* JFrog is shutting down JCenter completely and it is not longer
available
* as very short-term solution switch nightly publishing to R3
Artifactory cache, which already has all necessary binaries downloaded
from JCenter previously
* add missing configuration for Develocity (formerly Gradle Enterprise)
for remote caches
* ENT-11728: Switched to LTS version of BC. Also removed PQC algos as not supported in LTS.
* ENT-11728: Removed the SPHINCS PQC algorithm.
* ENT-11728: Added dependency on bcutil to fix missing class error.
The `TransactionBuilder` has been updated to look for any missing dependencies to legacy contract attachments, in the same way it does for missing dependencies for CorDapps in the "cordapps" directory,
Since `TransactionBuilder` does verification on the `WireTransaction` and not a `SignedTransaction`, much of the verification logic in `SignedTransaction` had to moved to `WireTransaction` to allow the external verifier to be involved. The external verifier receives a `CoreTransaction` to verify instead of a `SignedTransaction`. `SignedTransaction.verify` does the signature checks first in-process, before then delegating the reset of the verification to the `CoreTransaction`.
A legacy contract dependency is defined as an attachment containing the missing class which isn't also a non-legacy Cordapp (i.e. a CorDapp which isn't in the "cordapp" directory).
The various crypto tests that were previously ignored have been re-enabled.
The abandoned i2p EdDSA library has been replaced with native support that was added in Java 15.
Java 17 (via the `SunEC` provider) does not support the secp256k1 curve (one of the two ECDSA curves supported in Corda). This would not normally have been an issue as secp256k1 is already taken care of by Bouncy Castle. However, this only works if the `Crypto` API is used or if `”BC”` is explicitly specified as the provider (e.g. `Signature.getInstance(“SHA256withECDSA”, “BC”)`). If no provider is specified, which is what is more common, and actually what the Java docs recommend, then this doesn’t work as the `SunEC` provider is selected. To resolve this, a custom provider was created, installed just in front of `SunEC`, which “augments” `SunEC` by delegating to Bouncy Castle if keys or parameters for secp256k1 are encountered.
`X509Utilities.createCertificate` now calls `X509Certificate.verify()` to verify the created certificate, rather than using the Bouncy Castle API. This is more representative of how certificates will be verified (e.g. during SSL handshake) and weeds out other issues (such as unsupported curve error for secp256k1).
`BCCryptoService` has been renamed to `DefaultCryptoService` as it no longer explicitly uses Bouncy Castle but rather uses the installed security providers. This was done to fix a failing test. Further, `BCCryptoService` was already relying on the installed providers in some places.
The hack to get Corda `SecureRandom` working was also resolved. Also, as an added bonus, tests which ignored `SPHINCS256_SHA256` have been reinstated.
Note, there is a slightly inconsistency between how EdDSA and ECDSA keys are handled (and also RSA). For the later, Bouncy Castle is preferred, and methods such as `toSupportedKey*` will convert any JDK class to Bouncy Castle. For EdDSA the preference is the JDK (`SunEC`). However, this is simply a continuation of the previous preference of the i2p library over Bouncy Castle.
The node now sends a transaction to the verifier if any of its attachments were compiled with Kotlin 1.2 (the net.corda.node.verification.external system property has been removed). It uses kotlinx-metadata to read the Kotlin metadata in the attachment to determine this. For now this scanning is done each time the attachment is loaded from the database.
The existing external verification integration tests were converted into smoke tests so that 4.11 nodes could be involved. This required various improvements to NodeProcess.Factory. A new JAVA_8_HOME environment variable, pointing to JDK 8, is required to run these tests.
There is still some follow-up work that needs to be done:
Sending transactions from a 4.11 node to a 4.12 node works, but not the other way round. A new WireTransaction component group needs to be introduced for storing 4.12 attachments so that they can be safely ignored by 4.11 nodes, and the 4.12 node needs to be able to load both 4.11 and 4.12 versions of the same contracts CorDapp so that they can be both attached to the transaction.
Even though attachments are cached when retrieved from the database, the Kotlin metadata version should be stored in the attachments db table, rather than being scanned each time.
Finally, VerificationService was refactored into NodeVerificationSupport and can be passed into SignedTransaction.verifyInternal, instead of needing the much heavier VerifyingServiceHub. This makes it easier for internal tools to verify transactions and spawn the verifier if necessary.
* ENT-11055: Basic external verification
Introduction of the external transaction verifier, a separate JVM process for verifying `SignedTransaction`s. The end goal is for this verifier to be built with Kotlin 1.2 so that it creates a compatible verification environment for transactions with 4.11 contracts. For now however the verifier is built against Kotlin 1.8, same as the node.
External verification is enabled when the the system property `net.corda.node.verification.external` is set to `true`. When enabled, all verification requests made via `SignedTransaction.verify` are sent to the external verifier, regardless of the transaction content. It will do the vast bulk of the verification and then send the result back, namely if an exception occurred. If it did, then it's re-thrown in the node.
The external verifier is a stateless process, with no connection to the node's database. All transaction resolution information needed to create the relevant ledger transaction object are made to the node, which waits in a loop servicing these requests until it receives the result. The verifier Jar is embedded in the Corda node Jar, and is extracted and run when needed for the first time. The node opens up a local port for the verifier to communicate with, which is specified to the verifier in the process command line. This all means there is no extra configuration or deployment required to support external verification.
The existing code had some initial attempts and abstractions to support a future external verification feature. However,
they were either incorrect or didn't quite fit. One such example was `TransactionVerifierService`. It incorrectly operated on the `LedgerTransaction` level, which doesn't work since the transaction needs to be first serialised. Instead a new abstraction, `VerificationSupport` has been introduced, which represents all the operations needed to resolve and verify a `SignedTransaction`, essentially replacing `ServicesForResolution` (a lot of the changes are due to this). The external verifier implements this with a simple RPC mechanism, whilst the node needed a new (internal) `ServiceHub` abstraction, `VerifyingServiceHub`. `ServicesForResolution` hasn't been deleted since it's public API, however all classes implementing it must also implement `VerifyingServiceHub`. This is possible to do without breaking compatibility since `ServicesForResolution` is annotated with `@DoNotImplement`.
Changes to `api-current.txt` were made due to the removal of `TransactionVerifierService`, which was clearly indicated as an internal class, and returning `TransactionBuilder.toLedgerTransactionWithContext` back to an internal method.
* Address review comments
* One bulk load states method
* Merge fix