler thread +gets in control. The vCPU handler thread then actually starts +executing the VirtualBox specific emulation code (originally executed +by the EMT thread). Now the vCPU handler thread and the VirtualBox EMT +thread are physically one execution context. Whenever the emulation +code decides to switch to hardware accelerated mode, the vCPU handler +thread can directly setup the transfer of the VM state from the +VirtualBox emulation mode into the state fields of the vCPU of the +guest. + +Additionally, we had to re-adjust the memory management of our port to +meet requirements expected by VirtualBox. For some internal data +structures, VirtualBox saves a pointer to a memory location not just +as absolute pointer, but instead splits this pointer into a +process-absolute base and a base-local offset. These structures can +thereby be shared over different protection domains where the base +pointer typically differs (shared memory attached at different +addresses). For the Genode port, we actually don't need this shared +memory features, however we had to recognize that the space for the +offset value is a signed integer (int32_t). On a 64bit host, this +feature caused trouble if the distance of two memory pointers was +larger than 31 bit (2 GiB). Fortunately, each memory-allocation +request for such data structures comes with a type field, which we can +use to make sure that all allocations per type are located within a 2 +GiB virtual range. + +Finally, we optimized the VM exits marginally and now try to avoid +entering the emulation mode during a recall VM exit. If we detect that +an IRQ is pending by the VMM models during the recall VM-exit +handling, we inject the IRQ directly into the VM instead of changing +into the VirtualBox emulation mode by default. + +Regarding our keen endeavor to enable VirtualBox's guest additions, we +started by enabling the VMMDev PCI pseudo device, which is the basis +for VMM-specific hypercalls executed by guest systems. Beside basic +functions (e.g., software version reporting from host to guest and +vice versa) also complex communication protocols can be implemented by +storing request structures in guest-physical memory and passing their +addresses to the VMMDev request I/O port. The communication mechanism +in VirtualBox is called host-guest-communication manager (HGCM) and +provides host services to the enlightened guest-operating system. +Among the available services, the most interesting service for us was +support for _shared folders_ to exchange data between Genode and the +guest OS. Now, we are able to configure shares in VirtualBox, which +are mapped to VFS directories. For example + +! +! ... +! +! ... +! +! +! ... +! +! +! +! +! +! ... +! +! + +configures one shared folder _miezekatze_, which is backed by a VFS +mount to a pre-populated RAM file system. + +Furthermore, we integrated the guest-pointer device with the +Nitpicker pointer and connected the real-time clock VMM model to our +RTC-device driver. Both features are enabled by default and need no +further configuration. Currently, both Nitpicker and the guest OS +draw the mouse pointers on screen. We will improve this in the future +as the guest informs about GUI state via distinct pointer shapes. + +During our development, we updated our port to VirtualBox 4.2.24 with the +rough plan to go for 4.3 during the rest of the year. + + +Ported libraries +================ + +We updated OpenSSL to version 1.0.1g, which contains a fix for the +heart-bleed bug. +Furthermore, we enabled OpenSSL and curl for the ARM architecture. + + +Device drivers +############## + +USB 3.0 for x86-based platforms +=============================== + +Having support for USB 3.0 or XHCI host controllers on the Exynos 5 platform +since mid 2013, we decided it was about time to enable USB 3.0 on x86 platforms. +Because XHCI is a standardized interface, which is also exposed by the Exynos 5 +host controller, the enablement was relatively straight forward. The major +open issue for x86 was the missing connection of the USB controller to the PCI +bus. For this, we ported the XHCI-PCI part from Linux and connected it with the +internal-PCI driver of our _dde_linux_ environment. This step enabled basic XHCI +support for x86 platforms. Unfortunately, there seems not to be a single USB 3.0 +controller without quirks. Thus, we tested some PCI cards and notebooks and +added controller-specific quirks as needed. These quirks may not cover all current +production chips though. + +We also enabled and tested the HID, storage, and network profiles for USB 3.0, +where the supported network chip is, as for Exynos 5, the ASIX AX88179 +Gigabit-Ethernet Adapter. + + +Platforms +######### + +Execution on bare hardware (base-hw) +==================================== + +Multi-processor support +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +When we started to contemplate the support for symmetric multiprocessing +within the base-hw kernel, a plenty of fresh influences on this subject +floated around in our minds. Most notably, the NOVA port of Genode recently obtained +SMP support in the course of a prototypically comparison of different models +for inter-processor communication. In addition to the very insightful +conclusions of this evaluation, our knowledge about other kernel projects and +their way to SMP went in. In general, this showed us that the subject - if +addressed too ambitious - may boast lots of complex stabilization problems, and +coping with them easily draws down SMP efficiency in the aftermath. + +Against this backdrop, we decided - as so often in the evolution of the base-hw kernel - to +pick the easiest-to-reach and easiest-to-grasp solution first with preliminary +disregard to secondary requirements like scalability. As the base-hw kernel +is single-threaded on uniprocessor systems, it was obvious to maintain +one kernel thread per SMP processor and, as far as possible, let them all +work in a similar way. To moreover keep the code base of the kernel as +unmodified as possible, while introducing SMP, access to kernel objects get fully +serialized by one global spin lock. Therewith, we had a very minimalistic +starting point for what shall emerge on the kernel side. + +Likewise, we started with a feature set narrowed to only the essentials on the +user side, prohibiting thread migration, any kind of inter-processor +communication, and also the unmapping of dataspaces, as this would have +raised the need for synchronization of TLBs. While thread migration +is still an open issue, means of inter-processor communication and MMU +synchronization were added successively after having the basic work stable. + +First of all, the start-up code of the kernel had to be adapted. The simple +uniprocessor instantiation was split into three phases: At the very beginning, +the primary processor runs alone and initializes everything that is needed for +calling a simple C function, which then prepares and performs the activation of +the other processors. For each processor, the program provides a dedicated +piece of memory for the local kernel stack to live in. Now each processor +goes through the second (the asynchronous multiprocessor) phase, initializing +its local caches and its memory-management unit. This is a basic prerequisite +for spin locks to behave globally coherent, which also implies that memory +accesses at this level can't be synchronized. Therefore, the first +initialization phase prepares everything in such a way, that the second phase +can be done without writing to global memory. As soon as the processors are +done with the second phase, they acquire the global spin lock that protects all +kernel data. This way, all processors consecutively pass the third initialization +phase that handles all remaining drivers and kernel objects. This is the last +time the primary processor plays a special role by doing all the work that +isn't related to processor-local resources. Afterwards the processors can +proceed to the main function that is called on every kernel pass. + +Another main challenge was the mode-transition assembler code path that +performs both +transitions from a processor exception to the call of the kernel-main function +and from the return of the kernel-main function back to the user +space. As this can't be synchronized, all corresponding data must be provided per +processor. This brought in additional offset calculations, which were a little +tricky to achieve without polluting the user state. But after we managed +to do so, the kernel was already able to handle user threads on different processors +as long as they didn't interact with each other. + +When it came to synchronous and asynchronous inter-processor communication, +we enjoyed a big benefit of our approach. Due to fully serializing all kernel +code paths, none of the communication models had changed with SMP. Thanks to the +cache coherence of ARM hardware, even shared memory amongst processors isn't a +problem. The only difference is that now a processor may change the schedule of +another processor by unblocking one of its threads on communication feedback. +This may rescind the current scheduling choice of the other processor. To +avoid lags in this case, we let the unaware processor trap into an IPI. As the +IPI sender doesn't have to wait for an answer, this isn't a big deal neither +conceptually nor according to performance. + +The last problem we had to solve for common Genode scenarios was the coherency +of the TLB caches. When unmapping a dataspace at one processor, the corresponding +TLB entries must be invalidated on all processors, which - at least on +ARM systems - can be done processor-local only. Thus we needed a protocol to +broadcast the operation. First, we decided to leave it to the user land to +reserve a worker thread at each processor and synchronize between them. This +way, we didn't have to modify the kernel back end that was responsible for +updating the caches back in uniprocessor mode. Unfortunately, the revised memory +management explained in Section [Sparsely populated core address space] +relies on unmap operations at the startup of user threads, which led us into a +chicken-and-egg situation. Therefore, the broadcasting was moved from the user land +into the kernel. If a user thread now asks the kernel to update TLB caches, the +kernel blocks the thread and informs all processors. The last processor that +completes the operation unblocks the user thread. If this unblocking +happens remotely, the kernel acts exactly the same as described above in the +user-communication model. This way, the kernel never blocks itself but only the +thread that requests an MMU update. + +Given that all kernel operations are lightweight non-blocking operations, we +assume that there is little contention for the global kernel lock. So we hope +that the simple SMP model will perform well for the foreseeable future where +we will have to accommodate a handful of processors. If this assumption turns +out to be wrong, or if the kernel should scale to large-scale SMP systems one +day, we still have the choice to advance to a more sophisticated approach +without much backpedaling. + + +Sparsely populated core address space +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +As the base-hw platform started as an experiment, its memory management was +built pretty straight forward. All physical memory of the +corresponding hardware was mapped to the virtual memory-address space of +the kernel/core one-by-one. This approach comes with several limitations: + +* The amount of physical memory that can be used is limited to a maximum + of 4GB on 32-bit ARM platforms +* Several classes of potential memory bugs within base-hw's core may remain + undetected (i.e., dangling pointers) +* A static mapping of the core/kernel code within a dedicated, restricted area + of the address space of all tasks is impossible. Although, this might be + valuable to minimize runtime overhead of interrupts, and page faults. +* As all physical RAM is mapped into core/kernel's address space as + cacheable memory, in general it is impossible to map a portion of RAM with + other caching attributes, as the cache is working with physical addresses + on ARM. This caused problems when dealing with DMA memory, or when sharing + uncached memory between TrustZone's secure and normal world in the past. + +These limitations are resolved as only memory actually used by base-hw's +core/kernel is mapped on demand now. Moreover, the mapping from physical to +virtual isn't necessarily one-by-one anymore. + + +NOVA microhypervisor +==================== + +In line with most L4 kernels, the NOVA microhypervisor supports +priority-based round robin scheduling. However, on Genode we did not +leverage this feature. The reason was simple: We had no use for +priorities on NOVA until now. This changes when we are heading towards +using Genode on a daily basis to perform our work. On live Genode +systems, we want to prioritize particular workloads over others. +Admittedly, we also wanted to postpone the solution of one challenging +technical issue beside just enabling priority configuration. + +The NOVA kernel supports the creation of threads with and without a +scheduling context attached. Scheduling contexts define a time +quantum, a budget, and a priority. The scheduler uses contexts to +decide which activity runs next on the CPU. Therefore, a thread +without a scheduling context attached can be executed only if a thread +with a scheduling context transfers the context during IPC or during +an exception implicitly for the time of the request. The transfer of +the scheduling context implicitly defines the thread's current +priority level. As a consequence, entrypoint threads inherit the +priority of client threads and may run on completely different +priority levels than other threads in the same process. Unfortunately, +the described behavior interferes with the invariant, which is +required for Genode's yielding spinlock implementation: All threads of one +process are running at the same priority level. Otherwise, the system +may end up in a live lock. Although, the user-level yielding spinlock +implementation is used solely to protect some few instructions in the +lock implementation, the live-lock bears a high risk for the system. + +To overcome this issue in base-nova, we replaced the generic yielding +spinlock implementation with a NOVA specific helping lock. So, +lower-priority threads potentially holding the helping-lock get lent +the scheduling context of a higher-priority lock applicant and thereby +can finish the critical section. The core idea is to store the identity of the +lock holder in form of an execution-context capability in the lock +variable. Other lock applicants use the stored capability and instruct +the kernel to help the lock holder with their own scheduling context. +Consequently, the lock-holder thread will run on the budget of the +scheduling context obtained by the helping thread and, therefore, +implicitly at the inherited priority level. The lock holder will +instruct the kernel to pass back the lent scheduling context to the +applicant when leaving the critical section. + +We had to extend the NOVA syscall interface to express that a thread +wants to pass its current scheduling context explicitly to another +thread if and only if both threads belong to the same process and CPU. +On reschedule, the context implicitly returns to the lending thread. +Additionally, a thread may request an explicit reschedule in order to +return a lent scheduling context obtained from another thread. + +The current solution enables Genode to use of NOVA's static priorities. + +Another unrelated NOVA extension is the ability for a thread to yield +the CPU. The context gets enqueued at the end of the run queue without +refreshing the left budget. + + +Build system and tools +###################### + +Build system +============ + +Sometimes software requires custom tools that are used to generate source +code or other ingredients for the build process, for example IDL compilers. +Such tools won't be executed on top of Genode but on the host platform +during the build process. Hence, they must be compiled with the tool chain +installed on the host, not the Genode tool chain. The Genode build system +received new support for building such host tools as a side effect of building +a library or a target. + +Even though it is possible to add the tool compilation step to a regular build +description file, it is recommended to introduce a dedicated pseudo library +for building such tools. +This way, the rules for building host tools are kept separate from rules that +refer to Genode programs. By convention, the pseudo library should be named +__host_tools_ and the host tools should be built at +_/tool//_. With __, we refer to the name of the +software package the tool belongs to, e.g., qt5 or mupdf. To build a tool +named __, the pseudo library contains a custom make rule like the +following: + +! $(BUILD_BASE_DIR)/tool//: +! $(MSG_BUILD)$(notdir $@) +! $(VERBOSE)mkdir -p $(dir $@) +! $(VERBOSE)...build commands... + +To let the build system trigger the rule, add the custom target to the +'HOST_TOOLS' variable: + +! HOST_TOOLS += $(BUILD_BASE_DIR)/tool// + +Once the pseudo library for building the host tools is in place, it can be +referenced by each target or library that relies on the respective tools via +the 'LIBS' declaration. The tool can be invoked by referring to +'$(BUILD_BASE_DIR)/tool//tool'. + +For an example of using custom host tools, please refer to the mupdf package +found within the libports repository. During the build of the mupdf library, +two custom tools fontdump and cmapdump are invoked. The tools are built via +the _lib/mk/mupdf_host_tools.mk_ library description file. The actual mupdf +library (_lib/mk/mupdf.mk_) has the pseudo library 'mupdf_host_tools' listed +in its 'LIBS' declaration and refers to the tools relative to +'$(BUILD_BASE_DIR)'. + + +Rump-kernel tools +================= + +During our work on porting the cryptographic-device driver to Genode, +we identified the need for tools to process block-device and +file-system images on our development machines. For this purpose, we +added the rumpkernel-based tools, which are used for preparing and +populating disk images as well as creating cgd(4)-based cryptographic +disk devices. + +The rump-tool chain can be built (similar to building GCC for Genode) +by executing _tool/tool_chain_rump build_. Afterwards, the tools can +be installed via _tool/tool_chain_rump install_ to the default install +location _/usr/local/genode-rump_. As mentioned in +[Block-level encryption using CGD], instead of using the tools +directly, we added the wrapper shell script _tool/rump_. + +