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Docs: misc markup fixes to corda-bridge-component.rst
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Mike Hearn
Mike Hearn
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@ -5,10 +5,10 @@ Corda Bridge Component Overview
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Introduction
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------------
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The Corda ``bridge``/``float`` component is designed for enterprise deployments and acts as an application level
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The Corda bridge/float component is designed for enterprise deployments and acts as an application level
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firewall and protocol break on all internet facing endpoints. The ``corda-bridgeserver.jar`` encapsulates the peer
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network functionality of the basic Corda ``node``, so that this can be operated separately from the security sensitive
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JVM runtime of the ``node``. This gives separation of functionality and ensures that the legal identity keys are not
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network functionality of the basic Corda node, so that this can be operated separately from the security sensitive
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JVM runtime of the node. This gives separation of functionality and ensures that the legal identity keys are not
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used in the same process as the internet TLS connections. Also, it adds support for enterprise deployment requirements,
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such as High Availability (HA) and SOCKS proxy support.
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@ -16,108 +16,108 @@ This document is intended to provide an overview of the architecture and options
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Terminology
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-----------
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The component referred to here as the ``bridge`` is the library of code responsible for managing outgoing links to peer
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The component referred to here as the *bridge* is the library of code responsible for managing outgoing links to peer
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nodes and implements the AMQP 1.0 protocol over TLS 1.0 between peers to provide reliable flow message delivery. This
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component can be run as a simple integrated feature of the ``node``. However, for enhanced security and features on R3
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Enterprise Corda the in-node version should be turned off and a standalone and HA version can be run from the
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``corda-bridgeserver.jar``, possibly integrating with a SOCKS proxy too.
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component can be run as a simple integrated feature of the node. However, for enhanced security and features in Corda
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Enterprise, the in-node version should be turned off and a standalone and HA version can be run from the
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``corda-bridgeserver.jar``, possibly integrating with a SOCKS proxy.
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The ``float`` component refers to the inbound socket listener, packet filtering and DMZ compatible component. In the
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simple all-in-one ``node`` all inbound peer connections terminate directly onto an embedded Artemis broker component
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hosted within the ``node``. The connection authentication and packet the filtering is managed directly via Artemis
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permission controls managed directly inside the ``node`` JVM. For R3 Enterprise Corda deployments we provide a more
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The *float* component refers to the inbound socket listener, packet filtering and DMZ compatible component. In the
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simple all-in-one node all inbound peer connections terminate directly onto an embedded Artemis broker component
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hosted within the node. The connection authentication and packet the filtering is managed directly via Artemis
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permission controls managed directly inside the node JVM. For Corda Enterprise deployments we provide a more
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secure and configurable isolation component that is available using code inside ``corda-bridgeserver.jar``. This
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component is designed to provide a clear protocol break and thus prevents the ``node`` and Artemis server ever being
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directly exposed to peers. For simpler deployments with no DMZ the ``float`` and ``bridge`` logic can also be run as a
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single application behind the firewall, but still protecting the ``node`` and hosted Artemis. In future we may also host
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component is designed to provide a clear protocol break and thus prevents the node and Artemis server ever being
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directly exposed to peers. For simpler deployments with no DMZ the float and bridge logic can also be run as a
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single application behind the firewall, but still protecting the node and hosted Artemis. In future we may also host
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the Artemis server out of process and shared across nodes, but this will be transparent to peers as the interchange
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protocol will continue to be AMQP 1.0 over TLS.
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.. Note:: All deployment modes of the ``bridge``, ``float``, or all-in-one ``node`` are transparently interoperable, if correctly configured.
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.. Note:: All deployment modes of the bridge, float, or all-in-one node are transparently interoperable, if correctly configured.
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Message Path Between Peer Nodes
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-------------------------------
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When a flow within a ``node`` needs to send a message to a peer there is a carefully orchestrated sequence of steps to ensure
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When a flow within a node needs to send a message to a peer there is a carefully orchestrated sequence of steps to ensure
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correct secure routing based upon the network map information and to ensure safe, restartable delivery to the remote flow.
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Adding the ``bridge`` and ``float`` to this process adds some extra steps and security checking of the messages.
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Adding the bridge and float to this process adds some extra steps and security checking of the messages.
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The complete sequence is therefore:
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1. The flow calls ``send``, or ``sendAndReceive`` to propagate a message to a peer. This leads to checkpointing
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of the flow fiber within the ``StateMachine`` and posting the message to the internal ``MessagingService``. This ensures that
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the send activity will be retried if there are any errors before further durable transmission of the message.
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2. The ``MessagingService`` checks if this is a new destination ``node`` and if an existing out queue and bridge exists in Artemis.
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2. The ``MessagingService`` checks if this is a new destination node and if an existing out queue and bridge exists in Artemis.
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If the durable out queue does not exist then this will need to be created in Artemis:
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a. First the durable queue needs to be created in the peer-to-peer Artemis. Each queue is uniquely named based upon the hash of the
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legal identity ``PublicKey`` of the target ``node``.
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legal identity ``PublicKey`` of the target node.
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b. Once the queue creation is complete a bridge creation request is also published onto the Artemis bus via the bridge control protocol.
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This message uses information from the network map to link the out queue to the target host and port and TLS credentials.
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The flow does not need to wait for any response at this point and can carry on to send messages to the Artemis out queue.
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c. The message when received by the ``bridge`` process opens a TLS connection to the remote peer (optionally, this
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c. The message when received by the bridge process opens a TLS connection to the remote peer (optionally, this
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connection can be made via a SOCKS4/5 proxy). On connect the two ends of the TLS link exchange certificate details
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and confirm that the certificate path is anchored at the network root certificate and that the X500 subject matches
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the expected target as specified in the create bridge message using details contained in the network map.
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The links are long lived so as to reduce the setup cost of the P2P messaging.
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In future, there may also be DOS protection measures applied.
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In future, there may also be denial-of-service protection measures applied.
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d. If the outgoing TLS 1.2 link is created successfully then the ``bridge`` opens a consumer on the Artemis out queue.
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d. If the outgoing TLS 1.2 link is created successfully then the bridge opens a consumer on the Artemis out queue.
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The pending messages will then be transferred to the remote destination using AMQP 1.0, with final removal from the
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out queue only occurring when the remote end fully acknowledges safe message receipt. This ensures at least once
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delivery semantics.
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e. Note that at startup of either the ``node``, or the ``bridge`` the bridge control protocol resynchronises the bridging state,
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e. Note that at startup of either the node or the bridge, the bridge control protocol resynchronises the bridging state,
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so that all out queues have an active bridge.
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3. Assuming an out queue exists the message can be posted to Artemis and the ``bridge`` should eventually deliver this
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3. Assuming an out queue exists the message can be posted to Artemis and the bridge should eventually deliver this
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message to the remote system.
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4. On receipt of a message acknowledge from Artemis the ``StateMachine`` can continue flow if it is not awaiting a response
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i.e. a ``send`` operation. Otherwise it remains suspended waiting for the reply.
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5. The receiving end of the ``bridge`` TLS/AMQP 1.0 link might be the Artemis broker of a remote ``node``,
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but for now we assume it is an enterprise deployment that is using a ``float`` process running behind a firewall.
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The receiver will already have confirmed the validity of the TLS originator when it accepted the TLS handshake.
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However, the ``float`` does some further basic checking of received messages and their associated headers.
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5. The receiving end of the bridge TLS/AMQP 1.0 link might be the Artemis broker of a remote node,
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but for now we assume it is an enterprise deployment that is using a float process running behind a firewall.
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The receiver will already have confirmed the validity of the TLS originator when it accepted the TLS handshake.
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However, the float does some further basic checking of received messages and their associated headers.
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For instance the message must be targeted at an inbox address and must be below the network parameters defined ``maxMessageSize``.
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6. Having passed initial checks on the message the ``float`` bundles up the message and originator as a payload to be
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6. Having passed initial checks on the message the float bundles up the message and originator as a payload to be
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sent across the DMZ internal firewall. This inbound message path uses a separate AMQP 1.0/TLS control tunnel.
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(N.B. This link is initiated from the local master ``bridge`` in the trusted zone to the ``float`` in the DMZ. This allows a
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(N.B. This link is initiated from the local master bridge in the trusted zone to the float in the DMZ. This allows a
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simple firewall rule to be configured which blocks any attempts to probe the internal network from the DMZ.)
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Once the message is forwarded the ``float`` keeps track of the delivery acknowledgements,
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Once the message is forwarded the float keeps track of the delivery acknowledgements,
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so that the original sender will consume the message in the source queue, only on final delivery to the peer inbox.
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Any disconnections, or problems will send a reject status leading to redelivery from source.
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7. The ``bridge`` process having now received custody of the message does further checks that the message is good. At the
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7. The bridge process having now received custody of the message does further checks that the message is good. At the
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minute the checks are essentially of well formedness of the message and that the source and destination are valid.
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However, future enhancements may include deep inspection of the message payload for CorDapp blacklisting, and other purposes.
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Any problems and the message is acknowledged to prevent further redelivery, logged to audit and dropped.
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8. Assuming this is a normal message it is passed onto the Artemis inbox and on acknowledgment of delivery
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is cascaded back. Thus, Artemis acknowledgement, leads to acknowledgement of the tunnel AMQP packet,
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which acknowledges the AMQP back to the sending ``bridge`` and that finally marks the Artemis out queue item as consumed.
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which acknowledges the AMQP back to the sending bridge and that finally marks the Artemis out queue item as consumed.
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To prevent this leading to very slow one after the other message delivery the AMQP channels using sliding window flow control.
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(Currently, a practical default is set internally and the window size is not user configurable.)
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9. The ``MessagingService`` on the peer ``node`` will pick up the message from inbox on Artemis, carry out any necessary
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9. The ``MessagingService`` on the peer node will pick up the message from inbox on Artemis, carry out any necessary
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deduplication. This deduplication is needed as the distributed restartable logic of the Corda wire protocol only
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offers 'at least once' delivery guarantees.
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The resulting unique messages are then passed to the ``StateMachine`` so that the remote flow can be woken up.
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10. The reply messages use the authenticated originator flag attached by the ``float`` to route the replies back to the
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10. The reply messages use the authenticated originator flag attached by the float to route the replies back to the
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correct originator.
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.. Note:: That the message reply path is not via the inbound path, but instead is via a separately validated route
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from the local ``bridge`` to the original ``node``'s ``float`` and then on to the original ``node`` via Artemis.
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from the local bridge to the original node's float and then on to the original node via Artemis.
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Operating modes of the Bridge and Float
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---------------------------------------
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Embedded Developer Node (node + artemis + internal bridge, no float, no DMZ)
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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The simplest development deployment of the bridge is to just use the embedded Peer-to-Peer Artemis with the node as TLS endpoint
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and to have the outgoing packets use the internal bridge functionality. Typically this should only be used for easy development,
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@ -131,13 +131,13 @@ Node + Bridge (no float, no DMZ)
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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The next simplest deployment is to turn off the built in bridge using the ``externalBridge`` enterprise config property
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and to run a single combined ``bridge``/``float`` process. This might be suitable for a test environment, to conserve VM's.
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and to run a single combined bridge/float process. This might be suitable for a test environment, to conserve VM's.
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.. note:: Note that to run the ``bridge`` and the ``node`` on the same machine there could be a port conflict with a naive setup,
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.. note:: Note that to run the bridge and the node on the same machine there could be a port conflict with a naive setup,
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but by using the ``messagingServerAddress`` property to specify the bind address and port plus setting
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``messagingServerExternal = false``
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the embedded Artemis P2P broker can be set to listen on a different port rather than the advertised ``p2paddress`` port.
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Then configure an all-in-one ``bridge`` to point at this ``node``:
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Then configure an all-in-one bridge to point at this node:
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.. image:: resources/bridge/simple_bridge.png
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:scale: 100%
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@ -147,12 +147,12 @@ DMZ ready (node + bridge + float)
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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To familiarize oneself with the a more complete deployment including a DMZ and separated inbound and outbound paths
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the ``bridgeMode`` property in the ``bridge.conf`` should be set to ``BridgeInner`` for the ``bridge`` and
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``FloatOuter`` for the DMZ ``float``. The diagram below shows such a non-HA deployment. This would not be recommended
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the ``bridgeMode`` property in the ``bridge.conf`` should be set to ``BridgeInner`` for the bridge and
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``FloatOuter`` for the DMZ float. The diagram below shows such a non-HA deployment. This would not be recommended
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for production, unless used as part of a cold DR type standby.
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.. note:: Note that whilst the ``bridge`` needs access to the official TLS private
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key, the tunnel link should use a private set of link specific keys and certificates. The ``float`` will be provisioned
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.. note:: Note that whilst the bridge needs access to the official TLS private
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key, the tunnel link should use a private set of link specific keys and certificates. The float will be provisioned
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dynamically with the official TLS key when activated via the tunnel and this key will never be stored in the DMZ:
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.. image:: resources/bridge/bridge_and_float.png
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@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ DMZ ready with outbound SOCKS
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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Some organisations require dynamic outgoing connections to operate via a SOCKS proxy. The code supports this option
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by adding extra information to the ``outboundConfig`` section of the ``bridge`` process. An simplified example deployment is shown here
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by adding extra information to the ``outboundConfig`` section of the bridge process. An simplified example deployment is shown here
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to highlight the option:
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.. image:: resources/bridge/bridge_with_socks.png
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@ -173,12 +173,12 @@ to highlight the option:
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Full production HA DMZ ready mode (hot/cold node, hot/warm bridge)
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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Finally, we show a full HA solution as recommended for production. This does require adding an external ``Zookeeper``
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cluster to provide ``bridge`` master selection and extra instances of the ``bridge`` and ``float``. This allows
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hot-warm operation of all the ``bridge`` and ``float`` instances. The R3 enterprise Corda ``node`` should be run as hot-cold HA too.
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Finally, we show a full HA solution as recommended for production. This does require adding an external Zookeeper
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cluster to provide bridge master selection and extra instances of the bridge and float. This allows
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hot-warm operation of all the bridge and float instances. The Corda Enterprise node should be run as hot-cold HA too.
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Highlighted in the diagram is the addition of the ``haConfig`` section to point at ``zookeeper`` and also the use of secondary
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addresses in the ``alternateArtemisAddresses`` to allow ``node`` failover and in the ``floatAddresses`` to point at a
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pool of DMZ ``float`` processes.:
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addresses in the ``alternateArtemisAddresses`` to allow node failover and in the ``floatAddresses`` to point at a
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pool of DMZ float processes.:
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.. image:: resources/bridge/ha_bridge_float.png
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:scale: 100%
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